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Litigation Funding
I Introduction
A Origins of the legal regulation of litigation funding
[1] The funding of litigation has long attracted the attention of the law, both
in the form of statute and case law. Under the Statute of Westminster in 1275
Maintenance and Champerty were criminal offences and indeed remained so
until the Criminal Law Act 1967 when they were abolished both as crimes and
as torts. Section 14 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 preserves those doctrines in
the context of public policy and a contract offending that policy can be struck
down. For fuller treatment of maintenance and champerty see Division A.
B Legislative provision
[2] The Civil Justice Review in 1989 led to the legislative recognition of the
need to still further move away from the policy behind Maintenance and
Champerty. The statute which resulted was the Courts and Legal Services Act
1990 (CLSA 1990). The Act was brought into force by the implementation of
the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995 (CFA Regulations)1 and
the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 (CFA Order)2. The Act permitted
conditional fee agreements (CFAs) and in so doing permitted a solicitor to
make an agreement which effectively gave the solicitor a financial interest in
the success of the litigation. The 1995 Order restricted the use of a CFA to
personal injury, insolvency and European Court of Human Rights cases only.
This statutory regime also regulated the CFA itself. By the Conditional Fee
Agreements Order 19983 the range of specified proceedings to which the CLSA
1990 applied was extended to all proceedings. The Act itself excludes criminal
and family proceedings.
The CLSA 1990 was amended significantly by the Access to Justice Act 1999
(AJA 1999). The AJA 1999 effected the legislative changes by substituting
CLSA 1990, s 58 with wholly new wordings and by the insertion of ss 58A and
58B. The recoverability of the insurance premium is effected by the AJA 1999,
s 29. The major changes brought about by the AJA 1999 were:
(1) The recoverable success fee4 and insurance premium5.
(2) The removal of CFAs from the common law6.
(3) Extending CFAs to all proceedings for resolving disputes (and not just
court proceedings)7.
(4) Facilitating different forms of CFA with different conditions8.
(5) Litigation funding agreements9.
(6) The recoverability of costs by membership organisations10.
(7) Facilitating the abolition or partial abolition of the indemnity principle.
The provision for litigation funding agreements has yet to be commenced11.
The provision relating to the indemnity principle was commenced on 2 June
200312 and all other provisions were implemented from 1 April 2000.
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The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 200013 also came into force on
1 April 2000 and set out the requirements for an enforceable CFA14.
The Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 200015 came into
force on 30 November 200016. The CFA Regulations 2000 and the Collective
CFA Regulations 2000 were amended from 2 June 2003 to provide for a
simplified CFA and CCFA respectively17.
From 1 November 2005 the above regulations are revoked18. Other than for
membership organisations there are from 1 November 2005 no regulations to
govern CFAs19. The statutory regime therefore differs significantly according to
when the CFA in the matter was entered into. The revocation is not
retrospective. It is necessary as a result to consider separately CFAs made
before 1 April 2000, those made after that date including simplified CFAs and
finally with CFAs made on or after 1 November 2005.
Chronology of statutory provisions
1990
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58
CFAs to be allowed in personal injury cases
1993
Section 58 of the CLSA 1990 came into force 1 October 1993
1995
Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995
From 5 July 1995 permitted CFAs in personal injury cases. Regulations in
force until 1 April 2000.
1998
Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998
Repealed 1995 Order and permitted CFAs in all proceedings except
criminal and family proceedings
1999
Access to Justice Act 1999, s 27
Replaced s 58 of the 1990 Act with new ss 58 and 58A
2000
Section 27 of the AJA 1999 came into force on 1 April 2000
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 came into force on 1 April
2000
2005
Conditional Fee Agreements (Revocation) Regulations 2005 repealed the
2000 Regulations from 1 November 2005
1 See para [1031].
2 See para [1021].
3 See para [1041].
4 CLSA 1990, s 58A(6).
5 AJA 1999, s 29.
6 CLSA 1990, s 58(1).
7 CLSA 1990, s 58A(4).
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8 CLSA 1990, s 58A(3)(b).
9 CLSA 1990, s 58B.
10 AJA 1999, s 30.
11 CLSA 1990, s 58B.
12 AJA 1999, s 31, commenced by the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Commencement No 10) Order
2003, SI 2003/1241.
13 SI 2000/692.
14 See para [1051].
15 SI 2000/2988.
16 See para [1080].
17 Conditional Fee Agreement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1240.
18 Conditional Fee Agreements (Revocation) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2305, see para [1301].
19 Access to Justice (Membership Organisation) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2306, see para [1310].
C The modern common law
[3] During the same period in which the legislative changes were being made
the courts addressed the issues of public policy in the funding of litigation on
a number of occasions and with conflicting results. An early indication of
retreat from Maintenance and Champerty was given by a decision of the
House of Lords in the context of car hire. Here motorists whose cars were
damaged in accidents not their fault were provided with a hire car, the cost of
hire being sought not from the motorist but from the party at fault or their
insurer. Lord Mustill, in rejecting the argument that the arrangement was
unlawful as being champertous, said:
‘ . . . the balance of advantage is overwhelmingly in favour of those who receive
professional and financial assistance to recover a valid claim which would otherwise
go unsatisfied’1.
The decision of the House of Lords approved with a minor exception the
decision of the Court of Appeal where Stein LJ had reviewed the case law and
explained the public policy underlying Maintenance and Champerty. That
analysis is obiter on the law as it relates to conditional fee agreements which
were not the subject of that case.
The balancing of advantages and the consideration of competing public policy
interests led to major developments in the area of litigation funding but also to
differing judicial attitudes. In Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garret
(a firm)2 a retainer providing for a reduced fee where cases were lost was struck
down as being unlawful, notwithstanding the decision in Giles v Thompson3
and the passing of the CLSA 1990. It is to be noted that there was in this case
no uplift on ordinary fees in the event of success. Garland J reached the
following conclusions:
(1) A contingency fee which is contrary to public policy is not confined to
a direct or indirect share of the spoils but it includes a differential fee
dependent on the outcome of the litigation.
(2) Public policy has not been changed by the CLSA 1990 which in any
event is extremely limited in scope.
(3) The liberalisation of the law in relation to the assignment of choses in
action and the approach of the House of Lords to the allegedly
champertous agreement in Giles v Thompson4 have not modified or
cast any doubt upon public policy in relation to contingency fees which
is, at the end of the day, a rule of statute.
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1 Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321 at 361, HL.
2 [1995] 4 All ER 695, [1995] NLJR 1402.
3 [1994] 1 AC 142, [1993] 3 All ER 321.
4 [1994] 1 AC 142, [1993] 3 All ER 321.
[4] The provisions of the CLSA 1990 were not in force at the date of that
decision and in any event the class of work covered by the retainer did not
come within the 1995 Order. The clear basis of Garland J’s decision was that
public policy was still set against such arrangements.
Aratra Potato Co Ltd was overruled in the important decision of the Court of
Appeal in Thai Trading Co v Taylor1 where the direct question arose as to the
legality of a fee arrangement whereby the solicitor would seek payment from
his client only in the event of a successful outcome with an order for costs.
Millet LJ, as he then was, reached a conclusion which has since been subjected
to intense analysis and decisions which depart from it. In deciding that the fee
arrangement in Thai Trading was not unlawful the court made the following
points:
(1) Gundry v Sainsbury2 establishes the indemnity principle as being that a
successful party can only recover from the unsuccessful party such costs
as the successful party is legally liable to pay to his own solicitor.
(2) The client in this case, Mrs Taylor, was not going to pay her solicitor
unless she won.
(3) The trial judge had felt bound by British Waterways Board v Norman3
and Aratra Potato Co Ltd and so held the agreement on costs to be void
as being against public policy. Accordingly, under the indemnity
principle, the client had no legal obligation to pay her solicitor and thus
no costs were awarded.
(4) Section 59(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974 does not prohibit fee arrange-
ments of this type. The section merely provides that nothing in the Act
shall give validity to arrangements if they are otherwise unlawful – it
does not render unlawful and arrangement which is otherwise lawful.
(5) Although the arrangement would be contrary to the Solicitors Practice
Rules 1990, relying on Picton Jones & Co v Arcadia Develop-
ments Ltd4 that of itself does not make the practice unlawful.
(6) The Solicitors Practice Rules 1990 were in any event based upon a
perception of public policy which was now questioned.
(7) In a case where the solicitor is not to be paid more than the normal fee
if the case succeeds and no fee if he loses, the arrangement was probably
never contrary to public policy and should not be so regarded today.
(8) Rejecting British Waterways Board v Norman5 it is not improper for a
solicitor to agree to act on the basis that he is to be paid his ordinary
costs if he wins but not if he loses.
It is instructive to note Millet LJ’s treatment of the objections to agreements of
this kind:
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(1) Where the solicitor contracts for no more than his ordinary fee if he
wins there is nothing unlawful in the agreement to pay ordinary fees. If
there is anything unlawful it is the waiver or reduction of the fees if he
loses. The result of that unlawful aspect is not that the whole agreement
is unlawful. The client becomes liable to pay even where the case loses.
(2) There is a public interest and policy of making access to justice readily
accessible to persons of modest means. Legislation was needed to
authorise the increase in the lawyer’s reward over and above ordinary
costs. It by no means follows that it was needed to legitimise the
practice of acting for clients without means.
1 [1998] QB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65. Aratra was however referred to by Master O’Hare in
Tandara v Weightmans Solicitors [2008] EWHC 90101 (Costs) without reference to Thai
Trading which is itself doubted in Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm) [2001] QB 570, [2000]
1 All ER 608, CA: see para [6].
2 [1910] 1 KB 645, CA.
3 (1993) 26 HLR 232, [1993] NPC 143.
4 [1989] 1 EGLR 43, [1989] 03 EG 85.
5 (1993) 26 HLR 232, [1993] NPC 143.
[5] Before it was reported, Thai Trading was relied upon by Sir Richard
Scott V-C to approve a CFA which carried a success fee1. This was in the
context of arbitration proceedings which were omitted from the CLSA 1990.
The basis of this decision is that public policy changes over time and that
where an absurd result would be reached but for a change in policy then there
must be such a change. The absurd result was to hold unlawful in arbitration
proceedings a CFA with a success fee which fully complied with the CLSA
1990 and would thus be lawful in court proceedings. It is important to note
that the cause of action was within the class of case sanctioned by the CLSA
1990.
Thai Trading was the most far reaching decision in that it did not rely on the
CLSA 1990 either by requiring the CFA to comply with the Act’s demands nor
in it having to apply to a class of case sanctioned by the statute. The decision
was seen as a common law authority to enter into a CFA without complying
with the strictures of the CLSA 1990.
This breadth to the decision led to it being challenged. The Divisional Court
considered Thai Trading in a judgment given in November 1998 dealing with
a statutory nuisance case under the Environmental Protection Act 19902.
Heavy reliance is made here on the Solicitors Practice Rules which at the time
of Thai Trading prohibited agreements where by a solicitor is to be paid any
sum only in the event of success3. Although proceedings under the Environ-
mental Protection Act 1990 are criminal and therefore were not within the
specified proceedings of the CLSA 1990, Rose LJ did not base his decision on
that point. Thai Trading was held here to be contrary to the authority of the
House of Lords in Swain v Law Society4 on the ground that that decision
establishes that the Rules of Professional Conduct have the status of secondary
legislation. Arguments based on the public policy of Maintenance and
Champerty were rendered irrelevant given the fee agreement contravened the
Rules.
Swain v Law Society was not cited to the court in Thai Trading where
Millet LJ said that the contravention of a practice rule did not of itself result
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in a contravention of law. Swain was not cited to the court in Bevan Ashford
which relied upon Thai Trading. The practice rule point is not discussed in the
judgment in Bevan Ashford which is decided on the public policy point alone.
More recently the Court of Appeal in Garbutt v Edwards5 has considered the
status of rule 15 and the provision of costs estimates. It was argued that the
failure to give a costs estimate rendered the retainer unlawful. The court held
that although the rule had the force of subordinate legislation following Swain,
the Code issued under the Rule made provision for the exercise by the solicitor
of discretion. Accordingly it could not be said that all breaches of that
rule or Code rendered the retainer unenforceable. Garbutt does not therefore
alter the position with respect to Thai Trading.
1 Bevan Ashford (a firm) v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd (in liquidation) [1999] Ch 239,
[1998] 3 All ER 238.
2 Hughes v Kingston upon Hull City Council [1999] QB 1193, [1999] 2 All ER 49.
3 Solicitor’s Practice Rules 1990, rule 8 and see para [1253].
4 [1983] 1 AC 598, [1982] 2 All ER 827, HL.
5 [2005] EWCA Civ 1206, [2006] 1 All ER 553, [2006] 1 WLR 2907.
[6] Contravention of the Rules of Professional Conduct is then a separate
ground of attack on CFAs where for whatever reason the CLSA 1990 does not
apply. Further consideration of the status of those Rules has twice been given
by the Court of Appeal. In a case involving contravention of rule 3 concerning
introductions and referrals, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ held that the Rules
have the force of subordinate legislation with the effect that a contract
prohibited by the Rules was struck down1. In a further decision of the Court
of Appeal concerning an arrangement with a client of no means, this view of
the force of the Rules was reiterated by Scheimann LJ when considering
rule 82. The result here being that no fees were recovered because at the time
that the agreement was made rule 8 prohibited such agreements. The
legislative status of the Rules has taken over the role of Champerty and
Maintenance as the means to strike down funding arrangements between
solicitor and client and has led to the drawing of fine distinctions between
agreements with a client on the one hand and a mere intention not to charge
on the other. Kennedy LJ, who sat in Thai Trading, recently considered two
appeals from magistrates under the Environmental Protection Act 19903. In
the first appeal the solicitor knew that the client was in receipt of state benefit.
The magistrate found as a fact that there was an agreement to pay costs leaving
to the solicitor the decision as to whether to enforce that liability. That finding
was left in place by the Divisional Court. In the second appeal clients were in
receipt of income support and the finding of fact was that the solicitor had no
intention of enforcing the obligation to pay costs. Here Kennedy LJ held that
such intention did not mean there was an agreement and accordingly costs
were recoverable from the other side.
1 Mohamed v Alaga & Co (a firm) [1999] 3 All ER 699, [2000] 1 WLR 1815, CA.
2 Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm) [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608, CA.
3 Carr v Leeds City Council (1999) 32 HLR 753, [2000] COD 10, DC.
[7] On the facts of Thai Trading itself, Millet LJ had not agreed with the trial
judge’s view that there was an understanding between the client and solicitor
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that fees would not be sought in the event of a loss. Millet LJ took the view
that the client was legally liable to pay costs. On that basis and with the
analysis of Kennedy LJ from the Leeds cases it is possible to circumvent the
difficulty which is presented by the decision in Geraghty as to the status of the
Professional Rules. Where the facts do not clearly preclude it there can be a
finding that there is no agreement that costs will not be sought in the event of
a loss and accordingly no breach of the Rules. To the extent that Geraghty
disapproves of Thai Trading on this ground the result may not be far reaching.
However, the court in Geraghty was clearly critical of the Thai Trading
decision on the basis of the common law. It was not accepted that the common
law had moved beyond the statute in 1990 and indeed it was not accepted that
it had moved since. This is clearly a fundamental difference which could have
far reaching effect with regard to agreements made before Rule 8 was amended
where reliance was placed on the correctness of the decision in Thai Trading.
Thus where, as in Bevan Ashford, there is no factual basis for a decision that
there was no agreement, the agreement will be struck down as being both in
contravention of the Rules and as offending the common law of Maintenance
and Champerty. Millet LJ’s view that such an unlawful element to an
agreement does not render the whole agreement void and indeed leaves the
client liable to pay ordinary fees is clearly not followed by the court in
Geraghty or in Alaga.
[8] Rule 81 as it existed when the facts of all of these cases occurred,
emphatically prohibited any agreement where by a sum would be payable only
upon success. Following the decision in Thai Trading, Rule 8 was amended. As
of July 1999 the Rule permited any arrangement which statute or the common
law permits. At the time of the amendment this wording did not seem to beg
the question but following Geraghty the reference to the common law provides
no assistance. Accepting the correctness of the Geraghty view of the status of
Rule 8, that Rule cannot however change the common law and indeed it is
clear from the wording of the Rule that it is regarded as being subordinate to
the common law. An agreement made after the Rule change but which does
not comply with the statute can be lawful if, but only if, the common law
permits it. Geraghty is firm in deciding that the common law has not gone
further than the statute. The change in the Rules did not remove one of the
grounds of unlawfulness since there arises the then circular argument that if
the common law has not changed then the agreement is not permitted at
common law and accordingly it was a breach of Rule 8 in its revised wording.
Rule 8 was later replaced by Rule 2.04(1) of the Solicitors Regulation
Authority Code of Conduct when the SRA assumed responsibility for conduct.
1 See para [1251] ff.
Pre-litigation work
[9] The common law and professional rules discussed above have no appli-
cation outside of litigation. The Rule 8 of the Law Society Rules applies to
‘contentious business’ but not to non-contentious business. In Gaynor v
Central West London Buses Ltd1 an initial retainer letter provided for no
charge if the claim was disputed and not pursued. There was no subsequent
retainer or formal CFA but substantive proceedings issued and the case went
to detailed assessment with no new retainer. It was argued that this was
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contentious business and (an invalid) CFA. The Court of Appeal held that the
retainer was not a CFA. Only an agreement in respect of advocacy or litigation
services could be a CFA. The retainer in this case stated there would be no
charge for ‘work done to date’ if the client decided not to pursue her case. That
decision said the court had to be made before the issue of proceedings. It
followed that the retainer was not dealing with litigation or advocacy and was
not a CFA:
‘Advising a client as to whether he or she has a good prima facie case and writing
a letter of claim are not enough to amount to litigation services.’ [17]
The court did not address the issues that arise from the facts that proceedings
were issued and there was a detailed assessment without any further retainer.
There are difficult issues as to the status of the retainer post issue. The decision
appears to mean that there cannot be a CFA for covering pre-issue work only.
It was not argued that there can never be a CFA at such a stage where that
retainer extended beyond the pre-issue stage, merely that this retainer was not
a CFA. It is submitted that the decision does not affect the standard practice of
making a CFA that covers the case right to trial, including any pre-issue work.
The CPR makes provision for success fees where no proceedings have been
issued and the fixed recoverable costs regime also provides for success fees (and
therefore a CFA) for cases settled pre-issue.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1120, [2007] 1 All ER 84, [2007] 1 WLR 1045.
[10] The status of a Rule 15 letter was considered by the Court of Appeal in
Jones v Wrexham Borough Council1 in the context of a simplified CFA. The
Rule 15 letter enclosed an as yet unsigned CFA. The letter, but not the
subsequent CFA, made it clear that no fees or expenses would be payable
unless recovered from the opponent. The court repeatedly referred to the letter
to answer difficulties with the CFA wording and in so doing appears to
approve of the view taken by the district judge that the solicitors would be
estopped from proceeding against the client in a manner contrary to the letter.
It follows that had work been done before the CFA had been signed the Rule
15 letter would have bound the solicitor.
1 [2007] EWCA Civ 1356, [2008] 1 WLR 1590, (2008) Times, 21 January.
Continuing relevance of Thai Trading v Taylor
[11] It is likely that there are funding agreements made before 1 April 2000
where the litigation has yet to conclude and where disputes as to costs have yet
to arise. Where the funding agreement relates to the provision of litigation or
advocacy services as defined in the CLSA 1990, s 119 it will be enforceable if
it complies with s 58 of that Act as drafted and the Conditional Fee
Agreements Regulations 1995.
Regulation 2 provides:
‘An agreement shall not be a conditional fee agreement unless it complies with the
requirements of the following regulations.’1
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This provision in conjunction with s 58(1)(c) has the effect of removing the
statutory route to enforceability if the funding arrangement fails to comply
with the statute and the Regulations2.
1 SI 1995/1675, reg 2.
2 See further, para [151].
[12] Thai Trading1 involved a funding arrangement which could not comply
with the statutory scheme because at the time the nature of the proceedings
was not within those to which the statutory scheme applied. Bevan Ashford2
was outside of the statutory scheme because the scheme applied only to court
proceedings and not to arbitration. In each case the funding arrangement was
held to be enforceable at common law. In the case of court proceedings the
categories of case to which the statutory scheme applied was widened to all
civil actions other than family actions by the Conditional Fee Agreements
Order 19983 which came into force on 30 July 1998. From that date therefore,
it was possible to use the statutory scheme for all classes of litigation in the
courts. Arbitration was not, however, brought within the statutory scheme
until 1 April 2000 by the enactment of the AJA 1999, s 27 which inserted
s 58A into the CLSA 1990 to change the definition of proceedings to include
‘any sort of proceedings for resolving disputes (and not just proceedings in
court) . . . .’4. It follows that funding agreements relating to arbitration made
before 1 April 2000 cannot rely upon the statutory scheme for enforceability
where the agreement provides for payment of different fees in different
circumstances.
Thai Trading remains relevant therefore in cases where the funding agreement
was made before 30 July 1998 where the type of litigation was outside of the
statutory scheme and in arbitration cases where the funding agreement was
made before 1 April 2000. All of the difficulties dealt with above at paras [4]–[8]
arise in arbitration cases because the Court of Appeal in Bevan Ashford held
that arbitration was litigation with the result that Rule 8 of the Law Society
Rules applies to arbitration. The amended Rule 8, which came into force on
7 January 1999, provides the circular argument as to the position at common
law dealt with above at para 8. The CLSA 1990 seeks to govern the provision
of advocacy and litigation services where rights of audience are exercised. No
rights of audience are exercised in arbitration and but for the decision of the
court in Bevan Ashford that arbitration is litigation no difficulty at all would
arise. The definition of ‘proceedings’ given in the amended CLSA 1990 Act does
not sit well with the definitions of advocacy and litigation services in that Act.
As the law stands, however, arbitration is an area where, until relatively recently,
fee agreements amounting to a CFA were potentially unenforceable on the basis
of the disapproval of Thai Trading.
In Kellar v Williams5 the Privy Council referred to the judgment of Millett LJ
in Thai Trading in an appeal where it was argued that a funding agreement
between client and lawyer in Turks and Caicos constituted an unenforceable
CFA:
‘In approaching this issue their Lordships wish to make it plain that they are not to
be taken as accepting without question the traditional doctrine of the common law
that all such agreements are unenforceable on grounds of public policy. The content
of public policy can change over the years, and it may now be time to reconsider the
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accepted prohibition in the light of modern practising conditions. They would point
only to the views expressed by Millett LJ giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal
in Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781 and by May LJ in Awwad v Geraghty
& Co [2001] QB 570 at 600. For the purposes of the present appeal, however, their
Lordships propose, without deciding that issue, to consider the question argued
before them whether the respondent and his attorneys had entered into a conditional
fee agreement.’. At [21]
1 Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65.
2 Bevan Ashford (a firm) v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd (in liquidation) [1999] Ch 239,
[1998] 3 All ER 238.
3 SI 1998/1860.
4 CLSA 1990, s 58A(4).
5 [2004] UKPC 30, 148 Sol Jo LB 821, [2005] 4 Costs LR 559.
Costs agreements with impecunious clients
[13] The Federal Court of Australia referring to Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a
firm)1 has held that it does not reflect Australian law if it is taken to mean that
a solicitor cannot act for an impecunious client on the basis that normal fees
will be recovered if and only if a costs order is made in favour of the client2.
English law seems to have considerable difficulty in dealing with this everyday
reality – that a client is not going to be able to pay their own costs unless their
opponent is ordered to pay them.
1 [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608.
2 Schokker v Comr of Taxation of the Australia Commonwealth [2000] FCA 1734.
[14] In Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd1 the Court of Appeal referred to
Adams v London Improved Motorcoach Builders Ltd2 establishing that a
plaintiff whose litigation was in fact conducted by or under the instructions of
a trade union on his behalf was nevertheless entitled to costs on the basis that
although the solicitor was instructed by the union those instructions were
given on behalf of the plaintiff who remained liable for their costs, however
unlikely it was that he would ever have to pay them. The vital requirement is
that the client must be primarily liable for the payment of costs. This is made
clear in the more recent authority of Joyce v Kammac (1988) Ltd3 where
Morland J said:
‘The general principle is that a party in whose favour the order for costs was made,
the receiving party, is entitled to be indemnified in respect of such costs that he was
primarily and potentially legally obliged to pay his solicitors. It matters not whether
the receiving party was able or not to discharge that legal obligation, so long as the
primary potential legal obligation to his solicitors existed. It matters not whether the
receiving party was able to discharge that obligation from funds of his own or funds
provided by friends, family, trade union, employer, insurer or otherwise, so long as
the obligation was primarily his.’4
The need for a primary liability in the client rather than the funder has been
reaffirmed in the context of CCFAs5.
1 (1987) 132 Sol Jo 935, [1988] 3 LS Gaz R 33, CA; revsd [1990] 1 AC 398, [1988] 3 All ER
823, HL.
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2 [1921] 1 KB 495, CA.
3 [1996] 1 All ER 923, [1996] 1 WLR 805.
4 [1996] 1 All ER 923 at 928.
5 See Gliddon v Lloyd Maunder Ltd [2003] NLJR 318 , SCand Thornley v Lang [2003] EWCA
Civ 1484, [2004] 1 All ER 886, [2004] 1 WLR 378 – Newcastle Combined Court Centre
Claim No: NE 204504 considered at para [200.1].
[15] Impecunious clients must, therefore, have an arrangement which makes
them legally liable for costs. In British Waterways Board v Norman1, the
Divisional Court took the view that on the facts there must have been an
understanding between the solicitor and the client that the solicitor would not
seek costs from the client if the case lost. The outcome of such an agreement
was that even where the case succeeded there would be no costs recovered
either from the client or from the losing opponent. Such an arrangement failed
at the time to comply with the statutory scheme for CFAs (because that class
of litigation was not then included) and would in any event offend the
indemnity principle. There are then difficult questions of fact and fine
distinctions to be drawn as a result of this application of the indemnity
principle.
1 (1993) 26 HLR 232.
[15.1] The arrangements in Dix v Townend and Frizzell Financial Services1
were that there was a CFA under which the claimant’s solicitors undertook to
indemnify their client against adverse costs should the claim fail. That risk was
uninsured. The claim did not fail but the opponent then challenged the retainer
as being champertous. The challenge succeeded on the grounds of public
policy. The public policy behind the law of champerty was not confined to
cases where there was a division of the spoils but extended to any arrangement
that placed even a potential temptation in front of the solicitors to act under
the influence of their own risk of having to make substantial payments. A
different view of similar arrangements was taken by the Court of Appeal in
Sibthorpe v London Borough of Southwark2. These were housing disrepair
cases that had succeeded but the local authority challenged the validity of the
CFA on the basis of champerty because the solicitors had provided an
indemnity against adverse costs. The court held that the provision by the
solicitors of an indemnity for adverse costs was not champertous since the
modern case law on champerty suggested a restriction in the scope of the
doctrine rather than the necessary extension of it to cover cases where the
solicitor simply ran a risk of loss but with no prospect of a gain. The
arrangement was also held not to constitute insurance.
1 (SCCO CCD 0706942) [2008] EWHC 90117 (Costs).
2 [2011] EWCA Civ 25.
[16] The view given some approval in Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor1, that
an agreement to pay in the event of a win but not a loss did not offend the
indemnity principle in the event that the case wins, is difficult to support since
it requires the agreement to be looked at as two agreements rather than one
agreement as a whole. In Carr v Leeds City Council, Coles v Barnsley
Metropolitan Borough Council2 two appeals were heard together. In the Leeds
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case the client was in receipt of income support. Solicitors represented the
client had given her letters indicating that she would be liable for costs. The
council alleged that any such agreement was a sham on the basis that the
solicitors knew that the client would be unable to pay their costs and that they
never expected her to do so. Kennedy LJ held that the finding of fact by the
magistrate that there was a legally binding agreement under which the client
was liable to pay the costs was conclusive. It was a matter for the solicitors as
to whether they sought to enforce that liability. In the Barnsley case the clients
were again given letters making it clear that they had a liability for costs. The
clients were on income support. The magistrate found as a fact that the firm of
solicitors had never sought to enforce a costs liability against a client of this
type. Kennedy LJ held that a finding that the solicitors did not intend to pursue
their clients for costs was not determinative of the matter. There was not
sufficient basis for concluding that there was an agreement to receive a
contingency fee.
1 [1998] QGB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65.
2 (1999) 32 HLR 753, [2000] COD 10, DC.
[17] The decision in Adams1 was also relied upon by Lloyd J in R v Miller2
where it was held:
‘Costs are incurred by a party if he is responsible or liable for those costs, even
though they are in fact paid by a third party, whether an employer, insurance
company, motoring organisation or trade union, and even though the third party is
also liable for those costs. It is only if it has been agreed that the client shall in no
circumstances be liable for the costs that they cease to be costs incurred by him, as
happened in Gundry v Sainsbury.’34
That passage has been relied upon by a Divisional Court in R (on the
application of McCormick) v Liverpool City Magistrates’ Court5 in overturn-
ing a decision by a magistrates’ clerk to deny costs under the Prosecution of
Offences Act 1985 which had been reached on the basis that the client had no
means to pay their costs and accordingly had not been expected to pay them
notwithstanding a written agreement to pay them. Elias J held that the fact that
solicitors do not expect to recover costs in the absence of a defendant’s costs
order did not mean that there was no contractual liability on the part of the
client to pay the costs. A differently constituted Divisional Court considered
similar issues under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 in R (on the
application of Hazlett) v South Sefton Magistrates’ Court6 where there had
been a finding that the agreement between solicitor and client was a sham. The
Leeds and Barnsley7 cases were not referred to in the decision to overturn the
finding. Stanley Burton J dealt fully with the concept of a sham agreement
holding that for there to be a sham both parties must agree that their
agreement is to have no legal force and that it should be used to deceive. In
awarding costs reference was made to Millett LJ in Thai Trading8:
‘It is not uncommon for solicitors to take on a case for an impecunious client with
a meritorious case, knowing that there is no realistic prospect of recovering their
costs from the client if the case is lost, without thereby waiving their legal right to
their fees in that event. As every debt collector knows, what is legally recoverable
and what is recoverable in practice are not the same.’9
[16] Litigation Funding
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There remained from this series of cases the question of a CFA which seeks
only to impose a liability to pay if costs are recovered from an opponent. The
Senior Costs Judge held in The Accident Group Test Cases Tranche Two10 that
a CFA can validly define ‘win’ in terms of recovery of costs from an opponent:
‘There appears to be no reason why the circumstances specified should not be the
recovery of those costs and/or disbursements from the paying party.’. At 384
This would require a CFA compliant with the statutory scheme. From 2 June
2003 a simplified CFA11 has been permitted which limits the client’s liability to
sums recovered whether by way of costs or otherwise. Agreements which
provide for the client’s liability for own costs to depend upon recovering costs
can therefore be in the standard form of CFA or a simplified CFA. The CPR
199812 makes provision for the recovery of costs notwithstanding the limit on
the client’s liability. The CPR 1998 makes no such provision in respect of a
CFA entered in to before 2 June 200313. Here reliance must be placed on the
decision of the Senior Costs Judge in TAG Tranche Two referring to a draft of
changes to the CPR 199814:
‘This Rule is not yet in force. In my view, when it is in force it will not alter the law.
It will merely clarify it. In addition to the rule change, an amendment to the CFA
Regulations is envisaged which will make very much simpler the steps required to be
taken by a legal representative when entering into a CFA under which, in certain
circumstances, the client’s liability for fees and expenses is limited to costs recovered.
Also the amendment to Section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 by Section 31 of
the Access to Justice Act 1999 will be implemented. This also, in my judgment will
not alter the law. CFAs of all types have been regularly used and regularly upheld in
all courts, including the House of Lords, without this amendment being imple-
mented.’. At 385
A CFA which provides for a liability for own disbursements in any event and
for base costs only if recovered would be valid as a standard CFA. It is
submitted that such a CFA entered into after 2 June 2003 is within the terms
of the CPR 1998, r 43.2(3)15. It is less clear that such a CFA complies with the
requirements for a simplified CFA16.
1 Adams v London Improved Motorcoach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495.
2 [1983] 3 All ER 186, [1983] 1 WLR 1056, DC.
3 [1910] 1 KB 645.
4 [1983] 3 All ER 186 at 189.
5 [2001] 2 All ER 705.
6 [2001] EWHC Admin 791, [2001] All ER (D) 18 (Oct) – proceedings under the EPA 1990
were not within the statutory scheme for CFAs at the time of the agreement. From 1 April
2000 a CFA with a nil success fee can be entered into under which the client can agree not to
pay unless the case succeeds.
7 Carr v Leeds City Council, Coles v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council (1999) 32 HLR
753, [2000] COD 10, DC.
8 Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65.
9 [1998] 3 All ER 65 at 70.
10 [2003] EWHC 9020 (Costs).
11 Conditional Fee Agreement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/
1240 amending the CFA Regulations 2000, see para [31].
12 CPR 1998, r 43.2 provides:
‘(3) Where advocacy or litigation services are provided to a client under a conditional fee
agreement, costs are recoverable under Parts 44 to 48 notwithstanding that the client
is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and expenses only to the extent that sums
are recovered in respect of the litigation, whether by way of costs or otherwise.’
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13 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1242, r 6 (making transitional
provision).
14 SI 1998/3132.
15 See fn 13.
16 See paras [31]–[33].
Non-legal representative third party funders
[18] Much of the law concerning maintenance and champerty and the whole
of the law relating to CFAs is concerned with legal representatives who provide
services which in effect amount to the funding of the litigation. Where the third
party funding comes from a source other than a legal representative, mainte-
nance and champerty can still cause difficulties. In such cases the issue is most
commonly encountered under the jurisdiction to order costs against a third
party under the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 51. The Court of Appeal has
recently considered again the basis for making a costs order where the
competing principles are access to justice for the funded party and recovery of
costs by the successful unfunded party. In Hamilton v Al Fayed1 the Court of
Appeal declared that the balance of interest lay with access to justice:
‘the pure funding of litigation (whether of claims or defences) ought generally to be
regarded as being in the public interest providing only and always that its essential
motivation is to enable the party funded to litigate what the funders perceive to be
a genuine case.’2
The conclusion reached was that ‘pure funders’ are generally exempt from
third-party costs orders:
‘There is in short nothing in the facts of this case to take it out of the general
principle which for my part I would lay down: that pure funders generally are
exempt from section 51 liability.’3
In R (on the application of Factortame) v Secretary of State for Transport,
Environment and the Regions (No 2)4 accountancy services provided in
support of litigation but falling short of the provision of expert witnesses were
not provided under a champertous agreement where the services were to be
paid for by a percentage of recoveries. The question of the liability of the
provider of these services for opponent’s costs did not arise.
Where costs negotiators were to be paid according to sums saved in costs that
the insurer would otherwise have paid to claimants the negotiators were
refused rights of audience in costs proceedings on the grounds that the
agreement was champertous5.
The Senior Costs Judge rejected arguments based on maintenance and
champerty in RSA Pursuit Test Cases6. Here the premium for an after the event
insurance policy was payable only if the case succeeded. It was held that
following Factortame there was no agreement to share in the ‘proceeds of
litigation’. That phrase meant primarily damages and an insurance premium
even though only payable in the event that the litigation was successful did not
constitute ‘proceeds of litigation’.
Recent case law also establishes the legitimacy of commercial funders of
litigation who either have a direct interest in the outcome or have provided
funding on the basis of a share of proceeds in the event of success. Such funders
will have a liability for the costs of opponents in the event that the litigation
fails.
[17] Litigation Funding
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In CIBC Mellon Trust Company v Stolzenberg7 the 75% shareholder in two
companies who were unsuccessful in set aside proceedings was held liable for
the costs of the opponents to the set aside proceedings. The shareholder had
funded the proceedings in his own interests. The Court of Appeal held there
was no reason in principle why a non-director shareholder who funded,
controlled and directed litigation by the company in order to protect his own
financial interest should not be the subject of a costs order. Such a shareholder
was in no different position to any third party who chose for his own purposes
to fund and control litigation. In Goodwood Recoveries Ltd v Breen8. A
company director, described by the trial judge as having played the parts of
director, shareholder, company secretary, solicitor and investigator and only
witness for the claimant, failed in the Court of Appeal to overturn a third party
costs order against him as none of the costs of the litigation would have been
incurred but for his third party involvement, and they had been caused by his
dishonesty or impropriety. That was irrespective of whether he had any bona
fide belief in the claim.
In Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd the Privy Council,
hearing an appeal from the New Zealand Court of Appeal, held that costs
orders against non-parties were to be regarded as ‘exceptional’ but that
exceptional in this context means no more than outside the ordinary run of
cases where parties pursued or defended claims for their own benefit and at
their own expense. Where, however, the non-party not merely funds the
proceedings but substantially also controls or at any rate is to benefit from
them, justice will ordinarily require that, if the proceedings fail, he will pay the
successful party’s costs.
The English Court of Appeal following Dymocks9 considered in Arkin v
Borchard Lines Ltd10 the position of a professional commercial funder of
litigation which had agreed to fund expert evidence and document manage-
ment on a contingency basis. It was held that a professional funder who
finances part of the costs of litigation should potentially have a liability for the
costs of the opponent to the extent of the funding it has provided. Similarly the
Federal Court of Australia held in Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corpn Ltd11
that the fact that litigation was being supported by a commercial funder was
not grounds for staying the proceedings as being unlawfully maintained.
Whether proceedings are maintained, and the separate question whether such
maintenance poses a potential risk to the court’s processes so as to justify a
stay, turn on the terms and conditions upon which the funding is provided.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 665, [2003] QB 1175, [2002] 3 All ER 641.
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at para [47].
3 [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at para [51].
4 [2002] EWCA Civ 932, [2003] QB 381, [2002] 4 All ER 97.
5 Ahmed v Powell (SCCO Ref 0210290) [2003] EWHC 9011 (Costs).
6 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
7 [2005] EWCA Civ 628, [2005] 2 BCLC 618, (2005) Times, 8 June.
8 [2005] EWCA Civ 414, [2006] 2 All ER 533, [2006] 1 WLR 2723.
9 [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 4 All ER 195, [2004] 1 WLR 2807.
10 [2005] EWCA Civ 655, [2005] 3 All ER 613, [2005] 1 WLR 3055.
11 [2005] FCA 455.
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II Conditional fee agreements after 1 April 2000 and
before 1 November 2005
A Statutory definition
[19] CLSA 1990, s 58(2)(a) (as substituted by the AJA 1999, s 27):
‘a conditional fee agreement is an agreement with a person providing advocacy or
litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or any part of them, to
be payable only in specified circumstances.’
This wording came into force on 1 April 2000 when the AJA 1999, s 27
replaced the whole of s 58 as originally worded. From the same date a new
section, s 58A1, added by the AJA 1999, s 27, also came into force. The CFA
Regulations 2000 were amended from 2 June 20032 to provide for a simplified
version of CFA alongside the standard version of the original regulations. The
statutory regime differs significantly according to when the first CFA in the
matter was entered into. It is necessary as a result to deal separately with CFAs
made before 1 April 2000, those made after that date and with simplified
CFAs.
1 See para [1003].
2 For simplified CFAs, see para [31].
[20] ‘Advocacy and litigation services’ are defined in the CLSA 1990, s 119 as
follows:
‘ “advocacy services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a
person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right of audience in relation
to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide;
. . .
“litigation services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a
person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right to conduct litigation
in relation to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide; . . . ’
In R (on the application of Factortame) v Secretary of State for Transport,
Environment and the Regions (No 2)1 the Court of Appeal rejected the
argument that services provided by a firm of accountants in support of
litigation fell within this definition and accordingly held that the contingency
fee agreement between the accountancy firm and the litigant was not governed
by s 58. Accountancy expert witnesses were not included in that agreement
and the court expressed disapproval were any such arrangement to be made.
‘Proceedings’ for the purposes of the above definitions is itself defined in the
CLSA 1990, s 58A(4) as inserted by the AJA 1999, s 27:
‘In section 58 and this section (and in the definitions of “advocacy services” and
“litigation services” as they apply for their purposes) “proceedings” includes any
sort of proceedings for resolving disputes (and not just proceedings in court),
whether commenced or contemplated.’
It is difficult to interpret the references to the exercise of rights contained
within these definitions. The definition of ‘proceedings’ seems redundant given
that rights of audience are confined to court proceedings. It is arguable that no
[18] Litigation Funding
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rights are exercised for example in arbitrations and that accordingly the CLSA
1990, both as originally worded and as amended, has no application. In
Ahmed v Powell2 the Chief Costs Judge held in answer to preliminary issue
that an arrangement between an insurance company and a firm of costs
negotiators was champertous. Under the agreement the costs negotiators were
to be paid according to sums saved in costs that the insurer would otherwise
have paid to claimants. The negotiators sought rights of audience in costs
proceedings. It was held that no right of audience had arisen through the
solicitors acting for the insurer since instructions had not been given by the
solicitors but by the insurer. The court would not at its discretion grant a right
of audience because of the champertous arrangement.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 932, [2003] QB 381, [2002] 4 All ER 97. See also Dal-Sterling Group plc
v WSP South & West Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 228 (Jul) – where a contingency agreement with
claims consultants who assisted in preparing a case for litigation was held to not be
champertous.
2 (SCCO Ref 0210290) [2003] EWHC 9011 (Costs).
[21] Any fee agreement which falls within this statutory definition must
comply with the further provisions of the CLSA 1990 as amended and must
comply with the CFA Regulations 2000 or the Collective CFA Regulations
2000 made under the authority of the CLSA 19901. The CLSA 1990 and the
CFA Regulations 2000 constitute the statutory scheme. The effect of failing so
to comply is laid down in the CLSA 1990, s 58(1) (as substituted by the AJA
1999, s 27):
‘A Conditional Fee Agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by
virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a
conditional fee agreement; but (subject to subsection (5)2 any other conditional fee
agreement shall be unenforceable.’
The underlined words did not appear in the original wording of the Act but
were added by s 27 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and are clearly designed
to bring litigation funding under the exclusive control of the statute3.
1 CLSA 1990, s 58(3), as substituted. The CFA Regulations 2000 and Collective CFA
Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2988 were amended from 2 June 2003 to provide for a simplified
CFA and CCFA – see paras [31] and [199.1] and see the Conditional Fee Agreement
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1240.
2 ‘(5) If a conditional fee agreement is an agreement to which s 57 of the Solicitors Act 1974
(non-contentious business agreements between solicitor and client) applies, subsection (1) shall
not make it unenforceable.’ (CLSA 1990, s 58(5)).
This is a curious provision. Section 58 as originally worded expressly excluded from the
definition of Conditional Fee Agreements a contentious business agreement as defined in the
Solicitors Act 1974, s 59. That reference does not appear in the wording of s 58 substituted
by the AJA 1999, s 27. The substituted wording appears to provide that an agreement
concerning non-contentious business is not governed by a statute concerned with contentious
proceedings. As to contentious business governed by a contentious business agreement, it seems
that the effect of the substituted wording is that such an agreement, if it provides for payment
only in specified circumstances, must comply with of the CLSA 1990, s 58 as well as the
Solicitors Act 1974, s 59. A CFA is itself a contentious business agreement (Hollins v Russell
[2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.)
3 See further: Unenforceable CFAs, see para [151].
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[22] The intricacies of the common law decisions dealt with in Part I have no
application to any funding agreement made after 1 April 2000. The clear effect
of s 58(1) (para [21]) is that to be enforceable, all CFAs made after that date
must comply with the statutory scheme1.
A CFA with a success fee is defined in s 58(2)(b) as one which provides:
‘ . . . for the amount of any fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified
circumstances, above the amount which would be payable if it were not payable
only in specified circumstances’2.
In Crook v Birmingham City Council3, clients were offered a discounted rate
by way of a cap of £1,000. Irwin J held that there was no success fee in such
an arrangement but a discount from the ‘normal fee’, and that it could be
argued in every case that the reduced level of fees – which will often be nil –
represents what the market will bear and therefore the increment represents
the success fee. This argument, he said, would obliterate the distinction normal
in conditional fee agreements between the ‘base fee’ and the ‘success fee’.
The Court of Appeal in Gloucester County Council v Evans4 held that a CCFA
providing for an hourly rate of £95 irrespective of outcome with a rate of £145
for a win did not amount to a success fee. The CCFA referred to the higher
figure as base costs and to the lower figure as discounted charges. A success fee
was then applied in the agreement only to the base charges. The court accepted
that the success fee only applied to the higher figure and rejected the argument
that it was in reality an uplift on £95 and therefore in excess of 100%. The
court also rejected the argument that the costs at risk were £50 and that the
percentage uplift ought to be measured against that giving a figure of 290%:
‘Applying the language of section 58(4)(b) to the present case, I consider that the
Agreement states 100% as the percentage by which the amount of the fees which
would be payable if it were not a CFA (£145 per hour) is to be increased. The
Agreement provides for basic charges of £145 per hour. That is the amount of the
fees that would be payable if the Agreement were not a CFA.’ [24]
1 Compliance with the statutory scheme was considered by the Court of Appeal in Hollins v
Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487, see para [151].
2 See para [1002].
3 [2007] EWHC 1415 (Admin), [2007] NLJR 939, [2007] 5 Costs LR 732.
4 [2008] EWCA Civ 21, [2008] 1 WLR 1883, [2008] NLJR 219.
Meaning of ‘proceedings’
[23] For the purposes of the statutory scheme, s 58A(4)1 defines proceedings
to include ‘any sort of proceedings for resolving disputes (and not just
proceedings in a court), whether commenced or contemplated’.
Arbitration proceedings have been held to be litigation2 and are clearly now
within the statutory scheme having been omitted in 1990. As to the inclusion
of contemplated proceedings in the definition of ‘proceedings’ this can be taken
to be an expressed avoidance of doubt that where no proceedings have been
issued nonetheless the fee agreement is within the statute with all that follows
from that (in particular the provisions relating to recovery additional
liabilities). It could be argued, given the definition of proceedings is so wide,
[22] Litigation Funding
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that the distinction between contentious and non-contentious business has
been removed and that any fee agreement concerned with ‘contemplated
proceedings’ is governed by s 58. If that interpretation is correct, the practice
of treating potential litigious claims as non-contentious unless proceedings are
issued, would be unsuccessful. Such an argument returns, however, to the point
concerning the exercise of rights upon which s 58 appears to depend.
Where no right to provide advocacy or litigation services is being exercised in
respect of contemplated proceedings, the statutory scheme need not be
complied with. On this basis it is widely accepted (though not without
criticism) that Employment Tribunal cases are not governed by the statutory
scheme. An agreement to fund work up to but not including the exercise of
rights to provide advocacy or litigation services would thus not need to comply
with the statutory scheme whatever the nature of the contemplated proceed-
ings may be3. This is to treat the work as non-contentious business. If it
becomes necessary to issue proceedings, possibly even if only costs only
proceedings, it seems that the whole of the work done will be regarded as
contentious business following Re Simpkin Marshall Ltd4. If the whole of the
work is contentious business then Rule 8 of the Solicitors Practice Rules 1990
had the effect of requiring a statutory CFA to cover the whole of the work.
In Crosbie v Munroe5 Brooke LJ in an obiter statement said in the context of
the Protocols Practice Direction that the dealings between the parties which
lead up to the disposal of a clinical negligence claim are to be treated as
‘proceedings’ for the purposes of that Practice Direction even if the dispute is
settled without the need to issue a claim form.
In Gaynor v Central West London Buses Ltd6 the Court of Appeal held that
a retainer letter, covering advice to a claimant before it was known whether the
defendant would dispute the claim, was not a retainer in respect of advocacy
and litigation services. As to ‘contemplated proceedings’ there had to be a real
likelihood that proceedings would be issued and until the defendant disputed
the claim it was not possible to say that proceedings were contemplated. The
decision in Roche v Newbury Homes Ltd7 was that a CFA in Law Society
Model terms did not cover a pre-action application for disclosure. That said
the court was pre-action and not action. The Model refers to “Your claim
. . . ” and said the court that must mean a substantive claim and not any
pre-action matter. The Law Society Model has not changed on this point so
seemingly all pre-action work in all cases would fail to be covered – a most
astonishing result given the vast majority of personal injury claims settle before
issue.
1 See para [1003].
2 Bevan Ashford (a firm) v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd (in liquidation) [1999] Ch 239,
[1998] 3 All ER 238. See para [20] for the argument that arbitration does not involve advocacy
or litigation services.
3 See further Division L.
4 [1959] Ch 229, [1958] 3 All ER 611.
5 [2003] EWCA Civ 350, [2003] 2 All ER 856, [2003] 1 WLR 2033.
6 [2006] EWCA Civ 1120, [2007] 1 All ER 84, [2007] 1 WLR 1045 and see paras [9]–[10].
7 [2009] EW Misc 3 (EWCC).
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Excluded proceedings
[24] Section 58A1 lists proceedings which cannot be the subject of a condi-
tional fee agreement:
(a) criminal proceedings [except s 82 Environmental Protection Act 1990];
and
(b) family proceedings2.
1 See para [1003].
2 Defined in s 58A(2) as proceedings under one or more of the following:
(a) the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;
(b) the Adoption Act 1976;
(c) the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978;
(d) Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1978;
(e) Parts I, II and IV of the Children Act 1989;
(f) Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996; and
(g) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to children.
B The statutory scheme
[25] The hierarchy of statutory provisions which must be complied with –
Provision In force Effect
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as
amended by the Access to Justice Act 1999
1 April
2000
CFA validity
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
2000
1 April
2000
Standard CFA
validity
Conditional Fee Agreement (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Regulations 2003
2 June
2003
Simplified
CFA validity
Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules
2000
3 July 2000 Costs
recoverability
Practice Direction About Costs 3 July 2000 Costs
recoverability
Protocols Practice Direction1 3 July 2000 Costs
recoverability
The effect of the CLSA 1990, s 58(1) and (3)(c)2 is that a CFA entered into after
1 April 2000 is unenforceable if it fails to comply3 with the provisions of the
Act or Regulations. Failure to observe the CPR 1998, the Practice Direction
and when provided, the Protocol, has the usual effect under the CPR 1998 that
the recoverable costs will be at the discretion of the court. Additionally regard
must be had to CPR 44.3B(c) which provides that a party may not recover as
an additional liability:
‘(c) any additional liability for any period in the proceedings during which he
failed to provide information about a funding arrangement in accordance
with a rule, practice direction or court order; . . . ’
The application of this rule to success fees appears straight forward because
base costs for any given period of time will be known and the success fee can
be dis-applied for those costs. Where the additional liability is an insurance
premium the exercise is less easy and it appears that rule 44.3B(c) does not
allow for a percentage reduction representing the percentage of the entire time
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taken in the case during which the failure occurred. In Wooldridge v Hayes4 it
was held that in the case of an insurance premium it was the full premium that
fell within CPR 44.3B since it does not accrue (unlike a success fee) on a daily
basis. Relief from sanction was granted. Were such a deduction to be made it
is likely that the client will look to the solicitor to make good the shortfall.
From 1 October 2009 the words “Unless a court orders otherwise” are
inserted into CPR 44.3B(1) and a new paragraph (e) is added disallowing an
entire insurance premium where the receiving party has failed to provide the
specified information about an insurance policy in the time provided for in a
rule, practice direction or court order. CPR 44(3)(e) reads as follows:
“(e) any insurance premium where that party has failed to provide information
about the insurance policy in question by the time required by a rule, practice
direction or court order.”
1 The Protocols Practice Direction provides at para 4A1: ‘Where a person enters into a funding
arrangement within the meaning of rule 43.2(1)(k) he should inform other potential parties
tothe claim that he has done so.’ See para [73]. From 1 October 2009 the Practice Direction
(Pre-Action Conduct) replaces the Protocols Practice Direction and provides that a party must
inform the other parties about a funding arrangement as soon as possible and in any event either
within 7 days of entering into the funding arrangement concerned or, where a claimant enters
into a funding arrangement before sending a letter before claim, in the letter before claim. For
relief from sanction for failure to give notice, see para [74].
2 See para [1002].
3 The effect of failure to comply with the statutory regime is governed by the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR
2487, see para [152.1].
4 (SCCO Case No 0100072) [2005] EWHC 90007 (Costs).
The validity provisions – standard CFA
[26] A standard1 CFA2 between a client and legal representative, with or
without a success fee:
(1) Must be in writing3.
(2) Must specify:
(a) the proceedings or part of them to which it relates (reg 2(1)(a));
(b) the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and
expenses or part of them are payable;
(c) what payment, if any, is due if those circumstances only partly
occur (reg 2(1)(c));
(d) what payment, if any, is due irrespective of whether those
circumstances occur (reg 2(1)(c));
(e) what payment, if any, is due when the agreement ends for any
reason (reg 2(1)(c));
(f) the amount payable in the specified circumstances or the method
of calculation (reg 2(1)(d)); and
(g) whether the amount payable is limited by reference to damages
(reg 2(1)(d)).
(3) Must state that before making the agreement the matters required by
reg 4 to be explained verbally and in writing were so explained
(reg 2(2)).
(4) Must be signed by the client and the legal representative (reg 5(1)).
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [26]
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Paragraph (a) caused difficulty in Roche v Newbury Homes (see para [23] with
respect to pre-action work). In Blair v Danesh4 the CFA referred to a claim for
refund of monies given under undue influence but four years later the action
ranged widely. Costs were awarded for the successful undue influence claim but
it was argued that the CFA was invalid because the proceedings as they turned
out were not specified. The Court of Appeal refused leave on that point
seemingly because the costs had only been awarded for undue influence and the
consumer protection purpose of the Regulations had been satisfied. The Law
Society Model CFA includes an appeal brought against the client. The Court
of Appeal in Bexbes LLP v Beer5 where Bexbes had given notice before trial of
funding by means of a conditional fee under a CFA which provided for a success
fee was required to consider whether notice of the CFA had been given in
relation to the appeal. It was held that there was no separate requirement for
giving notice of a CFA in an appeal and opponents and advisers should know
that a standard CFA would continue if the opponent brings an appeal.
Paragraph (b) is usually satisfied by a definition of “win”. In Hanley v Smith
and MIB6 the CFA was made two years after a standard retainer and by then
the first defendant had admitted liability albeit not its extent. It was argued that
the definition of win in the Law Society model had already been satisfied. That
argument failed with the court holding that the claim against the MIB was an
essential ingredient of the claim, a reasonable person would have understood
that the central purpose of the litigation would not be satisfied merely by
obtaining a worthless (but necessary) judgment against the driver.
1 ‘Standard’ is used to differentiate from a ‘simplified’ CFA made under the provisions added by
the Conditional Fee Agreement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI
2003/1240, see para [31].
2 References to regs are to the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692. For
collective CFAs, see paras [193] to [200].
3 CLSA 1990, s 58(3)(a).
4 [2009] EWCA Civ 516.
5 [2009] EWCA Civ 628, [2009] All ER (D) 273 (Jun).
6 [2009] EWHC 90144 (Costs).
[27] A standard CFA between a client and a legal representative which has a
success fee must, in addition to the above:
(a) briefly specify the reasons for setting the percentage increase1
(reg 3(1)(a));
(b) specify the percentage increase (if any) by which the amount of the fees
which would be payable if it were not a CFA is to be increased2; and
(c) specify how much of the percentage increase, if any, relates to the cost
of waiting for payment (reg 3(1)(b)).
1 The percentage increase is limited to 100% in all cases except under the Environmental
Protection Act 1990, s 82 where there can be no success fee – Conditional Fee Agreements
Order 2000, SI 2000/823.
2 CLSA 1990, s 58(4)(b).
[28] Where the CFA with success fee relates to court proceedings it must:
[26] Litigation Funding
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(a) provide that where costs are assessed, the legal representative may
disclose to the court or any other person the reasons for setting the
percentage increase (reg 3(2)(a));
(b) provide that if on assessment the percentage increase is reduced as being
unreasonable, the amount disallowed ceases to be payable unless the
court permits it to remain payable (reg 3(2)(b)); and
(c) provide that where there is no assessment but the legal representative
agrees with any person liable to pay the success fee that the percentage
will be reduced, the amount due under the CFA will be r1‘educed by
that amount and cease to be payable unless the court is satisfied that the
full amount should be payable (reg 3(2)(c)).
Information to be given before a standard CFA, with or without a success
fee, is made
[29] Regulation 4 of the CFA Regulations 20001 provides a list of information
and specifies the form in which it has to be given. The information must be
given to the client by the legal representative defined in reg 1(3) as:
‘the person providing the advocacy or litigation services to which the conditional fee
agreement relates’.
The use of the word ‘person’ is difficult in these circumstances since it might
be expected that the information could be provided on behalf of the firm of
solicitors which is providing the services. In Hollins v Russell2 the Court of
Appeal held that compliance with reg 4 can be delegated to a non-legally
qualified agent, subject to the necessary level of supervision being in place. The
court gave no guidance as to the level or manner of supervision:
‘ . . . it will be in theory permissible for a solicitors’ firm to delegate the
performance of its regulation 4 duties to an organisation like TAG, and for TAG to
sub-delegate to its representatives, provided that in so doing the solicitor is not
abandoning the supervisory responsibilities required of him by Practice Rule 3.07
and the Guide to Professional Conduct. Whether the TAG scheme can and does
provide properly for this is a matter for the fact-finding trial.’. At 216
The information to be given:
(1) When will the client have to pay their own costs.
(2) When and how the client can seek assessment of those costs.
(3) Whether the client is already insured against any costs liability likely to
arise.
(4) How else those costs might be financed in this case.
(5) Whether the solicitor thinks a particular method(s) of financing costs is
appropriate.
(6) The reasons for recommending insurance or a particular insurance as a
method.
(7) Any interest the solicitor has in recommending insurance.
1 See para [1051].
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
[29.1] In Samonini v London General Transport Services Ltd1 a claims
management company (CMC) referred the claimant to a solicitor on the basis
that the claimant did not have existing legal expenses insurance The CMC had
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [29.1]
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not enquired sufficiently because it had asked only about the claimant’s motor
insurance. The solicitor had not carried out an enquiry independent of the
CMC. The Senior Costs Judge concluded that although it may be possible to
delegate the reg 4 responsibility it had not in any event been discharged.
The county court in English v Clipson2 held that where a client was already
committed to an ATE insurer at the time of first instructing a solicitor, the
solicitor was not relieved from giving advice under the CFA Regulations 2000.
The view then taken was that there was an inherent conflict of interest because
the clients were provided to the solicitor by the insurer. In the result it was held
that the ATE premium was not recoverable. This issue was not the subject of
consideration by the Court of Appeal in Hollins v Russell.
Breach of reg 4(2)(c) occurred in Myatt v National Coal Board3 where
the Court of Appeal concluded that in asking the client to decide whether
existing legal expenses insurance provided cover for the particular claim
(industrial injury) the solicitor had asked the wrong question. It will be only in
rare cases that the client will have sufficient understanding of insurance that
such a question can be asked.
In Langsam v Beachcroft LLP 4 where a replacement CFA did not contain the
cap on total fees that the original CFA did contain the failure to explain the
change was a breach of Regulation 4(3) and the CFA was unenforceable.
The conjoined appeal to Myatt is Garrett v Halton Borough Council5 where
the breach was of reg 4(2)(e)(ii). The CFA stated that the firm had no interest
in recommending the insurance policy. The firm’s arrangement with a claims
management company whereby it received referral and was obliged to
recommend a particular insurance did amount to an interest for the purposes
of the regulation.
1 [2005] EWHC 90001 (SCCO), [2006] NLJR 457.
2 (2002) unreported, Peterborough County Court – Claim No PE102464.
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554 considered fully at para
[152.6].
4 [2011] EWHC 1451 (Ch).
5 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, , [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554 considered fully at para
[152.8].
[29.2] The Myatt/Garrett decision was distinguished in Tankard v John
Fredricks Plastics Ltd1 where validity challenges to Accident Line panel firms
failed. For the purposes of reg 4, a solicitor has an interest if a reasonable
person with knowledge of the relevant facts would think that the existence of
the interest might affect the advice given by the solicitor to his client2. The
court went on to state obiter that had the firms involved had an interest,
compliance with the regulation required more than merely stating that there
was an interest. The firm had to go further and state to the client what the
nature of that interest was. The court made no reference to whether this had
ever been the practise of solicitors. Paying parties would need access to a
receiving party’s CFA in order now to determine whether there has been
compliance either in terms of stating that there is an interest or where such is
stated whether further explanation has been given. The retrospective require-
ment of the court provides scope for more satellite litigation.
[29.1] Litigation Funding
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1 [2008] EWCA Civ 1375, [2009] 4 All ER 526, [2009] 1 WLR 1731.
2 [2008] EWCA Civ 1375 at [13].
Form in which this information must be given
[30] All of the information above must be given orally (whether or not also
given in writing). The information in (5), (6) and (7)1 must be given in writing
as well as orally. It should be noted that the Regulations require that this
information is provided before a CFA is entered into. Recording this informa-
tion as part of the CFA itself does not therefore comply with this Regulation
and indeed would suggest that the information has not been given in advance
of the making of the CFA. Where a solicitor does not have an interest in
recommending insurance the Regulation does not require a statement to that
effect2.
In addition, the ‘effect’ of a CFA must be explained both orally and in writing
before the CFA is made. The regulations give no definition of ‘effect’. The Law
Society Model CFA provides Law Society Conditions that are separate from
the CFA itself and explain the effect of the CFA. Providing a client with a copy
of those conditions attached to the CFA itself is sufficient to satisfy the
regulation but a separate free-standing document is to be preferred3. The Law
Society Solicitor’s Costs Information and Client Care Code 1999 provides a
means of complying with reg 4(3)4 together with Annex 14F. A client care
letter is a further means of ensuring that the effect of a CFA is explained in
writing.
1 See para [29].
2 Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
3 [2003] EWCA Civ 718 at 152–154.
4 See para [1051].
The validity provisions1 – simplified CFAs
1 Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692, see para [1051] as amended by
the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI
2003/1240, in force 2 June 2003.
[31] The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 were amended from
2 June 2003 by the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Regulations 2003. The 2003 Regulations insert a new reg 3A into the CFA
Regulations 2000.
Regulation 3A provides:
‘(1) This regulation applies to a conditional fee agreement under which, except in the
circumstances set out in [paragraphs (5) and (5A)], the client is liable to pay his legal
representative’s fees and expenses only to the extent that sums are recovered in
respect of the relevant proceedings, whether by way of costs or otherwise.’2
The regulations thus provide for a ‘simplified’ CFA that is not required to
comply with the client care requirements of regs 2, 3 and 43 of the CFA
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [31]
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Regulations 2000. The changes permit a solicitor to agree to run the case on
recovered costs only, thereby guaranteeing damages stay with the client or on
recovered sums thereby ensuring the client is no worse off for having taken the
action. Where a CFA limits the client’s liability to recovered costs then the
removal of the requirements as to advice, particularly as to own costs
assessment, is explained by the fact that the client can have no liability which
has not already been met by the opponent in costs. Where the CFA limits own
costs liability to sums recovered the explanation for the removal of the client
care provisions cannot apply. If the CFA does not limit the client’s liability to
costs recovered then although the applicable regulations do not require the full
explanation applicable to a standard CFA, Rule 15 of the Law Society Rules
applies in the usual way.
2 Words ‘paragraphs (5) and (5A)’ in square brackets substituted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (2).
3 See para [1051].
[32] The revised regulations, together with the commencement of the AJA
1999, s 31, and changes to the CPR 1998, r 43.2, have the effect of removing
the indemnity principle for such an agreement. The Senior Costs Judge in The
Accident Group Test Cases Tranche Two1 held that a CFA could in any event
define ‘win’ in terms of recovering costs without causing difficulties with the
indemnity principle:
‘There appears to be no reason why the circumstances specified should not be the
recovery of those costs and/or disbursements from the paying party.’. At 384
A simplified CFA is one under which, except in the certain circumstances set
out in the regulations, the client is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees
and expenses only to the extent that sums are recovered in respect of the
relevant proceedings, whether by way of costs or otherwise2,3. Such an
agreement does not affect the client’s liability for after the event insurance4.
1 [2003] EWHC 9020 (Costs).
2 SI 2000/692, reg 3A(3) as inserted by SI 2003/1240.
3 The words ‘or otherwise’ permit own costs to be taken from damages.
4 SI 2000/692, reg 3A(2).
[33] A simplified CFA must:
(a) be in writing1;
(b) specify:
(i) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates
(including whether it relates to any appeal, counterclaim or
proceedings to enforce a judgment or order) (reg 3A(4)(a)(i)),
and
(ii) the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and
expenses, or part of them, are payable (reg 3A(4)(a)(ii)); and
(c) if it provides for a success fee:
(i) briefly specify the reasons for setting the percentage increase at
the level stated in the agreement (reg 3A(4)(b)(i)), and
[31] Litigation Funding
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(ii) provide that if, in court proceedings, the percentage increase
becomes payable as a result of those proceedings and the legal
representative or the client is ordered to disclose to the court or
any other person the reasons for setting the percentage increase
at the level stated in the agreement, he may do so
(reg 3A(4)(b)(ii)).
A CFA which provides for a liability for own disbursements in any event and
for base costs only if recovered would be valid as a standard CFA. It is
submitted that such a CFA entered into after 2 June 2003 is within the terms
of the CPR 1998, r 43.2(3). Whether such an agreement complies with the
requirements for a simplified CFA depends upon the meaning of
reg 3A(4)(a)(ii) above. This regulation replicates the reference in reg 2(1)(b)
applicable to a standard CFA that such must specify ‘the circumstances in
which the legal representative’s fees and expenses, or part of them, are payable.
The words ‘or part of them’ appear in both reg 2 and 3A and are a reference
back to the definition of a CFA contained in the CLSA 1990, s 58. Section
58(2)(a) defines a CFA as ‘an agreement with a person providing advocacy or
litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or any part of
them, to be payable only in specified circumstances’. An agreement under
which base costs are payable only in specified circumstances is therefore a CFA
with respect to those fees. It is arguable that because disbursements are payable
in all circumstances that the agreement is valid under the simplified form in
that the CFA only applies to base costs. Provided the CFA as to base costs
limits the liability for those costs to sums recovered the CFA would appear to
comply with the simplified regulations. Judge Richard Harvey QC sitting in
the High Court declined to rule on such an agreement in Munkenbeck &
Marshall v Harold2 leaving the point for full argument at a costs assessment
hearing.
The Court of Appeal in Jones v Wrexham Borough Council3 could see no
reason why the court should not look at the whole package produced by the
solicitor, the CFA agreement, the Rule 15 letter explaining to the client the
effect of the agreement, and indeed the insurance policy recommended by the
solicitor. The words of the Regulation ‘or otherwise’ were wide enough to
include the proceeds of an ATE policy. The court also held that the word
‘expenses’ in the Regulation does include disbursements so that the arrange-
ment must limit such to sums recovered. Similar reasoning in King v Halton
Borough Council4 was that by taking the CFA together with an ATE policy
covering own disbursements the result was a simplified CFA.
By reg 3A(5) of the CFA Regulations 20005, as inserted by the 2003
Regulations6, a simplified CFA can impose an own costs liability not limited to
sums recovered if the client:
(a) fails to co-operate with the legal representative;
(b) fails to attend any medical or expert examination or court hearing
which the legal representative reasonably requests him to attend;
(c) fails to give necessary instructions to the legal representative;
(d) withdraws instructions from the legal representative;
(e) is an individual who is adjudged bankrupt or enters into an arrange-
ment or a composition with his creditors, or against whom an
administration order is made; or
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [33]
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(f) is a company for which a receiver, administrative receiver or liquidator
is appointed7.
By reg (5A)8 a simplified CFA may specify that, in the event of the client dying
in the course of the relevant proceedings, his estate will be liable for the legal
representative’s fees and expenses, whether or not sums are recovered in
respect of those proceedings.
1 CLSA 1990, s 58(3)(a).
2 [2005] EWHC 356 (TCC), [2005] All ER (D) 227 (Apr).
3 [2007] EWCA Civ 1356, [2008] 1 WLR 1590, (2008) Times, 21 January contrary to the
decision in Foord v American Airlines Inc [2007] EWHC 90076 (Costs).
4 (Chester County Court 5ML00874).
5 SI 2000/692.
6 SI 2003/1240.
7 Sub-paragraphs (e), ( f ) inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (3)(b) with effect from 2 February
2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1.
8 Para (5A) inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (4) with effect from 2 February 2004: see SI
2003/3344, reg 1.
Liability for own costs
[34] The wording of the revised regulations limits the client’s liability to
‘sums’ recovered ‘whether by way of costs or otherwise’. Whilst that does not
appear to prevent the CFA limiting liability to recovered costs it does allow a
broader basis which can potentially swallow the whole of the client’s damages.
A justification for the broader wording is that it is still leaving the client better
off than having a liability to pay the solicitor simply because the claim
succeeded, even though nothing is recovered. That justification would require
that ‘recovered’ means actually paid rather than an agreement or order which
has not been met. It is by no means certain however that that is the meaning
of ‘recovered’1 where the CFA wording ‘you recover costs or sums on account’
was held to be satisfied by an order for costs at an interim stage.
1 See Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2001] CP Rep 108, [2001] NLJR 970, [2001] CP Rep 108.
[35] It is necessary to consider separately the two types of simplified CFA
possible under the 2003 Regulations: a CFA which limits the client’s liability
to costs recovered; a CFA which limits the client’s liability to sums recovered
by way of costs or otherwise:
Simplified CFA which limits the client’s liability to costs recovered
Case fails No liability for own costs or
disbursements. Because there is no
liability in this circumstance it is not
possible for the client’s insurance
policy to cover these costs. The
solicitor is taking the risk on
disbursements. The cost of that risk
needs to be accounted for in success
fees.
[33] Litigation Funding
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Case succeeds The client has a liability only to the
extent of costs paid by the
opponent. A global offer to settle,
which makes no distinction between
damages and costs, would present
insurmountable difficulties. It is
essential that the costs element is
specified in the settlement. If the
only settlement available is a no-
costs settlement then the client has
no liability for own costs or
disbursements.
Failure to beat Part 36 Assuming the opponent agrees or is
ordered to pay pre-Part 36 costs
and the client agrees or is ordered
to pay opponent’s costs post-
Part 36, it will be necessary to
determine what is meant by the
words ‘sums recovered by way of
costs’. The simplest explanation is
that the client does have a liability
for own costs pre-Part 36 because
the opponent is liable for those
costs so that those costs are
‘recovered’. This ignores any set-off
approach against the client’s post-
Part 36 liability. If the client has
ATE insurance the adverse costs
liability is covered. The client has
no liability either for own costs or
for disbursements post-Part 36 nor
would those costs be insured – they
are risked by the solicitor under the
CFA. This is a costs risk that some
ATE insurers have insisted upon but
it is not the standard approach of
the Law Society Model CFA which
provides for base costs but no
success fee – that option is not
available if the wording of the CFA
limits liability to costs recovered.
The risk on post-Part 36
disbursements need to be reflected
in the success fee.
Simplified CFA which limits the client’s liability to sums recovered by way of
costs or otherwise
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [35]
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These are the words used in the 2003 regulations and have the effect of
permitting recovery of costs from any monies recovered, whether costs,
damages or proceeds of an ATE insurance policy or any combination thereof.
Where the case fails There is no liability for own costs
or disbursements because no sums
at all will have been recovered.
Because there is no liability in this
circumstance it is not possible for
the client’s insurance policy to cover
these costs. The solicitor is taking
the risk on disbursements as well as
base costs. The cost of that risk
needs to be accounted for in success
fees.
Where the case succeeds The client has a liability for own
costs and disbursements to the
extent of costs and damages paid by
the opponent. Issues as to what
element of sums received
represented costs and what
represented damages do not
therefore arise.
Where there is a failure to beat
Part 36
Assuming the opponent agrees or is
ordered to pay pre-Part 36 costs
and the client agrees or is ordered
to pay opponent’s costs post-
Part 36, the client has a liability for
own costs and disbursements up to
the limit of all sums recovered from
the opponent. Post-Part 36 own
costs will not have been recovered
as costs but this wording does not
link the client’s liability to costs
recovered. That seems to allow a
simplified CFA to provide, as in the
standard CFA, for base costs (and
even a success fee) to be paid by the
client post-Part 36. The only
limitation is the total sum recovered
from the opponent. Such a post
Part 36 liability for own costs
would not be covered by insurance.
Part 36 risk illustration
[36]
Own costs Opponent’s costs
£500 £300
Opponent liable Client not liable
Client liable?
Part 36 Rejected
[35] Litigation Funding
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£300 £300
Opponent not liable Client not liable
Client not liable?
After the event insurance and simplified CFAs
CFA limited to costs recovered
[37] By definition the client has no liability for own costs beyond costs
recovered and accordingly no own costs are insurable in the event that the case
loses. Unrecovered disbursements will also be uninsured and the client will
have no liability to reimburse them. Adverse costs can be insured in the same
way as under a standard CFA. Part 36 adverse costs liabilities can be insured.
It is essential that the policy does not set-off against an adverse costs order any
own costs recovered by the client. There is no client risk on own costs and
these cannot be insured.
CFA limited to sums recovered
[38]–[40] The client can have no own costs liability in the event that the case
loses and that cannot therefore be insured. Where the case loses there will be
no sums recovered and hence no client liability for costs and disbursements.
Adverse costs can be insured as in a standard CFA. Part 36 adverse costs
liabilities can be insured and cover should be obtained which does not apply
a set-off against own costs or sums recovered. The client can have an own costs
liability post Part 36 because some sums will be recovered and therefore these
costs and disbursements can also be insured in the event that the Part 36
payment is not beaten.
Amendments to the CFA
[41] It is entirely feasible that a CFA will require amendment during its
lifetime. The use of CFAs in stages of proceedings is a recognised practice
enabling a case to be progressed and the risk to be managed by both client and
solicitor. Regulation 61 provides that where there is an amendment to cover
further proceedings or parts of them the Regulations must again be complied
with as if it were an original agreement.
1 See para [1051].
C The Law Society model agreement for personal injury cases
[42] The Law Society produced a model agreement1 for use only in personal
injury cases not including clinical negligence. The model was been redrafted to
comply with the requirements of the CFA Regulations 20002. A checklist for
solicitors was also available3. No model has been produced to make use of the
simplified regulations. A new Model4 for use in personal injury and clinical
negligence cases was produced by the Law Society for use from 1 November
2005. A separate document was also provided as client information and
appeared to be intended to form part of the contractual relationship between
solicitor and client.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [42]
BCS • Issue 96 E-33
0031 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:14 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
1 The version of the model available from June 2000 is reproduced at para [1261]. The June 2000
version was held to be not complaint with reg 3(2)(c) of the CFA Regulations in Ghannouchi
v Houni (SCCO Ref: TSB 0307009) [2004] EWHC 9002 (Costs), but the departure from
compliance was held to be not material. The Senior Costs judge has not followed the
Ghannouchi analysis of reg 3(2)(c) in Oyston v Royal Bank of Scotland [2006] EWHC 90053
(Costs). Between April and June 2000 a ‘running repair’ version was available. It was this early
version which was the subject of the decision in Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003]
4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
2 See para [1051]. The Model was not amended to provide for simplified CFAs introduced from
2 June 2003 by the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations
2003, SI 2003/1240, see paras [31]–[37].
3 See para [1271].
4 The new Model is reproduced at para [1320].
The clauses
The proceedings
[43] The agreement must state the proceedings or part of proceedings to
which it applies. In Brierley v Prescott1 the CFA referred to a claim against an
insurer. In the proceedings the driver’s name was later substituted for that of
the insurer. On assessment it was argued that there was no liability under the
CFA in respect of the claim against the driver and that therefore the driver
could not be liable to indemnify those costs. It was held that the CFA covered
a claim arising out of the accident and costs were therefore payable by the
client and recoverable. The Model excludes counterclaims and appeals against
final judgment. Enforcement of judgment is dealt with in the conditions
annexed to the CFA. Condition 4 gives the solicitor power to take enforcement
proceedings in the name of the client and makes the costs of such proceedings
part of the basic charges under the CFA. The Court of Appeal in Halloran v
Delaney2 has held that costs only proceedings are not enforcement proceedings
but that the model includes costs only proceedings within the ‘claim’ for which
it provides coverage.
1 2006 (SCCO) Ref 0504718.
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
The fees
[44] Regulation 2(1)(c)1 is complied with by detailing the liability of the client
to pay fees and disbursements in a number of situations falling short of success
as well as in the event of success. This part of the Model also states that the
amount of fees is not based on or limited by the damages. The ordinary
rules on proportionality contained in r 44.52 apply to the success fee.
The model does not seek to provide a cap on the success fee by reference to
damages. To apply any such limit would mean that under the indemnity
principle the paying party would not be required to pay any success fee in
excess of the cap. The commencement of the AJA 1999, s 313 does not alter the
indemnity principle in itself but provides for rules of court to permit a recovery
of costs notwithstanding that the client has no liability for those costs. CPR
19984, r 43.2 relates specifically to a CFA where the client’s liability for costs
is limited to sums recovered and it is submitted that this rule would not enable
[42] Litigation Funding
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a success fee to be recovered in excess of any cap. It is possible to provide for
a cap on the part of a success fee which relates to delay in payment although
the model does not do so. The earlier Law Society Model which was published
in April 2000 was unsuccessfully challenged on the grounds that the wording
referred only to the success fee as not being limited by reference to damages
whereas the Regulation refers to all costs amounts5. For the consequences of
failing to comply with the Regulations, see para [151] – Unenforceable CFAs.
The terms which apply where the agreement is terminated before the end of the
case are contained in Condition 7 to the Model6. Either party to the CFA may
wish to terminate the agreement, the main issue then arising is the amount
payable and particularly the position of the success fee. The reasons for
termination will affect the question of payment. Where termination is for
failure to take advice on settlement it may be seen as legitimate to seek a
success fee, at least where the case wins little or no more than the advised
settlement. If termination is because the client has misled the solicitor payment
of the success fee irrespective of the outcome of the case may be appropriate.
It is important that these provisions which lead to the client being liable for
paying the success fee in circumstances where it may not be recovered from the
opponent are carefully explained.
Regulation 2(1)(d)7 is complied with by providing for an hourly rate at various
scales according to the experience of the person doing the work. In Williams
v Myler8 the High Court considered the use of the A+B formula. The client did
not need to be informed of a specific formula by which fees would be
calculated, and it was sufficient if he was told that a system of basic charges
and an uplift would be used. Moreover, the system specified in the agreement
was one which was approved and applied by the court. In those circumstances,
the agreement had specified the method by which fees would be calculated and,
accordingly, complied with the requirements of reg 2(1)(d). The CFA also
provided for an annual review of the hourly rate but failed to state any method
by which that review would be made. That was a departure from reg 2(1)(d)
but that departure did not have an adverse effect on either the claimant or the
administration of justice. It followed that the agreement was not rendered
unenforceable.
In Cox v MGN Ltd9 the CFA provided: “[Basic charges] are calculated for
each hour engaged on your matter from now until the review date of which we
shall notify you”. This failed to comply with reg 2(1)(d) and was held to be
inadequate to support a claim to more than one increase in hourly rates.
1 CFA Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692. See para [1051].
2 SI 1998/3132, r 44.5 and see para [1177].
3 Access to Justice Act 1999 (Commencement No 10) Order 2003, SI 2003/1241 commenced
the AJA 1999, s 31 as from 2 June 2003.
4 SI 1998/3132.
5 Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487, see para
[151].
6 See para [1261].
7 See n 1 and para [1051].
8 [2003] EWHC 1587 (QB), [2003] All ER (D) 364 (Jun).
9 [2006] EWHC 1235 (QB), [2006] All ER (D) 396 (May).
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Increase in fee
[44.1] The 2002 Model wording as to increases in fees is as follows:
We will review the hourly rate on the review date and on each anniversary of the
review date. We will not increase the rate by more than the rise in the Retail Prices
Index and will notify you of the increased rate in writing.’
In Puksis v Brumby1 the question arose as to whether the claimant was liable
to pay the hourly rates claimed in the bill or was liable only to pay rates
increased by the retail price index. The increases exceeded the retail price index
as the result of an oversight. The court decided that the client was not obliged
to pay any more than the rates set out in the conditional fee agreement as
increased by the retail price index.
1 [2008] EWHC 90095 (Costs).
The success fee
[45] The reasons for setting the level of the success fee are set out in the Model
in a separate schedule to the agreement in compliance with reg 3(1)(a)1. That
schedule requires brief reasons of the assessment of the risk of the individual
case failing. Compliance with the requirement of the Regulation to provide
‘brief reasons’ for the success fee is achieved even where the CFA stated only
that the success fee reflected the risks in the case without identifying what those
risk were2.
Regulation 3(1)(b)3 is complied with by setting out in the same schedule the
percentage of the success fee which relates to waiting for payment of fees and
disbursements. That part of the success fee cannot be recovered from the
opponent4 and remains the responsibility of the client. If the success fee does
not incorporate such a calculation the agreement should state that no part of
the success fee relates to waiting for payment. Where the CFA leaves this
percentage blank but the risk assessment attributes a figure the CFA prevails
and no delay element is recoverable from the client5. In Spencer v Gordon
Wood t/a Gordon Tyres (a firm)6 there was a breach of reg 3(1)(b) where the
CFA failed to specify how much of the stated success fee related to waiting for
payment. There was a separate risk assessment on file which indicated the
respective percentages but that had not formed part of the CFA. It was not
argued before the Court of Appeal that there had been no breach nor that any
breach was not material but rather that to the hold the CFA unenforceable
with the consequence that no fees at all will be payable was so disproportion-
ate as to be wrong. That argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. This
must be contrasted with Hollins v Russell where a similar breach was held not
to be material where a non-CFA document enabled a client to understand what
part of the success fee related to waiting for payment and any unfavourable
agreement would simply not have been enforced against the client. The view
taken in Hollins was that if the client is not prejudiced because on an own
client assessment the client would not be put in a prejudiced position then the
breach of regulations is not material. In Hughes v George Major Skip Hire7 a
CFA in Law Society Model form for 2000 referred to a 50% success fee.
Schedule 1 to the CFA stated that the postponement element was 50%, that
risk elements amounted to 50% and that the total success fee was 50%. That
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confusion and breach of reg 3 was rescued by the oral explanation that left the
client certain that they would not be paying any costs out of damages so there
was no material breach. Burnton J in Palmier plc (in liq), Re, Sidhu v Sandhu
8 upheld a CFA that stated there was no charge for postponement although the
schedule risk assessment made no reference to postponement. That absence of
postponement in the schedule made it clear that there was no charge for that
element.
Condition 4 complies with the requirements of reg 3(2)(a) and (b)9 relating to
the assessment of the success fee. The same condition provides that the client
will not instruct the solicitor to accept an offer of a lower success fee than that
contained in the CFA.
1 See para [1051].
2 Bray Walker Solicitors v Silvera [2010] EWCA Civ 332.
3 See para [1051].
4 SI 1998/3132, r 44.3B(1)(a).
5 Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
6 [2004] EWCA Civ 352, 148 Sol Jo LB 356, (2004) Times, 30 March. See para [1261].
7 [2009] EWHC 90147 (Costs).
8 [2009] EWHC 983 (Ch), [2009] All ER (D) 93 (May).
9 See para [1051].
[45.1] In C v W10 the Court of Appeal was concerned with a serious personal
injury case where liability had been admitted before the CFA was entered into.
The model CFA was used and provided that the client would have no liability
for Part 36 work if the offer was not beaten. The court allowed a success fee
of 20%. The decision in Halloran v Delaney11, where a 5% success fee was
allowed, was not referred to. The reasoning of the court in C v W was that
there was no doubt that the solicitor had assumed a risk of some kind, but in
the circumstances it was not equivalent to more than a 15% risk of failure
overall. Nothing would be added for the general risks of litigation since they
must be taken to have been subsumed in the basic assessment, but in any event
to increase the risk by a factor of 10% would add little. The court did not add
anything for the size of the claim and made no allowance for the risk that C
might decide not to pursue the claim. The court accepted that there was a
virtually certain prospect of recovering substantial damages given the nature of
the injuries and the admission of liability. The 20% uplift permitted applied of
course to all of the fees recovered which was in fact for 100% of the work.
Had there been a failure to beat the Part 36 the uplift would still have applied
to a substantial portion of the work and therefore of the fees. It is submitted
that a truer reflection of the Part 36 risk is given by estimating the likely
proportion of total costs risked at Part 36. For example if it was thought likely
that 20% of the total fees would be attributable to Part 36 and therefore at risk
the 20% risk element ought to be reduced 4% – (20% x 20%). C v W
considered the success fee that could be set where liability had been admitted
prior to the CFA being made. The figure arrived at was 20%. In Hanley v
Smith and MIB12 the CFA was made two years after a standard retainer and by
then the first defendant had admitted liability. The extent of liability, quantum
and the liability of the MIB were all still live. The solicitor had a 100% success
fee of which 90% was for risk. It was held that apart from a double counted
element in the risk assessment the risks were properly assessed and 82% was
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [45.1]
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allowed. Leading counsel whose CFA was made after the MIB had admitted
liability but before quantum was agreed had sought a success fee of 82% but
it was reduced to 54%. The court said that there was a Part 36 risk and the
earlier an offer was likely to be made the greater the risk was, but not great
enough to justify 82%.
In Thornley v Ministry of Defence4 counsel entered into a CFA with a 100%
success fee at a time when liability and causation had been admitted. Coun-
sel’s CFA provided for fees to be paid even if counsel advised rejection of a
Part 36 offer which was subsequently not beaten. In all of those circumstances
there was no realistic possibility that counsel would not get her fees. No
success fee was allowed. The Court of Appeal described as ‘grotesque’ the fee
arrangements in Pankhurst v White and MIB5. The claimant suffered cata-
strophic injuries in a road accident. The CFA provided for the client to pay
own costs where the Part 36 offer is not beaten. The CFA had been entered
into after summary judgment had been entered against the uninsured driver.
There was accordingly no risk on liability. Nonetheless the CFA provided for
a 22.5% success fee rising to 100% if the case went to trial. There was also an
ATE policy which indemnified Part 36 adverse costs without any set off against
recoveries.
10 [2008] EWCA Civ 1459, [2009] 4 All ER 1129, [2009] RTR 199.
11 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
12 [2009] EWHC 90144 (Costs).
4 [2010] EWHC 2584 (QB).
5 [2010] EWCA Civ 1445.
Value Added Tax
[46] The model applies VAT to the total basic charges and the success fee.
Giving of information
[47] The model addresses the requirements of reg 2(2)1 to incorporate a
statement that the information to be given to the client under reg 42 has been
given. The model states that information has been given ‘verbally’ whereas the
Regulation requires a statement that reg 4 has been complied with. Regulation
4 requires some of the information to be given both orally and in writing
before the CFA is entered into. It is essential to have regard to reg 4 in that
information has to be given in writing before a CFA is entered into. It follows
that to give that information only within the CFA cannot comply with the
Regulation3. Where reg 4 requires information to be given in writing before the
CFA is entered into it cannot only be given in the CFA itself. The Law Society
Model CFA provides Law Society Conditions that are separate from the CFA
itself and explain the effect of the CFA. Providing a client with a copy of those
conditions attached to the CFA itself is sufficient to satisfy the regulation but
a separate free standing document is to be preferred4.
1 See para [1051].
2 See para [1051].
3 See paras [29]–[40].
4 Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718 at 152–154, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
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The insurance policy
[48] The model enables compliance with reg 4(2)(e)1 which requires reasons
to be given for recommending insurance or a specific contract of insurance.
The model states that the solicitor does not have an interest in recommending
the insurance. If the solicitor does have such an interest this clause must be
amended to declare that interest. The CFA Regulations do not define ‘interest’
for these purposes. In English v Clipson2 a county court held that a solicitor
had an interest where the client had been referred to him by the insurer.
Similarly in Garrett v Halton Borough Council and Myatt v National Coal
Board3 where clients were referred by a claims management company under
arrangements that then required the solicitor to recommend a particular ATE
policy, that arrangement amounted to an interest for the purposes of reg 4.
The Court of Appeal in Tankard v John Fredricks Plastics Ltd4 distinguished
Garrett and held that Accident Line Protect did not give rise to an interest. The
main reason for solicitors choosing membership of ALP was the quality of the
product endorsed by the Law Society. For the purposes of regulation 4, a
solicitor has an interest if a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant
facts would think that the existence of the interest might affect the advice given
by the solicitor to his client. There was nothing that would lead a reasonable
person with knowledge of the facts to think that the solicitors had an interest
in the scheme that might affect their advice.
Where insurance is being recommended after receipt of an admission of
liability5 there is doubt as to the wording of the model. The regulations require
the client to be told the reasons for recommending insurance. The model refers
to insurance ‘in case you lose’. It can be argued that there is no risk of losing
if there has been an admission of liability and accordingly that cannot have
been the reason for the recommendation. If that amounts to a failure to comply
with the regulations the consequences will depend upon an application of the
test laid down in Hollins v Russell6 of material breach.
An additional wording is provided at the end of the conditions to comply with
the requirements of the Accident Line insurance scheme. Similar wording may
be used to comply with the requirements of other insurers.
From 14 January 2005 further requirements as to information and recommen-
dations concerning insurance apply in furtherance of regulation of general
insurance by the Financial Services Authority. It is possible that failure to
comply in some respects with these requirements may lead to challenges to the
validity of the insurance and to paying parties denying liability for the
premium7. The Court of Appeal in Tankard went on to state that an obiter
statement of Brooke LJ in Garrett at [103] to the effect that post 1 November
2005 it is only necessary to inform the client that a contractual duty to
recommend a particular insurance policy should not now be followed. The
court did not state what it thought the consequences are post 1 November
2005 where the Garrett advice has been followed.
1 See para [1051].
2 (2002) unreported, Peterborough County Court – Claim No PE104264.
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, , [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
4 [2008] EWCA Civ 1375, [2009] 4 All ER 526, [2009] 1 WLR 1731.
5 See however Re Claims Direct Test Cases [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003]
2 All ER (Comm) 788 at para [110] as to the reasonableness of taking out insurance after an
admission of liability has been made.
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6 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487, see para [151].
7 See para [209].
D Recoverability of the success fee
[49] Section 58A(6) of the CLSA 1990 provides for a costs order to include a
success fee. That section applies only where the first CFA in respect of the
proceedings or cause of action was made after 1 April 20001. The CPR
1998 make provision for a costs order to include an ‘additional liability’
arising from a ‘funding arrangement’ which is defined as including a CFA,
a Collective CFA and an insurance policy to which the AJA 1999, s 29 applies2.
Section 9 of the CPD provides that under an order for payment of ‘costs’ the
costs payable will include an additional liability.
For fixed success fees, see para [1191].
1 Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2000, SI 2000/900, art 2(1) and see
para [1071].
2 SI 1998/3132, r 43.2(1)(k).
Meaning of success fee
[50] Section 58(2)(b) of the CLSA 1990 defines success fee as an increase in
specified circumstances above the amount which would be payable if it were
not payable only in specified circumstances. In Crook v Birmingham
City Council1, clients were offered a discounted rate by way of a cap of
£1,000. Irwin J held that there was no success fee in such an arrangement but
a discount from the ‘normal fee’, and that it could be argued in every case that
the reduced level of fees – which will often be nil – represents what the market
will bear and therefore the increment represents the success fee. This argument,
he said, would obliterate the distinction normal in conditional fee agreements
between the ‘base fee’ and the ‘success fee’. The Court of Appeal in
Gloucester County Council v Evans2 held that a CCFA providing for an hourly
rate of £95 irrespective of outcome with a rate of £145 for a win did not
amount to a success fee. The CCFA referred to the higher figure as base costs
and to the lower figure as discounted charges. A success fee was then applied
in the agreement only to the base charges – ie the higher fee. The court
accepted that the higher figure was the fee which would have been charged had
it not been a conditional fee and accordingly the 100% success fee applied to
that figure was valid. In Morris v Dennis3 the CFA defined basic charges to
which a 100% success fee was applied plus an administration charge of £150.
It was held that the charge was not part of the uplift which accordingly did not
exceed the 100% maximum.
1 [2007] EWHC 1415 (Admin), [2007] NLJR 939, [2007] 5 Costs LR 732.
2 [2008] EWCA Civ 21, [2008] 1 WLR 1883, [2008] NLJR 219.
3 [2008] EWHC 90112 (Costs).
Fixed success fees
[51] CPR 1998, Part 45 makes provision for fixed success fees in road traffic
and employer liability cases. Successive additions to Part 45 from October
[48] Litigation Funding
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2003 to September 2005 have produced a scheme applicable to road traffic
costs only proceedings, road traffic substantive proceedings, employer liability
accident cases and finally employer liability disease cases. The commencement
date for the section of Part 45 applicable to each of these types of proceedings
differs1. There is nothing in Part 45 to suggest that the relevant date is anything
other than the commencement of proceedings. In consequence claims for costs
will be governed by the CPR 1998 applicable at the date proceedings
commenced. The terms of a CFA may well not reflect, therefore, the
rules applicable at the time for assessment but are likely to reflect the rules as
they existed at the date of the CFA2. It was held in Nizami v Butt3 that Sections
II to V of Part 45 dis-applied the indemnity principle and that costs, including
a fixed success fee, are recoverable irrespective of the validity of the CFA. The
difficulty with this decision is with the wording of the relevant parts of the CPR
1998. Recovery of a fixed success fee is provided for in the CPR 1998,
r 45.11(1): A claimant may recover a success fee if he has entered into a
funding arrangement of a type specified in rule 43.2(1)(k)(i). Rule 43.2(1)(k)(i)
provides: ‘funding arrangement’ means an arrangement where a person has
–(i) entered into a CFA or a collective conditional fee agreement which
provides for a success fee within the meaning of the CLSA 1990, s 58(2)1. It is
submitted that there is a direct link between the recovery of a fixed success fee
and a valid CFA since an invalid CFA is not one that complies with s 58. In
Wetzel v KBC FIDEA4, the result was that the reasonableness of using a CFA
rather than BTE was also irrelevant, at least for Part II – Master O’Hare being
of the view that the court’s powers may be different under Part III.
1 A summary in table form is given at para [55].
2 See further at para [56]–[60].
3 [2005] EWHC 159 (QB), [2006] 2 All ER 140, [2006] 1 WLR 3307.
1 A summary in table form is given at para [55].
4 [2007] EWHC 90079 (Costs).
Road traffic costs only proceedings
[52] A fixed success fee is recoverable under the road traffic accidents – fixed
recoverable costs in costs-only proceedings procedure under Section II of the
CPR 1998, Part 451:
‘45.11
(1) A claimant may recover a success fee if he has entered into a funding
arrangement of a type specified in rule 43.2(k)(i).
(2) The amount of the success fee shall be 12.5% of the fixed recoverable costs
calculated in accordance with rule 45.9(1), disregarding any additional
amount which may be included in the fixed recoverable costs by virtue of
rule 45.9(2).’
Where the accident occurred on or after 6 October 2003 but costs only
proceedings were issued before 1 March 2004 the success fee was not fixed but
was subject to agreement or assessment2.
CPR 45.11 was considered by the Court of Appeal in Kilby v Gawith3 which
held that the word ‘may’ did not confer any discretion on a court and
accordingly the availability of BTE insurance was not a factor where the fixed
costs regime applied. A success fee of 12.5% was due irrespective of whether
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [52]
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BTE insurance could have been used. This decision does not address the
recovery of an ATE premium in such a case. ATE premiums are not a fixed
recovery under Part 45 and therefore reasonableness is an issue. This decision
may inadvertently put pressure on solicitors to run cases uninsured4 or it may
lead to solicitors paying the ATE premium rather than allow cases to go to a
panel firm.
1 SI 1998/3132. See para [1190.1].
2 This wording came into force on 1 March 2004 – see 34th update to the CPR 1998. For costs
only proceedings commenced before that date in respect of an accident occurring on or after
6 October 2003 the success fee was not fixed and was subject to assessment if not agreed. The
new wording cannot have applied to proceedings commenced before it came into force – ie
before 1 March 2004.
3 [2008] EWCA Civ 812, [2009] 1 WLR 853, [2009] RTR 8.
4 See Dix v Townend in para [15.1].
Road traffic other than in costs only proceedings:
[52.1] A fixed success fee is recoverable under Section III of the CPR 1998,
Part 451 – CPR 1998, r 45.15 in road traffic accident cases other than in costs
only proceedings. CPR 1998, r 45.11 and r 45.15 apply to cases where the
accident occurred on or after 6 October 2003.
The road traffic accidents rules fix base costs and success fees but do not fix the
level of ATE premium. For cases settling pre-issue the success fee is fixed at
12.5%2. Cases settling after issue carry the same rate unless they settle at trial
in which case the rate is 100%3. Success fees for counsel are dealt with
differently by providing an increment of 50% if the case settles within 14 days
of the trial date in fast rack and 75% if the case settles within 21 days of the
trial date in multi-track.
In Dahele v Thomas Bates4 and Lamont v Burton5, settlement on the day set
for trial but without any trial taking place was held to trigger the 100% success
fee. Success fees for counsel are dealt with differently by providing an
increment of 50% if the case settles within 14 days of the trial date in fast rack
and 75% if the case settles within 21 days of the trial date in multi track. If
detailed assessment is not part of the trial process for the purposes of
45.16(1)(a) a case settling but on the basis that costs will be assessed at a
detailed assessment will attract a success fee for the substantive claim of
12.5%6. Part 45.7 applies to costs only proceedings but that requires that no
proceedings have been started. If no substantive proceedings have been issued
it is unclear as to what rule applies to a detailed assessment. In Sitapuria v
Khan7 on the day fixed for the final hearing, before the case was opened, the
judge made a consent order in the terms of an agreement reached by the
parties. It was held, contrary to Dahele v Thomas Bates & Son Ltd that the
claimant’s solicitors and counsel were not entitled to a 100% success fee. In
Kingdom Thenga v Elsa Louise Quinn8 it was argued that a summary
assessment hearing following a settlement of the substantive claim constituted
a trial and therefore gave rise to an uplift of 100%. The Court of Appeal
rejected that argument holding it was plain beyond serious argument that, in
drafting Rule 45.15(6)(b) , the rule-makers had not thrown out the conven-
tional notion of a ‘trial’ and ‘final contested hearing’ related to the substantive
claim, albeit including a hearing referable to a disputed claim for an award of
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costs in principle, ie subject to quantification. Slade J disapproved Dahele in
favour of Sitapuria in Amin and Hussain v Mullings9 rejecting an argument
that under CPR 45 “at trial” meant merely the day of the trial and holding that
where the case had settled on the day set for trial but without any hearing
taking place the case had not settled “at trial”. The defendant’s counterclaim,
which did proceed to a hearing, was held that to be a separate action from the
claim.
1 See para [1191].
2 SI 1998/3132, Part 45, Section II.
3 SI 1998/3132, Part 45, Section III.
4 [2007] EWHC 90072 (Costs).
5 [2007] EWCA Civ 429, [2007] 3 All ER 173, [2007] 1 WLR 2814.
6 Styler v Ingham (2008) Leeds CC Ref 6MA 10298 where the view taken was that detailed
assessment is not part of the trial process for the purposes of CPR 45.16(1)(a).
7 Unreported – Liverpool County Court, 10 December 2007.
8 [2009] EWCA Civ 151.
9 [2011] EWHC 278 (QB).
Employer liability cases other than disease
[53] A fixed success fee is recoverable under Section IV of the CPR 1998,
Part 45 – CPR 1998, r 45.21 in employer liability accident cases where the
injury was sustained on or after 1 October 2004. Base costs and ATE
premiums are not fixed. CPR 1998, r 45.21 applies the CPR 1998, rr 45.16
and 45.17 so that the same structure applicable to road traffic cases applies to
employer liability cases but with a variation in the level of success fees
providing 27.5% where a membership organisation has undertaken to meet
the claimant’s liabilities for legal costs under the AJA 1999, s 30 and 25% in
all other cases.
Employer liability disease cases
[54] For disease cases Section V of the CPR 1998, Part 45 – CPR 1998,
r 45.23 came into force on 1 October 2005 and applies to disease cases where
the claimant sent a letter of claim to the defendant containing a summary of
the facts on which the claim is based and main allegations of fault on or after
1 October 2005. Success fees are fixed by the CPR 1998, r 45.24 with the rate
being dependent upon the stage of proceedings and the type of disease.
Different success fees apply to counsel than to solicitors.
Road traffic cases
[55] The following table sets out the dates from which the fixed fee
rules apply and sets out the type of proceedings to which the rules apply:
Date rule in
force
Date of
accident
Costs only/
substantive
proceedings
Base costs Success fee
06.10.03 On or after
06.10.03
Costs only
proceedings
Fixed Agreed or
assessed (not
fixed)
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [55]
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01.03.04 On or after
06.10.03
Costs only
proceedings
Fixed Fixed at
12.5%
01.06.04 On or after
06.10.03
Substantive
proceedings
Fixed Fixed
according to
stage
proceedings
reach
Employer liability accident cases
[55.1]
Date rule in
force
Date of injury Costs only/
substantive
proceedings
Base costs Success fee
1 October
2004
On or after
1 October 04
Both Not fixed Fixed
according to
stage
proceedings
reach
Employer liability disease cases
[55.2]
Date rule in
force
Date letter of
claim sent
Costs only/
substantive
proceedings
Base costs Success fee
1 October
2005
Before
1 October
2005
Both Not fixed Fixed
according to
type of
disease and
stage
proceedings
reach
CFA wordings and fixed fees
[56]–[60] It should be kept in mind that costs belong to the client. Part 45
fixes the success fee which can be ordered against a paying party. The CFA
itself will govern the level of fees payable to the solicitor and the CFA needs to
be drafted to reflect the fixed fee steps. The decision in Nizami v Butt1 that
fixed success fees are recoverable from an opponent irrespective of the validity
of the CFA does not affect the point that costs belong to the client. It is difficult
to see that Nizami would support an argument that the client has a liability
under an invalid CFA. If Nizami is correct the result is that the opponent has
a liability to pay costs that the client has no liability to pay and over which the
solicitor has no rights. The multiple variations increase the complexity of the
explanation to the client but if they are not included then the client will keep
any difference between the costs allowed and those specified in the CFA. In this
respect even the use of a simplified CFA which provided that the cli-
ent’s liability for costs will be limited to the costs recovered from the opponent
will not avoid the complexities of the variable success fee because it is the
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CLSA 1990, s 58 that requires the CFA to state the percentage by which fees
are to be increased. The success fee in the case of solicitors therefore must be
expressed as a two stage fee fixed at the date of the CFA. In the case of the CFA
with counsel there must be three stages, again fixed at the date of the CFA.
Each Section of Part 45 will apply to costs assessments on the basis of the date
of commencement of proceedings, including costs only proceedings. The CFA
in respect of those proceedings may well have been entered into before the
relevant Section of the CPR 1998, Part 45 came into being. This will give rise
to two situations of complexity:
(1) Cases where the CFA provides for a success fee that is lower than the
fixed success fee applicable at the date of commencement of proceed-
ings.
(2) Cases where the CFA provides for a higher success fee than that
applicable at the date of commencement of proceedings.
The liability of the client in both cases will be governed by the CFA. The
liability of a paying party will depend upon whether or not the Part 45 is
regarded as an exception to the indemnity principle. If it is an exception then
it is possible that the paying party will be liable for the fixed success fee even
though the client is liable for a lower fee. The client would not be liable to pay
the difference between the fee set in the CFA and that recovered. If Part 45 is
not regarded as an exception to the indemnity principle then the paying party
will be liable only to the extent of the lower fee stated in the CFA. If the CFA
provides for a higher success fee than the fixed figure then although the client
is liable for the higher rate the paying party is not.
1 [2005] EWHC 159 (QB), [2006] 2 All ER 140, [2006] 1 WLR 3307.
Success fees and CFAs made after 1 April 2000 and before 3 July 2000
[61] The success fee is only recoverable in respect of things done and costs
incurred from the date the CFA was made1. This appears to mean that
although the CFA may cover work done before it was made, a not unusual
position, the opponent is not at risk of paying a success fee in respect of that
period. If it is intended by the CFA that the client should remain liable for that
part of the success fee this should be carefully explained. Where a CFA covers
work done before and after 1 April 2000, the CPR become difficult through
lack of provisions to deal with this transitional combination. A court cannot
include in an order for costs an additional liability in relation to costs relating
to work done before 1 April. The CFA Regulations 20002, reg 3(2)(b) requires
the CFA to provide that any disallowed part of a success fee is to cease to be
payable unless the court orders otherwise. In the transitional circumstances it
is assumed that the court will order that part of the success fee relating to work
done before 1 April to continue to be payable.
1 Practice Direction About Costs, s 57.9(3) and see para [1230].
2 SI 2000/692.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [61]
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Success fees and CFAs made after 3 July 2000
[62] There is no provision limiting the period of work to be covered by the
recoverable success fee. An opponent is at risk of having to pay a success fee
in respect of work done before a CFA is made since the CFA when made will
usually relate to all work done in respect of the cause of action. An opponent
is therefore at risk of having to pay a success fee in respect of work done before
the CFA is notified (although since 1 April 2004 in the case of personal injury
the protocol provides that notice should be given). On ordinary principles of
contract such an agreement with the client would be valid. The result in terms
of the transitional period is that where the CFA was made after 3 July 2000 to
include work done before 1 April 2000 the success fee will be recoverable for
the pre-April work. To decide otherwise would be to deny effect to the
transitional rules which specifically dealt with agreements made between
1 April and 3 July 2000. By analogy an additional liability in the form of an
insurance premium has been allowed in respect of a policy of insurance
purchased in December 2000 giving retrospective cover for costs incurred
before April 20001. The Senior Costs Judge in King v Telegraph2 doubted
nonetheless that a retrospective success fee ought to be recoverable:
‘Although there is no prohibition in the legislation against backdating a success fee,
such backdating seems to me to fly in the face of the CFA Regulations and the CPR.
As [counsel for the defendant] has pointed out the solicitors are placed under a strict
duty to explain the position to their client, which they did not do until shortly before
the CFA was signed. The solicitors do not assume any risks under the CFA until it
is signed (although they may well have been at the normal commercial risk of not
being paid prior to that point). The solicitors are under no duty to give notice of
funding until the CFA has been signed. It is of great importance that an opposing
party should be aware of any additional liability as early as possible. The Claimant
is, to an extent, protected in that the level of the success fee does not have to be
disclosed, but, unless and until the Defendants are made aware that they are
potentially liable for a success fee this may fundamentally affect the way in which
they choose to conduct the litigation.’. [89]
The question of a retrospective success fee arose directly in Forde v Birming-
ham City Council3 where King v Telegraph was followed and no success fee
was recoverable in respect of the retrospective period of the CFA. This was a
case where a second CFA had been put in place to replace a first CFA thought
to be invalid. The first CFA did not have a success fee. Had the first CFA
included a success fee then the result may have been different as to the
retrospective effect of the success fee in the second CFA.
1 Ashworth v Peterborough United Football Club (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO 0201106.
Retrospective cover was also purchased in Inline Logistics v UCI Logistics Ltd [2002] EWHC
519 (Ch), (2002) Times, 2 May, [2002] 2 Costs LR 304.
2 [2005] EWHC 90015 (Costs).
3 [2008] EWHC 90105 (Costs).
Statutory limit to the success fee
[63] The success fee cannot exceed 100% of basic costs1. Proposals to remove
this limit from the Commercial Court, Construction and Technology Court
and Admiralty have not been implemented. In such commercial litigation the
statutory maximum is likely to cause difficulty, particularly where a charge is
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included in the success fee to reflect waiting for payment. In a commercial case
it may be expected that the matter will not conclude for perhaps three years
from the signing of the CFA. A waiting for payment element near 20% is not
unlikely in such circumstances, leaving 80% for merits in cases where 100%
is justified. In such a case it would seem open for the CFA to state that the total
success fee including waiting for payment would be in excess of 100% and that
only the success fee relating to the merits has been applied.
In Oyston v Royal Bank of Scotland2 the CFA originally provided for a success
fee of 100% but was later altered to include a bonus of £50,000 in the event
that damages in excess of £1m were recovered. That was held to be a breach
of s 58 rendering the CFA invalid. The breach was regarded as serious in terms
of the adverse effect on the administration of justice. In Jones v Caradon
Catnic Ltd3 a collective CFA provided that the solicitor should carry out a risk
assessment and stated that the success fee should not exceed 100%. The risk
assessment however specified a success fee of 120%. The Court of Appeal held
this to be a breach of the Act and the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000
and that there was a materially adverse effect on the administration of justice
(Hollins v Russell4). In Crook v Birmingham City Council5 clients were offered
a discounted rate by way of a cap of £1,000. Irwin J held that there was no
success fee in such an arrangement but a discount from the ‘normal fee’, and
that it could be argued in every case that the reduced level of fees – which will
often be nil – represents what the market will bear and therefore the increment
represents the success fee. This argument, he said, would obliterate the
distinction normal in conditional fee agreements between the ‘base fee’ and the
‘success fee’.The Court of Appeal in Gloucester County Council v Evans6 held
that a CCFA providing for an hourly rate of £95 irrespective of outcome with
a rate of £145 for a win did not amount to a success fee.
1 CFA Order 2000, SI 2000/823 and see para [1061]. In cases brought under the Environmental
Protection Act 1990, s 82 this order prohibits any success fee.
2 [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs).
3 [2005] EWCA Civ 1821; [2006] 3 Costs LR 427.
4 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590 , [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
5 [2007] EWHC 1415 (Admin), [2007] NLJR 939, [2007] 5 Costs LR 732.
6 [2008] EWCA Civ 21, [2008] 1 WLR 1883, [2008] NLJR 219.
The non-recoverable element
[64] Rule 44.3B(1)(a)1 precludes recovery of any part of a success fee which
relates to waiting for payment of fees and expenses. This element remains
payable by the client. There is no statutory control over this amount, other
than by the overall limit of 100% for the entire success fee.
1 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1317.
Calculating the success fee
Waiting for payment element
[65] The standard practice for a CFA is for payment of fees to be postponed
until the (successful) outcome of the case. The payment of disbursements is less
standard with some CFAs providing for payment before the conclusion of the
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [65]
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case and others postponing this also. There is a cost attached therefore to this
delay and it is carried by the solicitor. If a charge for this delay is to be included
in the success fee then the percentage relating to waiting for payment must be
separately stated in the CFA1. This element cannot form part of the additional
liability to be recovered from an unsuccessful opponent2. It remains the
liability of the client in the event that the case is successful. In Hollins v Russell3
there was a conflict between the wording of the CFA and that of the risk
assessment with the former failing to refer to a percentage for delay and the
later providing for such an element. The Court of Appeal approved an
admission that in such circumstances that element would not be recoverable
from the client.
The client can challenge the percentage of the success fee in the usual way
under Rule 48. The percentage of the success fee relating to waiting for
payment will on the face of the CFA apply to the base costs actually incurred
in the litigation and not merely to those costs recovered from the unsuccessful
opponent. Those costs will have been incurred over a period of time
accumulating to a total to which the percentage of the success fee is then
applied. Using the success fee as the mechanism for this recovery of cost will,
therefore, have a tendency to inflate the amount recovered if it assumes all
costs were incurred from day one. The difficulty in an individual case is
accurately to predict the length of time during which the solicitor is waiting for
payment.
The use of the success fee as the mechanism for recovering the cost of waiting
for payment calls for an accurate prediction of the length of time which will
elapse before the conclusion of the case. The following table illustrates the
percentage of a success fee which would be called for to obtain the annual
interest rates in the table.
Interest Rate
(%)
6.0 8.0 10.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
Month Month
9 4.5 6.0 7.5 23 11.5 15.3 19.2
10 5.0 6.7 8.3 24 12.0 16.0 20.0
11 5.5 7.3 9.2 25 12.5 16.7 20.8
12 6.0 8.0 10.0 26 13.0 17.3 21.7
13 6.5 8.7 10.8 27 13.5 18.0 22.5
14 7.0 9.3 11.7 28 14.0 18.7 23.3
15 7.5 10.0 12.5 29 14.5 19.3 24.2
16 8.0 10.7 13.3 30 15.0 20.0 25.0
17 8.5 11.3 14.2 31 15.5 20.7 25.8
18 9.0 12.0 15.0 32 16.0 21.3 26.7
19 9.5 12.7 15.8 33 16.5 22.0 27.5
20 10.0 13.3 16.7 34 17.0 22.7 28.3
21 10.5 14.0 17.5 35 17.5 23.3 29.2
22 11.0 14.7 18.3 36 18.0 24.0 30.0
1 CFA Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692, reg 3(1)(b) at para [1051].
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2 SI 1998/3132, r 44.3B (inserted by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2000, SI
2000/1317).
3 [2003] EWCA Civ 718 at 133, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487 referring to the
conjoined appeal of Tichband v Hurdman.
The risk that the case will lose
[66] The major part of the success fee will reflect the risk that fees will not be
earned because the case fails. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal in Glouces-
ter County Council v Evans1 rejected the argument that the lawfulness of a
success fee in terms of the statutory maximum of 100% should be measured
by reference to the costs at risk. The agreement was for £95 per hour in any
event and £145 for a win, it being then argued that the costs at risk were £50
so that the true success fee amounted to 290%. The court held that the proper
measure was against the fee that would have been payable had the agreement
not been a CFA which it said was £145 The CFA must contain brief reasons
for setting this percentage2. A risk assessment of the individual case will
provide the reasons for this element3. The risk assessment needs to be
expressed as a percentage level of confidence which can then be translated into
a percentage success fee. The purpose of this element of the success fee is to
recover from the successful cases sufficient funds to offset the losses incurred
in unsuccessful cases. If the costs typically incurred in winning cases were the
same as those typically incurred in cases which lose, an arithmetic conversion
would be possible4. This conversion requires a simple mathematical formula as
follows: Express the confidence of success in percentage terms – eg 60%. Con-
vert that to a two figure decimal by dividing the percentage figure by 100 – eg
60 ÷ 100 = .6. Divide 1 by that decimal eg 1 ÷ .6 = 1.67. 1 represents the
normal fee. To find the success fee, deduct 1 and multiply by 100. Eg 1.67−1
= .67 × 100 = 67%.
In Spiralstem v Marks & Spencer5, the claimants entered into a CFA with their
solicitors that provided for a success fee of 100%. Master Campbell in the
SCCO held that the decision as to whether or not the ready reckoner should
be adjusted to reflect that the fact that there is a split trial on liability and
quantum and, therefore, a change in the level of risk should be left to an appeal
court. The same costs judge sat in Barham v Athreya6 where Judge Dean QC
appears to have been referred to a shortened version of the ready reckoner
which listed a 50% chance case and then a 60% chance case with dramatic
decrease in the success fee from 100% in the former to 67% in the latter. In
Oliver v Whipps Cross Hospital NHS Trust7 the view taken in Barham of the
firm’s standard CFA was comprehensively rejected. The judge rejected the
argument that the firm would not have taken the case had it only had 50%
prospects. He also rejected the view that there had to be a two stage fee if a
100% figure was ever to be approved. The result was approval of a single stage
100% fee. McCarthy v Essex Rivers Healthcare NHS Trust8 is, according to
the judgment, the fourth case in which the same clinical negligence firm’s CFA
has been reviewed by a court. Here the point taken was that the CFA (as do
most) provided that it could be terminated “ . . . if we believe that you are
unlikely to win.” That, said Mackay J, was relevant to the level of a single
stage success fee (claimed at 100%). Also relevant was the fact that this was
not a two stage success fee. The success fee had been reduced to 80% and this
appeal against that decision failed. It was accepted that the case was, at the
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [66]
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time taken on, a 50:50 risk. Mackay J took the view that the termination
clause meant that at a fairly early stage cases below a 50% chance can be
removed leaving claims falling into the range of 50% to 80% prospects. The
table below provides the detail explaining what appears to be a dramatic
change. Ignoring this detail will always give a false appearance of dramatically
varying figures. Crane J in Edwards v Smiths Dock Ltd9 approved of the ready
reckoner as not producing unreasonable levels of success fee.
1 [2008] EWCA Civ 21, [2008] 1 WLR 1883, [2008] NLJR 219.
2 CFA Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692, reg 3(1)(a).
3 See para [221] ff.
4 Such a conversion is produced in a table in Bawdon, Napier and Wignall Conditional Fees –
A Survival Guide (2nd edn) Law Society publications.
5 [2007] EWHC 90084 (Costs).
6 [2007] EW Misc 6 (EWCC) Central London County Court.
7 [2009] EWHC 1104 (QB), 108 BMLR 181, 153 Sol Jo (no 21) 29.
8 Unreported, Case No HQ06X03686, 13 November 2009, QBD.
9 [2004] EWHC 1116 (QB), [2004] 3 Costs LR 440,.
[67] Table of commonly used percentage success fees:
Confidence of
success
Success fee Confidence of
success
Success fee
100 0 65 54
80 25 60 66
75 33.3 55 81
70 43 50 100
Such a conversion ratio cannot give an accurate reflection where costs incurred
in a typical losing case exceed in a significant amount the costs typically
incurred (and recovered) in successful cases. The conversion method can be
used as a starting point in such an environment in that it shows the level of
success fee which would be needed even where there is no differential in costs
in won and lost cases.
The table below calculates the risk assessment part of the success fee according
to the ratio of costs in lost cases to won cases. Thus a costs ratio of 1 means
that it is assumed that the costs in a case which loses are equal to a case which
wins. A ratio of 2 means that the assumption is that costs in a lost case will be
double the costs in a case which wins. Percentages have been rounded up.
Costs
ratio
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Chance of
winning
Success Fee
50 100% 150% 200% 250% 300%
51 96% 144% 192% 240% 288%
52 92% 138% 185% 231% 277%
53 89% 133% 177% 222% 266%
54 85% 128% 170% 213% 256%
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55 82% 123% 164% 205% 245%
56 79% 118% 157% 196% 236%
57 75% 113% 151% 189% 226%
58 72% 109% 145% 181% 217%
59 69% 104% 139% 174% 208%
60 67% 100% 133% 167% 200%
61 64% 96% 128% 160% 192%
62 61% 92% 123% 153% 184%
63 59% 88% 117% 147% 176%
64 56% 84% 113% 141% 169%
65 54% 81% 108% 135% 162%
66 52% 77% 103% 129% 155%
67 49% 74% 99% 123% 148%
68 47% 71% 94% 118% 141%
69 45% 67% 90% 112% 135%
70 43% 64% 86% 107% 129%
71 41% 61% 82% 102% 123%
72 39% 58% 78% 97% 117%
73 37% 55% 74% 92% 111%
74 35% 53% 70% 88% 105%
75 33% 50% 67% 83% 100%
76 32% 47% 63% 79% 95%
77 30% 45% 60% 75% 90%
78 28% 42% 56% 71% 85%
79 27% 40% 53% 66% 80%
80 25% 38% 50% 63% 75%
81 23% 35% 47% 59% 70%
82 22% 33% 44% 55% 66%
83 20% 31% 41% 51% 61%
84 19% 29% 38% 48% 57%
85 18% 26% 35% 44% 53%
86 16% 24% 33% 41% 49%
87 15% 22% 30% 37% 45%
88 14% 20% 27% 34% 41%
89 12% 19% 25% 31% 37%
90 11% 17% 22% 28% 33%
91 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
92 9% 13% 17% 22% 26%
93 8% 11% 15% 19% 23%
94 6% 10% 13% 16% 19%
95 5% 8% 11% 13% 16%
96 4% 6% 8% 10% 13%
97 3% 5% 6% 8% 9%
98 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [67]
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99 1% 2% 2% 3% 3%
The shaded area of the table shows the levels of confidence needed to achieve
a success fee below the statutory maximum of 100%. Allowance may still need
to be made for disbursement liability and for waiting for payment, in which
case the level of confidence will need to be higher.
Ratio of 1 – cut-off point
[68] 51% is the margin – out of 100 cases, 51 will win and 49 will lose (on
average). With costs in losing cases being the same as the winning cases, there
must be at least a 51% confidence of winning the case for the success fee to
cover the losses.
This can be shown as follows: 51 cases win, at a success fee of 96% on
£1,000.00 costs. Your total regained funds for these 51 cases are therefore 51
× 96 % × 1000 = £48,960.00.
On the 49 cases that, on average, would lose, £49,000.00 would be paid out.
The work just breaks even.
Ratio of 1.5 – cut-off point
[69] 61% confidence is your lowest possible limit. Recovered costs are 61 ×
95.9% × 1000 = £59,000.00 and costs out are £39,000.00 × 1.5 = £59,000.00.
At a ratio of 2 the same confidence level would give this result: costs recovered:
61 × 100% × 1000 = £61,000.00 whereas costs out are £39,000.00 × 2 =
£78,000.00 leaving a deficit of £17,000.00.
Ratio of 2 – cut-off point
[70] The cut-off point is now 67% confidence: Costs recovered will be
£67,000.00 and costs going out will be £66,000.00. If the ratio went to 2.5 at
that confidence level the following results: costs recovered £67,000.00 but
costs going out are £82,500.00 giving a deficit of £15,500.00.
The following examples illustrate the effect of the costs ratio assumptions
where the level of confidence is 75%:
Costs
Ratio
Success fee
%
Case
Number
Costs Success
Fee
Loss Net
loss
1 33 1 1000 333.33 0
2 1000 333.33 0
3 1000 333.33 0
4 0 0 1000
1000 1000 NIL
Case
Number
Costs Success
Fee
Loss
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1.5 50 1 1000 500 0
2 1000 500 0
3 1000 500 0
4 0 0 1500
1500 1500 NIL
Case
Number
Costs Success
Fee
Loss
2 66 1 1000 666.66 0
2 1000 666.66 0
3 1000 666.66 0
4 0 0 2000
2000 2000 NIL
Case
Number
Costs Success
Fee
Loss
2.5 83 1 1000 833.33 0
2 1000 833.33 0
3 1000 833.33 0
4 0 0 2500 NIL
2500 2500
Case
Number
Costs Success
Fee
Loss
3 100 1 1000 1000 0
2 1000 1000 0
3 1000 1000 0
4 0 0 3000 NIL
3000 3000
All of the above calculations can be used where the CFA states that in the event
of the case losing no fee at all will be paid. In such a case the success fee reflects
the risk of no payment. Where the CFA provides for some payment where the
case loses, then the calculation of the success fee must reflect the fact that only
part of the fees are being risked. One method of doing this is to calculate the
success fee as above but provide that it is only to be applied to the part of the
basic fees which would not be paid if the case loses.
Example assuming normal base fee is £1000:
Case loses – 50% of normal fees payable – £500
Case wins – 100% of normal fees payable £1000 plus success fee of 66%
Success fee applied to 50% of basic fee is 66% × £500 = £330
The alternative method would be to reduce the ordinary success fee by the
percentage of the basic fees being risked. In the above example, the success fee
of 66% would be reduced by 50% to 33%. This reduced success fee when
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [70]
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applied to normal basic costs gives the same result as the first method – ie 33%
× £1000 = £330 but this does not reflect the risk assessment which should
support a success fee at 66% and it is submitted that this method ought not to
be used.
Liability for disbursements
[71] Section 11.8(1)(b) of the Practice Direction About Costs (CPD) expressly
refers to the legal representative’s liability for any disbursements as being a
factor to be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the success
fee. The success fee is applied to the fees charged and is not applied to
disbursements. If the solicitor is carrying the liability for disbursements in the
event that the case is unsuccessful, the only mechanism for reflecting that risk
lies in increasing the percentage of the success fee. The increase attributable to
this liability will be recoverable from a losing opponent and can therefore be
challenged as being set at an unreasonable level. The test is whether the
percentage increase was reasonable having regard to the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time the percentage was set1. As with the
percentage for waiting for payment the difficulty is in accurately predicting the
level of disbursements to be reflected in a percentage of the success fee which
is a multiplier to the fees incurred throughout the life of the case. In order to
calculate the percentage success fee to recover disbursement liability it is first
necessary to express the disbursements as a percentage of costs. That
percentage is then multiplied by the success fee percentage figure representing
the risk of the case losing. This element of the success fee is vulnerable to
inaccuracy in predicting costs and/or disbursements.
1 CPD, s 11.7 at B[2474].
Outsourced services
[71.1] The Court of Appeal in Crane v Canons Leisure Centre1 considered the
question of whether charges of an outside agency could be treated as work
done by a fee earner rather than as a disbursement. The court concluded in the
context of an independent costs draftsman that the fee could be charged as the
solicitor’s fee and a success fee could therefore be levied on it. The distinction
was drawn between charges by solicitors themselves for work which they
themselves do or are directly responsible for and expenses which they incur for
a client for other people’s work for which they are not directly responsible and
in respect of which they simply pass on the cost to the client.
1 [2007] EWCA Civ 1352, [2008] 2 All ER 931, [2008] 1 WLR 2549.
[72] Illustration of the calculation of the disbursement element of a success
fee
DisbursementsCosts Ratio D to C % Confidence
success fee
Disbursement
success fee
%
£500 £10,000 5% 33.3% 1.66
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Disclosure to opponent
Pre-issue
[73] The requirements for disclosure are contained in r 44.151 and s 19 of the
Practice Direction About Costs2. There are no requirements relating to
pre-issue disclosure but such is recommended in the CPD3, the Protocols
Practice Direction4 until 1 October 2009 and thereafter the Practice Direction
(Pre-Action Conduct). The Protocols Practice Direction provides that disclo-
sure ‘should’ occur pre-issue. From 1 April 2004 the Personal Injury Pre-action
Protocol provided that notice should be given when a funding arrangement is
made. There are conflicting views on the meaning of ‘should’. In Metcalfe v
Clipstone5 it was held to mean can but not must disclose and in Cullen v
Chopra6 the same costs judge was not persuaded that the decision in Metcalfe
was wrong, whereas in Bainbridge v MAF Pipelines7 it was held to mean
‘must’ with the usual costs consequences of a failure to comply with the
Practice Direction. From 1 October 2009 the Practice Direction (Pre-Ac-
tion Conduct) provides that where a party enters into a funding agreement that
party must inform the other parties as soon as possible and in any event either
within 7 days of entering into the funding arrangement concerned or, where a
claimant enters into a funding arrangement before sending a letter before
claim, in the letter before claim. The CPD uses the phrase ‘funding arrange-
ment’ to refer both to a CFA with success fee and to an insurance policy. Where
more than one such arrangement has been made in respect of a case a single
notice can provide the information relating to each arrangement8.
1 See para [1188].
2 In force 3 July 2000.
3 CPD, s 19.2(5) at para [1227].
4 The Protocols Practice Direction came into force on 3 July 2000 and remained in force until
1 October 2009. It provided:
‘4A.1 Where a person enters into a funding arrangement within the meaning of
rule 43.2(1)(k) he should inform other potential parties to the claim that he has done
so.
4A.2 Paragraph 4A.1 applies to all proceedings whether proceedings to which a pre-action
protocol applies or otherwise.’
From 1 April 2004 the Personal Injury pre-action protocol provides in clause 3.2 that
where the case is funded by a conditional fee agreement (or collective conditional fee
agreement), notification should be given of the existence of the agreement and where
appropriate, that there is a success fee and/or insurance premium, although not the level
of the success fee or premium.
5 2004 unreported SCCO Case No: HN300882.
6 [2007] EWHC 90093 (Costs).
7 2004 unreported – Teesside County Court.
8 CPD, s 19.4(5) at para [1227].
Relief from sanction
[74] CPR 1998, r 44.3B(1)(c) provides that a party may not recover any
additional liability for any period in the proceedings during which he failed to
provide information about a funding arrangement in accordance with a rule,
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [74]
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practice direction or court order. Part 3, r 3.9 provides a procedure for the
granting of relief from sanction for failure to comply with a Rule, Practice
Direction or Court Order:
‘3.9
(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to
comply with any rule, practice direction or court order the court will
consider all the circumstances including –
(a) the interests of the administration of justice;
(b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly;
(c) whether the failure to comply was intentional;
(d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure;
(e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules,
practice directions, court orders and any relevant pre-action protocol
(GL);
( f ) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or his legal
representative;
(g) whether the trial date or the likely trial date can still be met if relief
is granted;
(h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and
(i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party.
(2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence.’
The CPD 10.1 provides–
‘In a case to which rule 44.3B(1)(c) or (d) applies the party in default may apply for
relief from the sanction. He should do so as quickly as possible after he becomes
aware of the default. An application, supported by evidence, should be made under
Part 23 to a costs judge or district judge of the court which is dealing with the case.
(Attention is drawn to rules 3.8 and 3.9 which deal with sanctions and relief from
sanctions).’
[75] In Hardcastle v Leeds and Holbeck Building Society1 the claimant
alleged negligence in a mortgage valuation causing the claimant to purchase a
property at a significant over value. There was a further claim for personal
injury in the form of depression as result of living in a house with serious
defects. Solicitors acted from February 2000 and entered into a CFA in
October 2000. No notice of the CFA was given until costs were sought
following a Tomlin order made in March 2002. It was held that CPR 1998,
rr 44.3B and 44.15(1) required information to be given once proceedings were
issued. This was a pre-condition to recovery of a success fee. The CPD at
19.2(5) recommended that notice be given prior to issue but that was not an
absolute requirement. There was no applicable pre-action protocol in this case.
The court could disallow all or part of a success fee if the paying party could
show some prejudice had been caused to it by the failure to give notice. No
such prejudice was shown because the defendant had totally rejected the claim
and there was nothing to suggest that its position would have altered had it
known of the CFA. No reference is here made to the Protocols Practice
Direction which provides as follows –
‘4A.1 Where a person enters into a funding arrangement within the meaning of
rule 43.2(1)(k) he should inform other potential parties to the claim that he
has done so.
4A.2 Paragraph 4A.1 applies to all proceedings whether proceedings to which a
pre-action protocol applies or otherwise.’
[74] Litigation Funding
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The result would seemingly have not altered because this notice requirement
would also not have altered the defendant’s stance.
1 [2003] 7 CL 48 (QBD).
[76] In Tait v Cataldo1a Notice of Funding served in February 2008 referred
only to a CFA made in November 2006 with no reference to two earlier CFAs
or to an ATE policy. In respect of the ATE the failure was an error in
transcribing a written N251 into the typed version sent to the defendants. As
to the two earlier CFAs those had come to an end by the time the notice had
to be given and the solicitor took the view that those earlier CFAs, being spent,
did not need to be referred to. That understanding was not however relied
upon before Master O’Hare who took the view that counsel was right not to
argue that the earlier CFAs need not be referred to. The explanations given for
the mistakes did not count in favour of granting relief but Master O’Hare did
grant relief in all respects based on the view that the CFA mistakes were of little
significance, the ATE mistake had caused no prejudice to the defendants and
the mistakes had in terms of substance been remedied informally before the
settlement process commenced.
The failures in Supperstone v Hurst1 were that service by email was not
sufficient, the notice was unsigned and omitted the address of the insurer and
the policy number, and the notice was late. The lateness was explained in
respect of the ATE policy in that the solicitors assumed the policy came into
effect at a later date and had given notice at that point. Relief from sanction
was given and on appeal upheld on the basis of the explanation given as to
lateness, including the fact that the notice stated the later date for commence-
ment of cover, and that there was no evidence of disadvantage to the opponent.
In Kutsi v North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust2 contrary to CPR
44.15 and CPR 44.3B, the defendant had not been notified of the existence of
the policy until after the claim was settled, as a result of which the claimant
needed the court to grant relief from sanctions before she could attempt to
recover the premium of £80,325.00 from the defendant on detailed assess-
ment. On appeal it was held right to be critical of the firm’s failure to be aware
of rudimentary CPR principles and there was no good explanation for the
complete failure to give any notice of the premium at all. It followed that
irrespective of any prejudice to the paying party relief from sanction would be
refused. In Haydon v Strudwick4 an initial CFA with success fee was entered
into whilst the client was a minor. Upon gaining majority the client’s position
became one of patient and a second CFA was entered into. ATE insurance was
also taken out. No notice of funding for any of these additional liabilities was
ever sent. Both CFAs were at various stages referred to in correspondence.
Early correspondence did refer also to the first CFA having additional
liabilities. At no point was the ATE policy referred to. Relief from sanction was
granted in respect of the two CFAs but not in respect of the ATE policy. Having
applied all of the factors of CPR 3.9 for the granting of relief none of those
factors indicated that relief ought to be withheld. In particular the opponent
was aware that there was a CFA with additional liabilities (but not the ATE)
and was not prejudiced by a failure to provide the technical detail that form
N251 sets out.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [76]
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1 [2010] EWHC 90166 (Costs).
1 [2008] EWHC 735 (Ch), [2008] 4 Costs LR 572, [2008] BPIR 1134.
2 [2008] EWHC 90119 (Costs).
4 [2010] EWHC 90164 (Costs).
[77]–[80] In Williams v Plymouth Community Services NHS Trust1, a county
court appeal, notice had not been given of the existence of a CFA or of
insurance entered into in February 2002. Notice was given in July 2002 and
immediate application for relief under the CPR 1998, Part 3, r 3.9. The county
court held that the appeal was brought by the client and not the solicitor and
that if a sanction was to be imposed it would necessitate a differentiation
between the success fee attributable to work done before notice was given and
that attributable to later work. That would involve an unjustifiable expense in
itself. The court considered that the relatively modest mistake by the solicitor
ought not to deprive the client of her success fee.
1 [2003] 4 CL 57.
Claimant funding arrangement in place before issue
[81] Notice of the funding arrangement must be given to the court when
issuing the claim form1. Form N2512 sets out the details required. Sufficient
copies of Form N251 must be provided to the court for service on all other
parties. If the claimant is serving the claim form in person then form
N251 must be served at the same time.
1 Claim form includes petition and application notice. See CPD, s 19.2(1) at para [1227].
2 See para [1241].
Defendant funding arrangements in place before filing a document
[82] Notice to the court must be given when filing the first document1.
Sufficient copies of the notice should be provided to the court for service on all
other parties. If the defendant serves the first document in person then notice
of the funding arrangement must be served at the same time.
1 First document includes an acknowledgment of service, a defence, application to set aside
default judgment or any other document. See CPD, s 19.2(3)(a) at para [1227].
Funding arrangements made after issue
[83] A party must file and serve notice to the court and to all other parties
within seven days of making the funding arrangement1.
1 CPD, s 19.2(4) at para [1227].
[76] Litigation Funding
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The information required to be disclosed1
1 CPD, s 19.4 at para [1227].
CFAs with success fee
[84] State the date of the CFA and the claim(s) to which it applies.
Disclosure where the funding arrangement was made after 1 April and be-
fore 3 July 2000
[85] Where a party has entered into a funding arrangement and started
proceedings after 1 April but before 3 July 2000, the disclosure requirements
were to be complied with by 31 July 2000 irrespective of the date within the
transitional period on which the funding arrangement was made1. This
provision applies only to claimants. Where a defendant entered into a funding
arrangement between 1 April and 3 July 2000 there is no provision2.
1 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1317, r 39 at para [1081]. This Rule
does not amend the CPR 1998 and stands alone as the transitional provision.
2 It was held in Inline Logistics Ltd v UCI Logistics Ltd [2002] EWHC 519 (Ch), (2002) Times,
2 May, [2002] 2 Costs LR 304 by Ferris J that the AJA 1999, s 29 gave the court power to
award an additional liability, that there were no applicable rules for defendants and that the
absence of applicable rules should not prevent recovery. The entire premium was allowed in
costs to the successful defendant.
Estimates of costs
[86] A party intending to seek to recover from another party an additional
liability is not required to reveal the amount of that additional liability when
giving an estimate of costs1.
1 CPD, s 6.2(2). See A[3003].
E Recoverability of after the event insurance premiums
[87] AJA 1999, s 29 provides:
‘Where in any proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any party who has
taken out an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability in those
proceedings, the costs payable to him may, subject in the case of court proceedings
to rules of court, include costs in respect of the premium of the policy’.
[88] Rule 43.2(1) of the CPR 1998 provides:
‘(m) “insurance premium” means a sum of money paid or payable for insurance
against the risk of incurring a costs liability in the proceedings, taken out
after the event that is the subject matter of the claim’1.
It is important to note that the litigation need not be funded by a CFA in
order for the insurance premium to be recovered under the AJA 1999, s 29. In
Ashworth v Peterborough United Football Club2 the premium for a both sides’
cover policy was allowed in full on assessment. As to what constitutes
premium, see para [108.2].
1 See para [1162].
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [88]
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2 (10 June 2002, unreported), SCCO 0201106.
Insurance policies taken out between 2 April and 3 July 2000
[89] A premium can only be recovered as an additional liability and only
constitutes a funding arrangement if it is the first policy of insurance relating
to those proceedings or cause of action1. It seems that only that part of the
premium relating to cover for costs which are incurred after the policy is taken
can form the basis of an additional liability2. The result will be a complex
matter of separating costs incurred by the paying party before the receiving
party entered into the insurance policy. It also requires separation of own
disbursements, if covered, incurred before and after taking out the policy.
Having made these calculations it is assumed that some apportionment of the
premium between the costs incurred before the policy was taken out will be
made and the additional liability confined to that portion attributed to the
costs incurred after the policy was taken out.
1 Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2000, SI 2000/900, art 3. See para
[1071].
2 CPD, s 57.9(3). See para [1230].
Insurance policies taken out after 3 July 2000
[90]–[93] There are no provisions limiting the period in which the insured
costs are themselves incurred. It is standard for policies to carry retrospective
cover in respect of adverse costs and many policies give retrospective cover for
own disbursements. The cover is for the benefit of the paying party and
accordingly the distinctions made in the transitional period are not made
thereafter. In Ashworth1 it was argued that the premium in respect of the
period of retrospective cover should not be recoverable on the grounds that
this imposed an additional costs liability which was not known at the time.
That argument failed on the basis that had it been intended to preclude
recovery of the cost of retrospective cover the Rules, Practice Direction or
Regulations would have so provided.
1 (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO 0201106.
Disclosure
[94] An insurance policy is a funding arrangement and the provisions on
disclosure apply in respect of it in the same way as they do for the CFA with
a success fee. Form N251 may be used to provide the necessary information
and sufficient copies given to the court for service on all other parties in the
same manner as for the CFA with a success fee1. In the context of an
application for a costs capping order in a libel claim it was held in Henry v
BBC2 that a defendant is entitled to enquire as to the limit of indemnity of an
ATE policy and as to whether it excluded cover where the insured is found to
be dishonest. In the particular case the key issue was the claimant’s honesty. In
Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd3 the ATE Insurance policy was a disclosable
document pursuant to CPR 31.14, was relevant and not privileged. It enabled
the defendant to a GLO to assess the costs risk it faced. It seems that the level
[88] Litigation Funding
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of premium is not relevant in those circumstances and would be redacted from
the disclosed policy. In R (on the application of Buglife, The Inverte-
brate Conservation Trust) v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corpo-
ration4 the court of appeal held that although the provisions of 44 PD do not
say in terms that the level of a success fee should be disclosed, in the context
of an application for a costs capping order, there was no doubt that this
information should be supplied.
1 The provisions for disclosure are dealt with fully above when considering the recoverability of
the success fee. Where there is an insurance policy but no CFA the disclosure on Form N251
will refer only to the policy. Where there is a CFA with success fee and an insurance policy
Form N251 (see para [1241]), should refer to both funding arrangements.
2 [2005] EWHC 2503 (QB), [2006] 1 All ER 154, [2005] NLJR 1780.
3 [2009] EWHC 1033 (TCC), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 428.
4 [2008] EWCA Civ 1209, [2008] 45 EG 101 (CS), (2008) Times, 18 November.
The information to be disclosed
[95] The name and address of the insurer, the date and number of the policy
and the claim(s) to which cover applies must be disclosed. From 1 April 2004
the address of the insurer and the policy number must also be given1. From
1 October 2009 notice must also state the level of cover2. It is not a
requirement that the cost of the insurance be disclosed at this stage. In
Ashworth3 a claimant gave notice in advance of taking out insurance. An
indication of the size of premium was also given by referring to its size relative
to the value of the claim. Whilst such advance disclosure is not required it is
likely to influence decisions on assessment as to reasonableness. Where a party
has a policy with a staged or stepped premium it should inform its opponent
that the policy is staged, and should set out accurately the trigger moments at
which the second or later stages will be reached4. This obligation should be
undertaken in addition to the obligations set out in the CPR 1998, r 44.15(1)
and in paras 19.1(1) and 19.4 of the CPD. If this is done, the opponent has
been given fair notice of the staging, and unless there are features of the case
that are out of the ordinary, his liability to pay at the second or third stage a
higher premium than he would have had to pay if the claim had been settled
at the first stage should not prove to be a contentious issue.
1 CPD 19.4(3).
2 CPD 19.4(2)(b) Form N251 applicable from 1 October 2009 assumes that “level of cover”
means the financial limit of indemnity.
3 (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO 0201106.
4 Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER
354, [2007] 1 WLR 808.
Failure to disclose
[96] A party may not recover, as an additional liability, for any period during
which there was a failure to provide information about the funding arrange-
ment as required by a rule, practice direction or court order1 nor where a
requirement of the practice direction or a court order to disclose at assessment
the reasons for setting the percentage increase at the level stated in the CFA has
not been complied with2.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [96]
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As in all cases of failure to comply with provisions of the CPR 1998, the court
may grant relief from the sanction under r 3.93. In Wooldridge v Hayes4 the
claimant disclosed an insurance schedule that described the cover as being
‘subject to the Policy Wording’. The policy wording had not been served but in
any event it did not provide the information required by the Costs Practice
Direction para 32.5(2). Under CPR 44.3B(1)(c) a party may not recover any
additional liability for any period in the proceedings during which he failed to
provide information about a funding arrangement in accordance with a rule,
practice direction or court order. It was held that in the case of an insurance
premium it was the full premium that fell within CPR 44.3B since it does not
accrue (unlike a success fee) on a daily basis. On the facts relief from sanction
was granted. From 1 October 2009 the words “Unless a court orders other-
wise” are inserted into CPR 44.3B(1) and a new paragraph (e) is added
disallowing an entire insurance premium where the receiving party has failed
to provide the specified information about an insurance policy in the time
provided for in a rule, practice direction or court order. CPR 44(3)(e) reads as
follows:
“(e) any insurance premium where that party has failed to provide information
about the insurance policy in question by the time required by a rule, practice
direction or court order.”
1 SI 1998/3132, r 44.3B(1)(c) and see para [1175].
2 SI 1998/3132, r 44.3B(1)(d) and see para [1175].
3 See para [73]. CPD, s 10.1 further provides that the party in default should apply for relief under
Part 23. See para [1223].
4 (SCCO Case No 0100072) [2005] EWHC 90007 (Costs).
F Assessment of an additional liability
Stage at which assessment to be made
[97]–[98] Rule 44.3A(1)1 of the CPR 1998 states:
(1) The court will not assess any additional liability until the conclusion of
the proceedings2, or the part of the proceedings, to which the funding
arrangement relates.
1 Inserted by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1317.
2 CPD, s 2.4 provides that proceedings are concluded when the court has finally determined the
matters in issue in the claim, whether or not there is an appeal. The making of an award of
provisional damages (Part 41) is also treated as a final determination of the matters in issue.
CPD, s 2.5 provides that proceedings are to be treated as concluded, although they are
continuing, where the court so orders or the parties in writing so agree.
Disclosure to the court
Summary assessment
[98.1] CPD 14.9
‘In order to facilitate the court in making a summary assessment of any additional
liability at the conclusion of the proceedings the party seeking such costs must
[96] Litigation Funding
E-62 BCS • Issue 96
0060 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:17 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
prepare and have available for the court a bundle of documents which must include
–
(1) a copy of every notice of funding arrangement (Form N251) which has been
filed by him;
(2) a copy of every estimate and statement of costs filed by him;
(3) a copy of the risk assessment prepared at the time any relevant funding
arrangement was entered into and on the basis of which the amount of the
additional liability was fixed.
Detailed assessment
CPD 32.4
If the detailed assessment is in respect of an additional liability only, the receiving
party must serve on the paying party and all other relevant persons the following
documents:
(a) a notice of commencement;
(b) a copy of the bill of costs;
(c) the relevant details of the additional liability;
(d) a statement giving the name and address of any person upon whom the
receiving party intends to serve the notice of commencement.
CPD 32.5
The relevant details of an additional liability are as follows:
(1) In the case of a conditional fee agreement with a success fee:
(a) a statement showing the amount of costs which have been summarily
assessed or agreed, and the percentage increase which has been
claimed in respect of those costs;
(b) a statement of the reasons for the percentage increase given in
accordance with Regulation 3(1)(a) of the Conditional Fee Agree-
ments Regulations or Regulation 5(1)(c) of the Collective Condi-
tional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000.
(2) If the additional liability is an insurance premium: a copy of the insurance
certificate showing whether the policy covers the receiving party’s own costs;
his opponents costs; or his own costs and his opponent’s costs; and the
maximum extent of that cover, and the amount of the premium paid or
payable.
(3) If the receiving party claims an additional amount under Section 30 of the
Access of Justice Act 1999: a statement setting out the basis upon which the
receiving party’s liability for the additional amount is calculated.’
Where the detailed assessment is in respect of base costs and an additional
liability the details required in the CPD 32.5 must be provided1.
In Wooldridge v Hayes2 the claimant disclosed an insurance schedule that
described the cover as being ‘subject to the Policy Wording’. The policy
wording had not been served but in any event it did not provide the
information required by the CPD 32.5(2).23. Under the CPR 1998,
r 44.3B(1)(c) a party may not recover any additional liability for any period in
the proceedings during which he failed to provide information about a funding
arrangement in accordance with a rule, practice direction or court order. It was
held that in the case of an insurance premium it was the full premium that fell
within the CPR 1998, r 44.3B since it does not accrue (unlike a success fee) on
a daily basis. On the facts relief from sanction was granted. In Hutchings v
British Transport Police3 the Senior Costs Judge refused an application for
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [98.1]
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disclosure of home and buildings and contents policies and restricted a request
for further information under Part 18 to three questions:
(1) Does the claimant have insurance?
(2) With whom?
(3) Does the claimant have any legal expenses insurance?
CPD 35.2(1)(b) requires a statement. That statement must be complete, its
purpose being to enable the paying party to know the basis of the uplift when
it was set. Where reasons given in reply to points of dispute differed from those
in the CFA that was not a complete statement. In any event a statement must
be given at commencement not in reply to points of dispute – Middleton v
Vosper4. In the case of an additional liability in the form of a success fee CPR
1998, r 44.3B(1)(d) disentitles a receiving party to recover any success fee at all
if there is a failure to provide the relevant details of the success fee as required
by paragraph 32.5 of the CPD.
In Findlay v Cantor Index Ltd5 it was held that CPD 32.5 could have no
application to post 1 November 2005 CFAs given the revocation of the
regulations.
1 CPD 32.7.
2 (SCCO Case No 0100072) [2005] EWHC 90007 (Costs).
3 (Claim No: CH 304636) [2006] EWHC 90064 (Costs).
4 (2009) unreported: Southampton CC 6SO05696.
5 EWHC 90116 (Costs).
[98.2] Regulation 3(2)(a) of the CFA Regulations 20001 requires the CFA to
provide that where a court on an assessment orders disclosure of the CFA it
may be given. This effectively provides a contractual waiver of the privilege
which exists in the CFA. An issue has arisen, however, in respect of other
documents relevant to the fee arrangements between solicitor and client. The
issue has arisen in several cases in the context of the indemnity principle and
concerns raised by paying parties that the principle was being breached where
the client did not have the means to pay their own costs unless they were paid
by the opponent. In Dickinson (t/a Dickinson Equipment Finance) v Rushmer
(t/a FJ Associates)2 bills were signed by the solicitor who certified compliance
with the indemnity principle3. Documents were voluntarily shown to the judge
at the costs hearing but were not disclosed to the paying party nor did the
judge put the receiving party to an election as to disclosure or reliance on other
evidence. Rimer J accepted that the bills were privileged but that the client care
letter and the calculations showing actual amounts of costs paid were not
privileged. Following Goldman v Hesper4 and Pamplin v Express News-
papers Ltd5 it was held that the paying party had by assertion raised a genuine
issue as to compliance with the indemnity principle. The judge ought not to
have decided the point by reference to documents not shown to the paying
party. The case was remitted.
In South Coast Shipping Co Ltd v Havant Borough Council6 a different view
was taken on very similar facts. Here bills and copies of cheques had been
voluntarily submitted to the costs judge but not to the paying party. Pumfrey
J held that the costs judge ought to have followed CPD, s 40.14, a provision
which Rimer J in Dickinson (above) said did not apply where documents had
[98.1] Litigation Funding
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been volunteered. On the facts it was held that the failure to apply s 40.14
should not give rise to still further satellite litigation and the costs judge’s de-
cision was confirmed.
The CPD, s 40.14:
‘The court may direct the receiving party to produce any document which in the
opinion of the court is necessary to enable it to reach its decision. These documents
will in the first instance be produced to the court, but the court may ask the receiving
party to elect whether to disclose the particular document to the paying party in
order to rely on the contents of the document, or whether to decline disclosure and
instead rely on other evidence.’
In the South Coast case (above) it was held that where a costs judge relies upon
privileged material (albeit voluntarily provided and not ordered to be pro-
duced under s 40.14), then s 40.14 ought to be followed with the receiving
party put to an election.
The Court of Appeal in Hollins v Russell7 declined to decide the issue of
privilege given that full argument had not been heard on that point. The court
concluded that the Pamplin8 election procedure was applicable where a
claimant wished to rely on a CFA in costs only proceedings. Ordinarily
therefore the claimant must disclose the CFA. It will not ordinarily be
appropriate to require disclosure of attendance notes.
1 SI 2000/692.
2 [2001] All ER (D) 369 (Dec).
3 See General of Berne Insurance Co v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] 2 All ER
301, [1998] 1 WLR 1231, CA and Bailey v IBC Vehicles Ltd [1998] 3 All ER 570, 142 Sol
Jo LB 126, CA.
4 [1988] 3 All ER 97, [1988] 1 WLR 1238, CA.
5 [1985] 2 All ER 185, [1985]1 WLR 689.
6 [2002] 3 All ER 779, [2002] NLJR 59.
7 [2003] EWCA Civ 718 at 80–81, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
8 See fn 5.
Assessment powers
At the conclusion of the case
[99] Rule 44.3A(2)1 of the CPR states:
(2) At the conclusion of the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to
which the funding arrangement relates the court may –
(a) make a summary assessment of all the costs, including any
additional liability1;
(b) make an order for detailed assessment of the additional liability but
make a summary assessment of the other costs; or
(c) make an order for detailed assessment of all the costs2.
Where, however, there have been separate trials of different issues, there will
not normally be an assessment of the additional liability until all issues have
been tried3.
Where the parties do not agree the additional liability, the court may make a
summary assessment or order detailed assessment of that liability4.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [99]
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1 The court may assess base costs alone or both base costs and the additional liability – CPD,
s 3.1. See B[2471]. Where the summary assessment includes an additional liability the
assessment must be of the additional liability for the whole of the proceedings – CPD, s 14.7
at para [1225].
1 The court may assess base costs alone or both base costs and the additional liability – CPD,
s 3.1. See B[2471]. Where the summary assessment includes an additional liability the
assessment must be of the additional liability for the whole of the proceedings – CPD, s 14.7
at para [1225].
2 Unless base costs have already been assessed, the court will, on a detailed assessment, assess
both the base costs and the additional liability – CPD, s 3.4. See B[2471].
3 CPD, s 14.5 at para [1225].
4 CPD, s 14.8. See para [1225].
Before conclusion of the case
[100] The court should make a summary assessment of base costs at any
hearing or application unless there is good reason not to do so1. The existence
of a funding arrangement is not sufficient reason to not carry out a summary
assessment2 of base costs.
Where there has been a summary assessment before the conclusion of the case,
no order for payment will be made unless the court is satisfied that the
receiving party is at the time liable to pay the legal representative3. The court
has power to order costs to be paid into court and to make orders to postpone
the receiving party’s right to payment4.
1 CPD, s 13.12 at para [1224].
2 CPD, s 14.1 at para [1225].
3 CPD, s 14.3 at para [1225].
4 CPD, s 14.4 at para [1225].
G Success fees
Disallowance of any part of the success fee
[101] Rule 44.161 provides that where the court disallows any part of the
success fee the legal representative may apply for an order that the disallowed
part should remain payable by the client. If such an application is made the
court may adjourn the hearing to enable the client to be notified.
1 See para [1189].
Success fee applied only to recovered base costs
[102] Rule 44.3A provides:
‘(1) The court will not assess any additional liability until the conclusion of the
proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to which the funding
arrangement relates.
[“Funding arrangement” and “additional liability” are defined in rule 43.2.]
(2) At the conclusion of the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to
which the funding arrangement relates the court may –
[99] Litigation Funding
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(a) make a summary assessment of all the costs, including any additional
liability;
(b) make an order for detailed assessment of the additional liability but
make a summary assessment of the other costs; or
(c) make an order for detailed assessment of all the costs.’1
‘If the court makes a summary assessment of costs at the conclusion of proceedings
the court will specify separately
(1) the base costs, and if appropriate, the additional liability allowed as
solicitor’s charges, counsel’s fees, other disbursements and any VAT; . . . ’2
Nowhere in the CPR nor the CPD is it made explicit whether the additional
liability, in the form of a success fee, is applied only to base costs ordered to be
paid from or whether it applies to the whole of the base costs claimed.
Nonetheless, it is implicit form the CPD dealing with summary assessment at
the conclusion of proceedings, that the additional liability relates to assessed
base costs. A contrary view would in effect be to base the additional liability
on an indemnity basis as to the base costs, or indeed upon a costs claimed
basis. It is submitted that the general principles applicable to an assessment of
costs must in any event lead to the attachment of the allowed additional
liability to the allowed base costs. The contractual nature of the CFA and the
references to success fees in the CLSA 1990 and the CFA Regulations 20003
have relevance as between solicitor and client but cannot govern the assess-
ment of recoverable costs.
1 SI 1998/3132, r 44.3A.
2 CPD, s 13.7.
3 SI 2000/692.
Preparation for summary assessment at conclusion of the case
[102.1] The party seeking an additional liability must prepare and have
available for the court a bundle including all notices of funding arrangements
(N251), estimates and statements of costs filed and a copy of the risk
assessment prepared at the time any funding arrangement was made1.
1 CPD, s 14.9. See para [1225]. In compliance with the CFA Regulations 2000, SI 2000/692, reg 3,
at para [1051], the CFA will contain brief written reasons for the success fee. Those reasons
form part of communications between lawyer and client and as such are privileged. The CFA
must contain a term enabling the solicitor and client to comply with any requirement of the court
to disclose, to the court or any other person, the reasons stated in the CFA for setting the
percentage success fee if the additional liability is to be assessed. CPD, s 14.9 anticipates the
court requiring such disclosure. The CFA thus gives a contractual waiver of the privilege only
in respect of assessment of the additional liability.
Costs only proceedings and CFAs
[102.2] Rule 44.12A1 provides for the procedure to apply where no proceed-
ings have been started and where the parties have reached agreement on all
issues, including which party is to pay costs, but have failed to agree the
amount of costs. Either party may make an application under Part 8 for an
order for costs. This can therefore include an additional liability.
The claim form under Part 8 must include or be accompanied by a written
agreement or written conformation of agreement as to the issues and the
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [102.2]
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matter of which party is to pay costs. The court may make an order for costs
or dismiss the claim. If there is an order for costs this will lead to detailed
assessment. If the claim is opposed then under this rule the claim must be
dismissed. In such circumstances it is open to a party to issue a new claim,
under Pt 7 or Pt 8, to enforce the agreement.
The CPR 1998, r 44.12A, Part 8 procedure is not confined to CFAs. However,
where there is a CFA with a success fee, a Costs Judge or district judge may
take into account the time at which the claim was settled and that it was settled
without the issue of proceedings2. It is submitted that where a success fee has
been properly set in accordance with a risk assessment process, the usual test
of the reasonableness of that success fee, in the circumstances reasonably
known to the legal representative at that time, should be applied3. There are no
provisions in the statutory scheme to require that the success fee be reviewed
periodically or in response to a change or perceived change in the chances of
success. It is therefore at the assessment stage that that an apparent conflict
arises between the CPR 1998, r 44.5 and 17.8(2) of the CPD. An explanation
of these provisions given by the Senior Costs Judge in Bensusan v Freedman4
was approved by the Court of Appeal in Halloran v Delaney5:
‘In Bensusan v Freedman (20 September 2001, unreported) Master Hurst, the
Senior Costs Judge, commented in relation to paragraphs 11.7 and 17.8(2) of the
Practice Direction:
“The combined effect of these two paragraphs is to prevent the costs officer from
using hindsight in arriving at the appropriate success fee, and to prevent excessive
claims for success fees in cases which settle without the need for proceedings when
it is clear, or ought to have been clear from the outset, that the risk of having to
commence proceedings was minimal.”
We agree.’ [at 13].
From 1 October 2009 CPR 44.12B makes provision in respect of after the
event insurance premiums in publication cases:
‘(1) If in proceedings to which rule 44.12A applies it appears to the court that—
(a) if proceedings had been started, they would have been publication
proceedings;
(b) one party admitted liability and made an offer of settlement on the basis of
that admission;
(c) agreement was reached after that admission of liability and offer of
settlement; and
(d) either—
(i) the party making the admission of liability and offer of settlement
was not provided by the other party with the information about an
insurance policy as required by the Practice Direction (Pre-
Action Conduct); or
(ii) that party made the admission of liability and offer of settlement
before, or within 42 days of, being provided by the other party with
that information,
no costs may be recovered by the other party in respect of the insurance premium.
(2) In this rule, “publication proceedings” means proceedings for—
(a) defamation;
(b) malicious falsehood; or
(c) breach of confidence involving publication to the public at large.’
[102.2] Litigation Funding
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1 See para [1185].
2 CPR 1998 16th Update, July 2000 Consequential Changes, adding s 8.2 to the Practice
Direction About Costs.
3 SI 1998/3132, r 44.5, see para [1177] and CPD, s 11.7 at B[2474].
4 [2001] All ER (D) 212 (Oct), SC.
5 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
[102.3] The Court of Appeal in Halloran v Delaney1 held that the Law
Society Model CFA covered costs only proceedings as well as any substantive
proceedings. The issue then addressed was whether a success fee would ever be
justified in costs only proceedings:
‘While we would not suggest that any great degree of risk is involved, we would
reject [counsel for the appellant’s] submission that even at the present time there is
no risk in costs only proceedings for which a lawyer acting under a CFA is entitled
to seek protection on the principles discussed by this court, and approved by the
House of Lords ([2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 1 WLR 2000) in Callery v Gray. In
May 2000, moreover, those risks were more substantial because of the uncertainties
in the law to which we have referred.’2
Brooke LJ ’s judgment addresses the level of success fee for CFAs entered into
after 1 August 2001:
‘ . . . judges concerned with questions relating to the recoverability of a success fee
in claims as simple as this which are settled without the need to commence
proceedings should now ordinarily decide to allow an uplift of 5% on the
claimant’s lawyers’ costs (including the costs of any costs only proceedings which are
awarded to them) pursuant to their powers contained in CPD 11.8(2) unless
persuaded that a higher uplift is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the
case.’3
On the facts of Halloran where the CFA had been entered into in May 2000
the court refused to interfere with the assessment decision to allow a success
fee of 20%. The court’s reasoning was that until its decisions in Callery v Gray
had been made there were significant uncertainties as to the recovery of costs
to justify success fees. Brooke LJ subsequently sought to clarify this judgment
in Claims Direct Test Cases4:
‘Subsequent events have shown that I should have expressed myself with greater
clarity. The type of case to which I was referring was a case similar to Callery v Gray
and Halloran v Delaney in which, to adopt the “ready reckoner” in Cook on Costs
2003, at page 545, the prospects of success are virtually 100%. The two-step fee
advocated by the court in Callery v Gray (No 1) is apt to allow a solicitor in such
a case to cater for the wholly unexpected risk lurking below the limpid waters of the
simplest of claims. It did not require any research evidence or submissions from
other parties in the industry to persuade the court that in this type of extremely
simple claim a success fee of over 5% was no longer tenable in all the circumstances.
The guidance given in that judgment was not intended to have any wider
application.’ At [101].
In para 36 of the judgment in Halloran (above) Brooke LJ links the level of
success fee for costs only proceedings to the level applied in the substantive
dispute. If a two-stage success fee5 is used and the higher success fee is
applicable, for example because then threshold for the higher fee is close of the
protocol period, this may have led to paying parties arguing that the lower
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [102.3]
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figure should be applied to the costs only proceedings. The provision in CPD,
s 11.8(2) for different percentages to be allowed for different periods was held
in U (a child) v Liverpool City Council6 to be wrong, the Court of Appeal
stating that no such power exists. This must lead to the higher of a two stage
success fee being allowed in costs only proceedings if it applied to the
substantive proceedings. It also appears to mean that the level of success fee
allowed for substantive proceedings is applied also to any costs proceedings:
‘As a matter of contract the same single-stage success fee is available throughout the
proceedings on the claim, including the detailed assessment of costs.’ At [28].
If a two stage success fee refers to a higher fee if the case does not settle within
the protocol period then in such a case where the substantive dispute settles
after the protocol period but there are costs only proceedings because no
agreement on level of costs is reached the higher level success fee will apply
throughout. If a single stage success fee is used then it will apply to the costs
only proceedings.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2002] All ER (D) 30 (Sep) at para [31].
3 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2002] All ER (D) 30 (Sep) at para [36].
4 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
5 See para [107.2].
6 [2005] EWCA Civ 475, [2005] 1 WLR 2657, (2005) Times, 16 May.
Factors taken into account in an assessment of the success fee
[103] The court will consider the amount of the success fee separately from
considering the base costs1. The proportionality rule applies then to the success
fee and the factors set out in r 44.5 apply in the usual manner2 but a success
fee is not to be reduced simply because when added to the base costs the total
appears disproportionate3. The assessment is made on the basis of the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the solicitor at the time the
funding arrangement was made or varied4. However, in costs only proceedings,
the costs judge or district judge should have regard to the time when and the
extent to which the claim has been settled and to the fact that the claim has
been settled without the need to commence proceedings5.
In determining whether a success fee is reasonable the court may take into
account6:
(1) The risk that the case may lose, with the effect that no fees will be
payable. Here the risk assessment which was made at the time that the
success fee was set will be relevant in determining the reasonableness of
the success fee7.
(2) The legal representative’s liability for disbursements8.
(3) What other methods of funding the costs were available to the receiving
party9.
1 CPD, s 11.5 at B[2474].
2 CPD, s 11.6. See n 1 above.
3 CPD, s 11.9. See n 1 above.
4 CPD, s 11.7. See n 1 above.
5 CPD, s 17.8(2) at para [1226] and see para [111]. See also para [102.2].
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6 CPD, s 11.8(1). See n 1.
7 See paras [65]–[69].
8 See paras [68]–[69].
9 See Part VIII.
[103.1] The Court of Appeal in Motto v Trafigura1 had to consider a decision
to allow a 58% success fee, each side appealing against that decision.
The Court of Appeal arrived at 58% but by a different route to that taken at
first instance. The claimant’s solicitors provided an internal assessment of the
prospects of success as 50% arrived at by multiplying out the following risks:
‘breach of duty’ 80%, ‘causation – medical’ 90%, ‘causation – other’ 85%,
‘forum’ 82.5%. The claim was therefore for a 100% success fee. The Court of
Appeal described that assessment as at least potentially self serving as solicitors
have an interest that the success fee is as high as possible. The multiplication
method was open to attack in principle, the Court referring to Chalk on Risk
Assessment in Litigation (2001). Not only was the precision accorded to the
prospects somewhat artificial, but the implicit assumption that each of the
risks is entirely self-contained, or insulated from all the other risks, was plainly
very questionable.
1 [2011] EWCA Civ 1150, [2012] 2 All ER 181.
Reasonableness of success fees – Callery v Gray and subsequent cases
[104] The Court of Appeal in the test case of Callery v Gray1 laid down
guidance on the recovery of success fees. The House of Lords2 dismissed an
appeal against that decision. The House expressed certain concerns as to the
funding of litigation by CFA and ATE insurance and these are considered
below. The Court of Appeal in Halloran v Delaney3 revisited the guidance it
gave in Callery. Halloran made revision in respect of CFAs entered into after
1 August 2001. That revision was later clarified by the Court of Appeal in
Claims Direct Test Cases4 by Brooke LJ and further clarification was thought
necessary in Atack v Lee5.
The importance of the original guidance in Callery remains in respect of all
current CFAs entered into before 1 August 2001. The importance of the
original guidance in Callery remains in respect of all current CFAs entered into
before 1 August 2001 in simple road traffic cases. For subsequent CFAs in
cases which are simple road traffic cases the Callery guidance is revised by
Halloran and Atack v Lee. The approach to assessment of success fees outside
of simple road traffic cases is considered in Bensusan v Freedman6, Edwards v
Smiths Dock Ltd7, U (a child) v Liverpool City Council8and Begum v Klarit9.
1 Callery v Gray [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833, [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
2 Callery v Gray [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
3 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
4 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
5 [2004] EWCA Civ 1712, [2005] 1 WLR 2643, [2006] RTR 127.
6 [2001] All ER (D) 212 (Oct), see para [108].
7 [2004] EWHC 1116 (QB), [2004] 3 Costs LR 440, [2004] All ER (D) 181 (May), see para [108].
8 [2005] EWCA Civ 475, [2005] 1 WLR 2657, (2005) Times, 16 May.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [104]
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9 [2005] EWCA Civ 234, (2005) Times, 18 March, [2005] All ER (D) 203 (Mar), see para [108].
Summary of the Court of Appeal in Callery v Gray
[105] To summarise the Court of Appeal’s decision in Callery v Gray:
(1) It is reasonable to enter into a CFA with a success fee from the outset.
(2) The success fee may be set at the beginning and may but need not
provide for a two stage fee differing according to whether the case
settled within the protocol period or not.
(3) In road traffic cases it was possible to apply a success fee which reflected
an overall success rate for the class of litigation. If such a method was
used in road traffic cases the maximum success fee would be 20%.
Types of success fee
[106] The court’s approach to setting success fees in simple road traffic cases
is complex and describes three methods. A fourth approach, two or more
success fees, was expressly not dealt with in the decision but is addressed
below. It must also be kept in mind that the court was considering simple road
traffic cases and that the factual basis may well not exist in other types of case
to be able to replicate the approach of the court. Halloran1 was also a simple
road traffic case. Paragraph [107] sets out Callery v Gray2. The effect of
Halloran is considered separately at para [107.5].
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
2 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
Type A – standard rate success fee
[107] The court reached the conclusion that it was possible in RTA cases to
take the view that a maximum 20% success fee would be reasonable given the
risks in that category of work on a national basis. This approach does not
require a consideration of the risks in an individual case but proceeds on the
basis that all RTA cases can be viewed as a category. This success fee is set at
the outset and does not change during the case.
This result is reached as follows:
‘In the circumstances we think that it is reasonable to proceed on the premise that
at least 90% of such claims will settle without the need for proceedings, or will
succeed after proceedings have been commenced.’1
‘After careful consideration and having reflected on the reasoning in the judgments
below in the two appeals, we have concluded that, where a CFA is agreed at the
outset in such cases, 20% is the maximum uplift that can reasonably be agreed.’2
Whilst this is stated as a maximum there is difficulty in reconciling the
reasoning of the global approach to any suggestion that some figure below
20% is appropriate in some RTA cases. To reach such a result must either
mean considering the cases individually (thus abandoning the global
approach) or producing categories within RTA where success fees below 20%
are to be set. The court gives no indication as to this aspect of the use of the
20% as a maximum figure. It may be instructive that Callery v Gray3
concerned an injured passenger4 and the 20% figure was allowed by the court.
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Any attempt to approach success fees in a Type A method outside of RTA cases
will be fraught with difficulty given the lack or data as to risk.
This approach was, however, seemingly based on, and arguably confined to,
solicitors carrying on litigation business on a large scale who may:
‘seek to ensure that the uplifts agreed result in a reasonable return overall, having
regard to his experience of the work done and the likelihood of success or failure of
the particular class of litigation.’5
Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords expressed doubt as to the possibility of
a costs judge assessing a success fee set on this global method:
‘The costs judge has simply no way of knowing whether the solicitor is carrying on
business on a large enough scale to justify such an approach, still less what level of
success fees would give him a “reasonable return overall”. Such matters are
traditionally outside the consideration of costs judges.’6
‘the criteria prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules for determining whether costs
are reasonable are framed entirely by reference to the facts of the particular case.
Once one invokes a global approach designed to produce a reasonable overall return
for solicitors, one moves away from the judicial function of the costs judge and into
the territory of legislative or administrative decision.’7
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [103], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [104], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833, [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
4 Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords described the case as being, ‘as certain of success as
anything in litigation can be . . . .’ ([2002] UKHL 28 at [21], [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002]
1 WLR 2000).
5 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [83], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
6 [2002] UKHL 28 at [33].
7 [2002] UKHL 28 at [35].
Type B – non-standard rate success fee
[107.1] It seems that in RTA cases the court is of the view that to depart from
the 20% maximum requires a delay in the setting of the success fee and
therefore in entering into a CFA. The court referring to the standard 20%
success fee said:
‘assumes that there is no special feature that raises apprehension that the claim may
not prove to be sound. Where there is such a feature, the appropriate uplift will be
higher, but it may not be reasonable to attempt to assess that uplift until further
information about the defendant’s response is to hand.’1
The court appears to find two other situations where a departure from the
standard 20% in RTA cases might be expected. They are where the solicitor
chooses to defer entering into a CFA until more is known than that told by the
client. The other is where the solicitor does not specialise in litigation but on
occasions conducts a piece of litigation for a client. In this latter case the court
took the view that the success fee would be set at the level needed to induce the
solicitor to take the risk of not recovering fees. Nothing is said in this case of
a need to await a response from the defendant. It would seem odd that a
non-specialist litigator could depart from the maximum 20% otherwise
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [107.1]
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imposed whereas a specialist litigator not specialising in RTA cases must await
a response from the defendant or use Type A.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [104], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
Type C – rebated success fee
[107.2]
‘A success fee can be agreed which assumes the case will not settle, at least until after
the end of the protocol period, if at all, but which is subject to a rebate if it does in
fact settle before the end of that period. Thus, by way of example, the uplift might
be agreed at 100%, subject to a reduction to 5% should the claim settle before the
end of the protocol period.’1
Although it is possible to see that this approach is intended to encourage
compliance with the protocol and to lead to early settlement, it is very difficult
to see what relation such figures bear to the risk run. For this reason such an
approach may prove to be unattractive to claimant firms.
If this method is to be used it must be kept in mind that this is not a two stage
fee. It is a single fee set at the outset. If the case does not settle inside the
protocol period the higher fee applies to the whole case. If it does settle in the
protocol period the lower fee applies to the whole case:
‘We consider there is no need to consider the question of the legality of a two-stage
success fee as we see no difficulty in having a . . . success fee calculated by
reference to an upper level and a reduced level in specified circumstances.’2
Further guidance on the setting of such a success fee is given by Lord Woolf:
‘A two-stage success fee of the type we propose, agreed at the outset, would be likely
to be agreed before the merits of the individual claim were apparent. Thus, the uplift
would be unlikely to reflect precisely the likelihood of failure of any individual claim
that did not settle. The determination of the reasonable figures for the full uplift and
the rebated uplift would have to be based on overall claims experience, with the
proportion of contested cases which succeed, and the costs earned from such cases,
being particularly significant.’3
The Court of Appeal in Claims Direct Test Cases4 refers to this type of success
fee as a two-step fee apt to cover cases where the prospects of success are
virtually 100%. In such cases the court in Callery suggested that the lower
figure should be 5% and the higher figure 100%. It is with respect difficult to
interpret the judgment in Halloran as a reference to the two-step success fee.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [107], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [114], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 833 at [115], [2001] 1 WLR 2112.
4 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
Type D – multiple success fee (two or more success fees for different
stages)
[107.3] Paragraph [114] makes it clear that the court was not considering the
legality of a success fee arrangement which applies different levels of success fee
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to different stages in the case. There was some concern during argument as to
whether the statutory scheme permitted of such a method. There can be no
difficulty if this staged result is produced by entering into a series of CFAs each
to cover specified stages in the litigation. The difficulty seemingly envisaged in
argument in the Court of Appeal might arise however where there is a single
CFA with more than one level of success fee. The CFA Regulations 20001 and
the CLSA 1990, s 58 as amended refer only to ‘the percentage’. It would seem
pedantic to insist that the singular could not include the plural. Provided the
CFA is clear as to what percentage increase applies to what stages of the case
the purpose of the statutory provisions will have been achieved.
1 SI 2000/692.
Factors for costs assessors raised by the House of Lords1
1 The numbers in square brackets refer to the paragraph numbers in the judgment of the House
of Lords in Callery v Gray [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
[107.4] The House of Lords raised these factors for costs assessors:
(1) A danger that base costs will be excessive [5]
(2) A danger that success fees will be grossly disproportionate to risk [5]
(3) Court of Appeal’s guidance is provisional and open to review [9] and
[30]
(4) The client has no economic rationality in any agreement to a success fee
[25]
(5) No incentive to compete on success fees set [32]
(6) Difficulties in determining scale of business justifying global approach
[33]
Further guidance on the reasonableness of success fees – Halloran v
Delaney1 and subsequent cases
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
[107.5] The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Halloran v Delaney1 was
given by Brooke LJ who also sat in Callery. The appeal concerned costs only
proceedings arising out of a road traffic passenger claim which settled without
the need to issue proceedings. The agreed damages were £1,500. The issue for
the Court of Appeal was whether a success fee of 20%, or indeed any success
fee at all, was appropriate in costs only proceedings. A success fee of 20% had
been allowed in Callery v Gray in a passenger road traffic claim. Against that
background the court revisited the broader matter of the appropriate level of
success fee in ‘simple claims when they are settled without the need for court
proceedings’:
‘After taking advice from our assessor, and after considering the arguments in the
present case, we consider that judges concerned with questions relating to the
recoverability of a success fee in claims as simple as this which are settled without
the need to commence proceedings should now ordinarily decide to allow an uplift
of 5% on the claimant’s lawyers’ costs (including the costs of any costs only
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [107.5]
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proceedings which are awarded to them) pursuant to their powers contained in CPD
11.8(2) unless persuaded that a higher uplift is appropriate in the particular
circumstances of the case. This policy should be adopted in relation to all CFAs,
however they are structured, which are entered into on and after 1st August 2001,
when both Callery judgments had been published and the main uncertainties about
costs recovery had been removed.’2. (emphasis added) At [35]
The CFA in Halloran used a single stage success fee. The guidance in Halloran
must now be read in the light of clarification provided by Brooke LJ in Claims
Direct Test Cases3:
‘Subsequent events have shown that I should have expressed myself with greater
clarity. The type of case to which I was referring was a case similar to Callery v Gray
and Halloran v Delaney in which, to adopt the “ready reckoner” in Cook on Costs
2003, at page 545, the prospects of success are virtually 100%. The two-step fee
advocated by the court in Callery v Gray (No 1) is apt to allow a solicitor in such
a case to cater for the wholly unexpected risk lurking below the limpid waters of the
simplest of claims. It did not require any research evidence or submissions from
other parties in the industry to persuade the court that in this type of extremely
simple claim a success fee of over 5% was no longer tenable in all the circumstances.
The guidance given in that judgment was not intended to have any wider
application.’. At 101
The reference to the two-step success fee advocated in Callery is a reference to
an example given there where the figure of 5% was used for the lower figure
and 100% for the higher figure. It is with respect difficult to see how Halloran
can be explained as referring to that type of success fee given the words
‘however they are structured’ in paragraph [35] and the fact that the success
fee in the CFA in Halloran was a single stage fee. There is nothing in the
judgment in Halloran to suggest that the types of success fee dealt with in
Callery do not survive. The 5% figure appears to be a simple revision of the
level at which the Type A standard fee is to be set.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2002] All ER (D) 30 (Sep) at [35].
3 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
[107.6] Brooke LJ provided yet further clarification of Halloran in Atack v
Lee1:
‘Because there seems to be some lingering uncertainty about the combined effect of
Callery v Gray and Halloran v Delaney we feel that we ought to restate for the
benefit of district judges and costs judges the principles in cases governed by the old
regime (for the meaning of this phrase see para 12 above). The reasonableness of the
success fee has to be assessed as at the time the CFA was agreed. It is permissible for
any CFA to include a two-stage success fee, and this is to be encouraged. In other
words the success fee may be a higher percentage (up to 100% in an appropriate
case) in the event that a claim does not settle within the protocol period, and a lower
success fee (down to 5% in the very simplest of cases) in claims which do settle
within that period. Further statistical evidence is now available (see paras 11–12
above) to which it will be legitimate for parties to refer in relation to success fees
agreed in an old regime case after the date of this judgment.’. At [51]
The guidance in Atack v Lee makes reference to statistical evidence now
available. That material is contained in reports made to the Civil Jus-
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tice Council and can be found on the costs debate page of the Civil
Justice Council web site at www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk.
The reference in the judgment of Brooke LJ to the ‘old regime’ is to cases not
covered by the fixed costs regime:
‘It is not permissible simply to adopt the new CPR fixed rates for success fees when
assessing the reasonableness of a success fee in an RTA case where the assessment of
the CFA is not governed by the new rules. The reason for this is that the new CPR
approach (informed by an industry wide agreement) does not take into account the
individual facts of each particular case . . . .’. At [52]
Nonetheless, in determining the reasonableness of success fees set before
1 August 2001, reference can be made to the statistical material that informed
the new rules. The statistics show the level of risk involved according to type
of case. There are statistics for road traffic and for employer liability cases.
The Court of Appeal in U v Liverpool City Council2 made reference to other
statistical material obtained by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers
(APIL)3:
SUCCESS RATES – PERSONAL INJURY CASES CRU STATISTICS
RTA EMPLOYER PUBLIC CLIN NEG
2001–2 89% 74% 61% 46%
2002–3 87% 77% 60% 46%
Attack and Lee was heard on the same day as Ellerton v Harris and judgement
in the two appeals was given together. The CFAs in each case were entered into
before 1 August 2001 and the decisions in Callery v Gray. Accordingly they
were not governed by Halloran.
Atack v Lee was a claim arising from a moving traffic accident not involving
a collision. It was alleged that the defendant’s driving had caused the claimant
motorcyclist to take evasive action which led to his hitting a kerb and suffering
serious injuries. The case settled after the first day of a trial on liability where
the defendant was found 100% liable. The court allowed a success fee of 50%
against the 100% stated in the CFA. The court did not make use itself of the
statistical material to which it makes reference and in arriving at a figure of
50% stated that some judges might reasonably have considered a single-stage
success fee of up to 67% reasonable on this material but that the 50% allowed
by the deputy district judge was within the range available to him.
In Ellerton the claim was made by a pedestrian run over in a supermarket car
park. The driver left the scene but there were witnesses to the accident. The
claim was for a 30% success fee. The court allowed 20%:
‘In our judgment the guidance given by this court in Callery v Gray can be applied
by analogy to this case even though it was allocated to the multi-track and settled
for a sum exceeding £15,000. We consider that there are no factors here which could
legitimately have taken this success fee over 20%. The uncertainty about the identify
of the driver could have been resolved by a single telephone call to the police, which
the solicitor could have made before entering into the CFA, and the only significant
risk related to the possibility of the claimant accepting her solicitor’s advice and then
not beating a payment in. This is just one of the rare risks which justified a success
fee set as high as 20% in the simplest of claims.’. At [49]
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [107.6]
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It should be noted that this decision is in relation to a CFA entered into before
1 August 2001 and it cannot be taken as an indication of the level of success
fees in CFAs entered into after that date and which are governed by the
guidance in Halloran. In each case a single stage success fee had been stated in
the CFA and although the court again encourages the use of a two stage success
fee it cannot depart from the contractual structure of the CFA. The Court of
Appeal in the later decision in KU v Liverpool City Council2 held that 11.8(2)
of the CPD was wrong and that a court has no power to award different
percentage success fees in respect of different items of costs or different periods
during which costs were incurred.
1 [2004] EWCA Civ 1712, [2005] 1 WLR 2643, [2006] RTR 127.
2 [2005] EWCA Civ 475, [2005] 1 WLR 2657, (2005) Times, 16 May.
3 A fuller table is published in Litigation Funding August 2003 – pub. Law Society.
[107.7]–[108] The reasonableness of a success fee in a CFA entered into after
1 August 2001 was considered in Burton v Kingsley1. The claimants’ solicitors
entered into a CFA with each of two claimants on 9 September 2001, less than
four weeks after an accident in which the claimants were innocent passengers.
The agreed single success fee under each agreement was 100%. The first
claimant was rendered tetraplegic and the second claimant sustained spinal
injuries in the accident. The approach to a single success fee is summarised in
the judgment of Richards J:
‘Where a single success fee has been agreed, the solicitors do not have the power or
duty to renegotiate the CFA in the light of changed perceptions of the risk as time
goes on, nor does the court have power to direct that a success fee is recoverable at
different rates for different periods of the proceedings: KU v Liverpool City Council,
para 49. As Brooke LJ expressed it in that case, at para 42:
“Nowhere in the statute, the regulations, or the rules is there any indication that the
court is to have the power to subvert the statutory scheme by determining that
although the level of a success fee was reasonable in view of the facts which were or
should have been known to the legal representative at the time it was set, he is only
entitled to recover a different, much lower, success fee in respect of some later period
when different facts were or should have been known to him . . . .”. At [10]
1 [2005] EWHC 1034 (QB), [2005] All ER (D) 378 (May).
Success fees outside of RTA cases
[108.1] An early application of the principles laid down in Callery1 is found
in the decision of the Senior Costs Judge Master Hurst in Bensusan v
Freedman2. The claimant, an elderly female, swallowed a dental reamer during
treatment by a dentist. The claimant suffered shock and anxiety as a result of
the incident but surgery was not required. The claimant was represented by
specialist dental negligence lawyers on a CFA carrying a 50% success fee. The
claimant lived in Kent and her solicitors in Cheshire. She was represented by
a grade one fee earner. The claim was settled for £2,000 plus costs five weeks
after the letter of claim. The costs were not agreed and the claimant issued Pt 8
costs only proceedings.
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It was held that it was not reasonable to instruct solicitors in Cheshire or
specialist dental negligence lawyers in such a case. It was not a case warranting
a grade one fee earner. The case could have been handled by a grade two fee
earner. The success fee was not appropriate for a straightforward clinical
negligence case such as this. The success fee was reduced from 50% to 20%.
The court accepted the following factors as contributing to higher risks in this
field of litigation but said that none applied in this particular case:
(1) Professional judgments are less certain in the field of medicine and
dentistry than in other fields.
(2) Defences are more rigorously pursued by medical defence organisa-
tions.
(3) The costs of investigating clinical negligence claims can be extremely
high as liability, causation and quantum issues are usually complicated
and expert evidence is required in support of such issues.
At para [36] reference is made to success rates in clinical negligence:
‘ . . . judicial notice can be taken of the fact that, of clinical negligence cases which
go to trial, the success rate is modest and it may well be that, viewed across the
whole spectrum of clinical negligence cases, the success rate is 50%. I have
insufficient data to make such a finding.’
The decision in effect grades cases within clinical negligence and even within
the field of dentistry so that success fees cannot enable a practice to reflect its
workload overall. The danger of this approach for access to justice is that
without stronger cases supporting weaker cases solicitors will be unable to
take on cases which are weak or carry high cost risks.
The approach of the solicitors in Bensusan is likely to be that of the majority
who work outside of RTA. The client was offered a CFA from the outset and
thus a success fee had to be set before anything could be known from the
defendant. No national data exists for a standard success fee to be set outside
of road traffic and employer liability claims. Individual factors relating to the
perceived risks in the case were recorded and a percentage figure was stated. It
is difficult to see what other approach can be taken where there is insufficient
data as to a class of case upon which to make a judgment, a judgment which
is to be assessed, if at all, on the basis of what was known at the time that
decision was made. It is instructive that in these commonly recurring circum-
stances the Court of Appeal’s guidance on success fees is of little assistance.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1117, [2001] 3 All ER 832, [2001] 1 WLR 2112; affd [2002] UKHL 28,
[2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
2 [2001] All ER (D) 212 (Oct), SC.
[108.2] In Begum v Klarit1 the Court of Appeal was asked to allow a success
fee of 100% for counsel and 70% for solicitors in respect of an appeal form
an order concerning a sale of land. In that context Brooke LJ said any
responsible lawyer acting for the respondent and reading the limited permis-
sion to appeal would have appreciated for all practical purposes that they were
on a stone-cold certainty of resisting the appeal and recovering costs. The court
concluded that there are always some risks in litigation and allowed 15% for
each success fee and in strong terms expressed disapproval of the original
figures:
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‘[5] We find it hard to understand how responsible counsel could have agreed with
responsible solicitors a success fee of 100 per cent in respect of this appeal, or how
responsible solicitors could have agreed with their client a success fee of 70 per cent.
Success fees negotiated, if that is the right word, at that level, discredit and devalue
the whole of the arrangements for conditional fee agreements. In Callery v Gray, the
various members of the House of Lords expressed great concern about the new
regime where success fees were, in effect, being negotiated between the parties to the
agreement and there was no direct financial incentive to drive the level of the success
fee down.’
‘[6] I hope that this is the last occasion on which this court will have to express itself
quite so strongly about the level of success fees proffered for approval. In our
judgment, there was a small amount of risk in this litigation, which would properly
have been provided for by a success fee of 15 per cent. Accordingly, both in relation
to counsel and in relation to solicitors’ fees, we reduce the success fee to 15 per cent
in each case.’
It is difficult to reconcile the phrase ‘stone-cold certainty’ attracting a success
fee of 15% and the phrase used in Claims Direct Test Cases by Brooke LJ, ‘the
prospects of success are virtually 100%’, which justified a success fee of 5%.
1 [2005] EWCA Civ 234, (2005) Times, 18 March, [2005] 3 Costs LR 452.
Staged success fees
[108.3] The Court of Appeal in U (a child) v Liverpool City Council1
considered the reasonableness of a single stage success fee of 100% set in
October 2001 in a personal injury claim involving a four year old child who
had stepped into a hole in a grass verge. Again Brooke LJ emphasised the use
of a two stage success fee:
‘[21] When deciding upon a success fee [the claimant’s solicitor] had two choices. He
could have taken the view that this claim would probably settle without fuss at a
reasonably early stage, but he wished to protect himself against the risk that the
claim might go the full distance and might eventually fail. In those circumstances he
could select the two-stage success fee discussed by this court in Callery v Gray
[2001] EWCA 1117 at [106]–[112], [2001] 1 WLR 2112. In this situation he would
be willing to restrict himself to a low success fee if the case settled within the
protocol period – or within such other period, perhaps until the service of the
defence, as he might choose – and to have the benefit of a high success fee for the
cases that did not settle early. As things turned out, he would have benefited on the
facts of this case if he had adopted this course: a high two-stage success fee would
have been more readily defensible in a case which did not settle until proceedings
were quite far advanced.’
‘[22] Alternatively, he could have selected, as he did in fact, a single-stage success fee,
being a fee which he would seek to recover at the same level however quickly or
slowly the claim was resolved. In those circumstances it would not be possible to
justify so high a success fee.’
One factor in the claimant solicitor’s risk assessment was the low value of the
claim (as assessed at the time of the CFA) and the risk that no costs would be
recovered because the claim fell into the small claims jurisdiction:
‘[24] ‘In a claim as small as this, it is not reasonable that the defendants should have
to pay the claimant’s solicitor a higher success fee against the risk that the value of
[108.2] Litigation Funding
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the claim was so low that legal costs would not be recoverable at all: this is a risk
the solicitor must bear himself if he is willing to act at all.’
The court had been referred to statistical material relating to ‘tripping cases’
contained in a report by Pascoe Pleasance for the Legal Aid Board in 1985 and
showing a 77% success rate for legally aided cases categorised as ‘trip slip and
fall (Public Authority)’:
[25] ‘In our judgment an appropriate single-stage success fee would have been 50%
in this case. On the hypothesis that winning and losing claims are of equal weight,
this would reflect a 2:1 chance of success. This, incidentally, represents a figure that
is closer to the chances of success shown in the Pascoe Pleasance study . . . .’
A 100% single stage success fee in a clinical negligence case where the CFA was
entered into at a very early stage where little could be known of the risk was
not upheld in Barham v Athreya2. This was an appeal from a detailed
assessment where the court explained that it may be difficult when before a
costs judge to justify the decision to have a high single stage success fee because
had the decision been to take a lower profit uplift at the initial stages, with a
further uplift if the case proceeded beyond those initial stages, because that
was a time when there would be a better risk assessment, then that on the face
of it is easier to justify and is more reasonable.
The mere fact a success fee is staged does not remove the need for it also to be
reasonable. In Fortune v Roe3 the CFA was entered into after judgment had
been entered on liability in a catastrophic injury case. The staged success fee
was 100% payable if the case settled within three months of the trial date and
25% for any earlier settlement. The case settled less than a month before trial.
The risk assessment identified Part 36 as the major risk. The claimant pointed
to the fact that had the case been within the Part 45 scheme a 100% success
fee would be recoverable as the fixed success fee at a trial. The court held that
at the time of the CFA the claimant had already won in terms of the standard
Law Society definition of win. Providing for a 100% success fee as if liability
had been in doubt was unreasonable. The risk of failing to beat a Part 36 offer
did not justify a 100% success fee. There could only be a risk in respect of costs
from the last date for acceptance and that could be accounted for by the 20%
success fee that the defendants conceded.
In the defamation case of Peacock (Matthew) v MGN Ltd4 the success fee was
in three stages: 100% of the basic charges, where the claim proceeds to 28 days
after service of the defence; 50% if the case settles after proceedings are issued
but before 28 days after the defence is served; or 25% if the case settles before
proceedings are issued. As MGN continued with a reasoned defence to stage
three a 100% success fee was allowed.
In the context of construction adjudications in Redwing v Charles Wishart5
Akenhead J held that CFAs and ATE could be used in enforcement proceedings
given there was no exemption in the CPR from the usual rules relating to
funding arrangements. It needed to be borne in mind however that the large
majority of reported cases on adjudication enforcements are successful and are
usually perused (as here) via application for summary judgment because there
is no realistic defence. It was important that claimants did not use CFAs and
ATE insurance primarily as a commercial threat to defendants. It was
legitimate for the Court to ask itself whether, in any particular case, a CFA or
ATE Insurance was a reasonable and proportionate arrangement to make. The
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [108.3]
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100 per cent success fee claimed was reduced to 20 per cent given that in
circumstances the claimant was virtually bound substantially to ‘win’.
Twenty per cent of the ATE premium was also ordered to be paid.
A tendency to set a 100% success fee in all cases was noted by the Court of
Appeal in Drake v Fripp6when reducing such a fee to 50%. The client with
whom the fee is negotiated by the lawyer has no interest in the level of success
fee (at least in a case such as this, where he has to pay no more than he is
entitled to recover from the paying party), and the lawyer has an obvious and
strong interest in the success fee being as high as possible. In many cases, it is
easy for a lawyer, acting in complete good faith, to persuade himself that the
prospects of his client’s case succeeding are no better than 50% when it is in
his interest to do so, and when he has no negotiations with the party who will
or may have to pay the success fee. The court has a particular duty, therefore,
to be vigilant in considering the reasonableness of the level of success fee
agreed but that does not mean that the court can invoke the wisdom of
hindsight or should adopt an unduly harsh approach.
1 [2005] EWCA Civ 475, [2005] 1 WLR 2657, (2005) Times, 16 May.
2 [2007] EW Misc 6 (EWCC) Central London County Court.
3 [2011] EWHC 2953 (QB), [2011] All ER (D) 91 (Nov).
4 [2010] EWHC 90174 (Costs).
5 [2011] EWHC 19 (TCC).
6 [2011] EWCA Civ 1282.
[108.4] On an appeal to the High Court in Edwards v Smiths Dock Ltd1 a
success fee of 87% was upheld in a mesothelioma claim which reached trial on
quantum. It was found that at the time of the CFA liability was not certain and
there were other issues relevant to quantum. The risk of failing to beat a
Part 36 payment was said not to mean that advising on quantum was
straightforward. A single success fee must be arrived at where liability and
quantum issues arise in the same case. In another High Court appeal it was
held in Cox v MGN Ltd2 that the uncertainty of the law in privacy claims in
2001 was such that a decision to allow 40% against a claimed 95% was within
the range reasonable assessments such that the appeals on each side failed.
1 [2004] EWHC 1116 (QB), [2004] 3 Costs LR 440.
2 [2006] EWHC 1235 (QB), [2006] All ER (D) 396 (May).
[108.5] The level of success fee in Benaim (UK) Ltd v Davies Middleton &
Davies Ltd1 was fixed on a scale up to a maximum of 100% dependent upon
the level of damages achieved in favour of the client. This was held to be a valid
CFA. In rejecting arguments that the arrangement was champertous the court
pointed out that an alternative method would have been to set the success fee
at 100% and provide for a rebate according to the level of damages recovered.
1 [2004] EWHC 737 (TCC), [2004] NLJR 617.
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Success fees in costs only proceedings
[108.6] The Court of Appeal in Halloran1 rejected arguments from the
paying party that there were no risks in costs only proceedings to justify a
success fee attaching to the costs of those proceedings. The court’s guidance for
cases where the CFA was entered into after 1 August 2001 lumps together the
success fee for substantive claims and the costs only proceedings. This
approach to costs only proceedings was repeated in U v Liverpool City Coun-
cil2 where the Court of Appeal held CPD, s 11.8(2) to be wrong in providing
for different percentages to be allowed for different periods. The court stated
that no such power exists. It follows that if a two-stage success fee is used and
the higher success fee has become applicable, for example because then
threshold for the higher fee is close of the protocol period which has passed
without settlement, then the higher level will apply to costs only proceedings.
A two stage success fee is not a variable success fee. Whichever of the two
stages applies it applies to the whole of the litigation. There is only one success
fee. The level of success fee allowed for substantive proceedings is also applied
therefore to any costs proceedings:
‘As a matter of contract the same single-stage success fee is available throughout the
proceedings on the claim, including the detailed assessment of costs.’. At [28]
The basis of paragraph 28 was the contractual nature of the CFA and success
fee and the If a two stage success fee refers to a higher fee if the case does not
settle within the protocol period then in such a case where the substantive
dispute settles after the protocol period but there are costs only proceedings
because no agreement on level of costs is reached the higher level success fee
will apply throughout, irrespective of the risk at the costs only stage. If a single
stage success fee is used then it too will apply to the costs only proceedings
again irrespective of the level of risk in those proceedings. Where there is a
single stage success fee Crane v Canons Leisure Centre3 confirms the result of
U v Liverpool City Council to be that the same fee applies to costs only
proceedings.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
2 [2005] EWCA Civ 475, [2005] 1 WLR 2657, (2005) Times, 16 May.
3 [2007] EWCA Civ 1352, [2008] 2 All ER 931, [2008] 1 WLR 2549.
H After the event insurance
Factors taken into account in assessment of insurance premium
[108.7] An After the Event (ATE) insurance premium is an ‘additional
liability’ for the purposes of CPR Part 44.1.21 Where the court makes an
order for costs and the receiving party has entered into a funding arrangement
the costs payable by the paying party include any additional liability unless the
court orders otherwise2. As with the success fee the court is to consider the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time the insurance policy was
taken out3.
The following factors may be taken into account in determining whether the
cost of insurance is reasonable4:
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(1) Where the insurance cover is not purchased in support of a CFA with
a success fee, how its cost compares with the likely cost of funding the
case by use of a CFA with success fee and supporting insurance. This
calls for a complex comparison in cases where the insurance option
selected is for cover of costs on both sides. Here the premium will be
higher than in a CFA insurance but there will be no success fee5.
(2) The level and extent of the cover provided. The premium should reflect
the limit of indemnity and the headings of cover such as adverse costs
only or cover including own disbursements6.
(3) The availability of any pre-existing insurance cover. Pre-existing cover
may exist but not be available to the client’s chosen solicitor. In RTA
claims with a value of less than £5,000 if the client wishes to be
represented by their own choice of solicitor and accordingly takes out
after the event insurance rather than use the pre-existing insurance no
additional liability will be allowed in costs in the absence of exceptional
circumstances7.
(4) Whether any part of the premium would be rebated in the event of early
settlement. This may lead in cases where there is early settlement but no
rebate to the court disallowing a part of the premium. It is less clear
how the provision for a rebate will be relevant to a case where there has
not been an early settlement.
(5) The amount of commission payable to the receiving party or his legal
representatives or other agents. This may call for complex calculations
of the overall difference in the premium level had there been no such
commission. It is assumed that by commission is meant a sum referable
to the premium actually payable.
1 SI 1998/3132, r 43.2.
2 CPD 2.1 – ‘funding arrangement’ is defined as including an ATE policy of insurance – CPR
1998, r 43.2.
3 CPD, s 11.7. See Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR
125.
4 CPD, s 11.10 at B[2474].
5 See Part X.
6 See Part X.
7 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125 – see para
[124]. For Before the Event Insurance, see para [202].
[108.8] In Ashworth v Peterborough United Football Club1 on an assessment
where it was argued that the premium was disproportionate to the total sum
claimed it was held that the issue was one of proportionality to the ‘matter in
issue’. In RSA Test Cases2 the premiums were disproportionate to the value of
the claims but also the costs in respect of which the insurer was at risk:
‘The court should look both at the costs risks and at the size of the claim when
considering the premium.’. At [261]
1 (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO Ref 021106.
2 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
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[108.9] What constitutes premium within the AJA 1999, s 29 was fully
considered in Claims Direct Test Cases1. The Senior Costs Judge held that
premium meant:
‘the consideration required of the assured in return for which the insurer undertakes
his obligation under the contract of insurance . . . .’. (MacGillivary on Insurance
Law)’2
The test adopted was to consider whether the money paid by a customer of
Claims Direct (CDL) was a payment in respect only of insurance or whether it
in part related to other services. This test is derived from the Court of Appeal
in Callery v Gray (No 2)3:
‘Section 29 of the 1999 Act permits the recovery of a premium where this is payment
for insurance against the risk of liability for costs. If payment of a so-called premium
buys a contractual entitlement to other benefits it is, to say the least, arguable that
the premium cannot, to that extent, be recovered under s 29. Thus the court has to
consider the terms of the contract under which the premium is paid to see whether
it is simply a contract of insurance against liability for costs or whether it is
something other than, or additional to, that.’4
The Senior Costs Judge makes particular reference to the fact that the
customer has a contract with CDL and that CDL is not an insurer:
‘When a claimant enters into a contract with Claims Direct he is not exclusively a
“party who has taken out an insurance policy”, he is certainly given Evidence of
Insurance but that is only part of the package which he has purchased from Claims
Direct. In my view the Claimant is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of the
insurance element and, in relation to the amount which I find to be properly the
insurance premium, I accept [counsel for claimants’] argument that I should not
further analyse that figure.’5
‘Claims Direct is not the insurer nor even the agent of the insurer. Claims Direct
offers to members of the public a package which includes an insurance element.’6
‘The true position is that this insurance was provided by the Underwriters through
their brokers and coverholder LPL to the Claimant via Claims Direct. The Claimant
would if asked almost certainly think he/she was agreeing with Claims Direct
not LPL or the Underwriters.
The agreement between the Claimant and Claims Direct is not an agreement with an
insurer. The money paid is not all premium. Part of what is provided by Claims
Direct under its Protect Scheme is an insurance policy the premium for which is, if
reasonable, recoverable. It is therefore necessary to identify the amount attributable
to the insurance.’7
The thrust of the liability insurer’s argument was that the claims handling
provided was not insurance and that the package bought by a customer was in
large part not insurance. Enquiry into what the money was paid for was
therefore warranted and it led to the conclusion that not all of the money was
paid for insurance.
It was found that the following services, although accepted as being of some
benefit to the underwriters and indeed required by them, were not insurance
services:
(1) Obtaining information for the solicitor.
(2) Obtaining witness statements from clients, witnesses and experts.
(3) Arranging client attendance for medical examination.
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(4) Review by costs draftsman.
These non-insurance services were categorised as claims handling services. Of
the £1,250 (not including tax) paid by a Claims Direct client, it was found that
£591.55 was premium within s 29. The decision refers to the possibility that
at least some of the non-insurance services could be recovered as solici-
tor’s costs.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
2 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at para [14].
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246, [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
4 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [12], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
5 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at [173].
6 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at [178].
7 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at [180].
[108.10] A similar exercise to that conducted in the Claims Direct Test Cases
was used in The Accident Group Tranche 2 Issues Sharratt v London Central
Bus Co1. The TAG scheme was challenged in similar fashion to Claims Direct
mainly on the basis of the level of premium sought to be recovered under
the AJA 1999, s 29. The Senior Costs Judge held that the payment of £310 +
VAT to AIL was a referral fee and not recoverable from the client nor from an
opponent. Between £425 and £480 was premium for the purposes of s 29. The
AIL payment was almost identical in function to the MLSS fees in Claims
Direct. TAG solicitors were committed to paying the fee before they had a
client. Accordingly it could not be a disbursement. It was also a fee that was
charged for the solicitor to get the case and was therefore a referral fee. A
referral fee is contrary to the Law Society Rules. The amount allowed as
‘premium’ for s 29 purposes and therefore recoverable from the opponent was
arrived at by looking at how the amounts charged to clients were made up.
Again this is a similar exercise to that carried out in the Claims Direct Test
Cases where £630 was allowed. In a later decision2 the Senior Costs Judge
reviewed the amount allowable as premium for the Lloyd’s policies written in
2001 in the light of evidence as to premium adjustments made by underwriters.
The amounts allowed varied as to date and underwriter as follows: for the
2000 year £450 including IPT; for 2001 Lloyds £525 including IPT; and for
2001 NIG £425 including IPT.
1 (Case No PTH 0204771) [2003] EWHC 9020 (Costs).
2 2003 SCCO Case No: PTH 0204771 30 July.
Reasonableness of premium – Callery v Gray (No 2)1
1 [2002] UKHL 28, [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
[109] The Court of Appeal gave guidance on ATE insurance having deferred
its decision to enable a report to be prepared by Master O’Hare. The House of
Lords1 did not interfere with the court’s decision as to ATE premiums and
confirmed the court’s interpretation of the AJA 1999, s 29 that the words ‘the
risk of incurring a costs liability’ meant a costs liability that cannot be passed
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to the opposing party2. Lord Scott dissented from the majority decision to
allow the recovery of the premium on the facts of Callery3.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at paras [59] and [60], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246, [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
Reasonableness of premium – RSA Test Cases
[109.1] The Senior Costs Judge addressed the question of the reasonableness
of premium in the RSA Pursuit Test Cases1. There were five test cases included
in the hearing. The insurance policy in each case was the RSA Pursuit policy.
The assessment of recoverable premium was made in the context of having
found that the insurance company’s method of calculating premium was
inherently and seriously flawed such that the actual premiums set by the
insurer could not be recovered.
The decision that the premium paid in each test case was disproportionate
relied upon Lownds v Home Office2 and the principle that if the costs as a
whole, or a single item of costs, are or appear to be disproportionate, the test
of necessity must be used:
‘The premiums in respect of Anthony Baker, Clarke and Farr have the appearance
of disproportionality. For the reasons I have already given the premium in the case
of Anthony Baker is disproportionate and fails the test of necessity. In the cases of
Clarke and Farr, given that I propose to allow reasonable and proportionate
premiums, the disproportionality point disappears. The premiums which I allow in
respect of the remaining Test Cases are those which I consider to be reasonable and
proportionate.’. At [452]
Given then that the premiums paid were not proportionate they could be
reduced for the purposes of a costs assessment and an order that the paying
party pays a premium. Court of Appeal in Callery v Gray (No 2) had held that
in so far as the court finds that the premium is not reasonable it can and should
reduce it:
‘In my judgment it cannot be reasonable to require the paying party to pay a
premium based on costs claimed which may be higher than those which the court
has found to be reasonable and proportionate. It must follow that if the costs
claimed have been found to be unreasonable and disproportionate, the premium
calculated on the basis of those costs must itself be unreasonable and dispropor-
tionate.’. At [347]
In assessing how much the losing party should be required to contribute to the
premium which the ATE insurers had chosen to set the court should look both
at the costs risks and at the size of the claim when considering the premium.
The premiums had been set using a formula applied to estimates of costs and
which was found to be flawed. In assessing the premium to be allowed the
Senior Costs Judge considered the actual level of costs to which the insurer had
been exposed:
‘Provided that the premium rate has been calculated by a method which is not
flawed . . . I can see no reason why the calculation of the premium itself should
not be based on the Claimant’s actual, reasonable and proportionate costs as
assessed or agreed with the opposing party.’. At [260]
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The premiums allowed, based on the insurer’s costs exposure, were therefore
seen as proportionate to the risk involved. It had not been argued that the costs
themselves were disproportionate.
Actual Costs
risked
Damages
obtained
Premium
Claimed
Premium
Allowed
Deborah
Baker
£24,708 £400,000 £52,048.92 £13,695
Anthony
Baker
£5,752 £1250 £8962 £787.50
Clarke £15,267 £20,000 £32,392.38 £11,666
Sandiford £29,885 £44,000 £16,986 £16,986
Farr £80,233 £250,000 £153,378 £41,708
In one of the five cases (Anthony Baker) the value of the claim itself was an
important factor:
‘ . . . estimates were reasonably accurate save that he significantly under estimated
his own costs. The prospect of success at 60% appears reasonable given the failure
of the claim to CICA and the union solicitors’ refusal to take the case any further.
Had the claim been for a significant amount of damages the premium might have
been justified. In fact this claim was never anything other than a fast track claim and
before the policy proposal was accepted counsel had advised that the maximum
damages would be £5,000. Even if [the solicitor’s] estimate of his normal costs had
been accurate, this would still have produced a premium in excess of the potential
damages. On any reading the premium was clearly going to be disproportionate and
the use of the Pursuit Policy not justified. [Council of the defendant] says, given the
finding that £798 premium was disproportionate in the case of Samonini (a £2,000
case) “no more than £750 should be allowed, if a premium is allowed at all”. I allow
£750 plus IPT.’. At [460]
1 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 365, [2002] 4 All ER 775, [2002] 1 WLR 2450.
Time of taking out ATE insurance
[110] The House of Lords in Callery1 upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeal that an ATE premium can be recovered where the insurance has been
purchased at the outset of the case before any reference has been made to the
defendant. The House emphasised that all of the court’s guidance was being
given at an early stage in the new funding environment and that the guidance
was to be reviewed as knowledge and experience developed.
On this point the approach of the House in not interfering with the decision of
the Court of Appeal is summed up by Lord Hope:
‘These and the other practical considerations relied on by the Court of Appeal seem
to me to point clearly in favour of allowing the ATE insurance policy to be taken out
at the outset when the claimant first consults his legal representative.’2
Lord Scott’s dissenting judgment is at [63]–[136] and does not accept the need
for ATE insurance at the outset of a case. In RSA Pursuit Test Cases3 the
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Senior Costs Judge rejected an argument that a delay in taking out ATE
insurance was unreasonable:
‘In my judgment the Court of Appeal in Callery v Gray (No 2) did not state that ATE
insurance ought not to be taken out late because this would have the result that
premiums would be unnecessarily high, since the many were no longer paying for
the few. The court in fact stated that it was not unreasonable for ATE insurance to
be taken out early. The correct test is whether the individual claimant has acted
reasonably in taking out ATE insurance when he or she did so. That is a decision
which can only be taken having regard to the individual facts in each case.’. At
[374]
In Claims Direct Test Cases, Re4 the Senior Costs Judge sets out the principle
to be applied where ATE insurance is taken out after an admission of liability
has been made by the opponent:
‘Where an incident occurs, particularly a minor road traffic accident causing slight
injury (Maxine Kelly’s claim was settled for £2,500 general damages) and where the
liability insurer has from the outset accepted liability for the occurrence, it will
generally be disproportionate and unreasonable to take out an ATE policy. There
may however be circumstances surrounding the incident, particularly if there is
likely to be a live issue as to causation (which on the facts of Kelly v Larkin there
did not appear to be) which would make it reasonable to take out ATE insurance.’5
The Court of Appeal in Halloran6 accepts that there are risks in costs only
proceedings, sufficient to justify from 1 August 2001, a 5% success fee7. There
will also be argument as to what constitutes an admission of liability and the
risk as to adverse costs orders arising under Pt 36.
An ATE policy was purchased in respect of a quantum only dispute in
Wooldridge v Hayes8 where the matter had been dealt with under a before the
event (BTE) policy until the limit of indemnity under that policy had been
exhausted. The ATE premium of £7,469 (excluding tax) was for cover of
£60,000 over and above the BTE cover. The premium was allowed on
assessment on the basis that the purchase of that cover was reasonable given
the risks on Part 36 and on the basis that the premium itself was reasonable.
1 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
2 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417 at [60], [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
3 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
4 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
5 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at para [231].
6 [2002] EWCA Civ 1258, [2003] 1 All ER 775, [2003] 1 WLR 28.
7 See para [108.1].
8 (SCCO Case No 0100072) [2005] EWHC 90007 (Costs).
Benefits obtained
[111] The Court of Appeal decided that reasonableness was to be judged by
the benefits obtained for the premium and not the use made of the premium by
the insurer1. AJA 1999, s 29 refers to the benefit of insuring against a costs
risk. As to whether s 29 could extend to other benefits the court regarded that
question as arguable2. The reference to the use made of the premium by the
insurer deals with and rejects arguments that the make-up of the premium
ought to be examined:
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [111]
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‘It is important in this context to draw a distinction between two separate matters.
The first is the nature of the benefits to which the litigant is contractually entitled in
exchange for the payment of the premium. This falls to be determined from the
terms of the contract under which the premium is paid. Section 29 of the 1999 Act
permits the recovery of a premium where this is payment for insurance against the
risk of liability for costs. If payment of a so-called premium buys a contractual
entitlement to other benefits it is, to say the least, arguable that the premium cannot,
to that extent, be recovered under s 29. Thus the court has to consider the terms of
the contract under which the premium is paid to see whether it is simply a contract
of insurance against liability for costs or whether it is something other than, or
additional to, that.’3
‘The contractual benefits purchased by the premium must be distinguished from the
use made by the insurer of the premium. An insurer will necessarily look to premium
income to meet the costs of the business. The primary costs are likely to be those of
meeting claims, but the costs will also include matters such as commissions,
advertising and, indeed, refurbishing the insurer’s premises. The court will not be
directly concerned with how, or on what, the insurer spends the premium income.
The court will, however, be concerned with the question of whether the premium is
a reasonable price to pay for the benefits that it purchases. Ultimately, this should be
a question to be considered having regard to experience, or evidence, of the market.
If an insurer is conducting his business in a manner which incurs extravagant,
extraneous or otherwise unnecessary expenditure, which has to be covered by the
premiums, those premiums are likely to be uncompetitive. To pay such a premium
where other more reasonable premiums are available may disentitle the litigant from
making a full recovery of the costs of the premium.’4
It was by an application of these principles in the Claims Direct Test Cases5
that the Senior Costs Judge concluded that if the whole of the amount paid by
a Claims Direct client constituted premium under s 29, then not all of the
benefits so purchased constituted insurance. Accordingly the costs of the
non-insurance benefits was disallowed. This was an alternative to the finding
that not all of the amount paid constituted premium – see above at para [108.4].
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [12], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [13], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [12], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
4 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [13], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
5 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
[111.1] Similarly in The Accident Group Tranche 2 Issues Sharratt v London
Central Bus Co1 the Senior Costs Judge heard extensive evidence as to the
benefits purchased by the gross premium and concluded that not all of those
benefits constituted insurance. Accordingly only part of the sum paid by a
client was recoverable under the AJA 1999, s 29. The Senior Costs Judge
addressed the issue of the use of extensive actuarial evidence in challenges to
premiums:
‘The court will not normally be prepared to receive such evidence. Evans J in
Johnson v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1992] 1 All ER 169 at 183 stated:
“[Presenting] such figures requiring non expert analysis, ie by persons who are not
accountants, is misconceived as a means of assisting the court in a particular case.
Assessing costs is not an exact science; neither is accountancy. Treating the latter as
if it were so that the results of an accountancy exercise can be used as a basis for the
former, seems to me to achieve the worst of both worlds. The [Costs Judges] general
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knowledge and experience of local conditions and circumstances remains the only
firm basis for reliable and consistent [assessment].”’. At 272
The Court of Appeal in Claims Direct Test Cases2 considered that a court
would only conduct a deconstruction of premium in exceptional cases:–
‘In my judgment, in this quite exceptional case, it was inevitable that the Master
should adopt this [deconstruction] approach in order to identify what should truly
be treated as the premium.’. Brooke LJ at 87
1 (Case No PTH 0204771) [2003] EWHC 9020 (Costs)..
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
Extent of cover
Adverse costs
[112] The court set out a number of circumstances where a court order might
be made (judgment for defendant; CPR 1998, Pt 36; claimant losing one or
more issues; discretionary power). The policy in this case further provided
cover where the parties agreed that the insured should pay costs. The court
held that a premium in respect of each of these circumstances was recoverable
under the AJA 1999, s 29.
Own costs
[113] Paragraphs [34]–[62] of the judgment deal with this issue. The court
outlined the circumstances in which a litigant might be left to bear own costs:
‘A litigant may be left to bear his own costs in a number of different circumstances.
The costs incurred may be excessive or otherwise unreasonable, so that they will in
no circumstances be recoverable from the litigant’s opponent. Reasonable costs will
be recoverable only under a settlement agreement or an order of the court. A litigant
may fail to obtain a court order for payment of costs for a number of reasons. His
claim may fail, so that costs are ordered against him, rather than in his favour. He
may fail on a particular issue at an interlocutory stage or at the final hearing and, in
consequence, fail to obtain a costs order in relation to that issue. If he is successful
the costs order made in his favour will not necessarily cover his solicitor and client
costs.’1
Having reviewed material from the Lord Chancellor’s Department consulta-
tion papers, the explanatory notes to the Access to Justice Bill and submissions
as to the overall scheme, the court reached its conclusions on this issue by
dealing with the relevant parts of the CPR 1998 and the CPD.
In particular, reference is made to CPD, s 11.10 which provides in part:
‘In deciding whether the cost of insurance cover is reasonable, relevant factors to be
taken into account include:
(1) where the insurance cover is not purchased in support of a conditional fee
agreement with a success fee, how its cost compares with the likely cost of
funding the case with a conditional fee agreement with a success fee and
supporting insurance cover;’
The court reached the conclusion that own costs cover is within the AJA 1999,
s 29:
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [113]
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‘The provisions of Practice Direction 11.10 clearly anticipates that insurance cover
that falls within the ambit of section 29 may provide alternative protection to that
provided by a CFA coupled with insurance. Such cover will necessarily include own
cost insurance. The Practice Direction cannot, of course, confer on the court a
jurisdiction that falls outside that conferred by section 29. The question is whether
section 29 can and should be interpreted so as to treat the words “insurance against
the risk of incurring a costs liability” as meaning “insurance against the risk of
incurring a costs liability that cannot be passed on to the opposing party”.’2
‘We have concluded that section 29 can and should be interpreted in this way. We
believe that such an interpretation will do no more than give the words the meaning
that would be attributed to them by the reasonable litigant. It will also give the
words a meaning that accords with the legislative intention and with the overall
scheme for the funding of legal costs.’3
Here again, however, the court restricted itself to the facts of the case and has
left it open for challenges to be made on the degree of own costs cover granted
by other cases:
‘The circumstances in which and the terms on which own costs insurance will be
reasonable, so that the whole premium can be recovered as costs, will have to be
determined by the courts, when dealing with individual cases, assisted, if appropri-
ate, by the Rules Committee.’4
This conclusion must however be set against the court’s decision as to the
meaning of AJA 1999, s 29 in terms of the risk of being unable to pass a
liability to an opposing party. Lord Scott in the House of Lords in Callery5 also
addressed the own costs element of a premium:
‘If it is reasonable for a claimant to take out ATE insurance cover in order to protect
himself against incurring a costs liability in litigation, whether in respect of the other
side’s costs or his own costs, I can, for my part see no reason why any distinction
should be drawn between the types of adverse costs orders that might be made or the
circumstances in which the orders might be made. If the claimant becomes entitled
to costs and the expenditure has been reasonably incurred and is reasonable in
amount, the expenditure, in my opinion, ought in principle to be included in the
costs to be paid.’.’ At 130
In Ashworth v Peterborough United Football Club6 the cost of a policy
covering both sides’ costs was allowed in full on an assessment.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [39], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [59], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [60], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
4 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [61], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
5 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
6 (10 June 2002, unreported), SCCO 0201106.
Premium cover
[114] The policy in Callery included a commonly provided cover for the
premium itself in the event that the claim failed. The court1 concluded that as
an item of own costs cover this was within the AJA 1999, s 29:
‘The cover provided by the Temple policy, as is usual, includes cover against the risk
of being unable to recover the premium as a consequence of losing the action . . .
We can see no reason, in principle, why this should not form part of the cover
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provided under insurance that falls within section 29, provided always that any part
of the premium attributable to it is reasonable in amount.’. At [63]
The court here however expressly states that the level of premium charged for
this part had to be reasonable. This item by item approach is not reflected in
the rest of the judgment. It is submitted that given the court has decided that
this benefit is within s 29 it is the overall cost of obtaining all of the s 29
benefits which should be considered rather than any attempt to apportion
parts of premium to each or any benefit. This head of cover was also allowed
in Claims Direct Test Cases2.
1 Callery v Gray (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1246, [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142; affd
[2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
Deferred premium
[115] The policy purchased in this case provided for the premium to be paid
at the conclusion of the case. The issue of the cost within the premium
representing a delay in payment was not raised in the appeal and the court
therefore said that this issue would be addressed if and when it arose1. Deferral
of premium was later addressed in RSA Pursuit Test Cases2 where the
Senior Costs Judge made no deduction from premiums for the fact of deferral.
It had been argued that some reduction in premium ought to take place
because there must be hidden in the premium a cost that in effect amounts to
an irrecoverable cost of funding the litigation. The alternative method of
funding premiums which many insurers provide is by way of a loan to the
client. The interest on that loan would not be recoverable on the basis of the
general principle of not inquiring into how a litigant has funded their costs3.
1 In Tilby v Perfect Pizza [2002] NLJR 397, Senior Costs Judge Hurst held that a deferred
premium did not constitute credit for the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
2 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
3 See Hunt v RM Douglas (Roofing) Ltd (1987) 132 Sol Jo 935, [1988] 3 LS Gaz R 33, CA;
revsd [1990] 1 AC 398, [1998] 3 All ER 823, HL.
Unrecovered premium/ring fencing of damages
[116] Some policies give cover designed to protect damages from unrecovered
costs and in particular from any unrecovered premium. The effect on the
premium level in Callery itself was regarded as minimal or non-existent. The
cover there provided was limited to any un-recovered premium. This leaves
therefore the question of recovery where the cover is greater although the court
did question whether it was the Lord Chancellor’s intention that such cover
would be paid for by an opponent:
‘We have seen nothing to suggest that it was the intention that claimants should be
entitled to pass on to defendants the cost of insuring against failure to be awarded
costs on the ground that the costs had been unreasonably incurred or were otherwise
objectionable.’1
In Claims Direct Test Cases2 the Senior Costs Judge was clear that an
additional premium paid exclusively to cover unrecovered premium was itself
not recoverable:
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [116]
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‘The Defendants object to paying this additional premium, firstly because they say
it was brought about by the poor claims performance of Claims Direct, which is
ultimately due to bad management, for which they should not have to pay. Secondly,
they argue that in any event the cover purchased by the additional premium does not
fall within the ambit of Section 29. The Court of Appeal in Callery v Gray (No 2)
explained the position in this way:
“38. Insurance is the purchase of an indemnity against the risk of loss caused by a
fortuity. A contract that provides for the payment of a sum of money upon the
occurrence of a fortuitous event will not be insurance unless the sum in question is
intended to indemnify against a consequence of that event. When considering the
nature of ‘own costs insurance’, it is necessary to identify the fortuity that triggers
liability and consider the extent to which this fortuity exposes the insured to the loss
against which cover is provided.” The fortuity here is not the inability to recover
costs but the event of claiming too much’.3
‘In my view, since the cover purchased for £245 plus IPT was a discrete add on to
the existing insurance for which the Claimant paid separately, and since the cover
provided does not fall within the strict limits of Section 29, no part of the £245 plus
IPT is recoverable. Had the Claimant taken out a policy which included ring fencing
at the outset it still seems to me that this element of cover and therefore its cost
should be excluded from what is recoverable from the paying party.’4
It is important to note that the above extract from the decision relates to an
additional premium paid by Claims Direct clients to provide cover against
un-recovered premium.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [54], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142. In Re Claims Direct
Test Cases [2002] EWCA Civ 428, [2002] PIQR Q 152, (2002) Times, 4 April Lord
Phillips MR stated that Callery does not give an answer to the issue of ring-fencing – at
para [29]. This was an appeal from a case management decision and not an appeal from the
substantive case.
2 [2002] All ER (D) 76 (Sep).
3 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at [213].
4 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at [214].
Collateral benefits
[117] The court here refers to benefits provided by the insurance other than
cover for legal costs and at para [33] expressly leaves this question open. Master
O’Hare’s report gave examples of collateral benefits such as claims negotiation
and handling, counselling and other practical help. On the facts of the case there
were no collateral benefits given by the policy. In Claims Direct Test Cases1 a
number of collateral benefits were identified and their cost was disallowed as
premium2. It was however possible that some of those benefits could be claimed
as solicitor’s costs. Similar benefits were included in the gross premium in the
TAG Test Cases3 and that part of gross premium was not recoverable under
the AJA 1999, s 29.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
2 See above at paras [108.9] and [111].
3 SCCO 2003 Case No: PTH 0204771.
[116] Litigation Funding
E-94 BCS • Issue 96
0092 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:21 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
Both sides costs policies1
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [61], [41], [51], and [54], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
[118] The court was not considering a policy which provided both sides’ costs
(BSI) other than the limited extent of own disbursements. There are passages
in the judgment, however, which refer to the issues which will arise where the
cover is for own costs in a fuller extent:
‘Mr Callery’s cover does not make it a condition of the recoverability of his
disbursements in the event of the failure of his claim that these would have been
recoverable had his claim succeeded. In the case of BSI this question is likely to be
much more significant.’2
The point being made here is that where a policy provides cover for all of the
insured’s own costs in the event that the case fails, that cover may well extend
to items which would not have been recovered had the claim succeeded. It will
be a difficult exercise however to try to apportion premium to this hypothetical
amount since the cover given will be in terms of an overall limit of indemnity.
Where a CFA is used the risk on own costs, including items that would not be
recovered form an opponent, is taken by the legal representative. The cost of
that risk is included in the success fees of cases that win. By analogy if a both
sides’ costs policy is used the insurance will cover all own costs including those
that would not themselves be recoverable.
Lord Scott in the House of Lords in Callery3, whilst dissenting from the
decision on the facts to allow recovery of the premium, saw no reason to treat
a both sides’ policy any differently to an adverse costs only policy:
‘If it is reasonable for a claimant to take out ATE insurance cover in order to protect
himself against incurring a costs liability in litigation, whether in respect of the other
side’s costs or his own costs, I can, for my part see no reason why any distinction
should be drawn between the types of adverse costs orders that might be made or the
circumstances in which the orders might be made. If the claimant becomes entitled
to costs and the expenditure has been reasonably incurred and is reasonable in
amount, the expenditure, in my opinion, ought in principle to be included in the
costs to be paid.’4
In Ashworth v Peterborough United Football Club5 the premium for a both
side’s costs policy was allowed in full.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [41], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
3 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
4 [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417 at para [130], [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
5 (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO 0201106.
The actual cost in Callery1
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246, [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
[119] The premium paid in the case was £350 plus tax. The court was asked
by the appellant to reduce that figure to near £160. The court held that the
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [119]
BCS • Issue 96 E-95
0093 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:21 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
price paid was not manifestly disproportionate to the risk. The premium paid
was not however the lowest available in the market:
‘So far as alternatives are concerned, Mr Callery was able to choose, with the
assistance of his solicitors, cover at a premium near the bottom of the range of what
was available. The premium was one tailored to the risk and the cover was suitable
for Mr Callery’s needs. The policy terms also had the attractive feature that they
gave his solicitors control over the conduct of the proceedings on his behalf, without
any involvement by a claims manager until a settlement offer was made.’2
Having allowed this premium the court was clearly concerned for the future
effect on premiums:
‘Just as in the case of our decision on the CFA uplift, we should emphasise that this
judgment should not be treated as determining once and for all that a premium of
£350 is reasonable in a case such as this. As further information and experience
about the market becomes available it will be possible to found conclusions as to
whether premiums are reasonable on a sounder basis.’3
It will remain to be seen how coherent the market becomes in the future and
what information about products and claims will be made available. Not all
insurers will gather the same experience at the same time and they will not all
review their products at the same time. This at the very least will make it
difficult to take a snap shot of the market at any given time with a view to
setting benchmarks.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [70], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
3 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [00], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
Master O’Hare’s Report
[120] The court annexed the report to its judgment without approving the
views expressed within the Report. The object is to make available to those
who have to make decisions on recoverability in the future:
‘His views may prove of assistance to those faced with the task of ruling on the
recoverability of ATE premiums, but they cannot be treated as definitive.’1
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 1246 at [4], [2001] 4 All ER 1, [2001] 1 WLR 2142.
Guidance for assessment
[121] Set out below in Table I is a summary of the Report’s analysis of
premiums based upon a list of benefits additional to adverse costs cover.
Master O’Hare was giving guidance as to the percentage of premium which
could be attributed to these items, information which will be needed only
where on assessment it is considered that that part of the premium ought not
to be recovered. The effect of the court’s judgment on each item is therefore
given since not all items can be treated in the same way as to recoverability.
Table II sets out Master O’Hare’s guidance for the conduct of detailed
assessments in RTA cases. Again the effect of the court’s judgment is given
alongside the Report’s conclusions.
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Table I What does the premium cover?
[122]
Item Court of Appeal Report
recoverable*
Own counsel’s fees Yes Allow in full
Other disbursements Yes Allow in full
Cover for appeals Not considered Negligible
Costs of Part 36 Yes Substantial but not
quantified
Top up cover option Not considered Not quantified
Interest foregone on
deferred premiums
No decision – see [65]
**
Allow in full
Premium cover in event
case loses
Yes Allow in full
Unrecovered premium Doubted – see [54] and
[62]
Not quantified
Claims record of
solicitor
Not considered Not quantified
Interest on
disbursement loans if
claim fails
Not considered Consider: likely rate of
interest, size of loan,
likely duration of
proceedings, risk of loss
Advice and assistance
of claims managers
Arguably not see Not quantified
* The court’s decision is as to recoverability and not the question of the cost of that cover
which might be found nonetheless to be unreasonable.
** All paragraph numbers are references to the judgment of Lord Phillips MR.
Table II Guidance for detailed assessment – RTA
[123]
Guidance Court of Appeal
(a) No benchmarking – develop
benchmarks through experience
(b) High limit of indemnity does
not itself indicate unreasonable
premium
(c) Block risk policies not
unreasonable
May be difficult to justify see –
[23]
(d) [rejected by court] There is no presumption that the
premium is reasonable
(e) Allowed premium is total not
the pure underwriting risk
premium
Do not look to how the premium
is used by the insurer.
( f ) Assessment fees and profit
costs of complying with policy
recoverable
Not considered
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [123]
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(g) Receiving party need not have
made the best choice – must be
reasonable choice
Premium actually allowed was
not lowest available.
(h) Paying party to provide
evidence from ‘Litigation
Funding’ or similar source
ATE insurer to provide evidence
of reasonableness – see [16]
(i) Can be reasonable to insure
before sending letter to
opponent
Yes
Also reasonable to wait until
defendant’s reaction known
Not considered
( j ) If premium at or above top of
range of other policies –
purchaser must explain
Not specifically addressed but
judgment generally consistent
(k) High cost premium easier to
justify where high success fee
has been allowed
Not considered
(l) Consider reductions for
irrecoverable elements [Table I]
See Table I
(m) Value deductions by broad
brush
Not considered
The issue of block rated policies arose in Claims Direct Test Cases1:
‘Such evidence as there is on the topic of block rating is to the effect that the level
of recoverable premium would have been altered to a minimal extent. Accordingly,
in the context of these test cases, I make no deduction in respect of block rating. As
Master O’Hare stated in paragraph 15 of his Report the issue may arise again in
cases where there is sufficient evidence to decide whether block rated policies are
more expensive than individually rated policies and if so whether the premium of
such a policy is reasonably recoverable.’2
Reliance on material published in the Law Society publication Litigation
Funding (see (h) in the above table) has since been disapproved by the
Senior Costs Judge in re RSA Pursuit Test Cases and by the Court of Appeal
in Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council3.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 136, [2003] 4 All ER 508, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 788.
2 [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs) at para [222].
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER 354, [2007] 1 WLR 808. See paras [141]–[144].
The effect of before the event insurance on recovery of after the event
insurance premiums1
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
[124] An ATE premium is recoverable as an additional liability if it was
reasonable to take out such a policy. The Court of Appeal in Sarwar1 addressed
a number of issues with regard to the use of ATE insurance where a before the
event (BTE) policy of insurance is in existence. This decision concerned only
the recovery of the additional liability. In the later case of Samonini v London
[123] Litigation Funding
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General Transport Services Ltd2 the Senior Costs Judge considered the effect
of pre-existing legal expenses insurance on the validity of entering into a CFA.
The Court of Appeal in Myatt v National Coal Board3 held a CFA to be invalid
where insufficient enquiry had been made as to the existence and extent of BTE
insurance. In Richards v Davis4, where the client was represented under the
TAG scheme, no enquiry at all was made as to existing insurance or any other
form of funding. The CFA was accordingly invalid. Importantly, that does not
decide the recoverability of the ATE premium. It was held that there should, be
no recovery of premium in this case as to enter into such arrangements without
any enquiry as to alternatives was itself unreasonable. As with Callery, the
decision in Sarwar concerned RTA cases involving personal injury and the
court’s decision is expressed to be confined to that class of case with a value
below £5,0005. The Sarwar guidance as to using BTE where it exists was held
in Woolley v Haden Building Services6 not to apply other than relatively small
personal injury claims in road traffic cases and certainly did not apply to
industrial disease claims.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
2 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457. See para [152.5].
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
4 (2005) unreported: SCCO Ref: PTH 0504722.
5 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541 at para [41], [2002] 1 WLR 125.
6 SCCO 0705738 [2008] EWHC 90097 (Costs).
The level of inquiry about BTE cover
Inquiry of the client
[125] The court’s approach in Sarwar to checking BTE cover begins at
para 45 with the assumption that the client will be attending a face to face
interview with the solicitor. In the context of road traffic personal injury claims
that assumption would be wrong in a large number of cases. It was recognised
in Myatt v National Coal Board1 that it is necessary to adapt the court’s ap-
proach for clients who will be interviewed by telephone and who will not meet
their solicitor. The general guidance given in Sarwar:
‘In our judgment, proper modern practice dictates that a solicitor should normally
invite a client to bring to the first interview any relevant motor insurance policy, any
household insurance policy and any stand-alone BTE insurance policy belonging to
the client and/or any spouse or partner living in the same household as the client. It
would seem desirable for solicitors to develop the practice of sending a standard
form letter requesting a sight of these documents to the client in advance of the first
interview. At the interview the solicitor will also ask the client, as required by
paragraph 4( j )(iv) of the client care code (see para 14 above), whether his/her
liability for costs may be paid by another person, for example an employer or trade
union.’2
The essence of the guidance is that proportionate and early inquiry should be
made of the client and that the solicitor should obtain sight of insurance
policies.
In Myatt the court stressed that the test was one of reasonableness in all the
circumstance. In the context of a finding that the CFA was invalid for breach
of reg 4(2)(c) the court explained its guidance given in Sarwar:
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [125]
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‘ . . . regulation 4(2)(c) duty does not require solicitors slavishly to follow the
detailed guidance given by this court in Sarwar. In particular, the statement at
para 45 [of Sarwar] that a solicitor should normally invite a client to bring to the
first interview any relevant policy should be treated with considerable caution. It has
no application in high volume low value litigation conducted by solicitors on referral
by claims management companies. As the Myatt cases show, the clients will often
live far from the solicitor’s offices, and face to face interviews may well not take
place.’ [70]
As to the enquiry to be made of a client the court identified five factors of
relevance:
First, the nature of the client. If the client is evidently intelligent and has a real
knowledge and understanding of insurance matters, it may be reasonable for the
solicitor to ask him not only (i) whether he has credit cards, motor insurance or
household insurance or is a member of a trade union, (ii) whether he has legal
expenses insurance, but also (iii) the ultimate question of whether the legal expenses
policy covers the proposed claim and, if so, whether it does so to a sufficient extent.
Litigants such as the Myatt claimants and Ms Garrett plainly do not fall into this
category: few litigants will. If the solicitor does ask such questions, he will have to
form a view as to whether the client’s answers to the questions can reasonably be
relied upon. [72.]
Secondly, the circumstances in which the solicitor is instructed may be relevant to the
nature of the enquiries that it is reasonable to expect the solicitor to undertake in
order to establish the BTE position. A good example of the application of this factor
is to be found in Pratt v Bull, which was one of the five cases that was heard together
with Hollins v Russell. In that case, the 80-year old claimant was injured in a road
accident. A solicitor visited her while she was in hospital and a CFA was made. At
the assessment of her costs, it was argued on behalf of the defendant that the
possibility of legal expenses insurance under her home insurance policy had not been
fully explored. At para 138, the court said that there were limits to what can
reasonably be expected of the interchange between solicitor and client in such
circumstances: “It would be ridiculous to expect a solicitor dealing with a seriously
ill old woman in hospital to delay making a CFA while her home insurance policy
was found and checked.” It was sufficient that the solicitor had discussed it with her
and formed a view on the funding options. [73]
Thirdly, the nature of the claim may be relevant. If the claim is one in respect of
which it is unlikely that standard insurance policies would provide legal expenses
cover, this may be a further reason why it may be reasonable for the solicitor to take
fewer steps to ascertain the position than might otherwise be the case. [74]
Fourthly, the cost of the ATE premium may be a relevant factor. This is the point
made at para 50 of Sarwar. In our judgment, it is as relevant to a question of breach
of regulation 4(2)(c) as to a question of the reasonableness of the premium for the
purposes of an assessment of costs pursuant to CPR 44.4. [75]
Fifthly, if the claim has been referred to solicitors who are on a panel, it may be
relevant that the referring body has already investigated the question of the
availability of BTE. Whether it is reasonable to rely on any conclusion already
reached will be a matter on which the panel solicitor must exercise his own
judgment.’ [76]
The court then considered the question of whether a solicitor must always
request sight of insurance documents:
‘ . . . in our judgment a solicitor is not required in every case to ask the client who
says that he has a home, credit card or motor insurance or is a member of a trade
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union to send him the policy or trade union membership document . . . In some
circumstances, it is reasonable for the solicitor to ask the further question whether
the insurance covers legal expenses and to rely on the answer given by the client
without further ado. In yet other cases, it is even reasonable to ask the client to
answer what we have called the ultimate question. [77]
We acknowledge that to require the solicitor to ask the client to send the policies in
all cases has the merit of certainty and would minimise the risk of satellite litigation.
In Adair v Cullen, Judge Holman said that the Sarwar approach should be adopted
to breach of regulation cases and that it “suggests a question along the lines of “Do
you have motor insurance” and if the answer is “Yes”, the next question is “can I
see the policy document please?” “ In some cases, such an approach is reasonable
and necessary to enable the solicitor to discharge his regulation 4(2)(c) duty. But for
the reasons that we have given, we do not accept that it is required in all cases. [78]
In White v Revell3 the CFA was held to be valid where the solicitor relied upon
the educated professional client’s answers to questions of alternative legal
expenses insurance or other means of funding his action. Specifically men-
tioned was the possibility of using an insurance policy that the client’s parents
may have had. The reliance on the client to check for such insurance was
acceptable in the circumstances.
The guidance given in Myatt was in the context of compliance with the now
revoked CFA Regulations and therefore it has direct application only to cases
where a CFA was entered into before those regulations were revoked. Myatt
was not a case falling into the category of low value simple road traffic claims
considered in Sarwar. Compliance with reg 4 is required in all cases of
whatever tripe, complexity or value, subject to the third of the five factors
outlined above. For the purposes of recovery of an ATE premium even after the
revocation of the regulations it is submitted that the guidance is applicable to
the extent that it explains the court’s decision in Sarwar. Recovery of premium
is not automatically decided by a finding that the CFA is invalid although in
many cases it is likely to have been unreasonable to have used ATE4. BTE has
caused particular difficulties in cases involving busses with no consistency in
the lower courts as to whether a solicitor before 2005 could have been
expected to check the bus company’s insurance to see if it covered injured
passengers. A decision in favour of the paying party is Tranter v Hansons5, and
a decision in favour of the receiving parties is Dole v ECT6.
There seems nothing in principle that prevents adequate inquiry by telephone
albeit that the costs in terms of time are likely to be significant if a
questionnaire has to be administered by telephone. The following question-
naire is suitable for client use before first interview or administration by
telephone. If as a result of this inquiry it appears that the client has insurance
policies that may include legal expenses cover then the solicitor will need to see
those policies before making a decision as to a CFA and ATE insurance. Failure
to obtain sight of the policies may render the CFA invalid and will preclude any
recovery of the ATE premium.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
2 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 at [45], [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
3 (2006) unreported SCCO Ref: CW0508940 [2006] EWHC 90054 (Costs).
4 See for example Richards v Davis (2005) unreported: SCCO Ref: PH 0504722 [2005] EWHC
90014 (Costs) at para [124].
5 [2009] EWHC 90145.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [125]
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6 (unreported SCCO 17 September 2007) [2007] EWHC 90086 (Costs).
BTE enquiry and Part 45 fixed costs
[125.1] CPR Part 45 provides for fixed recoverable fees including a success
fee in specified types of case. Part 45 provides for recovery of an ATE premium
as a disbursement but does not fix the recoverable premium by amount. The
availability of BTE in cases covered by the fixed costs regime cannot affect the
recovery of base costs and a success fee. The fixed costs regime was considered
by the Court of Appeal in Kilby v Gawith1 which held that Part 45 did not
confer any discretion on a court and accordingly the availability of BTE
insurance was not a factor where the fixed costs regime applied. A success fee
of 12.5% was due irrespective of whether BTE insurance could have been
used. This decision does not address the recovery of an ATE premium in such
a case. ATE premiums are not a fixed recovery under Part 45 and therefore
reasonableness is an issue. This decision may inadvertently put pressure on
solicitors to run cases uninsured or it may lead to solicitors paying the ATE
premium rather than allow cases to go to a panel firm.
1 [2008] EWCA Civ 812, [2009] 1 WLR 853, [2009] RTR 8.
Client questionnaire
[126] Please answer each question YES or NO or NOT KNOWN by putting
a tick in the box next to each question:
Yes No Not
known
1 Do you, or a partner living with you, own (with
or without a mortgage) your home?
2 Do you, or a partner living with you, have home
contents insurance?
3 Have you, or a partner living with you,
purchased Legal Expenses insurance?
4 Are you, or a partner living with you, employed?
5 Are you, or a partner living with you, a member
of a trade union?
6 Were you driving a car when the accident
occurred?
7 If you were a passenger do you know the name
of the driver of the car you were in?
8 If you were a passenger, is the driver related to
you?
9 In your opinion was the accident the fault of
your driver?
10 Are you likely to be able to find any insurance
policies that you have?
[125] Litigation Funding
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Using the above questionnaire
[127]–[128] The questionnaire is intended to enable a risk assessment to be
made of the likelihood of a client having BTE cover. This approach avoids the
assumption that a client will have accurate knowledge of their past and
existing insurance cover. Questions 1–3 where answered YES indicate a
likelihood that BTE will exist. Negative answers indicate a likely absence of
BTE. Questions 6–9 indicate the suitability of BTE and deal particularly with
passenger clients. Question 10 addresses the practical difficulty of asking a
client to bring with them all policy documents. An accompanying letter should
stress the importance of existing insurance cover and the need to provide the
documents. In passenger cases the client should be asked to contact the driver
to obtain a copy of the driver’s policy. Questions 4 and 5 comply with the
Client Care Code in exploring alternatives other than insurance.
The questions
(1) YES = Likely to be buildings insurance which may have an add-on BTE
cover (but may exclude road traffic claims.)
(1) NO = No buildings insurance is likely to exist giving cover to the client.
(2) YES = BTE may exist as an add-on to the contents policy (but may
exclude road traffic claims.)
(2) NO = Not a source for BTE
(3) YES = This is specifically purchased as a stand-alone BTE policy.
(3) NO = No stand-alone likely to exist.
(4) YES = Possible that the employer provides BTE.
(4) NO = Not a source of BTE
(5) YES = May provide legal assistance though not BTE.
(5) NO = Not a source of funding.
(6) YES = Client ought to have liability insurance – it may include a BTE
add-on (see likelihood – below).
(6) NO = Client’s own motor policy BTE add-on will not provide cover*.
(7) YES = Client to request copy of driver’s BTE policy and seek consent to
use it (see Suitability of BTE cover – below).
(7) NO = Unlikely to be cost effective to pursue this source.
(8) YES = Potential conflict of interest may make this BTE unsuitable..
(8) NO = No conflict of interest arising from family relationship.
(9) YES = Likely conflict of interest may make this BTE unsuitable.
(9) NO = Need to assess nonetheless the possibility that blame will
eventually attach to own driver.
(10) YES = Indicates information provided will be accurate.
(10) NO = indicates that information will be incomplete and some unavail-
able.
*If the client was a passenger but had a motor policy of their own covering the
driver as a named driver or where the policy covers all drivers, there may be
BTE cover available to the client under such a policy. For example where a
husband is driving his wife’s car and the wife’s policy covers the husband as a
named driver, both are likely to be covered in any add-on BTE policy. If in such
a case there were to be multiple claims, for example, husband wife and other
passenger, the situation becomes complex, certainly in terms of advice to the
client as to the suitability of cover.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [127]
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In Dole v ECT Recycling1 the costs judge accepted the clear conclusion from
uncontradicted evidence that the state of knowledge of solicitors specialising in
the personal injury field in the summer of 2004 was not that the defendants to
a claim against a bus company might have passenger cover, and in particular
that such cover would be dealt with independently of any claim made against
them by the passenger. Accordingly failure to enquire of the defendant was not
unreasonable.
1 [2007] EWHC 90086 (Costs).
Investigating documents
[129] The court in Sarwar1 as explained in Myatt2 anticipates that the BTE
policy wording will be available and that the client’s solicitor will in sutitable
cases read through it to determine its availability and suitability. Myatt
emphasised that in many cases it will not be sufficient to rely on the
client’s own knowledge and understanding and it will be insufficient merely to
ask whether the client has legal expenses insurance and be content with a
negative answer. Determining the existence of BTE can be achieved if the client
has a renewal notice, a certificate of insurance or an invoice/receipt – the latter
may come from a broker or from the insurer. Suitability of cover cannot be
determined except from the policy wording applicable to the insurance. Where
the client does not produce a policy wording it would be necessary for the
client to obtain the wording before suitability of cover can be assessed and any
decision as to how to fund the case is taken. The court gave no guidance as to
what further steps should be taken or any time scale for such steps. Failing to
have sight of policy wordings can also affect the validity of a CFA3. The
enquiries made by the solicitor in Puksis v Brumby4 revealed that the client did
not have household contents insurance, did not drive and did not have credit
cards and the solicitor concluded that there was no legal expense cover. The
court was satisfied on the evidence that the solicitor checked the building
insurance policy that the client did have. Those enquiries covered the realistic
possibilities in the circumstances of this case.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
2 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
3 See para [152.5].
4 [2008] EWHC 90095 (Costs).
The effect of inaccurate information
Client risk
[130] Where BTE cover is available and suitable in a road traffic case valued
at less than £5,000 it is clear that an ATE premium will not be recovered in
costs. Where a client mistakenly concludes that they have no such cover it is
not clear what the result will be for the ATE premium. The court suggests the
sort of inquiry which the above questionnaire facilitates. A solicitor must also
have sight of any insurance policies that may have legal expenses cover. If after
such inquiry it is mistakenly concluded that the client has no BTE cover then
the reasonableness of purchasing ATE cover and entering into a CFA with
[127] Litigation Funding
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success fee ought to be judged in the light of the steps which have been taken.
A client in such circumstances will rely on the CPD s 11.7:
‘Subject to paragraph 17.8(2), when the court is considering the factors to be taken
into account in assessing an additional liability, it will have regard to the facts and
circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the solicitor or counsel when the
funding arrangement was entered into and at the time of any variation of the
arrangement.’
In Samonini v London General Transport Services Ltd1 a failure on the part of
a solicitor to carry out this level of inquiry was a breach of the CFA
Regulations with the consequence that the entire funding arrangement was
invalid2.
1 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457.
2 See para [152.5].
Solicitor risk
[131] The court in Sarwar1 addressed only the question of fault in terms of a
solicitor’s duty of care. The court said that any advice given will necessarily be
based on the information provided by the client and that advice based upon
inadequate or inaccurate information, whilst unsound, will not indicate fault2.
There are, however, serious questions as to risk which this does not answer.
Where a client has purchased ATE insurance on the mistaken basis that there
is no BTE, the client has a liability for the premium. In many cases the
premium will be deferred or funded so that there is still a real question as to
payment (or repayment of a loan). There will be circumstances in which the
solicitor will in some form or other be carrying the premium as a disbursement
liability. In these circumstances clearly there is a real risk of financial loss
irrespective of the matter of negligence.
Equally a solicitor who has entered into a CFA with a success fee may be faced
later with evidence of available and suitable BTE which the early inquires did
not discover. As with the client’s position as to premium, such a solicitor will
seek to rely upon CPD, s 11.7 as to the reasonableness of entering into such a
funding arrangement. In Samonini v London General Transport Services Ltd3
and in Myatt v National Coal Board4 a failure on the part of a solicitor to carry
out the Sarwar level of inquiry was a breach of the CFA Regulations, with the
consequence that the entire funding arrangement was invalid, notwithstanding
the fact that the client did not have BTE cover5. Where inadequate enquiry is
made it may lead to a pre November 2005 CFA being unenforceable and to a
failure to recover the premium. From 1 November 2005 the CFA will be valid
but the success fee will be at risk as well as the ATE premium where it can be
argued that BTE was available. In fixed costs cases under Part 45 the success
fee is fixed and not vulnerable to such a challenge but the premium is still
vulnerable.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
2 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 at [51].
3 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457.
4 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [131]
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5 See para [152.5].
The terms of the BTE policy in Sarwar
[132] The BTE was with DAS, with the following important provisions
highlighted by the court1:
(1) Driver and passengers covered.
(2) Passenger claims require the consent of the driver.
(3) Limit of indemnity £50,000.
(4) DAS entitled to ‘full conduct and control of any claim or legal
proceedings’.
(5) Insured’s right to choose a lawyer only if proceedings are issued or there
is a conflict of interest.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 at para [6], [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
Suitability of BTE cover
[133] The court’s approach was to refer to available and suitable cover in
road traffic claims valued at less than £5,000. It is a matter for judgment
therefore as to whether in any particular case the available BTE is suitable for
the particular client. The court gives no guidance here except with regard to
passenger claims where the BTE available is possessed by the defendant.
The court summarised the position of a passenger faced with using this DAS
policy taken out by the defendant driver whom he is suing:
‘representation arranged by the insurer of the opposing party, pursuant to a policy
to which the claimant had never been a party, and of which he/she had no
knowledge at the time it was entered into, and where the opposing insurer through
its chosen representative reserves to itself the full conduct and control of the claim,
is not a reasonable alternative.’1
There are, however, difficult circumstances other than this example. Whenever
a claimant is a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident there is a
possibility that at some stage it will turn out to be necessary to blame, at least
in part, the claimant’s own driver. The court gives no guidance for these
situations as to how to assess suitability where the only BTE cover available is
that of the driver. The court refers to the limit of indemnity where there is more
than one claimant on the policy as being a possible factor rendering use of the
BTE unsuitable. A low limit together with multiple claims on that limit is likely
to leave a client in the difficult position of looking for top up cover with an
ATE insurer.
On an individual basis, the suitability of BTE cover will depend also on
ensuring that cover was in place at the relevant time (date of accident, not date
of claim) and that the type of claim to be pursued is covered by the policy. A
household policy may for example exclude any claims for injuries sustained
whilst a driver or passenger a car. It is also necessary to consider whether the
conditions laid down in the policy have been complied with, such as the time
limit for notification of claims. BTE policies will give cover only where the
insurer takes the view that there are reasonable prospects of success. It is
difficult to see from the judgment how this factor can be accommodated in the
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question of suitability at the time the decision has to be made as to the use of
ATE insurance. The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau’s Bulletin 16 states:
‘Disagreements over reasonable prospects make up a fair proportion of the
legal expenses cases we consider every year.’2
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 at para [58], [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
2 IOB Bulletin 16.2 (1998).
Use of ATE where BTE exists
[134] Sarwar1 is concerned with claims for additional liabilities, in the form
of insurance premiums, against losing opponents. Where BTE cover is
available and suitable in a road traffic case valued at less than £5,000, any ATE
premium will be irrecoverable. By implication a success fee under a CFA would
also be un-recovered where a BTE policy could have been used and in
Samonini v London General Transport Services Ltd2 and in Myatt v Na-
tional Coal Board3 the CFA was held to be invalid as a result of a failure
properly to consider whether the client had existing legal expenses cover. It is
difficult to advise a client in these circumstances to not avail themselves of the
BTE cover but instead to choose an ATE route at their own expense or to take
the case without insurance cover at all.
The Solicitors’ Costs Information Client Care Code 1990, 4( j ) provided:
‘The solicitor should discuss with the client how, when and by whom any costs are
to be met, and consider:
. . .
(iii) whether the client’s liability for another party’s costs may be covered by
pre-purchased insurance and, if not, whether it would be advisable for the
client’s liability for another party’s costs to be covered by after the event
insurance . . . ’
The SRA Code of Conduct applicable from 1 July 2007 at 2.03(1)(d)(ii)
provides:
‘(d) discuss with the client how the client will pay, in particular: [ . . . ]
(ii) whether the client’s own costs are covered by insurance or may be
paid by someone else such as an employer or trade union;’
As to running a case without insurance 2.03(1)(g) provides:
‘(g) discuss with the client whether their liability for another party’s costs may
be covered by existing insurance or whether specially purchased insurance
may be obtained.’
The arrangements in Dix v Townend and Frizzell4 were that there was a CFA
under which the claimant’s solicitors undertook to indemnify their client
against adverse costs should the claim fail. That risk was uninsured. The claim
did not fail but the opponent then challenged the retainer as being champer-
tous. The challenge succeeded on the grounds of public policy. The public
policy behind the law of champerty was not confined to cases where there was
a division of the spoils but extended to any arrangement that placed even a
potential temptation in front of the solicitors to act under the influence of their
own risk of having to make substantial payments. A different view of similar
arrangements was taken by the Court of Appeal in Sibthorpe v London
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [134]
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Borough of Southwark5. These were housing disrepair cases that had suc-
ceeded but the local authority challenged the validity of the CFA on the basis
of champerty because the solicitors had provided an indemnity against adverse
costs. The court held that the provision by the solicitors of an indemnity for
adverse costs was not champertous since the modern case law on champerty
suggested a restriction in the scope of the doctrine rather than the necessary
extension of it to cover cases where the solicitor simply ran a risk of loss but
with no prospect of a gain. The arrangement was also held not to constitute
insurance.
Although the Sarwar decision is confined to insurance premiums, it is difficult
to see that a CFA success fee would be recoverable where BTE insurance was
available and suitable. If adequate consideration has been given to the
availability of BTE before entering into a CFA and taking out ATE insurance
then the CFA will be valid. Recovery of an additional liability in the form of
a success fee and/or an ATE premium must depend upon proportionality and
the reasonableness, in the context of recovering costs from a paying party, of
the decision not to use the BTE route. The court in Sarwar made it clear that
in the context of recovery of an ATE premium it would not be reasonable to
use ATE if the BTE is suitable in road traffic claims below £5000. That does
not preclude the use of a CFA and ATE where BTE is available and suitable but
it does preclude the recovery of the additional liabilities. Where BTE is
available and suitable, a CFA with a nil success fee would in theory not add to
the opponent’s costs. It may be argued that a BTE insurer’s costs claimed
would be at a lower level. During the Court of Appeal hearing in Sarwar the
court was shown a letter from DAS which stated that the insurer would not
pay own costs in any event. On that basis there is a CFA, presumably with a
nil success fee. It is at least arguable therefore that even where BTE is available
and suitable, a client who chooses not to use that cover should be able to
recover own solicitor costs but no success fee and no ATE premium. Whether
such a position will be attractive to a client and the solicitor must be a question
for them. It is clear from the experience of ATE insurers that many CFA cases
are run without taking insurance. This appears to be done on the basis that the
case is likely to settle without the need for the issue of proceedings. Sarwar may
be seen to encourage this approach where a client does not wish to use their
BTE insurer but this will cause difficulty when such a case does unexpectedly
issue.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401 [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
2 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457.
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
4 (SCCO CCD 0706942) [2008] EWHC 90117 (Costs).
5 [2011] EWCA Civ 25.
ATE in fixed costs cases
[134.1] CPR Part 45 provides for fixed recoverable fees including a success
fee in specified types of case. Part 45 provides for recovery of an ATE premium
as a disbursement but does not fix the recoverable premium by amount1.
1 See para [125.1].
[134] Litigation Funding
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Freedom of choice of lawyer/use of panels
[135] A common feature of BTE insurance is that the insurer will seek to
control the choice of lawyer to be used. This level of control ensures that the
costs liability of liability insurers is kept to a minimum hence the connection
between liability insurers and the providers of BTE insurance. If the DAS letter
referred to in Sarwar (see para [134]) is accurate the control over choice is also
effective in ensuring that the BTE insurer incurs no own costs.
The issue of freedom of choice of lawyer was addressed by the Insurance
Ombudsman in 1993 in the context of the Insurance Companies (Legal
Expenses Insurance) Regulations 19901:
‘6
(1) Where under a legal expenses insurance contract recourse is had to a lawyer
(or other person having such qualifications as may be necessary) to defend,
represent or serve the interests of the insured in any inquiry or proceedings,
the insured shall be free to choose that lawyer (or other person).
(2) The insured shall also be free to choose a lawyer (or other person having
such qualifications as may be necessary) to serve his interests whenever a
conflict of interests arises.
(3) The above rights shall be expressly recognised in the policy.
The Ombudsman ruled that under the Regulations there is no freedom of choice of
lawyer until commencement of proceedings unless there is a conflict of interest[2].
More recently the Financial Ombudsman Service has addressed choice where a
non-panel solicitor already has charge of the case –
‘We consider that insurers should take a pragmatic approach. Where one firm is
already familiar with all the background and is dealing satisfactorily with the case,
it will generally not be sensible for the insurer to involve another firm unless, for
example, the new firm has superior expertise. Otherwise, insurers risk alienating
their policyholders to little or no advantage.’3
The court was addressed on the issue of freedom of choice but there is little in
the judgment that reflects the arguments. In particular the court fails to address
the crucial matter of when proceedings are to be considered commenced. The
CPR 1998 provides for legal consequences to flow from pre-action conduct.
There is nothing in the judgment, however, which could be said to lead to a
conclusion other than that proceedings commence when a claim is issued in a
court. There is indeed no analysis of the Council Directive 87/344/EEC nor of
the Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990 which
implement the Directive. The court having given a description of the relevant
provisions of the Regulations concludes its treatment at para [26]4:
‘It appears that the Insurance Ombudsman has consistently interpreted
regulation 6(1) as meaning that the obligation to permit the insured to select a
lawyer of his choice is triggered at the time when efforts to settle a claim by
negotiation have failed and legal proceedings have to be initiated.’
Brooke LJ has considered obiter the meaning of ‘proceedings’ in para-
graph 4A.2 of the Practice Direction: Protocols:
‘4A.2
Paragraph 4A.1 applies to all proceedings whether proceedings to which a pre-
action protocol applies or otherwise.’
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [135]
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In Crosbie v Munroe5 Brooke LJ, in the absence of argument, took the view
that for instance–
‘ . . . the dealings between the parties which lead up to the disposal of a clinical
negligence claim are to be treated as “proceedings” for the purposes of that
paragraph even if the dispute is settled without the need to issue a claim form.’ At
[37]
In Sarwar4 at para [44] the court refers to a letter leaving the court uneasy
about the terms on which a non-panel solicitor would be permitted to act
under the DAS BTE policy. The letter stated that the solicitor would not be
reimbursed for costs or disbursements in the event that the case failed. Such
terms amount in effect to a conditional fee agreement with no success fee. It
was not clear whether DAS enters into a CFA within the CLSA 1990 and
the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 20006. It would seem that
following the judgment and thus publicity to this arrangement, a solicitor
entering into an arrangement of this kind must ensure that the funding
agreement complies with the above provisions and that a written CFA is
entered into. A failure to comply would leave the solicitor vulnerable on an
assessment in a case that is successful. Arrangements for paying oppo-
nent’s costs where a claim fails were not referred to in the DAS letter but it is
necessary to ascertain whether the BTE insurer will meet this liability or
whether it is expected that the solicitor will do so.
In Brown-Quinn v Equity Syndicate Management Ltd7in a series of test cases
the High Court made a ruling on the charging rates where, under the
Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990, a BTE
insurer cannot insist on its panel solicitors being used if proceedings are issued.
Where a non-panel solicitor can be used by the insured the costs level of that
non-panel solicitor will be assessed against a comparator of the fixed rate that
the BTE insurer sets out for non-panel firms. The BTE insurer’s rate can be
exceeded on such an assessment. The comparison is one factor in assessing the
reasonableness of the charging rate. A court assessing the costs should take
into account the availability of any other suitable firms on lesser rates
negotiated with the insurers, and the following factors identified by the Court
of Appeal in Wraith v Sheffield Forgemasters Ltd 7:
(i) the location of the chosen solicitors;
(ii) their specialisation, and in particular any special qualifications for
taking on the instant claim;
(iii) the complexity of the claim;
(iv) the importance of the claim to the insured;
(v) the substance and strength of the proposed defendant to such claim;
(vi) the nature of the work required to be carried out, in particular whether
it should sensibly be carried out by senior solicitors or partners, whose
rates would inevitably be likely to be greater than the hourly rate
provided for in the non-panel costs.
1 SI 1990/1159.
2 Insurance Ombudsman Annual Report 1993, paras 6.56–6.65.
3 Ombudsman News (April 2001).
4 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
5 [2003] EWCA Civ 350, [2003] 2 All ER 856, [2003] 1 WLR 2033.
4 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
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6 SI 2000/692.
7 [2011] EWHC 2661(Comm).
7 [1998] 1 WLR 132.
Use of panels
[136] There are several references in the Sarwar judgment1 to the use by BTE
insurers of recommended panels of solicitors. At para [29] the court describes
the practice of a major LEI insurer and repeats that insurer’s view that the use
of panels enables it to control the costs incurred by the paying party. At
para [37] the court refers to the arrangements of DAS in using 52 panel firms
with 60 offices. As with much of the judgment there is again no analysis and
it is assumed therefore that the court accepts all of these arrangements.
The court raises some concern at para [44] about the size of some BTE
insurer’s panels and refers also to the post-Woolf days as making it perhaps
inappropriate to restrict choice of lawyer at the time the procedures in a
pre-action protocol come to be activated. The court concludes however that
these issues need not be decided in the current appeal.
1 Sarwar v Alam [2001] EWCA Civ 1401, [2001] 4 All ER 541, [2002] 1 WLR 125.
The House of Lords in Callery
[137] The following observations were made in the judgments1:
(1) Danger that ATE available only at an unreasonably high price [5]
(2) Clients have no incentive to keep down premiums [14]
(3) Costs judges have no criteria by which to judge the reasonableness of
premiums [44]
(4) Delay in taking out ATE policies would adversely affect the market [57]
Lord Scott gave a dissenting judgment in respect of ATE insurance in which his
Lordship says that ATE insurance is not needed unless there is going to be
litigation and that the correct approach to any assessment of costs is to
consider the circumstances of the individual case.
1 The numbers in square brackets refer to the paragraph numbers in the judgment of the House
of Lords in Callery v Gray [2002] UKHL 28, [2002] 3 All ER 417, [2002] 1 WLR 2000.
Reasonableness of the choice of insurance policy
[138] One basis for challenging the recovery of an ATE premium is that the
choice of the particular type of policy is itself unreasonable, irrespective of the
level of premium. This was considered in the RSA Pursuit Test Cases1, Tyndall
v Battersea Dogs Home2 and in Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Bor-
ough Council3. In RSA the policy chosen calculated premium on a case by case
basis with premiums significantly higher than those for standard off the peg
polices. The policy in each case was chosen because of difficulty in insuring the
case at the stage at which insurance was sought. Of the six test cases it was
found that the decision to use this policy was unreasonable in one case due to
the significant lack of proportionality between the value of the claim and the
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [138]
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likely premium. In Tyndall v Battersea Dogs Home the insurance was taken at
a late stage and the policy had a stepped or staged premium meaning that if the
case reached trial, which it did, a much increased premium was payable than
had the case settled pre-trial. It was found that it had not been shown that an
alternative policy (without a stepped approach) was actually available to that
client at the time the decision was taken to insure. Accordingly the choice of
policy was not itself unreasonable.
The Court of Appeal in Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council
approved a staged premium totalling £4860 in a personal injury claim settled
for £3105. The choice of such a policy is a separate issue to that of using a
stepped approach to premium calculation. It is unclear to what extent this
aspect of the decision is dependent on the factual background of the claimant
solicitor’s arrangements with the insurer whereby most cases were not ever
insured so that although the defendant in this particular case was faced with
a high stage thee premium, many other defendants would not be paying a
premium at all:
‘If the court concludes that it was necessary to incur the staged premium, then as this
court’s judgment in Lownds shows, it should be adjudged a proportionate expense.
Necessity here is, we think, not some absolute litmus test. It may be demonstrated
by the application of strategic considerations which travel beyond the dictates of the
particular case. Thus it may include, as we are persuaded it does, the unavoidable
characteristics of the market in insurance of this kind. It does so because this very
market is integral to the means of providing access to justice in civil disputes in what
may be called the post-legal aid world.’ [105]
The court gave more general guidance on the approach to be taken at
assessment:
“District Judges and Costs Judges do not as Lord Hoffmann observed in Callery v
Gray (Nos 1 and 2) [2002] 1 WLR 2000 para 44 have the expertise to judge the
reasonableness of a premium except in very broad brush terms and the viability of
the ATE market will be in peril if they regard themselves (without the assistance of
expert advice) as better qualified than the underwriter to rate the financial risk the
insurer faces. Although the Claimant very often does not have to pay the premium
himself this does not mean that there are no competitive or other pressures at all in
the market. The evidence before this court shows it is not in an insurer’s interest to
fix a premium at a level which will attract frequent challenges.” Brooke LJ at [117]
The above passage was relied upon in the judgment of Simon J in Kris Motor
Spares Ltd v Fox Williams4 who provided the following guidance:
‘ . . . challenges must be resolved on the basis of evidence and analysis, rather than
by assertion and counter-assertion. The issue should be identified promptly and,
where necessary, there should be directions for the proper determination of specific
issues. This may involve the Costs Judge looking at the Proposal; and in the
Receiving Party providing a note for a one-off ATE premium and not just for a
staged premium.’ [46]
The requirement for ‘a note’ is a reference to the decision in Rogers v Merthyr
Tydfil County Borough Council.
1 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
2 (2005, unreported (SCCO Ref: 0500466)) [2005] EWHC 90011 (Costs).
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER 354, [2007] 1 WLR 808.
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4 [2010] EWHC 1008 (QB).
Staged premiums
[139] The Court of Appeal approved the use of staged premiums in the test
case Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council1. The premium was
divided into three stages: outset – £400, Issue of proceedings £900, 60 days
before trial – £3510 giving a total premium of £4860 in a personal injury claim
where damages were agreed at £3105. The first two stages were fixed block
rated sums. The third stage was individually underwritten taking account of
the merits of the case and the estimated maximum loss to the insurer if the case
fails. The total costs allowed were £16,821 including the full staged premium.
In approving the stepped approach the court said that there is in principle no
difference between a two-staged success fee, whose merits the court had
consistently endorsed, and a staged ATE premium.
If an issue arises about the size of a second or third stage premium, it will
ordinarily be sufficient for a claimant’s solicitor to write a brief note for the
purposes of the costs assessment explaining how he came to choose the
particular ATE product for his client, and the basis on which the premium is
rated – whether block rated or individually rated. Where a staged premium in
a £120,000 personal injury claim came in the form of an initial stage at £551
with an additional £9,550 if the case reached service of a defence a challenge
failed on the basis that without expert evidence the court was in no position to
second guess the underwriter2.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER 354, [2007] 1 WLR 808.
2 Parker v Seixo [2010] EWHC 90162 (Costs).
Reasonable level of premium
[140] The second basis for challenging the premiums in RSA Test Cases1,
Tyndall v Battersea Dogs Home2 and in Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County
Borough Council3 was the level of the premium itself where the choice of the
type of policy was itself reasonable. In the one case in RSA Test Cases where
the choice of policy itself was not reasonable a premium was allowed based on
the level of premium that would have been paid for an off the peg policy. In the
remaining test cases and in the two staged premium cases of Tyndall v
Battersea Dogs Home and Rogers v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council
the level of premium permitted was determined by reference to the method by
which it had been calculated by the insurer. In the RSA cases the method was
flawed. The court applied a method based on the insurer’s method but
removing the flawed element. This still calculated premium on a case by case
basis rather than on actuarial methods covering all of the cases taken on by the
insurer. A significant element in the calculation permitted in the decision of the
Senior Costs Judge is the subjective estimate of the prospects of success in the
individual case. That estimate is expressed as a percentage figure which is then
incorporated in the arithmetic used to arrive at a premium. It is submitted that
that is the most significant finding in the RSA cases and is applicable to other
polices offered by other insurers. In Tyndall and Rogers the court accepted the
assumptions that the insurer had made in calculating its staged approach.
CFAs after 1 April 2000 and before 1 November 2005 [140]
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In Winmill v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council4 a block rated staged
premium of £6,950, consisting of £950 stage 1 and an additional £6,000 at
allocation, was reduced on the basis that the premium claimed was in the view
of the court higher than was strictly necessary in all the circumstances.
1 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
2 (2005, unreported (SCCO Ref: 0500466)) [2005] EWHC 90011 (Costs).
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER 354, [2007] 1 WLR 808.
4 Unreported 2007 SCCO Refs: 0700826 and 0700689 [2007] EWHC 90092 (Costs).
Evidence justifying the ATE premium claimed
[141] The Court of Appeal in Rogers1 had the benefit of evidence from the
insurer that had not been available to the judge below who had relied on
information contained in the Law Society publication Litigation Funding. The
court in Rogers endorsed the view of Senior Master Hurst expressed at
paragraph [235] in the RSA Test Cases2 decision:
‘As to the information contained in Litigation Funding and The Judge website, this
is no more than an indication of policies which might be available in certain
circumstances. As [counsel] points out, the premiums on his website are “ndicative
only” and the website contains further warnings. Litigation Funding has similar
warnings and reservations. I can derive no firm data from these sources.’
The court in Rogers went on to consider the approach to be taken at a costs
assessment:
‘District judges and costs judges do not, as Lord Hoffmann observed in Callery v
Gray (Nos 1 and 2) [2002] UKHL 28 at [44]; [2002] 1 WLR 2000, have the
expertise to judge the reasonableness of a premium except in very broad brush
terms, and the viability of the ATE market will be imperilled if they regard
themselves (without the assistance of expert evidence) as better qualified than the
underwriter to rate the financial risk the insurer faces.’ [117]
The approach taken in Winmill above [140]–[144] seems difficult to reconcile
with this advice. The Senior Costs Judge in David Smith v Interlink Express
Parcels3 was faced with an absence of evidence as to the calculation of premium
and reduced the first stage from £750 to £450 on the basis that it appeared
unjustifiably high. The absence of evidence was however crucial.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1134, [2007] 1 All ER 354, [2007] 1 WLR 808.
2 [2005] All ER (D) 88 (Aug).
3 Unreported (2007) SCCO Ref: 0702192
ATE obtained by misrepresentation
[142] In Charmaigne England v Burnley Healthcare1 a county court refused
an application under s 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a third party
costs order against an ATE insurer that had avoided a policy on the grounds
of misrepresentation by the policyholder. The judge held that such an
order following well known authorities2 required exceptional circumstances
such as an insurer having direct control of a case. No exceptional circum-
stances existed here. It was noted that defendant would be well aware that a
deliberate misrepresentation would lead to a policy being avoided.
[140] Litigation Funding
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1 2007 – Preston County Court ZP200075.
2 See Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc and Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc [1997]
1 All ER 518, [1997] 1 WLR 1591, CA and Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v
Todd [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 4 All ER 195, [2005] 4 All ER 195.
ATE and security for costs
[143] The use by claimants in a libel action of a CFA and ATE policy is not
generally relevant to an application for security for costs although where the
ATE cover was suitable its existence may be a basis for resisting an order for
security. In Al-Koronky v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd1 the ATE policy
was voidable where liability for costs arose due to untruthfulness. In the
context of the libel action there was no real cover that could be relied upon to
resist an order.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1123, [2007] 1 Costs LR 57.
ATE policies and third party rights
[144] In Persimmon Homes Ltd v Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) plc1 a claim
succeeded under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 where an
insured under an ATE policy had become insolvent. The Third Parties (Rights
against Insurers) Act 2010 will replace the 1930 Act and s 16 of the 2010 Act,
which refers to voluntary contractual liabilities, will reflect the current practice
of including legal expenses insurance within the 1930 Act – see also Re
OT Computers2.
1 [2010] EWHC 1705 (Comm), [2010] All ER (D) 114 (Jul).
2 [2004] EWCA Civ 653.
III Conditional fee agreements made before
2 April 2000
[145] Before the AJA 1999 came into force on 1 April 2000, the statutory
scheme governing CFAs was the CLSA 1990, s 58, the CFA Regulations 19951
and the CFA Order 19982. This scheme is preserved after the coming into force
of the 1999 Act in respect of CFAs and insurance policies pre-dating 2 April
20003. It is necessary to have reference to the provisions of the statutory
scheme as it existed at the time the CFA was made4. The success fee is not
recoverable from the losing opponent5. No insurance premium is recoverable
from the losing opponent in respect of policies taken out before 1 April 20006.
The non-statutory position for CFAs is covered in Part I.
1 SI 1995/1675. Set out at para [1031].
2 SI 1998/1860. Set out at para [1041].
3 Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2000, SI 2000/900. Set out at para
[1071].
4 CFA Regulations 1995, SI 1995/1675, reg 3. See para [1031].
CFAs made before 2 April 2000 [145]
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5 Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2000, SI 2000/900, art 2.
6 SI 2000/900, art 3.
A Proceedings
[146] All proceedings other than criminal and family proceedings are capable
of being proceedings in respect of which an enforceable CFA can be made1.
‘Proceedings’ is defined as ‘proceedings in any court’, ‘court’ includes any
tribunal, court-martial or statutory inquiry2.
1 CLSA 1990, s 58(1)(a) and (10) and the CFA Order 1998, SI 1998/1860, art 3. The
proceedings specified in the CFA Order 1995, SI 1995/1674 were limited to the specific cases
of personal injury, insolvency and European Convention of Human Rights cases.
2 CLSA 1990, s 119.
B Requirements for a CFA
[147] A written CFA is made enforceable by s 58 of the 1990 Act provided it
complies with the CFA Regulations 1995. The Regulations require the
agreement to state1:
(a) the proceedings or parts of them covered by the CFA (including
specifically whether it covers any counterclaim, appeal or enforcement
proceedings);
(b) the circumstances in which fees and expenses or part of them are
payable;
(c) what payment is due:
(i) upon partial failure of the specified circumstances in which the
fees would be payable,
(ii) irrespective of the occurrence of the specified circumstances,
(iii) upon termination for any reason; and
(d) the amount payable or method of calculating the amount payable in (b)
and (c) and whether the amount payable is limited by reference to
damages.
1 CFA Regulations 1995, SI 1995/1675, reg 3 at para [1021].
[148] Further requirements exist as to information given to the client. The
CFA must state that the legal representative drew the client’s attention to1:
(a) client’s entitlement to legal aid;
(b) client’s liability to pay fees and expenses;
(c) client’s liability for adverse costs; and
(d) client’s taxation rights.
1 CFA Regulations 1995, SI 1995/1675, reg 4. See para [1021].
C The success fee
[149] The maximum percentage increase permitted as a success fee is 100%1.
The Law Society produced a Model CFA for use in personal injury cases. This
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model recommended that the success fee should be limited to 25% of the
damages recovered by the client. This device became known as ‘the cap’. The
limiting of the success fee by way of a cap has at no time been a requirement
of law.
1 Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998, SI 1998/1860, art 4 at para [1041].
D Assessment of the success fee
[149.1] A client is entitled to detailed assessment of the success fee and or the
base costs1. If the client challenges the success fee the reasons for reduction
must be set out in writing as must the level of the success fee which it is claimed
ought to be applied2.
The factors which are taken into account on an assessment are:
(a) the risk that the circumstances in which the fees or expenses would be
payable might not occur;
(b) the disadvantages relating to the absence of payment on account;
(c) whether the amount which might be payable under the CFA is limited
to a certain proportion of any damages recovered by the client;
(d) whether there is a CFA between the solicitor and counsel; and
(e) the solicitor’s liability for disbursements3.
The assessment is to be conducted with regard to the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared to the solicitor when the CFA was made or varied4.
1 SI 1998/3132, r 48.9 at B[2303].
2 CPR PD 48, para 2.14.
3 CPR PD 48, para 2.15.
4 CPR PD 48, para 2.16.
IV CFAs on or after 1 November 2005
[150] From 1 November 2005 all of the Regulations relating to CFAs and
CCFAs are revoked so that for a CFA made on or after that date there are no
Regulations. The revocation is brought about by the Conditional Fee Agree-
ments (Revocation) Regulations 20051. The requirements of the CLSA 1990,
s 58 continue to apply so that for example the failure in Oyston v Royal Bank
of Scotland2 to adhere to the statutory maximum success fee of 100% will post
1 November 2005 still render the CFA invalid. It was the revocation of the
regulations that provided the opportunity in Forde v Birmingham City Coun-
cil3 to replace a potentially invalid CFA governed by the 2000 CFA Regulations
with a retrospective CFA not governed by any regulations. There is a new Law
Society Model CFA4, which can be used also from that date. The Solicitors’
Practice (Client Care) Amendment Rule 2005 makes additions to the infor-
mation that must be given under the Law Society Solicitors’ Costs Information
and Client Care Code 1999 in accordance with Rule 15 of the Solicitors’
Practice Rules 1990. Responsibility for the regulation of CFAs has therefore
been transferred to the Law Society by these changes. The legal status of Law
CFAs on or after 1 November 2005 [150]
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Society Rules and their potential effect on the recovery of costs has been
considered in Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm)5 and Garbutt v Edwards6 and
in each case Swain v Law Society7 was relied upon as authority for holding that
the Rules of Professional Conduct have the force of subordinate legislation. In
Garbutt however the effect of a breach of those rules was held to depend on
the particular rule rather than on any overriding principle to be taken from
Swain. On the particular wording of the Code issued under Rule 15 the court
held that the Code gave a discretion to the solicitor as to whether to provide
a client with an estimate. And was not written in terms that are consistent with
breach rendering a retainer unenforceable. This decision leaves the question of
the effect of breaches of the Professional Rules open and dependent on
interpretation of individual rules. It is unclear therefore to what extent failure
to comply with the professional Rules concerning CFAs may lead to an
unenforceable retainer.
1 SI 2005/2305.
2 [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs).
3 [2008] EWHC 90105 (Costs).
4 See para [1320].
5 [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608.
6 [2005] EWCA Civ 1206, [2006] 1 All ER 553, [2006] 1 WLR 2907.
7 [1983] 1 AC 598, [1982] 2 All ER 827.
[150.1] The main effect of the revocation of the CFA Regulations, including
the Collective CFA Regulations, is to greatly reduce the effect of s 58(1) of the
CLSA 1990 in terms of the unenforceability of a CFA. From 1 November 2005
a CFA will be unenforceable only if s 58 itself has not been complied with.
Section 58 provides:
‘(3) The following conditions are applicable to every conditional fee agreement–
(a) it must be in writing;
(b) it must not relate to proceedings which cannot be the subject of an
enforceable conditional fee agreement; and
(c) it must comply with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed
by the Secretary of State.
(4) The following further conditions are applicable to a conditional fee
agreement which provides for a success fee—
(a) it must relate to proceedings of a description specified by order made
by the Secretary of State;
(b) it must state the percentage by which the amount of the fees which
would be payable if it were not a conditional fee agreement is to be
increased; and
(c) that percentage must not exceed the percentage specified in relation
to the description of proceedings to which the agreement relates by
order made by the Secretary of State.’
There are no requirements now created that fall under s 58(3)(c). Accordingly
where a CFA satisfies all of the above requirements of s 58 it is not
unenforceable under that section. Where under the pre-1 November 2005
rules CFAs have been held unenforceable that outcome will no longer be
possible under s 58 were the same conduct to be repeated on or after
1 November 2005. It is however open to a court in assessing costs and in
making any order for costs to consider the reasonableness of the party
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claiming costs. It is also possible that paying parties will argue that breaches of
the Law Society Client Care Code can render the CFA unenforceable.
[150.2] The Solicitors’ Practice (Client Care) Amendment Rule 2005 came
into force on 1 November 2005 and made the following additions to the Client
Care Code which under Practice Rule 15 had to be followed:
‘Clients represented under a conditional fee agreement (including a collective
conditional fee agreement)
(d) Where a client is represented under a conditional fee agreement, the solicitor
should explain:
(i) the circumstances in which the client may be liable for their own costs
and for the other party’s costs;
(ii) the client’s right to assessment of costs, wherever the solicitor intends
to seek payment of any or all of their costs from the client; and
(iii) any interest the solicitor may have in recommending a particular
policy or other funding.’
From 1 July 2007 these requirements are contained in Rule 2 of the Solicitors
Regulation Authority Code of Conduct. For the legal status of Law Society
Rules and their potential effect on the recovery of cost, see cases noted below1.
In Thomas v Butler T/A Worthington’s Solicitors2the defendant firm took over
a case that had run with a different firm under a CFA. The first firm had
declined to continue because of poor prospects. The client thought the new
firm was acting under a CFA and that adverse costs were covered by BTE
insurance. There had been discussion with the new firm about a CFA but the
matter was not confirmed either way. This was the main failing of the firm and
was a breach of the Solicitors’ Costs Information and Client Care Code 1999
(similar provisions are contained in the current SRA Code). The client had
become liable for own costs on a private paying basis and was left with an
adverse costs bill not covered by the BTE. The court had power to deal with
the own cost side and assessed it at nil on the basis that those costs had been
‘unreasonably incurred’.
1 Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm) [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608 and Swain v Law
Society [1983] 1 AC 598, [1982] 2 All ER 827.
2 [2009] EWHC 90153 (Costs).
[150.3] The revocation of the CFA Regulations does not prevent a CFA made
after 1 November taking the form of what was a simplified CFA under those
revoked regulations. The provisions of the CPR 1998 permitting recovery of
costs where a simplified CFA is used continue in force after 1 November1.
The disclosure requirements for CFAs also continue to apply on and after
1 November 2005 – see para [73].
1 For simplified CFAs see para [61].
CFAs on or after 1 November 2005 [150.3]
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V Matters affecting CFAs generally
A Unenforceable CFAs
[151] Section 58(1) of the CLSA 1990 as inserted by the AJA 1999, s 27
provides:
‘(1) A conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable
to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its
being a conditional fee agreement; but (subject to subsection (5)) any other
conditional fee agreement shall be unenforceable.’
For these purposes a CFA means ‘an agreement with a person providing
advocacy or litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or any
part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances;’’1.
From 1 April 2000, therefore, a CFA for the provision of advocacy or litigation
services is unenforceable unless it satisfies all of the conditions of the statutory
regime. That regime includes the CFA Regulations 20002 and the Collec-
tive Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 20003.
The position before 1 April 2000 is governed by the CLSA 1990, s 58 as
originally drafted. There was no express provision then to render unenforce-
able a CFA which did not comply with the statutory scheme. The decision in
Thai Trading Co (a frim) v Taylor4 recognised that the statute gave one method
of funding which was lawful, the court concluding that the common law also
enabled such funding. Thus the CFA Regulations 19955 provided the rules as
to a statutory CFA without at all impinging upon the common law. That
approach was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Awwad v Geraghty
& Co (a firm)6.
1 CLSA 1990, s 58(2)(a).
2 SI 2000/692.
3 SI 2000/2988.
4 [1998] QB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65. See para [4] ff.
5 SI 1995/1675. See para [1031].
6 [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608.
[151.1] Invalid CFAs and disbursements
In Tandara v Weightmans Solicitors1 [2008] EWHC 90101 (Costs) Master
O’Hare considered the question of the status of disbursements under an invalid
CFA. Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garet (a firm)2 was said to apply
only to executed contracts where the litigation had been completed. It is
submitted that in Tandara, where the retainer had been terminated and the
solicitors had come off the record before the conclusion of the litigation, the
contract was not executory (even though the litigation was continuing) and
that Aratra ought to apply. The argument that CLSA 1990, s 58 rendered
unenforceable not only the agreement as to fees but also as to expenses was
rejected. Hollins v Russell3 was applied with the result that disbursements that
had already been paid were not recoverable from the client’s own solicitors. It
follows that if the client went on to succeed in the litigation the losing
opponent would be liable to indemnify for those disbursements. Tandara does
not address the question of disbursements funded by the solicitors where it
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would seem necessary to argue that the disbursement arrangement is not
tainted by the invalidity of the retainer.
1 [2008] EWHC 90101 (Costs).
2 [1995] 4 All ER 695, [1995] NLJR 1402. See para [3].
3 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487. See para [152.1].
[152] The difficulties presented where a funding agreement fails to comply
with the statutory regime ought to differ therefore, according to whether the
agreement was made prior to or after 1 April 2000. In Woods v Chaleff1 little
was made of that distinction. Solicitors in a non-personal injury matter had
made an agreement which incorporated the Law Society Conditions attached
to its Model CFA for use in personal injury cases. The CFA itself however,
failed to comply with the CFA Regulations 19952, in particular regs 3(d) and
4. On an assessment of costs this agreement was held to be unenforceable, it
having been accepted by the claimant’s solicitors that to be enforceable the
agreement had to comply with the Regulations. No argument was offered as
to the common law position with regard to the solicitor client agreement. In
the result no fees at all were recoverable. There was also a CFA between
counsel and the solicitors which failed to comply with the Regulations, in
particular reg 3(a)–(c). It was here argued in the alternative that the agreement
with counsel was valid at common law. That argument was rejected on the
basis that the judgments in Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm)3 led to the
conclusion that the common law did not permit such agreements in 1999, the
date of this agreement. Again in the result no fees at all were recovered.
The failure to comply with the relevant statutory provisions as to CFAs can
therefore lead to a failure to recover any fees at all, including base costs, either
from the losing opponent or from the client. This gives rise to the question of
the possibility of replacing an unenforceable agreement with a new CFA which
does comply with the statutory regime. Assuming there to be no possibility of
any restitutionary liability on the part of the client as to work done under an
unenforceable CFA, there seems to be no reason to preclude a new CFA taking
over from the unenforceable agreement and providing for work done there-
after. It is unclear as to whether such a new CFA could have retrospective effect
to govern work already done under an unenforceable agreement. A deed of
rectification was used in Brennan v Associated Asphalt Ltd4 but its effective-
ness was not tested in the decision of the Senior Costs judge given the decision
that the CFA was in fact valid. The possibility of a retrospective CFA was
accepted in Holmes v Alfred McAlpine Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd5 provided the
CFA expressly states that it is to have retrospective effect. That was not
however a decision concerned with an attempt to replace an invalid CFA with
a retrospective replacement. In Oyston v Royal Bank of Scotland6 severance of
the words of the CFA that constituted a breach of the Regulations was refused
on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy to permit such
avoidance of the need to comply with the Regulations. A deed of rectification
in that case also failed because it had been made after judgment and would,
contrary to Kellar v Williams7, have imposed on the paying party a greater
liability in costs than had existed at the time of judgment. Seeking any
replacement agreement by a solicitor is likely also to involve the need for a
warning as to independent legal advice given the apparent conflict of interest.
Matters affecting CFAs generally [152]
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Finally, it is submitted that an attempt to avoid the problems encountered in
Woods v Chaleff8 by use of wordings in the CFA to the effect that provisions
necessary to comply with the Regulations are deemed to be incorporated, must
be wholly ineffective in curing the defects.
1 [2002] All ER (D) 414 (Jul), SC.
2 SI 1995/1675.
3 [2001] QB 570, [2000] 1 All ER 608.
4 [2005] EWHC 90052 (Costs). An appeal was later allowed by consent and the case cannot be
followed on the invalidity point.
5 [2006] EWHC 110 (QB), [2006] 3 Costs LR 466.
6 [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs).
7 [2004] UKPC 30, 148 Sol Jo LB 821, [2005] 4 Costs LR 559.
8 [2002] All ER (D) 414 (Jul), SC.
B Hollins v Russell1 and subsequent cases
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
[152.1] It was in the above context with the prospect for paying parties
avoiding all liability that the Court of Appeal heard conjoined appeals as a test
case in Hollins v Russell. The Court of Appeal held that breaches of the CFA
Regulations 2000 did not mean a failure to satisfy the conditions applicable to
CFAs under the CLSA 1990, s 58(1) if the breaches were immaterial. The court
expressed itself in the form of a question to be asked by costs judges:
‘Has the particular departure from a regulation pursuant to section 58(3)(c) of the
1990 Act or a requirement in section 58, either on its own or in conjunction with
any other such departure in this case, had a materially adverse effect either upon the
protection afforded to the client or upon the proper administration of justice?’. At
107
Where the answer to that question is ‘no’ then the breach does not mean that
s 58(1) has not been satisfied.
The breaches dealt with in Hollins:
• The Law Society Model April 2000 – refers to the success fee as not
limited by reference to damages whereas reg 2(d) refers to all costs.
Held: if the CFA as a whole was looked to it was clear that there was
no limitation on the costs.
• An absence of any reference to any costs limited by damages. Held: as
with the April Model, it was clear from the agreement as a whole that
the liability in costs was not limited.
• The CFA stated none of the success fee related to postponement of
payment. The accompanying risk assessment stated that 5% was
attributable to delay. Was there a breach of reg 3(1)(b)? Held: a court
would not in those circumstances permit a solicitor to recover such a
figure from the client and therefore there was no material breach.
• The existence of legal expenses insurance had been raised but not fully
pursued with a client who was ill and in hospital (reg 4(2)(c)). Held: it
was sufficient that the use of existing insurance had been discussed with
the client.
[152] Litigation Funding
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• The solicitor had not stated that he had no interest in recommending
the use of insurance (reg 4(2)(e)). Held: it was only necessary to state
where there is such an interest.
• Use of the Law Society two part model CFA to comply with the
requirement to explain the effect of a CFA (reg 4(3)). Held: the two-part
CFA was sufficient compliance.
• The giving of oral explanation by an unqualified agent (reg 4 requires
the giving of information by the legal representative). Held: Such advice
could be given by such an agent. Whether the advice was adequate was
a question of fact. (This was the issue in The Accident Group test case
– a further hearing to determine the facts will be necessary.)
Cases applying Hollins v Russell
[152.2] CFAs made between 1 April 2000 and 1 November 2005 have the
potential for a paying party to discover one or more breaches of the CFA
Regulations with the result that no costs at all are payable. From 1 November
2005 that result is only possible where there is a breach of the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990, s 58, such as where the statutory maximum success
fee of 100% is exceeded.1 Section 58 requires that the CFA be in writing but
it makes no requirement as to signature. Cases where the CFA has been
challenged on validity grounds will, therefore, continue to arise for some time
to come. The Court of Appeal in Spencer v Gordon Wood t/a Gordons Tyres
(a firm)2 rejected the argument that to hold the CFA entirely unenforceable was
disproportionate to the mischief. There had been a breach of reg 3(1)(b). The
judge applied the test stated in Hollins and held that the breach had materially
adverse effects upon the protection afforded to the claimant, in that he did not
know which part of the 75% success fee would not be recoverable from the
defendant so that he would be obliged to pay it himself. In those circumstances
the judge held that the CFA generally was unenforceable. The Court of Appeal
held that the words in the CLSA 1990, s 58(1) ‘shall be unenforceable’ mean
what they say. The applicability of Hollins to post 1 November 2005 CFAs
was considered in Findlay v Cantor Index Ltd 3where disclosure was sought of
the CFA, the reasons for the success fee and counsel’s opinion. Master
Campbell held that Costs Practice Direction 32.5 could have no application to
post 1 November 2005 CFAs (where there is no requirement to state reasons
for the success fee) and thus the paying party has no right to information
concerning the setting of the success fee. As to the CFA, Hollins still required
it to be disclosed at the costs stage. Counsel’s opinion was privileged albeit
referred to in a disclosed risk assessment.
1 See Oyston v Royal Bank of Scotland [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs) and Jones v Caradon
Catnic Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1821; [2006] 3 Costs LR 427.
2 [2004] EWCA Civ 352, 148 Sol Jo 356, (2004) Times, 30 March.
3 [2008] EWHC 90116 (Costs).
[152.3] The Law Society Model CFA produced in April 2000 to meet the
CFA Regulations coming into force on 1 April 2000 was found in Ghannouchi
v Houni Ltd1 not to comply with reg 3(2)(c) in that it failed to state the
client’s liability for base costs where costs are agreed between the parties. It
was held that this breach did not have a materially adverse effect under the
Hollins test. Because it is necessary for solicitors to apply to the court if they
Matters affecting CFAs generally [152.3]
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wish to recover from their client any shortfall in base costs and success fee
where there has been a settlement on costs the client was protected notwith-
standing the failure of the CFA wording. The Senior Costs Judge has not
followed the Ghanouchi analysis of reg 3(2)(c) in Oyston v Royal Bank of
Scotland2. In Oyston the breach was in providing for a 100% success fee with
a further sum of £50,000 in the event that damages in excess of £1 million
were recovered. The total success fee would therefore exceed the statutory
maximum of 100%. The CFA was invalid and there was a materially adverse
effect on the administration of justice. The Law Society Model was replaced in
June 2000 with wording that differs from the model dealt with in Ghannouchi.
The decision in Brennan v Associated Asphalt Ltd3 that a breach of reg 3(1)(b)
had no material effect on the protection afforded to the client where the CFA
failed to specify what part (if any) of the stated success fee related to the
postponement of payment of costs was subsequently the subject of an appeal
by consent and on this point cannot be followed. The reasoning in the original
decision by the Senior Costs Judge that the client would not be liable for any
sum in respect of postponement and therefore there was no adverse effect
appears to have run counter to the correct test for material effect, applied by
the Senior Costs Judge in Samonini v London General Transport Services4,
which is not dependent upon showing actual detriment.
1 (SCCO Ref: TSB 0307009) [2004] EWHC 9002 (Costs).
2 [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs).
3 [2005] EWHC 90052 (Costs).
4 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457. See para [152.7].
[152.4] The Court of Appeal in Hollins1 said that at the stage when the
agreement has been made, acted upon, and success for the client has been
achieved, it is most unlikely that any minor shortcoming which the paying
party might discover in the agreement or the procedures leading up to its
making will amount to a material breach of the requirements or mean that the
applicable conditions have not been sufficiently met. The court later held in
Myatt v National Coal Board2 that the materiality of breach is to be judged at
the time that the CFA is made. Accordingly the question whether the
protection afforded by the Regulation has been materially affected is not
answered by reference to whether there has been any actual detriment in a
particular case and the absence of such detriment does not mean that the
departure from the Regulation is not material.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487.
2 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554. The decisions in
Ghannouchi v Houni (SCCO Ref: TSB 0307009) [2004] EWHC 9002 (Costs) and Hussain v
Leeds County Council (2005) unreported (SCCO 0501930)) were based on absence of actual
detriment and should not be followed.
[152.5] In Myatt v National Coal Board1 the Court of Appeal clarified the
Hollins test and held that the materiality of a breach is not judged by its
consequences:
‘The importance of Hollins v Russell is that it dealt a fatal blow to challenges that
were being made by defendants’ insurers to the enforceability of CFAs on the
grounds of minor technical breaches of the statutory requirements. The court
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explained that Parliament did not intend that such breaches should render CFAs
unenforceable. The breaches had to be material in the sense that they had a
materially adverse effect on the protection afforded to the client or on the proper
administration of justice. The primary statutory purpose of the requirements was to
provide protection to claimants. In these circumstances, it seems to us that it would
be extraordinary if the court were required to hold that, however egregious the
breach, it was not material if it had not in fact caused the client to suffer any loss.
The solicitor might have been guilty of serious negligence or even have acted
deliberately to further his own interests at the expense of those of his client. In such
cases, on the argument advanced on behalf of the Law Society, there would be no
material breach unless the court concluded that the client had actually suffered loss
as a result of the breach. That would be a startling result in view of the plain
language in which the 1990 Act and the Regulations are expressed, and the purpose
that they were intended to serve. [38]
. . . in most cases the court should focus its attention principally on the terms of
the CFA and the advice and information given by the solicitor and other relevant
circumstances which existed at the date of the CFA and make a judgment as to
whether, in the light of that material, the departure from the requirement in question
had a material adverse effect on the protection afforded to the client.’ [39]
The breach in Myatt was of reg 4(2)(c) and the failure to make adequate
enquiry of the client as to the existence and extent of legal expenses insurance.
The fact that the clients did not in fact have such insurance did not mean that
the breach of the Regulations was not material.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
[152.6] In Myatt enquiry of the client as to the existence and extent of BTE
insurance was made by telephone to clients bringing industrial disease claims.
A check list used by the solicitor included the question. Does the client have an
existing contract of insurance that would cover him/her for bringing this
claim? According to a witness statement the client was actually asked whether
he had an insurance policy ‘which would entitle him to legal expenses
insurance in respect of the contemplated claim i.e. a claim for noise-induced
hearing loss’. The Court of Appeal held that such a question meant that the
client was being asked to interpret what could well have been a complex
document. Being unsophisticated clients this was an inadequate inquiry and
not compliant with reg 4(2)(c). The breach had a materially adverse effect on
the level of protection afforded by the Regulation and accordingly the CFA
was invalid.
Enquiry of a client’s existing legal expenses insurance was the subject of
the Court of Appeal decision in Sarwar v Alam in the context of the recovery
of an ATE premium in a low value road traffic claim. Sarwar was not
concerned with the CFA Regulations but in Myatt the court stressed that
Sarwar did not propound a rigid test and emphasis that the overriding
principle is that the claimant and his solicitor should act reasonably. The duty
to act reasonably is also implicit in reg 4(2)(c) and what is reasonably required
of a solicitor depends on all the circumstances of the case. The court in Myatt
in giving retrospective guidance as to compliance with reg 4 identified five
factors relevant to what can reasonably be expected of a solicitor1.
The decision of the Senior Costs Judge in Samonini v London General
Transport Services2 is an early application of Hollins endorsed by the
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explanation given in Myatt3. Here a claimant in a road traffic matter was
referred to a solicitor by a claims management company. It was found that the
solicitor did not carry out any separate enquiry as to LEI, did not consider
whether the claimant’s risk of incurring liability for costs was insured against,
but relied entirely upon the enquiries made by the claims company. The
claimant did not have BTE legal expenses cover under his motor policy. The
claimant was never asked about any policy other than his motor policy. The
Senior Costs Judge held that irrespective of whether there had been proper
delegation to the claims company there had been insufficient inquiry and
therefore there was a breach of reg 4(2)(c) of the CFA Regulations 2000. There
was a materially adverse effect upon the protection afforded to the client and
the proper administration of justice:
‘In my judgment the failure, properly to consider whether the client’s risk of
incurring a liability for costs in respect of the proceedings to which the CFA relates,
is insured against under an existing contract of insurance, has had a materially
adverse effect upon the protection afforded to the client, in that the client has
entered into a CFA, a loan agreement and an ATE insurance policy costing £798. In
circumstances where the Claimant’s damages were never going to exceed £2,000, a
premium of this magnitude is, on its face, disproportionate. The Court of Appeal in
Sarwar referred to: “the availability of ATE at a modest premium . . . ” This is not
such a policy. If it is appropriate for the Claimant to have agreed to take on a policy
with a premium of this size, the solicitor is clearly under a duty to carry out a careful
investigation as to alternative sources of insurance.’. At [65]
‘As to the proper administration of justice I accept [Counsel for the defendant’s]
submission that if solicitors are permitted to skimp on the proper investigation of
LEI the administration of justice will be badly served since there will be no
improvement in the way in which solicitors conduct proceedings of this type, added
to which the client will have been badly served. In addition this breach has led to
costly satellite litigation.’ At [66]
The CFA in Oduvbu v Dualeh4 was entered into in 2000, before Sarwar and
Hollins but the issue as to compliance with the CFA Regulations arose in 2006
when costs were disputed. The client was represented by a firm at some
distance form his home and there was no evidence that solicitor had seen any
polices. However, the claimant had been knocked from a pedal cycle and was
an impecunious client. It was accepted that in the context of what was
reasonable to do in 2000 sufficient had been done to satisfy the Regulations.
It will remain to be seen as to how far the court’s retrospective guidance in
Myatt is applied in cases where the compliance was required even before the
decision in Sarwar.
1 See para [125].
2 [2005] EWHC 90001 (Costs), [2006] NLJR 457.
3 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
4 (2006) unreported: SCCO Ref: 0600886 [2006] EWHC 90059 (Costs).
[152.7] The defect in Jones v Caradon Catnic Ltd1 in respect of a collective
CFA was with the risk assessment. The CFA itself provided for a 100% success
fee but an annexed risk assessment provided for a fee of 120%, the figure
actually claimed. The court held that there could be no detriment to the client
since in no circumstances would the client have to pay a fee above 100% but
there was a detrimental affect on the administration of justice. Preliminary
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issues may arise in such circumstances and in any event if this were not a
material breach no breach would be material.
1 [2005] EWCA Civ 1821, [2006] 3 Costs LR 427.
[152.8] The breach in Garrett v Halton Borough Council1 was of reg 4(2)(e).
The CFA stated that the solicitor had no interest in recommending the
particular ATE insurance. The client had been referred to the solicitor by a
claims management company under an arrangement requiring the solicitor to
recommend a particular ATE policy. The court held that such an arrangement
did amount to an interest for the purposes of the regulation. The firm gained
a financial benefit from referrals to it and was at risk of the arrangement being
cancelled if it did not recommend the insurance. Informing the client that the
firm was on the CMC’s panel was not sufficient. The client could not have
known from what she was told that the firm were recommending the policy
because this was dictated by their financial interests. There has been a series of
conflicting decisions in the lower courts concerning compliance with this
regulation in cases where solicitors have used Accident Line and the CFA states
the solicitor has no interest in recommending the insurance. The Court of
Appeal in Tankard v John Fredricks Plastics Ltd2 distinguished Garrett and
held that Accident Line Protect did not give rise to an interest. The main reason
for solicitors choosing membership of ALP was the quality of the product
endorsed by the Law Society. For the purposes of reg 4, a solicitor has an
interest if a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts would
think that the existence of the interest might affect the advice given by the
solicitor to his client. There was nothing that would lead a reasonable person
with knowledge of the facts to think that the solicitors had an interest in the
scheme that might affect their advice. Further cases where a CFA has been
declared invalid for this breach have involved claims management companies
where the firm of solicitors has been dependent upon referrals of cases3.
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 1017, [2007] 1 All ER 147, [2007] 1 WLR 554.
2 [2008] EWCA Civ 1375, [2009] 4 All ER 526, [2009] 1 WLR 1731.
3 See Janman v Timber Store (2007 – Reigate County Court No: 5RHO 1797); Lowerson v
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (2007 – Newcastle County Court No: 6PL00093); Foord v
American Airlines [2007] EWHC 90076 (Costs); Jones v Wrexham Borough Council [2007]
EWCA Civ 1356, [2008] 1 WLR 1590, (2008) Times, 21 January; Andrews v Harrison Taylor
Scaffolding [2007] EWHC 90071 (Costs).
BTE enquiry cases
[152.9] In Richards v Davis1, where the client was represented under the TAG
scheme, no enquiry at all was made as to existing insurance or any other form
of funding. The CFA was accordingly invalid. In White v Revell2 the CFA was
held to be valid where the solicitor relied upon the educated professional
client’s answers to questions of alternative legal expenses insurance or other
means of funding his action. Specifically mentioned was the possibility of using
an insurance policy that the client’s parents may have had. The reliance on the
client to check for such insurance was acceptable in the circumstances. The
claimant in Choudhury v Kingston Hospital NHS Trust3 was a consultant
anaesthetist whose solicitor took the view could understand insurance. The
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client informed the solicitor in writing that she did not have legal expenses
insurance. That was held to be sufficient enquiry in the circumstances. The
CFA in Oduvbu v Dualeh4 was entered into in 2000, before Sarwar and
Hollins, but the issue as to compliance with the CFA Regulations arose in 2006
when costs were disputed. The client was represented by a firm at some
distance from his home and there was no evidence that solicitor had seen any
policies. However, the claimant had been knocked from a pedal cycle and was
an impecunious client. It was accepted that in the context of what was
reasonable to do in 2000 sufficient had been done to satisfy the Regulations.
In Bevan v Power Panels Electrical Systems Limited5, the Myatt point was that
to ask merely whether the client or family member has any insurance at all was
an inadequate question. In Andrews v Dawkes6, where the solicitors knew
their client’s mother had engaged a firm already and then assumed, but did not
check, that their client was unlikely to have access to BTE, the CFA was
invalid. In Berry v Spousals7, the client had an arrangement with a CMC and
then moved to a firm of solicitors that after 14 months offered a CFA but did
not at any time check the CMC arrangement to see if it would cover costs, the
result being an invalid CFA. Myatt featured in Choudhury v Kingston Hospital
Trust8 but there the client consultant anaesthetist wrote to the solicitors
confirming she had no BTE – a sophisticated client answering the Myatt
ultimate question. The same result occurred in Kashmiri v Ejaz9 with a
commercial client able to provide all the Myatt answers himself. In Foulkes v
Loxton10 failure to by the solicitors to demand proof or otherwise from the
client as to existing legal expenses insurance did not render the CFA invalid
given the intelligence of the client and her heavy involvement in the case before
instructing the solicitors. Cochrane v Chauffeurs of Birmingham11 explained in
a case where the client passenger of a chauffeured car that the issue is not
whether the client would have used the driver’s policy but whether the
obligation upon the solicitor to take reasonable steps to ascertain the true
position so that they could inform the client about the matters contained in the
regulations had been fulfilled. In Barlow v Perks12 the client had been
represented under a BTE policy but was then transferred to a different firm not
on the BTE panel. The CFA with the new firm was invalid because the firm had
not informed the client that it might be possible to find another panel firm. The
Sarwar guidance as to using BTE where it exists was held in Woolley v Haden
Building Services13 not to apply other than relatively small personal injury
claims in road traffic cases and certainly did not apply to industrial disease
claims. It will remain to be seen as to how far the court’s retrospective guidance
in Myatt is applied in cases where the compliance was required even before the
decision in Sarwar.
1 (2005) unreported: SCCO Ref: PTH 0504722 [2005] EWHC 90014 (Costs).
2 (2006) unreported SCCO Ref: CW0508940 [2006] EWHC 90054 (Costs).
3 [2006] EWHC 90057 (Costs).
4 (2006) unreported: SCCO Ref: 0600886.
5 [2007] EWHC 90073 (Costs).
6 (2006) unreported: (BM 370235 – QBD Birmingham).
7 (2007) unreported: (BM 309007 – Birmingham County Court).
8 [2006] EWHC 90057 (Costs).
9 [2007] EWHC 90074 (Costs).
10 Leeds CC No: 5SE30035.
11 (22 June 2007, unreported), Central London CC 5CL16141.
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12 SCCO 0606555 [2007] EWHC 90087 (Costs).
13 SCCO 0705738 [2008] EWHC 90097 (Costs).
[152.10] In Jenkins v Young Brothers Transport Ltd1 it was argued that as a
result of the client’s solicitor moving to a different firm (on two occasions)
there must be a new CFA with each successive firm2. No attempt had been
made to enter into a new CFA or to comply with the CFA Regulations 2000.
The court did not interfere with the cost judge’s decision3 as to material
departure from the Regulations:
‘In my judgment, [counsel for the claimant] is correct and it would have been
unnecessarily heavy handed had Ms Pierce trawled through CFA Regulation 4 not
just once, but twice or three times. Where, as here, the client has been given the
Regulation 4 information at the outset, I consider he has received the protection to
which he is entitled and it is not a material breach if the same Solicitor omits to go
through the same regulations a second time, solely on account of his having changed
firms in circumstances where the client has consented in writing to a new retainer on
identical terms as the old. On the contrary, in a detailed assessment context one
would anticipate that a paying party would argue that it was wholly unreasonable
for the cost of such an exercise to be claimed against him more than once.’ At [52]
The High Court held that a contract for personal skills could be assigned with
the burden of the contract at least where the individual solicitor continued to
represent the client through each move of firm. Where, as here, there was a
valid assignment there was no requirement to repeat the advice required by the
Regulations. It was held that in any event the failures with respect to the
Regulations, had there not been a valid assignment, had not had a materially
adverse effect within the Hollins test.
1 [2006] EWHC 151 (QB), [2006] 2 All ER 798, [2006] 1 WLR 3189.
2 In Haines v Sarner (2005, unreported (SCCO Case No: 0407816)) [2005] EWHC 90009
(Costs) where a solicitor moved firm, a new CFA was made with the new firm.
3 Jenkins v Young Brothers Transport Ltd (2005) SCCO Ref: CC0501190 [2005] EWHC
90008 (Costs).
C CFAs where legal aid is available
[152.11] In Bowen v Bridgend Borough Council1 and Hughes v London
Borough of Newham2 it was held that in failing properly to inform clients of
the availability of legal aid, solicitors had departed from what was required of
them by reg 4(2)(d) and that the departure had a materially adverse effect upon
the protections afforded to their clients. Both cases were housing disrepair
matters and the CFA and attendant other arrangements with various agencies
and for ATE insurance were all held invalid. Also in housing disrepair in
Hussain v Leeds City Council3 costs were disallowed in respect of clients
eligible for legal aid with a nil contribution but allowed where clients would
have been liable to make a contribution, it being clear that in the latter
situation the clients would not have agreed that method of funding. Housing
disrepair claims also featured in Crook v Birmingham City Council4 where
wrong advice as to the legal help scheme was held not to be a material breach
under the Hollins test.
1 (2004) SCCO Ref: 0309853 [2004] EWHC 9010 (Costs).
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2 (2005) SCCO Case Numbers: 0502314, 0502887 and 0502315 [2005] EWHC 90019 (Costs).
3 2005 unreported: SCCO No 0501930 Master O’Hare.
4 [2007] EWHC 1415 (Admin), [2007] NLJR 939, [2007] 5 Costs LR 732.
D Retrospective CFAs
[153] On the basis of the ordinary rules of contract it is possible for a CFA to
have retrospective effect and to become the charging agreement in respect of
work already done at the time the CFA is made. This assumes, however, that
the work done was done under a lawful and enforceable agreement, in which
case there is ample consideration for abandoning rights and liabilities under
the former agreement in return for those under the new agreement. The only
limitation appears to be that the CFA must be made before the conclusion of
the case in order to comply with CLSA 1990, s 58 which envisages an
agreement before the specified circumstance in which payment would be due
have occurred1. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hollins v
Russell2 a question may arise as to the replacement of a CFA which may have
failed to comply with the statutory requirements. Given the nature of the test
laid down in Hollins it will in many cases be the replacement of a doubtful
agreement rather than one that it is known will be unenforceable. In those
circumstances the replacement is likely to be valid.
It may be argued that the consumer protection provisions of the CFA
Regulations 2000 would be evaded if retrospective CFAs were permitted. It is
submitted that that is not the case. The consumer protection provisions will
apply at whatever stage a CFA is being considered and they require that before
a CFA is entered into guidance is given to the client. The fact the CFA in
contemplation will cover fees for which the client already has a liability does
not, it is submitted, detract from the purpose of the Regulations or compliance
with them.
With the revocation of the Regulations from 1 November 2005 the possibility
arises for a CFA made after that date to be retrospective to a date prior to the
revocation. The possibility of a retrospective CFA was accepted in Holmes v
Alfred McAlpine Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd3 provided the CFA expressly states
that it is to have retrospective effect. The CFA in Holmes was entered into
prior to 1 November 2005 but the principle of retrospective effect is not in
theory affected by removal of the Regulations. The position in respect of the
replacement of an invalid CFA with a new retrospective CFA is dealt with at
para [152].
The CFA in Holmes was not however a retrospective agreement but one that
had simply been backdated. The agreement was made in August but had been
dated July. That was not a permissible means of providing retrospective effect.
It may also be argued that there should be no liability on a paying party in
respect of a success fee relating to work done prior to the giving of notice of
funding. A similar argument in respect of an ATE premium failed in Ashworth
v Peterborough United Football Club4.
1 See Colman J in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2001] CP Rep 108, [2001] NLJR 970 – where
it was held that the statute clearly referred to ‘circumstances which have not eventuated at the
time when the agreement is entered into’.
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 4 All ER 590, [2003] 1 WLR 2487, see para [152.1].
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3 [2006] EWHC 110 (QB), [2006] 3 Costs LR 466.
4 (10 June 2002, unreported) SCCO 0201106.
E Withdrawal from a CFA – Less v Benedict1
1 [2001] All ER (D) 242 (Feb).
[154] A CFA is likely to provide for the withdrawal by the solicitor in certain
circumstances, including where the solicitor takes the view that the case is not
likely to win2. Where such withdrawal occurred a few weeks before trial with
solicitors asking their client to put them in funds in order to continue, and
eventually applying to come off the record, an adjournment sought by the
client was refused3. In Kris Motor Spares Ltd v Fox Williams LLP4 the firm
acted under a under a discounted CFA arrangement (30% of the fees being
conditional). The litigation failed at a very late stage due to the client
misleading the solicitors as to the independence of an expert witness whose
evidence was crucial. The solicitors terminated the CFA on terms that they
would continue to provide services to conclude the case on ordinary fee terms,
the opponents having offered a “drop hands” outcome. The CFA provided for
full fees to be paid in the event of such termination. Had the solicitors not
terminated at that stage the case would have concluded as a loss under the CFA
and the solicitors would have only recovered 70% of their fees. The costs issue
reached the High Court by way of appeal from Master Roger’s decision to
refuse detailed assessment. Held: the solicitors had validly terminated the CFA.
The CFA had not provided for any notice provision and none was to be
implied. The retainer was still in place so the client had not been left
unrepresented at a late stage.
2 See for example Law Society Model CFA for use in personal injury cases, see para [1262].
3 [2001] All ER (D) 242 (Feb).
4 [2009] EWHC 2813 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 156 (Nov).
F Moving a CFA to a different firm
[154.1] Where a solicitor moves from one firm to another or where an
existing firm converts from a partnership to LLP status consideration must be
given to the effect of that change on the existing CFA where the client wishes
to continue to be represented by the same solicitor. It is unlikely that the CFA
will have provided for termination in this event. In Haines v Sarner1 a new CFA
was entered into by the firm to which the solicitor moved taking her client with
her. In Jenkins v Young Brothers2 there was deed of transfer between the two
firms and the client signed a letter agreeing to the transfer but no new CFA was
entered into and no attempt to comply with the CFA Regulations was made at
the time of the change although there had been full compliance at the time of
the original CFA. The High Court held that a contract for personal skills could
be assigned with the burden of the contract at least where the individual
solicitor continued to represent the client through each move of firm. Where,
as here, there was a valid assignment there was no requirement to repeat the
advice required by the Regulations. It was held that in any event the failures
with respect to the Regulations, had there not been a valid assignment, had not
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had a materially adverse effect within the Hollins test. A change of legal status
from an unincorporated partnership to an LLP raises the same issues as a
change from one firm to another. It is submitted that the entering into of a new
CFA is the better approach.
1 (2005) SCCO Case No: 0407816 [2005] EWHC 90009 (Costs).
2 [2006] EWHC 151 (QB), [2006] 2 All ER 798, [2006] 1 WLR 3189.
G The indemnity principle where the CFA provides for payment of
recovered costs only
[155] Where a CFA provides that a client shall have a liability for own costs
only to the extent that costs are recovered from the opponent, there is a
circular argument under the indemnity principle. In Woods v Chaleff1 a CFA
between counsel and solicitor was in terms that the latter accepted no liability
for counsel’s fees ‘unless we are put in funds by the defendants following a
taxation or other settlement of costs’. The argument that therefore an order of
no costs would produce a nil liability was accepted. The exact wording of any
agreement is likely however to be significant in this respect. In Arkin v
Borchard Lines Ltd2 the wording of the CFA in respect of interim applications
was called into question. The CFA provided ‘winning’ included ‘where you
recover costs or sums on account or interim awards . . . .’. It was argued that
the claimant under such an agreement only ‘recovers’ costs if they are actually
paid to him. Accordingly it was said that there was a circularity in the
provision with the result that no costs should be awarded. Colman J held3 that
‘recover’ meant obtain an order – it did not mean satisfaction of an order. The
use of the phrase ‘monetary recoveries’ in a letter from counsel’s clerk also did
not mean that counsel was agreeing to an entitlement based upon the solvency
of the opponent.
Such wordings are of particular relevance when the client is impecunious and
it is submitted that the meaning attributed to these words by such a client is
more likely to reflect that contended for by the defendant in Arkin than that
given by the decision4.
The circularity argument was not addressed in the TAG Test Cases5 where the
Chief Costs Judge held that a CFA stated that the panel solicitor will in
successful cases limit his fees to those recovered from the paying party is not
a breach of the indemnity principle. A CFA is an agreement to receive fees in
‘specified circumstances’ and there appears to be no reason why the circum-
stances specified should not be the recovery of those costs and/or disburse-
ments from the paying party.
From 2 October 2003 a simplified CFA can provide for a costs liability to be
limited to sums recovered in the litigation. See para [31].
1 (30 April 2000, unreported). See para [152].
2 [2001] NLJR 970.
3 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2001] CP Rep 108, [2001] NLJR 970.
4 See para [13] – Impecunious Clients.
5 2003 SCCO Case No: PTH 0204771 15 May.
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H Interim costs awards and the terms of the CFA
[156] The decision in Arkin1 dealt with a set-off issue in interim applications
where costs orders had been made at various stages in favour of each side. The
claimant sought at the interim stage to set off sums due to him against those
ordered to paid by him. It was argued that until the conclusion of the case a
client under a CFA had no liability to pay own costs and therefore no interim
order could be used in set off. It was held that the terms of the CFA gave rise
to liability to pay own costs where an order for costs was made at an interim
stage. The wording of the CFA was as follows:
‘“Winning” means where a court or arbitrator decides the case in your favour or an
agreement or settlement is reached under which you are paid damages. It also
includes where you recover costs or sums on account or interim awards during the
litigation.’
Other clauses of the CFA provided the client liability to pay costs ‘if you win’.
The combination of clauses therefore enabled the court to conclude that there
was a liability to pay at the interim stage and that such liability could be set off
against adverse costs orders.
1 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2001] CP Rep 108, [2001] NLJR 970, see para [155].
I Terminaton of a CFA
[157] The Law Society Model CFA is dealt with at paras [42] to [48] and
provides for termination in a number of circumstances. The definition of ‘win’
may also give rise to termination issues. In Milne v David Price Solicitors and
Advocates1 the client accepted an offer of settlement that did not satisfy the
definition of win provided in the CFA. It was held that the acceptance of that
offer amounted to a termination of the CFA and gave rise to a liability to pay
the base costs of the solicitor.
1 [2005] EWHC 90002 (Costs).
J Rectification
[158] It is unclear as to whether a new CFA can have retrospective effect to
govern work already done under an unenforceable agreement. A deed of
rectification was used in Brennan v Associated Asphalt Ltd1 but its effective-
ness was not tested in the decision of the Senior Costs judge given the decision
that the CFA was in fact valid2. The possibility of a retrospective CFA was
accepted in Holmes v Alfred McAlpine Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd3 provided the
CFA expressly states that it is to have retrospective effect. That was not
however a decision concerned with an attempt to replace an invalid CFA with
a retrospective replacement. In Oyston v Royal Bank of Scotland4 severance of
the words of the CFA that constituted a breach of the Regulations was refused
on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy to permit such
avoidance of the need to comply with the Regulations. A deed of rectification
in that case also failed because it had been made after judgment and would,
contrary to Kellar v Williams5, have imposed on the paying party a greater
liability in costs than had existed at the time of judgment.
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1 [2005] EWHC 90052 (Costs).
2 This case was later the subject of an appeal by consent and cannot be relied upon as to the
validity point.
3 [2006] EWHC 110 (QB), [2006] 3 Costs LR 466.
4 [2006] EWHC 90053 (Costs).
5 [2004] UKPC 30, 148 Sol Jo LB 821, [2005] 4 Costs LR 559.
Replacing an invalid CFA
[158.1] Whether a new CFA can have retrospective effect to govern work
already done under an unenforceable agreement was considered at length in
Forde v Birmingham City Council1. CFA 1 was thought to be invalid and once
the CFA Regulations 2000 were revoked the solicitors decided to enter into a
retrospective replacement CFA (CFA 2) to govern all the work already done
and work yet to be done to complete the case. It was held that CFA 2 could
validly replace CFA 1 following Holmes v Alfred McAlpine Homes
(Yorkshire) Ltd2 although that was not a decision concerned with an attempt
to replace an invalid CFA with a retrospective replacement. The court found
good consideration for CFA 2 in the undertaking of the future work. The court
did not allow a retrospective success fee.
1 [2008] EWHC 90105 (Costs).
2 [2006] EWHC 110, [2006] 3 Costs LR 466.
K CFAs and costs capping
Defamation and group litigation cases
[159] King v Telegraph Group Ltd1 established the discretionary power to
cap costs on a prospective basis under the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 51 and
the CPR 1998, r 3.1(2)(m). In the context of high cost defamation actions
the Court of Appeal stated that there were three weapons available to control
excessive costs: a costs-capping order; a retrospective assessment and a wasted
costs order. In defamation cases run on a CFA with no ATE an order should
be made at allocation capping the total amount including any additional
liability (success fee). In Henry v BBC2 a capping order was refused because
the application was made only six weeks prior to trial. It is clear that the cost
capping power related to setting a cap on future costs and does not act
retrospectively, a point accepted by the court in Tierney v New Group
Newspapers3 where a cap was imposed in defamation proceedings being run
on an uninsured CFA basis. In money terms this was a low value claim where
costs on each side when added together were already estimated as being likely
to exceed the value by a multiple of five or more. The High Court left to a costs
judge the determination of the appropriate level of the cap and the court was
mindful of the danger of that exercise itself increasing the costs of the
litigation. It was suggested that limited written submissions be used with
limited oral argument.
In the context of Group Litigation Orders costs capping was considered by the
Senior Costs Judge in AA v Tui4 where personal injury claims were being
brought by over 800 claimants. At the time of the application for a costs
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capping order the claimants’ costs had reached £1.6m with an estimate of
future costs of £1.4m. It was held that the cap ought not to be retrospective
and would not include any success fee, King v Telegraph being distinguished
on that point as being confined to defamation. Any ATE premium was also
excluded from the cap on future costs which was set at £881,250 with liberty
to apply for variation. In Claimants appearing on the Register of the Corby
Group Litigation v Corby Borough Council v Corby Borough Council5 both
sides had entered into CFAs and the claimants had ATE insurance. The costs
cap arrived at ignored any uplift on the CFAs and the premium.
1 [2004] EWCA Civ 613, [2005] 1 WLR 2282, [2004] 25 LS Gaz R 27.
2 [2005] EWHC 2503 (QB), [2006] 1 All ER 154.
3 [2006] EWHC 3275 (QB), [2006] All ER (D) 321 (Dec).
4 The Claimants set out in Schedule 1 to the Order of the Senior Master dated 17.1.05 v Tui
UK Ltd 2005 unreported – SCCO Case Nos: HQ04X03737, HQ04X03648, HQ04X03645,
HQ04X03646, HQ04X03647 [2005] EWHC 90017 (Costs).
5 [2008] EWCA Civ 463, [2009] QB 335, [2009] 4 All ER 44.
Other cases
[159.1] King v Telegraph1 was distinguished in Tui2 and again in Knight v
Beyond Properties Pty Ltd3 as being of no application in non-defamation
litigation. In Knight a passing off action was brought using an uninsured CFA
with 100% success fee. The defendant’s application for a costs cap failed.
Mann J held that King v Telegraph laid down no generally applicable
principles, Outside of defamation and group litigation the test set out by Gage
J in Smart v East Cheshire NHS Trust4 was to be applied:
‘a real and substantial risk that without such an order costs will be disproportion-
ately or unreasonably incurred;
and that this risk may not be managed by conventional case management and a
detailed assessment of costs after a trial;
and it is just to make such an order’. [22]
1 [2004] EWCA Civ 613, [2005] 1 WLR 2282, [2004] 25 LS Gaz R 27.
2 See para [159] fn 4. 2005 unreported – SCCO Case Nos: HQ04X03737, HQ04X036–48,
HQ04X03645, HQ04X03646, HQ04X03647.
3 [2006] EWHC 1242 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 91, [2007] 1 WLR 625.
4 [2003] EWHC 2806 (QB), 80 BMLR 175.
L CFAs and group litigation
[160] The Law Society Model CFA1 is intended for use in personal injury and
clinical negligence claims but is often sued either with minor amendment or
none at all in other forms of litigation and in group litigation where its
suitability may be a matter of doubt. In Brown v Russell Young & Co2 six lead
claimants represented under a CFA identical in terms to the Law Society model
sought to claim a proportion of generic costs having settled their claims under
Part 36. The CFA made no reference to generic costs, no group litigation
order was in place and there was no other costs sharing order. The issue
therefore arose under the indemnity principle that the claimants had no
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liability for such costs and could therefore not recover them from their
opponents. On appeal the Senior Costs Judge held that the wording of the CFA
was wide enough to include generic costs and the CPR 1998, r 36.13 could
also be relied upon. Where claims are settled before a GLO is made. Difficulties
over apportionment of generic costs could be avoided by suitable wording in
any settlement agreement.
1 See paras [42]–[48] and [1261].
2 (2006) – unreported: SCCO Ref: 53R/2005; CW0406715/720 [2006] EWHC 90055 (Costs).
M Solicitor agents
[161] Where a client was represented under a CFA whose terms provided that
basic charges included wok done by a solicitor agent the client was liable for
work done by such agent even though that work was done under a separate
CFA between the client’s solicitor and the agent under which instructions were
given by the client’s solicitor as principal. So held Ramsay J in Sharratt v
London Central Bus Co Ltd1.There was accordingly no breach of the
indemnity principle. The Court of Appeal in Crane v Canons Leisure Centre2
considered the question of whether charges of an outside agency could be
treated as work done by a fee earner rather than as a disbursement. The court
concluded in the context of an independent costs draftsman that the fee could
be charged as their own fee and a success fee could therefore be levied on it.
The distinction was drawn between charges by solicitors for work which they
themselves do or are directly responsible for and expenses which they incur for
a client for other people’s work for which they are not directly responsible and
in respect of which they simply pass on the cost to the client.
1 [2005] EWHC 3018 (QB), [2006] 4 Costs LR 584.
2 [2007] EWCA Civ 1352, [2008] 2 All ER 931, [2008] 1 WLR 2549.
N Well resourced litigants
[162] The House of Lords in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd (No
2)1 held that a claimant who can demonstrably afford to fund litigation is
nonetheless entitled to use a CFA with a 100% success fee. Parliament had
been entitled to lay down a general rule that CFAs were open to everyone and
to put in place a regime whereby unsuccessful defendants contributed to the
funding of other litigation. The defendant’s rights under Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights were not thereby
infringed. This decision does not affect any of the court’s powers in respect of
the assessment of reasonable costs but does exclude from consideration the
‘need’ to use a CFA. No Ate insurance had been put in place in Campbelland
the point was not considered. It is open to argument as to whether the use of
ATE insurance is also Parliament’s proportionate response to the need to
provide access to justice. In MGN v UK2 the European Court of Human Rights
by a unanimous decision held that the recoverability of success fees had led to
a violation of Art 10 (the right to freedom of expression). There are several
aspects to the decision that limits it to publication cases: the court focussed on
proposals to reform success fees specifically in publication cases as strong
evidence that the existing regime was unreasonable; Art 10 was available in
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publication cases as a counter to access to justice; there was a very high level
of base costs in such cases; MGN had submitted that publication cases can be
treated differently to other cases.
Outside of publication cases and in similar vein to the House of Lord’s MGN
decision is the decision in Sousa v Waltham Forest London Borough3. The
defendant contended that the claimant should not recover a success fee under
his CFA because he was never at risk as to costs because he was indemnified
under his insurance policy. The Court of Appeal held it is inherent in the
concept of subrogation that an insurer is entitled to benefit from the same
rights as the insured. The defendant could not rely on the fact of the insurer
funding the claim as a defence to the policy holder’s claim for a success fee
when the claim succeeded: the insurer would be in a worse position than the
policy holder would have been. Not to reach that decision would lead to an
anomaly that an insurer with an assigned cause of action could take advantage
of a CFA but an insurer with a subrogated claim could not.
1 [2005] UKHL 61, [2005] 4 All ER 793, [2005] 1 WLR 3394.
2 (Application no 39401/04) [2011] ECHR 66.
3 [2011] EWCA Civ 194.
O CFAs and interest on costs
[162.1] The question of interest on costs where there is a CFA arose in
the Court of Appeal in Crema v Cenkos Securities plc 1. Even though there was
a CFA and the court assumed that the claimant had not borrowed to fund the
action, interest at 5% above base rate was awarded. A differently consti-
tuted Court of Appeal in Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc 2 held the starting
point under CPR 40.8 is the same as the rule under the County Courts (Interest
on Judgment Debts) Order 1991 that costs run from the date ordered not the
date assessed or agreed. That enabled the court to then consider whether in
cases to which CPR 40.8 applied, the existence of a CFA was relevant in
deciding whether to make an order. It was held that the existence of a CFA was
not relevant and so the usual order would be that interest runs from the date
costs are ordered.
1 [2010] EWCA Civ 1444, [2012] All ER (D) 107 (Feb).
2 [2012] EWCA Civ 137, [2012] All ER (D) 107 (Feb).
P Cost of setting up funding arrangements
[162.2] Claimants cannot recover the cost of preparing and advising on CFAs
nor can they recover costs incurred in discussing litigation with or taking
instructions from ATE insurers1. Setting up funding arrangements involved the
expertise and effort of solicitors in identifying a potential claimant and
negotiating the terms on which they are to be engaged and that cannot
properly be described as an item incurred by the client for the purposes of the
litigation. Until the CFA is signed, the potential claimant is not merely not a
claimant: he is not a client. As to liaising with ATE insures after the insurance
was in place that was collateral to the action, liaising with insurers being
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designed to ensure the claimant was protected against costs, accordingly the
cost of such work was not recoverable from an opponent.
1 Motto v Trafigura [2011] EWCA Civ 1150, [2012] 2 All ER 181.
VI Contingent fee agreements
[163] The phrase ‘contingent fee agreement’ was prevalent at the time of the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor1 and in
the main was used to denote a CFA which had no success fee. The continued
use of such terminology, after the change to the CLSA 1990, s 58 brought
about by the AJA 1999, would lead to confusion. The only relevant terminol-
ogy is ‘conditional fee agreement’ as defined in s 58(2)2.
1 [1998] QB 781, [1998] 3 All ER 65, CA.
2 See para [1002].
VII Contingency fee agreements
[164]–[170] Rule 8 of the Law Society Rules of Professional Conduct1
continues to use the phrase ‘contingency fee’ defined in r 18(2)(c)2 as a sum
payable only in the event of success. Rule 8 prohibits any agreement for such
a sum which is not authorised by statute or the common law. The definition
includes a conditional fee agreement within the meaning of the CLSA 1990,
s 583.
The phrase ‘contingency fee’ has also been used to denote a fee arrangement
where the solicitor is to receive a percentage of the damages recovered by the
client. Such an arrangement would not conform to the CLSA 1990, s 58 and
the statutory scheme and would thus contravene r 8 as well as the statute. An
agreement with a firm of accountants for the provision of services in support
of litigation has been held not to be champertous and to be outside of the
regulation of s 584. Similarly in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd5 the position of a
professional commercial funder of litigation which had agreed to fund expert
evidence and document management on a contingency basis was that the
funder should potentially have a liability for the costs of the opponent to the
extent of the funding it has provided. The agreement was not struck down as
being champertous.
Following the AJA 1999 the use of the phrase ‘contingency fee’ is capable of
leading to confusion. The only fee arrangements, having the effect that the
client does not pay the same fee in all circumstances, which are lawful, are
agreements which comply with the statutory scheme and are termed condi-
tional fee agreements.
In Ahmed v Powell6 the Chief Costs Judge held in answer to preliminary issue
in that an arrangement between an insurance company and a firm of costs
negotiators was champertous. Under the agreement the costs negotiators were
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to be paid according to sums saved in costs that the insurer would otherwise
have paid to claimants. The negotiators sought rights of audience in costs
proceedings. It was held that no right of audience had arisen through the
solicitors acting for the insurer since instructions had not been given by the
solicitors but by the insurer. The court would not at its discretion grant a right
of audience because of the champertous arrangement.
1 See para [1253].
2 See para [1254].
3 See para [1002].
4 R (on the application of Factortame) v Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWCA Civ 932,
[2003] QB 381. [2002] 4 All ER 97.
5 [2005] EWCA Civ 655, [2005] 3 All ER 613, [2005] 1 WLR 3055.
6 (SCCO Ref 0210290) [2003] EWHC 9011 (Costs).
VIII Differential fee agreements
[171]–[180] A fee agreement providing for an ordinary charging rate for
cases which win and a discounted rate for cases which lose is an agreement
falling within the definition of a conditional fee agreement contained in the
CLSA 1990, s 581. This was the funding arrangement used in Aratra
Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garrett (a firm)2. From 1 April 2000 such an
agreement is only lawful if it complies with the statutory scheme. It is
submitted that such an arrangement is a CFA which has no success fee
provided the fee for cases which win is the fee which would be charged where
there is no difference in the fee payable if the case loses.
1 See para [1002].
2 [1995] 4 All ER 695, [1995] NLJR 1402.
IX Membership organisations
[181] Section 30 of the AJA 19991 provides a mechanism for a body
prescribed by the Lord Chancellor, to recover any provision made by or on
behalf of the body to meet the costs liability of any person. By s 30 and the
Access to Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 20002 in respect of
arrangements made before 1 November 2005 provision is made for the
recoupment of a sum no greater than the equivalent of the cost to a member
of taking out a personal insurance policy covering adverse costs only.
Arrangements made on or after 1 November 2005 are governed by the Access
to Justice (Membership Organisation) Regulations 20053.
1 See para [1013].
2 SI 2000/693. See para [1080].
3 SI 2005/2306. See para [1310].
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[182] The Access to Justice (Membership Organisation) Regulations 20051
replace the 2000 Regulations from 1 November 2005. This regulatory scheme
still leaves the organisation responsible for the administration of the litigation
and for ensuring that an agreement with the member exists, which can give rise
to the recoupment of the costs. It also leaves own costs in lost cases with the
organisation.
The 2005 Regulations differ from their predecessor only by removing the
references to the detailed circumstances in which the member is liable to pay
the costs of the proceedings – those are the words taken from the individual
CFA regime and which were inappropriate for the arrangements with mem-
bership organisations. The 2005 Regulations still require that the arrange-
ments contain a statement specifying the circumstances in which the member
may be liable to pay costs of the proceedings and it is difficult to see how in real
terms this is any different to the former regulations. The requirement to give
a copy of the arrangements to the member has also been removed in the 2005
Regulations.
1 SI 2005/2306.
A Recovery of the provision for meeting liability
[183]–[184] AJA 1999, s 30:
‘(1) This section applies where a body of a prescribed description undertakes to
meet (in accordance with arrangements satisfying prescribed conditions)
liabilities which members of the body or other persons who are parties to
proceedings may incur to pay the costs of other parties to the proceedings.
(2) If in any of the proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any of the
members or other persons, the costs payable to him may, subject to
subsection (3) and (in the case of court proceedings) to rules of court,
include an additional amount in respect of any provision made by or on
behalf of the body in connection with the proceedings against the risk of
having to meet such liabilities.
(3) But the additional amount shall not exceed a sum determined in a
prescribed manner; and there may, in particular, be prescribed as a manner
of determination one which takes into account the likely cost to the member
or other person of the premium of an insurance policy against the risk of
incurring a liability to pay the costs of other parties to the proceedings.
(4) In this section “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made by the
Lord Chancellor by statutory instrument; and a statutory instrument
containing such regulations shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a
resolution of either House of Parliament.
(5) Regulations under subsection (1) may, in particular, prescribe as a
description of body one which is for the time being approved by the Lord
Chancellor or by a prescribed person.’
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the provision which can lead to the recovery
of an additional amount is a provision to meet a member’s liability for
opponent’s costs, not his own costs1. The ‘provision’ made by the organisation
is thus an ‘additional amount’ which can be claimed by the individual and may
be included in a costs order. Section 30(2) can be taken to mean that there has
to be evidence of the making of such a provision By subs (3) the amount
claimed cannot exceed the ‘likely’ cost to an individual in purchasing an
insurance policy to provide cover only for opponent’s costs. That is more
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restrictive than the provisions of s 29 which permit the recovery by an
individual of a premium paid in respect not only of opponent’s costs but own
disbursements and costs.
Section 30 addresses only the ‘self insurance’ element of the costs to a
membership organisation or other body. Where such a body uses a CFA to
conduct proceedings the CFA must also comply with the statutory scheme in
place at the time the CFA is made.
1 Section 30 refers to ‘the costs of other parties’. In the LCD Conclusions paper Conditional
Fees: Sharing the Risks of Litigation (February 2000) it is assumed that covers own
disbursements – see para 98. However it seems difficult to read the words of the section to
mean this.
B The Regulations
Access to Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 2000
Body of a prescribed description
[185] The 2000 Regulations1 make reference to an approval by the Lord
Chancellor of the bodies to which the AJA 1999, s 30 may apply. All trade
unions listed by the Certification Office for Trade Unions and Employers
Organisations2 are approved together with the following bodies3:
• AA Legal Services
• British Cycling Federation
• Defence Police Federation
• Durham Colliery Overmen Deputies & Shotfirers Retired Members
Group
• Engineering Employers’ Federation
• Police Federation of England and Wales
• RAC Motoring Services
• The Cyclist Touring Club
• The London Cycling Campaign
• British Triathlon Federation
• The Co-operative Group
• The National Union of Students
1 Access to Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/693.
2 The maintenance of a list of trade unions is a power conferred by the Trade Union and Labour
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.
3 The above list is as at November 2006. No later list has been published by the Ministry of
Justice which took over the duties of the Department for Constitutional Affairs in May 2007.
Requirements for arrangements to meet costs liabilities
[186] The Regulations lay down requirements concerning the ‘arrangements’
between the body and the individual under which the body agrees to meet the
individual’s liabilities. The arrangements must be in writing and must contain
a statement specifying the individual’s liability for costs. A copy of that
statement must be provided to the individual. The Regulations specify the
details in terms similar to the requirements for a CFA:
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[186]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Access to Justice (Membership
Organisations) Regulations 2000.
(2) These Regulations come into force on 1st April 2000.
2 Bodies of a prescribed description
The bodies which are prescribed for the purpose of section 30 of the Access to
Justice Act 1999 (recovery where body undertakes to meet costs liabilities) are those
bodies which are for the time being approved by the Lord Chancellor for that
purpose.
3 Requirements for arrangements to meet costs liabilities
(1) Section 30(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applies to arrangements
which satisfy the following conditions.
(2) The arrangements must be in writing.
(3) The arrangements must contain a statement specifying –
(a) the circumstances in which the member or other party may be liable
to pay costs of the proceedings,
(b) whether such a liability arises –
(i) if those circumstances only partly occur,
(ii) irrespective of whether those circumstances occur, and
(iii) on the termination of the arrangements for any reason,
(c) the basis on which the amount of the liability is calculated, and
(d) the procedure for seeking assessment of costs.
(4) A copy of the part of the arrangements containing the statement must be
given to the member or other party to the proceedings whose liabilities the
body is undertaking to meet as soon as possible after the undertaking is
given.
4 Recovery of additional amount for insurance costs
(1) Where an additional amount is included in costs by virtue of section 30(2)
of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (costs payable to a member of a body or
other person party to the proceedings to include an additional amount in
respect of provision made by the body against the risk of having to meet the
member’s or other person’s liabilities to pay other parties’ costs), that
additional amount must not exceed the following sum.
(2) That sum is the likely cost to the member of the body or, as the case may be,
the other person who is a party to the proceedings in which the costs order is
made of the premium of an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a
liability to pay the costs of other parties to the proceedings.
[186.1] AJA 1999, s 30 and the above Regulations came into force on 1 April
2000 and were not written for the purposes of Collective CFAs which had yet
to be provided for1. Regulation 3 must be complied with for a membership
organisation to recover costs through the member’s costs order.
Regulation 3, is however, borrowed from the wording of the CFA Regulations
2000 and directly imports wording from reg 2 of those Regulations which deal
with own costs. The s 30 provision is aimed at adverse costs not own costs and
it is odd that arrangements between a Membership Organisation and its
members, aimed at meeting an adverse costs liability, should have to be in a
form which addresses own costs. It is all the more odd that that own costs
arrangement should be in the form of a CFA without it actually being a CFA
between a member and a solicitor. Compliance with reg 3 is a matter between
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the Membership Organisation and its member but it regulates the mem-
ber’s liability, presumably only to the Membership Organisation, for own
costs. If it were to regulate a liability to a solicitor to pay own costs then it
would constitute an individual CFA which would have to comply with the CFA
Regulations 2000 with all that that entails. The reference in reg 3(3)(d) to an
assessment of costs would seem to be meaningless however, unless the effect of
the arrangement is to make the member liable to a solicitor for those costs, in
which case there is an individual CFA and mere compliance with the Access to
Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 2000 will not be sufficient.
Given that the purpose of s 30 is to give some comparable recovery to s 29 for
a self insurance element of the costs of a membership organisation it is difficult
to see either the need for or the connection with the arrangements for own
costs.
1 CCFAs were enabled by the CCFA Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2988 which came into force on
30 November 2000.
Suggested wording to comply with reg 3
[186.2] The following wordings attempt to comply with reg 3 without
creating at the same time an individual CFA. The wording in (i) below assumes
that it is necessary to recognise the indemnity principle. Given this apparent
necessity, the wordings will lead to a need carefully to consider the client care
requirements.
(1) You [the member] are ultimately responsible for paying the fees and
disbursements of your legal representative, whether you win your case
or not. If you win you are entitled to seek recovery of your costs from
your opponent. Your legal representative’s own costs are calculated as
follows: [insert charging rate(s) of the legal representative who will act
for the member]
(2) If you lose you are ultimately responsible for paying the fees and
disbursements of your opponent, in addition to your own costs.
(3) The [Name of membership organisation] has agreed to indemnify you
for the liability for costs mentioned in (I) and (ii) above.
(4) This arrangement between you and [name of membership organisation]
may be ended by [set out any terms in the Membership organisa-
tion’s rules under which it or the member can terminate the indemnity
arrangement.]
(5) If this arrangement is ended you will be ultimately liable for all the costs
referred to in (i) and (ii) above but you will not be entitled to an
indemnity for that liability from the [name of membership
organisation]
(6) You are entitled to apply to the court for a detailed assessment of the
costs of your legal representative which means that the court will check
the bill. There are strict time limits for doing this. If you apply to the
court within one month of receiving the bill the court will order that the
bill be assessed. If you apply after that time but within 12 months of
receiving the bill the court may, but does not have to, order an
assessment. If 12 months have passed since you received the bill, or you
have paid the bill and 12 months have not passed since you paid it, you
will have to show special circumstances to the court if it is to order an
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assessment. If 12 months have passed since you have paid the bill you
cannot obtain an assessment. An application for an assessment and the
assessment itself can be an expensive process if you lose.
There has here been no attempt to incorporate the language of the regulation.
The wording of the reg 3 is inappropriate for a non-CFA funded case,
particularly reg 3(3)(b)(ii) and (iii) – clearly the member’s primary liability will
not differ according to circumstances in a non CFA funded case.
Access to Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 2005
[187] The 2005 regulations1 differ from their predecessors only by removing
the references to the detailed circumstances in which the member is liable to
pay the costs of the proceedings – those are the words taken from the
individual CFA regime and which were inappropriate for the arrangements
with membership organisations. But, the 2005 regulations still require the
arrangements to contain a statement specifying the circumstances in which the
member may be liable to pay costs of the proceedings and it is difficult to see
how in real terms this is any different to the former regulations. The
requirement to give a copy of the arrangements to the member has been
removed in the 2005 regulations.
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Access to Justice (Membership
Organisation) Regulations 2005 and shall come into force on 1st November
2005.
(2) In these Regulations a reference to a section by number alone is a reference
to the section so numbered in the Access to Justice Act 1999.
2 Revocation and transitional
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Access to Justice (Membership Organisation)
Regulations 2000 (the “2000 Regulations”) are revoked.
(2) The 2000 Regulations shall continue to have effect for the purposes of
arrangements entered into before 1st November 2005 as if these Regulations
had not come into force.
3 Bodies of a prescribed description
The bodies which are prescribed for the purpose of section 30 (recovery where body
undertakes to meet costs liabilities) are those bodies which are for the time being
approved by the Secretary of State for that purpose.
4 Requirements for arrangements to meet costs liabilities
(1) Section 30(1) applies to arrangements which satisfy the following condi-
tions.
(2) The arrangements must be in writing.
(3) The arrangements must contain a statement specifying the circumstances in
which the member may be liable to pay costs of the proceedings.
5 Recovery of additional amount for insurance costs
(1) Where an additional amount is included in costs by virtue of section 30(2)
(costs payable to a member of a body or other person party to the
proceedings to include an additional amount in respect of provision made by
the body against the risk of having to meet the member’s or other
person’s liabilities to pay other parties’ costs), that additional amount must
not exceed the following sum.
(2) That sum is the likely cost to the member of the body or, as the case may be,
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the other person who is a party to the proceedings in which the costs order is
made of the premium of an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a
liability to pay the costs of other parties to the proceedings.
1 Access to Justice (Membership Organisations) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2306.
Disclosure of the existence of a s 30 arrangement
[188]–[189] A s 30 arrangement is a ‘funding arrangement’ within the
meaning of the CPR 1998, r 43.2(1)1. It follows that the rules concerning the
disclosure of funding arrangements apply to s 30 arrangements2. The Costs
Practice Direction requires disclosure of the existence of a s 30 agreement but
not its terms3. Notice must be given at the time of issue of a claim form if the
s 30 agreement is already in place4. Where a s 30 agreement is made after the
issue of proceedings notice must be given within seven days of the making of
the agreement5. There is no requirement in the Costs Practice Direction for
pre-issue disclosure. The Protocols Practice Direction 4A.1 (in force until
6 April 2009) provided that disclosure ‘should’ occur pre-issue. There are
conflicting views on the meaning of ‘should’. In Metcalfe v Clipstone6 it was
held to mean can but not must disclose whereas in Bainbridge v MAF
Pipelimes7 it was held to mean ‘must’ with the usual costs consequences of a
failure to comply with the Practice Direction. From 6 April 2009 the Practice
Direction (Pre-Action Conduct) provides at 9.3 that where a party enters into
a funding arrangement within the meaning of rule 43.2(1)(k), that party must
inform the other parties about this arrangement as soon as possible and in any
event either within 7 days of entering into the funding arrangement concerned
or, where a claimant enters into a funding arrangement before sending a letter
before claim, in the letter before claim. Where the s 30 agreement relates to a
defendant, notice of it must be given when filing the first document8. Section
30 agreements made after the serving of the first document must be notified
within seven days of the making of the agreement9. All of these provisions are
identical to those applying to individual CFAs. Form N251 may be used for the
giving of this information10.
1 CPR 1998, SI 1998/3132, r 43.2(1) provides:
‘In Parts 44 to 48, unless the context otherwise requires “funding arrangement” means an
arrangement where a person has
. . .
(iii) made an agreement with a membership organisation to meet his legal costs;’
2 SI 1998/3132, r 44.15(1) provides: ‘A party who seeks to recover an additional liability must
provide information about the funding arrangement to the court and to other parties as
required by a rule, practice direction or court order.’
3 CPD, s 19.1(1).
4 CPD, s 19.2(2) (a).
5 CPD, s 19.2(4).
6 (2004 unreported SCCO Case No: HN300882.
7 (2004 unreported – Teesside County Court.
8 CPD, s 19.2(3).
9 CPD, s 19.2(4).
10 See para [1241].
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X Collective conditional fee agreements
[190]–[192] The Lord Chancellor’s Department issued a consultation paper
in June 2000 entitled Collective Conditional Fees1. This addressed the different
circumstances of bulk purchasers and suppliers of legal services. The consul-
tation paper also considered the applicability of a bulk agreement for the
benefit of individual third parties.
The Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 20002 came into force
on 30 November 2000 and apply to all CCFAs made from that date until
1 November 2005, whether the funder is the recipient of the litigation services
or not. Amendment was made to the Regulations by the Conditional Fee
Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 20033 to permit a
CCFA to limit the fees payable to the sums recovered in costs or otherwise.
That amendment has the effect of providing for a simplified CCFA in line with
the simplified CFA4 also introduced by the 2003 Regulations. All of these
Regulations are revoked from 1 November 2005 by the Conditional Fee
Agreements (Revocation) Regulations 20055. Doubt has been raised as to the
recovery of costs under a CCFA notwithstanding the commencement of
the AJA 1999, s 316 which enables Rules of Court to provide for a recovery by
a party of costs which would not have been payable by that party had no
order for costs been made. Such Rules would remove the indemnity principle
for the purposes of the particular Rule. The CPR has been amended to provide
for a costs order where a simplified CFA or CCFA has been used ie where
liability has been limited to recovered sums. The CPR make no other provision
in respect of CCFAs which are an agreement between a funder and a provider
of legal services. Where the funder is not also the recipient of the legal services
the indemnity principle requires there to be a legal liability between the
recipient and the provider7. Section 31 itself has not abolished the indemnity
principle but has permitted Rules to be made which constitute exceptions. No
Rule has been made which enables a CCFA to be treated as an exception to the
indemnity principle.
1 Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper, Collective Conditional Fees, June 2000,
CP 12.
2 SI 2000/2988. See para [1080].
3 SI 2003/1240.
4 For simplified CFAs see para [31] and for simplified CCFAs, see para [199.1]
5 SI 2005/2305. See para [1301].
6 AJA 1999, s 31 provides: ‘In section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (costs), in subsection
(2) (rules regulating matters relating to costs), insert at the end “or for securing that the amount
awarded to a party in respect of the costs to be paid by him to such representatives is not limited
to what would have been payable by him to them if he had not been awarded costs”.’
7 See para [200].
A CCFAs before 1 November 2005
Definition and scope
[193] A CCFA is defined in the CCFA Regulations 2000, reg 31:
‘(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this regulation, a collective conditional fee
agreement is an agreement which–
(a) disregarding section 58(3)(c)2 of the Courts and Legal Services Act
1990, would be a conditional fee agreement; and
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(b) does not refer to specific proceedings, but provides for fees to be
payable on a common basis in relation to a class3 of proceedings, or,
if it refers to more than one class of proceedings, on a common basis
in relation to each class.
(2) An agreement may be a collective conditional fee agreement whether or not
–
(a) the funder is a client; or
(b) any clients are named in the agreement.’
The CCFA Regulations 2000 make provision for all CCFAs irrespective of the
context in which they are to be used. The Regulations apply to bulk purchasers
of legal services, such as the legal department of a multi-national company, and
to bulk providers of legal services such as the legal representatives retained by
a trade union to act for its members. There is a crucial difference between these
two categories in that the bulk purchaser is also the client, whereas the bulk
provider situation will involve numerous clients who are not funding the
litigation. Regulation 3(2) provides that an agreement may be CCFA whether
or not the funder is a client and whether any clients are named in the
agreement. During the consultation period concerns were raised as to the
consumer protection requirements for funding agreements. Where the funder
is also the client, with bulk requirements, it is seen as desirable to dispense with
the administration that would be needed if the individual CFA regime applied,
there being no need for a new CFA to be entered into in respect of each new
matter. Where, however, the CCFA is to be used in respect of bulk supply
where individuals are to be the beneficiaries of the legal services but not the
funders of those services, the need for consumer protection and additional
client care arises. The Regulations reflect this difference in the requirements
laid down for the CCFA but do so by seemingly applying consumer protection
provisions to all CCFAs, including those where the client is also the funder. The
intended saving in terms of the administration are thus not as great as they
might have been. The Regulations are not set out so as to have provisions
applying according to whether the CCFA is for a bulk purchaser or not.
In Kitchen v Burwell4 Gray J proceeded on the basis that non-compliance with
the Collective CFA Regulations did not render the CCFA unenforceable
because the statutory provisions differed from those applying to a CFA. It is
difficult to see the authority for that basis. No reference is made in the
judgment to reg 3(1)(a) of the Collective CFA Regulations but it is submitted
that if that were the reason for this view it amounts to a misinterpretation of
that regulation5.
1 SI 2000/2988.
2 CLSA 1990, s 58(3) provides:
‘the following conditions are applicable to every conditional fee agreement –
. . .
(c) it must comply with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the Lord
Chancellor.
Regulation 3(1)(a) of the CCFA Regulations is necessary in order to disapply the individual
CFA Regulations. Regulation 7 of the CCFA Regulations further provides that, by the
insertion of a reg 8 into the CFA Regulations 2000, that the CFA Regulations shall not apply
to collective CFAs.
3 ‘Class’ is not defined.
4 [2005] EWHC 1771 (QB), [2006] 1 Costs LR 82.
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5 CLSA 1990, s 58(3) provides:
‘the following conditions are applicable to every conditional fee agreement –
. . .
(c) it must comply with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the Lord
Chancellor.
Regulation 3(1)(a) of the CCFA Regulations is necessary in order to disapply the individual
CFA Regulations. Regulation 7 of the CCFA Regulations further provides that, by the
insertion of a reg 8 into the CFA Regulations 2000, that the CFA Regulations shall not apply
to collective CFAs.
Definitions of ‘client’ and ‘funder’
[194] Regulation 1(2) defines ‘client’ as a person who will receive advocacy or
litigation services to which the agreement relates. ‘Funder’ is defined as the
party who under the CCFA will pay the legal representative’s fees. The client
may or may not, therefore, also be the funder. This will call for the application
of Rule 15 of the Law Society Rules of Professional Conduct to the person
fitting the description of ‘client’ under the Regulations, whether or not that
person is also the funder. Where the funder is not a person fitting the definition
of ‘client’ for the purposes of the Regulations, that person will still be the
subject of Rule 15.
B Contents of a standard1 CCFA
1 ‘Standard’ is used to describe a CCFA which does not satisfy the amendment to the CCFA
Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2988 made by the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1240 which create ‘simplified’ CCFAs. For simpli-
fied CCFAs, see para [199.1].
Specified circumstances in which fees to be paid
[195] Regulation 4(1) requires the CCFA to specify the circumstances in
which the legal representative’s fees and expenses, or part of them, are payable.
The definition of a CCFA in effect requires reference to the individual CFA
provisions of the CLSA 1990, s 58 and the definition therein of a CFA and of
a CFA which provides for a success fee. The CCFA Regulations are then
applied to those definitions. Hence ‘specified circumstances’ pre-supposes that
there is an agreement that some or all of the fees and expenses will be payable
only in specified circumstances. The CCFA then must set out what those
circumstances are.
Information and advice in the specific proceedings
[196] Regulation 4(2) requires the CCFA to contain a term as to the giving of
information to the client concerned in the specific proceedings. These require-
ments apply to a client whether or not he is also the funder. The CCFA must
contain a term that when accepting instructions in relation to any specific
proceedings, the legal representative must inform the client as to the circum-
stances in which the client may be liable to pay the costs of the legal
representative. There must be a term that further explanation, advice or
information about the costs liability as may be reasonably required by the
client must also be given. There must be a term that the legal representative
must also confirm in writing his acceptance of the instructions in respect of the
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specific proceedings. All of these requirements are designed with ‘consumer
protection’ in mind. The opportunity to recognise that these requirements are
irrelevant where the funder and the client are the same legal person was
ignored, with the result that this administrative requirement applies to all
CCFAs. These provisions differ from the individual CFA Regulations. Where
the individual Regulations apply there is an actual requirement that costs
information is given and a further requirement that there must be a term of the
CFA stating that immediately before the CFA is signed the costs information
was given. That method of ensuring that the consumer has the information
necessary to understand their liability has been omitted from the CCFA
Regulations, albeit it may be assumed that the contractual term required by the
Regulations will also be performed. Under the CCFA there is no regulation as
to the giving of costs information but only as to the terms of the agreement
itself. The requirements as to costs information do not apply to a CCFA
between a legal representative and an additional legal representative.
Regulation 4 provides:
‘(2) A collective conditional fee agreement must provide that, when accepting
instructions in relation to any specific proceedings the legal representative
must –
(a) inform the client as to the circumstances in which the client may be
liable to pay the costs of the legal representative; and
(b) if the client requires any further explanation, advice or other
information about the matter referred to in sub-paragraph (a),
provide such further explanation, advice or other information about
it as the client may reasonably require.
(3) Paragraph (2) does not apply in the case of an agreement between a legal
representative and an additional legal representative.
(4) A collective conditional fee agreement must provide that, after accepting
instructions in relation to any specific proceedings, the legal representative
must confirm his acceptance of instructions in writing to the client.’
During the consultation period it became clear that there was a concern that
where the CCFA was to be used to fund the litigation of an individual who was
not a party to the CCFA, that individual should be informed that the case was
being conducted under a funding arrangement1. Regulation 4 appears to
address that concern, but of course applies to all CCFAs. In the case of CCFA
relating to an individual who is not a party to the CCFA, the Rules of
Professional Conduct will in any event impose a requirement for the giving of
advice to the client.
In Duffy v Port Ramsgate Ltd2 a CCFA between a trade union and a firm of
solicitors, in order to comply with reg 4 of the CCFA Regulations 2000,
required the solicitor to inform the member as to the circumstances in which
the member may be liable to pay the solicitor’s charges. It was argued that no
new information having been given to the client when the case was transferred
to CCFA funding there was a breach of the CCFA itself and of Rule 15
Solicitors Practice Rules 1990. The argument failed:
‘I do not think the Claimant in this case has been misled as to his liability for
costs or has been let down by his solicitors in explaining that liability to him.
The obligation of the solicitors acting under a CCFA is to explain to the litigant
the consequences of the CCFA so far as the litigant is concerned. By
emphasising his costs free position [the firm] appear to have done that
correctly. In my judgment it would have been unreal, bordering upon the
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absurd, for them to have attempted to give the full information which another
litigant, not funded by a trade union, should be given.’ At [21].
1 Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper, Collective Conditional Fees, June 2000,
CP 12, para 252.
2 (2004) unreported SCCO Case No: 0306901 [2004] EWHC 9008 (Costs).
Further requirements where there is a success fee
[197] Regulation 5(1) provides:
‘Where a collective conditional fee agreement provides for a success fee the
agreement must provide that, when accepting instructions in relation to any specific
proceedings the legal representative must prepare and retain a written statement
containing –
(a) his assessment of the probability of the circumstances arising in which the
percentage increase will become payable in relation to those proceedings
(“the risk assessment”)1;
(b) his assessment of the amount of the percentage increase in relation to those
proceedings, having regard to the risk assessment; and
(c) the reasons, by reference to the risk assessment, for setting the percentage
increase at that level.’
The legal representative is thus to prepare and retain a statement containing
the following–
(a) an assessment of the probability of winning – the “risk assessment”;
(b) an assessment of the percentage increase having regard to (a);
(c) the reasons, by reference to the risk assessment, for setting the
percentage increase.
The above requirements are more detailed than those applicable to an
individual CFA. Each of the three requirements requires consideration.
1 For Risk Assessment see Pt IX.
Risk assessment
[197.1] This is assumed to be an expression of the level of confidence in
winning. Many practitioners are familiar with the use of percentages to
indicate a level of confidence. Practitioners who use a risk assessment method
based upon a weighted list of factors which produces a score expressed as a
number will usually have a conversion of that number firstly into a percentage
of the maximum number which could have been scored and secondly from that
into a percentage increase. For example a score of 12 out of a possible 20
represents a 60% confidence level which is then converted into a percentage
increase. This Regulation would not be satisfied with a number with no
explanation – it calls for an ‘assessment’ which is then referred to as ‘the risk
assessment’.
Percentage increase
[197.2] The assumption here is that the expression of the chances of success
can be and needs to be converted into a success fee. (b) seems to be the place
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to explain the basis of that conversion. That can be satisfied by the explanation
of any conversion method which is being used, such as the ready reckoner
contained in the Law Society publication Conditional Fees – a Survival Guide1.
1 (Law Society Publishing, 2nd edn, 2001).
The reasons for the level of the success fee
[197.3] The reasoned explanation of the chances of success on which is based
then (b) and (c) has already been given in (a). If (c) means the full reasons for
the success fee, that would seem to be the same as requirement (a) which
appears to constitute the ‘‘risk assessment’ to which both (b) and (c) refer. It is
difficult to see the differences between the three requirements in (a), (b) and (c),
with perhaps the most difficult being the difference between (a) and (c) which
each seem to require a reasoned explanation. It can only be safe to assume that
if all of the requirements are satisfied it matters not what their order is.
Other factors affecting the success fee
[198] The CCFA Regulations1 make no reference to other factors which
under an individual CFA would be included in the success fee. In particular
there is no reference to an amount reflecting a liability for disbursements and
no reference to a percentage increase representing the cost of the postponement
of the fees. This latter element cannot be recovered form an opponent and in
an individual CFA must be stated separately, or, where no such figure is
included in the success fee, it should be stated that there is no such inclusion.
It is recommended that the same approach be adopted for CCFAs.
1 SI 2000/2988.
Information to be given where the client is also the funder
[198.1] Here it is envisaged that a bulk purchaser of legal services must be
informed1 as to costs liability2 each time new specific proceedings are included
under the CCFA and each time the legal representative must confirm in writing
an acceptance of instructions3. It is likely that these requirements will be
combined in one note making reference to the proceedings and to the terms of
the CCFA and to an acceptance of instructions. If there is a success fee there
must be retained a written risk assessment statement4. The Regulations do not,
therefore, make the risk assessment a term of the CCFA although it is likely
that a CCFA with a success fee will, when defining the success fee, refer to this
risk assessment and incorporate it into the contract. The CCFA will contain a
provision that the client will permit disclosure of the reasons for setting the
success fee to the court or other person at the direction of the court. If the
CCFA itself incorporates the risk assessment it would be better were it also to
provide that the party to the CCFA gives permission for such disclosure.
1 SI 2000/2988, reg 4(2)(a) uses the word ‘inform’ but does not specify that this must be in
writing.
2 SI 2000/2988, reg 4(2)(a).
3 SI 2000/2988, reg. 4(4).
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4 SI 2000/2988, reg 5(1).
Information to be given where the client is not the funder
[198.2] Where a CCFA is being used to fund an individual’s litigation, for
example of a member by a Trade Union, the CCFA must state that the legal
representative will inform the individual of the circumstances in which he or
she will be liable to pay the costs of the legal representative. This is rather less
than the advice and information which Practice Rule 15 of the Law Society
Rules of Professional Conduct requires, particularly given there is no reference
to adverse costs liability. The legal representative must confirm to the
individual in writing the acceptance of instructions for the specific proceedings.
Where there is a success fee the CCFA (to which the individual client is not a
party) must state that if the legal representative or the client is required to
disclose the reasons for the success fee to the court or any other person, the
legal representative may do so. There is no provision in the Regulations
entitling the client as client to a copy of the reasons for the success fee nor even
a provision that the client is to be provided with a copy if they so request.
C Table of the information to be given to the client under a CCFA
[198.3]
Information To Client Regulation
Circumstances in which client liable for
legal representative’s costs
Yes 4(2)(a)
Further explanation, advice or
information reasonably required by the
client
Yes 4(2)(b)
Written confirmation of the acceptance
of instructions
Yes 4(4)
Written risk assessment No 5(1)
D CCFAs providing for a success fee in the case of
court proceedings
[199] Following the regime of the individual CFA the CCFA must contain
terms concerning disclosure of the reasons for a success fee and the recoup-
ment of disallowed amounts of the success fee:
Regulation 5 states:
‘(2) If the agreement relates to court proceedings it must provide that where the
success fee becomes payable as a result of those proceedings, then –
[Disclosure]
(a) if –
(i) any fees subject to the increase are assessed, and
(ii) the legal representative or the client is required by the court to
disclose to the court or any other person the reasons for setting the
percentage increase at the level assessed by the legal representative,
(ii) he may do so,
[Disallowed amounts]
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(b) if –
(i) any such fees are assessed by the court, and
(ii) any amount in respect of the percentage increase is disallowed on the
assessment on the ground that the level at which the increase was set
was unreasonable in view of facts which were or should have been
known to the legal representative at the time it was set
(ii) that amount ceases to be payable under the agreement, unless the
court is satisfied that it should continue to be so payable, and
[Lower amounts on settlement]
(c) if –
(i) sub-paragraph (b) does not apply, and
(iii) the legal representative agrees with any person liable as a result of the
proceedings to pay fees subject to the percentage increase that a lower
amount than the amount payable in accordance with the conditional fee
agreement is to be paid instead,
(iii) the amount payable under the collective conditional fee agreement in
respect of those fees shall be reduced accordingly, unless the court is
satisfied that the full amount should continue to be payable under it.’
The above provisions are identical to those applying to individual CFAs. There
are some complications for CCFAs arising from the fact that the party seeking
a costs order may not be a party to the CCFA and may not have received a
copy of the risk assessment supporting the level of the success fee.
E Contents of a simplified1 CCFA
1 ‘Simplified’ is used to refer to a CCFA, which complies with the amendments to the CCFA
Regulations, made by the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regula-
tions 2003, SI 2003/1240. For CCFAs that do not comply with the amended Regulations, see
para [195].
Specified circumstances in which fees to be paid
[199.1] Regulation 4(1) of the CCFA Regulations 2000 requires the CCFA to
specify the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and expenses,
or part of them, are payable. By reg 4(1A)2 the circumstances referred to in
4(1) may include the fact that the legal representative’s fees and expenses are
payable only to the extent that sums are recovered in respect of the
proceedings, whether by way of costs or otherwise. A simplified CCFA does
not affect any liability in respect of an after the event insurance policy3. Where
the CCFA does limit the client’s liability for costs to sums recovered the
Regulations are simplified. Where a CCFA is being used by a third party
funder, for example a trade union in respect of members, it is likely that the
funder intends that the client should retain all damages and have an indemnity
for all costs. The CCFA is the agreement between the funder and the legal
representative. There is no necessary connection therefore between the liability
of the third party funder and the sums recovered by the party to the
proceedings. In particular a third party funder may intend to be liable for own
costs for work done after a rejection of a Part 36 payment where that payment
has not been beaten. If a simplified CCFA limits the funder’s liability to costs
recovered then the same difficulties will arise as for a simplified CFA with
regard to Part 364. It is submitted that the regulation of CCFAs needs to
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recognise that where there is a third party funder the client is not intended to
fund the litigation and that the only legal liability is between the funder and the
legal representative.
2 Inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 3(2).
3 CCFA Regulations 2000, reg 5(5) as inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 3(3).
4 See para [35].
Information and advice
[199.2] Regulations 4(2)(a) and (b) of the CCFA Regulations 2000 require
the CCFA to provide that, when accepting instructions in relation to any
specific proceedings, the legal representative must inform the client as to the
circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the costs of the legal
representative and provide such further explanation, advice or other informa-
tion as to that matter as is required by the client. Paragraph [196] deals with
the information to be given where the client is and is not also the funder.
Further requirements where there is a success fee
[199.3] Regulation 5(1)(a), (b) and (c) require the legal representative to
prepare and retain a written statement of his assessment of the probability of
the circumstances arising in which the success fee will become payable, the
percentage increase attributable to the risk and the reasons by reference to risk
for setting the percentage increase. See paras [197]–[198].
Simplified CCFAs providing for a success fee in the case of
court proceedings
[199.4] Regulation 5 states:
‘(2) If the agreement relates to court proceedings it must provide that where the
success fee becomes payable as a result of those proceedings, then –
(a) if–
(i) any fees subject to the increase are assessed, and
(ii) the legal representative or the client is required by the court to
disclose to the court or any other person the reasons for
setting the percentage increase at the level assessed by the
legal representative,
(ii) he may do so . . . ’
Regulation 5(2)(b) and (c) do not apply to simplified CCFAs. Accordingly the
CCFA can provide for own costs, including a success fee, to be limited only by
all sums recovered and not just recovered costs, but not contain a provision
removing liability where the success fee has been reduced on assessment or by
agreement with the paying party. Had the 2003 Regulations defined a
simplified CFA as one where fees are limited to costs (as opposed to sums)
recovered these changes would not have appeared anomalous.
E Disclosure
[199.5] A CCFA is governed in the same way as an individual CFA in terms
of the disclosure requirements of the CPR 1998 and Practice Direction
about Costs. The CCFA Regulations define a CCFA as a CFA but for the CLSA
1990, s 58(3)(c) and it is assumed that for the purposes of the CPR and PD a
CFA includes a CCFA. A CCFA is therefore a ‘funding arrangement’ within the
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meaning of the CPR 1998, r 43.2(1)1. It follows that the rules concerning the
disclosure of funding arrangements apply to CCFAs in the same way as for
individual CFAs2. The Practice Direction about Costs requires disclosure of the
existence of a CCFA but not its terms3. Notice must be given at the time of
issue of a claim form if the CCFA is already in place4. Where a CCFA is made
after the issue of proceedings notice must be given within seven days of the
making of the agreement5. There is no requirement in the CPD for pre-issue
disclosure6. The Protocols Practice Direction provides that disclosure ‘should’
occur pre-issue. For the conflicting views on the meaning of ‘should’ see para
[188]–[189]. Where the CCFA relates to a defendant, notice of it must be given
when filing the first document7. CCFAs made after the serving of the first
document must be notified within seven days of the making of the agreement8.
All of these provisions are identical to those applying to individual CFAs. Form
N251 may be used for the giving of this information.
The requirements for disclosure at the assessment of costs stage are the same
as those that apply to a CFA. The CCFA must be disclosed and to comply with
the CPR 1998, Part 44 and CPD 14.9 either the risk assessment itself or at least
a statement reciting the calculation of the success fee must be disclosed9.
1 CPR 1998, SI 1998/3132, r 43.2(1) provides:
‘In Parts 44 to 48, unless the context otherwise requires “funding arrangement” means an
arrangement where a person has –
(i) entered into a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee within the
meaning of section 58(2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.’
2 SI 1998/3132, r 44.15(1) provides: ‘A party who seeks to recover an additional liability must
provide information about the funding arrangement to the court and to other parties as
required by a rule, practice direction or court order.’
3 CPD, s 19.1(1).
4 CPD, s 19.2(2)(a).
5 CPD, s 19.2(4).
6 CPD, s 19. 2(5).
7 CPD, s 19.2(3).
8 CPD, s 19.2(4).
9 Woollam v Cleanaway Ltd (2004) unreported Chester County Court (Judge Halbert).
F Shortfalls
[199.6] Where the funder and the client are the same legal entity the recovery
of a shortfall in the success fee following an assessment or agreement raises no
difficult questions. The CCFA will provide that the funder-client is liable for
the success fee. The provisions relating to the disallowance by a court and the
acceptance of a lower sum by any settlement are dealt with above. A shortfall
will arise outside of those circumstances. The success fee will be paid by the
losing party as a multiplier of the assessed base costs which will in most if not
all cases be a lower sum than the own party base costs. If it is intended that that
shortfall should be recoverable by the legal representative the terms of the
CCFA must make that clear. Where the funder and client are the same legal
entity there is no difficulty. Where, however, the client is not the same legal
entity as the funder, the CCFA will only be able to provide for recovery from
the funder. Any circumstances in which the client is to be liable for any costs
cannot be dealt with by the CCFA because the client here is not a party to the
CCFA. There must therefore be a separate funding agreement between the
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legal representative and the individual for any circumstances in which the
individual is to be liable for costs. Work done outside of the terms of a CCFA
but without there being an agreement with the individual is likely to prove to
be a difficult issue if costs are sought from the individual.
G Third party funders and the indemnity principle
[200] Where a third party funder uses a CCFA, the recovery of costs incurred
by the third party, for which the party to the proceedings had no primary
liability, can only be achieved by dis-applying the indemnity principle. This
situation applies also to subrogated claims under insurance contracts. Al-
though artificial, the provision by a third party of an indemnity for costs
incurred by a party is a method of funding which does not offend the
indemnity principle. A CCFA however, is a funding arrangement which does
not involve the party to proceedings unless that party is also the funder.
Subrogated proceedings are brought by and in the name of the policy holder,
they are not proceedings brought in the name of the funder. Equally with Trade
Union funding, the case is brought by the member and not by the Union.
Recovery of costs under a CCFA must therefore be made either by an order in
favour of the party to the proceedings (in which case the indemnity principle
requires first that the party be liable) or to the funder as a third party. The
mechanism for the latter approach seems to be the Supreme Court Act 1981,
s 51(3) and the CPR 1998, r 48.2 which would require the funder to be joined
as a party for costs purposes and show exceptional circumstances why costs
should be awarded. In Holden v Oyston1, McKinnon J held that the Solicitors
Indemnity Fund should recover costs in circumstances where it would have
been liable to pay costs had the case failed. The power to make third party
costs orders in favour of a non-party was seemingly assumed to be within s 51
on the basis of the wording of the CPR 1998. No cases where such a power
had been exercised are cited in this decision.
The various relationships existing where a third party funder uses a CCFA with
ATE insurance are shown below.
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[200.1]
.
The legal relationship of the recipient of legal services under a Trade Union
CCFA has been considered in two costs appeals in 2003 with differing
reasoning. In Gliddon v Lloyd Maunder Ltd1 Master O’Hare held that the
CCFA Regulations 2000 do not create an exception to the indemnity principle.
It was recognised that a CCFA is between the legal representative and the
funder only but it was held that there was a ‘linkage of liability’ with the client
who by contract with the Trade Union has permitted the latter to instruct a
solicitor. In Thornley v Lang2 the Court of Appeal reviewed the line of
authorities dealing with trade union funding and held that the member here
was liable on the basis of the CCFA. It reached that result by alternative routes.
Either the union agreed with the authority of its member or the member
ratified the union’s agreement. On either footing there was a contract under
which the member was liable and that contract was a CCFA. The court
expressly rejected the argument that the member had entered into a CFA on an
individual basis which would be subject to the CFA Regulations. Field J3 had
found that the member had no liability for the success fee but that of the CLSA
1990, s 58A(6), in providing for a costs order to include as success fee, enabled
an order to be made on the basis of the CCFA to which the member was not
a party. The Court of Appeal rejected that basis for the decision.
1 [2002] EWHC 819 (QB), [2002] All ER (D) 296 (Apr).
1 [2003] NLJR 318, SC.
Collective conditional fee agreements [200.1]
BCS • Issue 96 E-157
0155 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:27 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 1484, [2003] 1 All ER 886, [2004] 1 WLR 378.
3 Thornley v Lang (25 February 2003, unreported) – Newcastle Combined Court Centre Claim
No: NE 204504.
[200.2] The indemnity principle formed the basis for challenges to a Trade
Union arrangement in Kitchen v Burwell1 where the CCFA was made after the
union’s member had been represented by the solicitors for six weeks under the
union’s legal assistance scheme. The change was communicated 13 months
later by letter to which the member made no response. It was found that the
letter was sufficient to vary the retainer so that it now incorporated the CCFA.
The member’s continued use of the legal service after receiving the letter was
acceptance by conduct. It was further found that a clause in the CCFA stating
that the solicitors would not seek to recover costs directly from the member
was not in breach of the indemnity principle. That conclusion was arrived at
however by deciding that the clause did not mean that the solicitors could not
make a recovery from the member because it was clear form other terms of the
CCFA and in other documents that the union was only providing an indemnity
and that the member had a liability to pay the costs.
1 [2005] EWHC 1771 (QB), [2006] 1 Costs LR 82.
CCFAs and after the event insurance
[200.3] The relationship of the party to proceedings and the legal represen-
tative under a CCFA where the funder is not a party to the proceedings is
considered at paras [200]–[200.2] where the argument that the party to the
proceedings has no liability for own costs under a CCFA is explored. The CCFA
creates a liability between the funder and the legal representative but also
between the party and the legal representative. Section 29 of the AJA 1999
provides for the recovery by a party to proceedings of an insurance premium
in respect of that party’s liability in those proceedings. If the analysis in
Thornley1 is followed it is possible to argue that the trade union member has
a liability for own costs to the extent that the CCFA provides. Such a liability
could therefore be insured by after the event insurance covering for example
own disbursements and adverse costs. The union arrangements in Kitchen v
Burwell2 included the union funding an after the event premium for the member
and indemnifying the member for the premium in the event that the case failed.
No argument was raised as to the reasonableness of the party purchasing such
a policy in circumstances where he had in the original arrangements been
indemnified directly by the union.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 1484, [2004] 1 All ER 886, [2004] 1 WLR 378.
2 [2005] EWHC 1771 (QB), [2006] 1 Costs LR 82.
CCFAs after 1 November 2005
[200.4] The Conditional Fee Agreements (Revocation) Regulations 20051
revoke the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 as from
1 November 2005. A CCFA entered into on or after that date must comply
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with the CLSA 1990, s 58. The disclosure requirements in respect of additional
liabilities continue to apply2. The Law Society Client Care Code is amended
from the same date3.
1 SI 2005/2305. See para [1301].
2 See para [199.5].
3 See para [150].
XI Insurance
[201] The major distinction to be drawn in the insurance products available
to provide cover for the costs of litigation is between policies sold where the
event which gives rise to the legal claim has not occurred and those sold where
that event has already occurred. The phrases ‘before the event’ and ‘after the
event’ are used to refer to this distinction.
A Insurance before the event – legal expenses insurance (LEI)
[202] The generic term used in before the event insurance is Legal Expenses
Insurance (LEI) which takes two forms. Many household and motor insurance
policies have an add-on benefit of cover for legal expenses. In some cases there
is no charge for this addition in others the policyholder will have paid a sum
in the region of £10. The limits of indemnity in these policies will vary but
generally start from £10,000. The policy may also seek to restrict to a panel the
solicitor who may do the work. The Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses
Insurance) Regulations 19901 provide for the insured to have choice of lawyer
where there are legal proceedings. Prior to issue of proceedings the Regulations
do not require that the insured should have a right to choose a lawyer2. The
same Regulations require that the insured have a right to choose a lawyer
where there is a conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer. LEI
policies are also available as ‘stand alone’ products not connected to some
other policy.
Before a CFA is signed the client must be informed as to whether the legal
representative considers that the client’s costs liability is insured under an
existing policy2. Whether the litigation is to be funded by a CFA or not, the
client must be informed of costs including the question of whether the costs are
or can be insured3.
1 SI 1990/1159.
2 SI 1990/1159, reg 6(1) and (3).
2 CFA Regulations 2000, reg 4(1)(c).
3 Practice Rule 15 and Solicitors’ Costs Information and Client Care Code paragraph 4( j ).
Typical cover under a legal expenses policy
[203] Cover will depend upon which sections of a policy have been purchased
but typically can include employment, personal injury, contract and motoring
claims. The policy may include cover for family members as well as the
insured. It is essential to ascertain that the client is within the class of persons
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covered and that the class of claim is within the sections of the policy which
have been purchased. Cover will be for irrecoverable legal costs of the insured
and the opponent. The policy will require the insured to persuade the insurer
that the case should be pursued.
B Insurance after the event – AEI
[204] After the event insurance products are relatively new in that they
effectively came about to support the availability of CFAs which became
lawful in England and Wales in July 1995. The number of providers of such
policies has grown considerably since 1995 and the variations in cover are
accordingly many and complex. AEI policies are available to support litigation
funded by a CFA and funded without a CFA. In addition to the many policies
available to insure the liability which a client has in costs, there are policies
available also to the solicitor to enable the firm to insure on a stop loss basis.
C Client insurance
Insurance to support a CFA
[205] The client with a CFA is at risk of being liable for the costs of the
opponent. The client may also be liable for own disbursements including
counsel’s fees depending upon the terms of the CFA and whether own counsel
is acting on a CFA or not. Although this client liability is equally applicable to
defendants, not all of the policies offered are available to defendants.
Typical cover
[206] The typical cover offered under policies designed to support a CFA will
include not only opponent’s costs but also own disbursements. Not all
products include own counsel’s fees in the meaning of own disbursements.
There are variations also as to whether cover is retrospective form the date of
the policy and if so to what extent. Some insurers do not accept proposals
where proceedings have already been issued, others will not accept proposals
within a specified time of a trial date. Further variation exists with regard to
application or assessment fees. Not all providers have policies to cover all fields
of litigation, in particular some are confined to personal injury matters.
Premium rates will depend in many cases on the limit of indemnity taken and
the type of case, with percentage rates in the range of 1.5% up to 40%. Some
providers use a fixed premium on a scale of the indemnity others provide a
quote for individual cases. Where the limit of indemnity being sought is high,
limits often being below £50,000, it is usual for the case to be assessed on an
individual basis. With lower value cases many insurers operate a delegated
authority scheme where below defined values the solicitor has authority to
bind the insurers without reference on an individual case basis. Where
delegated authority schemes are available the firm will be assessed by the
insurer against their own criteria.
As with all policies of insurance it is essential to read the full policy wording
when considering the suitability of a policy for an individual client.
D Insurance in non-CFA cases
[207] Many but not all providers have policies to cover costs in cases where
there is no CFA. Typically therefore, cover is for both side’s costs and
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disbursements. Given that both side’s costs are to be covered, the limit of
indemnity which the client will need will be higher than that needed under a
CFA. The premium percentage rate will also be higher than for a CFA case. In
many policies cover for adverse costs will be retrospective from the date of the
policy but own costs will be covered only from the date of the policy.
E Own costs partly insured and partly covered by a CFA
[208] Some providers do offer a policy which covers adverse costs and a
percentage of own costs in a case where there is a CFA. In such a case there is
a question of whether the success fee for the CFA should be lower than it
would have been had the solicitor taken the risk of receiving no costs at all. To
apply the success fee to the whole of the costs without reducing the success fee
in proportion to the costs insured would give a distorted result. The alternative
here would be for the CFA to provide that the success fee will be applied only
to the proportion of costs uninsured which is a truer reflection of the risk being
taken by the solicitor.
F Solicitors and ATE from January 14 2005 – FSA Regulation
[209] From 14 January 2005 the FSA assumed regulation of activity con-
cerned with general insurance. Activity is termed ‘mediation’ for the purposes
of the FSA and in essence covers anything to do with taking out insurance and
then using it, including filling in a proposal form. Such activity is a regulated
activity for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.So-
licitors who deal with clients using ATE products are carrying on an activity in
respect of General Insurance.
Solicitors do not however have to be registered by the FSA. Solicitors can be
regulated instead by the Law Society. The Law Society is a Delegated
Professional Body – DPB.
The Law Society has produced a set of rules approved by the FSA which
solicitors must follow: Solicitors’ Financial Services (Conduct of Business)
Rules 2001 [amended 7 October 2004], Solicitors’ Financial Services (Scope)
Rules 2001[amended 8 June 2004] and Solicitors’ Financial Services (Insur-
ance and Mortgages) Amendment Rules 2004.On a day to day basis the
responsibilities of solicitors are contained in the Conduct of Business Rules
that set out what solicitors must do. Firms must be registered with the FSA on
the Exempt Professional Firms register and must comply with these rules in
order to carry on insurance activity without being regulated by the FSA. Under
this DPB scheme it is important to note that solicitors must not state that they
are regulated by the FSA.
Insurance Mediation activity:
Article 2.3 of the Insurance Mediation Directive1:
‘ “Insurance mediation” means the activities of introducing, proposing or carrying
out other work preparatory to the conclusion of contracts of insurance, or of
concluding such contracts, or of assisting in the administration and performance of
such contracts, in particular in the event of a claim.’
Article 8 Solicitors’ Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001:
‘insurance mediation activity means any of the following activities specified in the
Regulated Activities Order2 which is carried on in relation to a contract of insurance
or rights to or interests in a life policy:
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(a) dealing in investments as agent;
(b) arranging (bringing about) deals in investments;
(c) making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments;
(d) assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance;
(e) advising on investments;
( f ) agreeing to carry on a regulated activity in (a) to (e) above”
The following activities with respect to ATE insurance falls within the
definition of insurance mediation:
(a) dealing as an agent in contracts of insurance;
(b) arranging, or making arrangements, with a view to a person entering
into a contract of insurance;
(c) assisting in the administration and performance of contracts of insur-
ance;
(d) advising on the merits of buying and selling a contract of insurance.
1 Directive 2002/92/EC.
2 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544.
[210] The main requirements for firms under the Law Society scheme:
Only firms that can comply with the ‘basic conditions’ of the DPB are able to
conduct insurance activities without being authorised and regulated by the
FSA. Section 4 of the Solicitors’ Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001 sets out
seven conditions:
(a) the activities arise out of, or are complementary to, the provision of a
particular professional service to a particular client;
(b) the manner of the provision by the firm of any service in the course of
carrying on the activities is incidental to the provision by the firm of
professional services;
(c) the firm accounts to the client for any pecuniary reward or other
advantage which the firm receives from a third party;
(d) the activities are not of a description, nor do they relate to an
investment of a description, specified in any order made by the Treasury
under section 327(6) of the Act;
(e) the firm does not carry on, or hold itself out as carrying on, a regulated
activity other than one which is allowed by these rules or one in relation
to which the firm is an exempt person;
(f) there is not in force any order or direction of the FSA under sec-
tions 328 or 329 of the Act which prevents the firm from carrying on
the activities; and
(g) the activities are not otherwise prohibited by these rules.
[211] The main requirements of the Law Society scheme in respect of
individual clients
(1) ‘Status Disclosure’
(1) Firms not authorised and regulated by the FSA but by the Law Society
must tell their clients that they are not authorised by the FSA but by the
Law Society. This is termed a “status disclosure” ie it discloses to the
client the status of the solicitor as not being authorised by the FSA.
(1) Written notice of the following must be given before any services
relating to insurance are provided:
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• a statement that the firm is not authorised by the FSA;
• the name and address of the firm;
• the nature of the regulated activities carried on by the firm, and
the fact that they are limited in scope;
• a statement that the firm is regulated by the Law Society; and
• a statement explaining that complaints and redress mechanisms
are
• provided through Law Society regulation.
(2) Letterhead
(2) The letterhead of a firm must bear the words “regulated by the Law
Society”. This is an existing requirement of the Solicitors’ Public-
ity Code 2001.This requirement provides, therefore, only some of the
new requirements referred to in point 1 above. It is likely that firms will
use a separate information sheet to ensure full compliance.
(3) Records of insurance transactions
(3) File notes or client letters must now include a note that the firm has
been instructed to effect an insurance transaction and/or has given
instructions to another person to effect a transaction. Records must be
kept for six years from the date the record is made.
(4) Record of commissions
(4) If a firm receives a commission in respect of insurance activities the firm
must comply with Practice Rule 10. It must also record the amount of
commission and how it has been accounted to the client. Such record
can be in the form of a client letter or bill of costs. Records must be kept
for six years from the date the record is made.
(5) Client information
(5) Where a firm recommends a contract of insurance to a client, the firm
must inform the client whether the firm has given advice on the basis of
a ‘fair analysis’ of a sufficiently large number of insurance contracts
available on the market to enable the firm to make a recommendation
in accordance with professional criteria regarding which contract of
insurance would be adequate to meet the client’s needs. It is not a
requirement that a firm conducts a fair analysis of the market.
(5) If the firm does not conduct a fair analysis of the market, the firm must:
(a) advise the client whether the firm is contractually obliged to
conduct insurance mediation activities only with one or more
insurance undertakings;
(b) advise the client that the client can request details of the
insurance undertakings the firm selects from or deals with in
relation to the contract of insurance provided; and
(c) provide the client with such details on request.
(6) Suitability of insurance policy
(6) Before a firm recommends a contract of insurance the firm must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the recommendation is suitable to the
client’s demands and needs by:
(a) considering relevant information already held;
(b) obtaining details of any relevant existing insurance;
(c) identifying the client’s requirements and explaining to the client
what the client needs to disclose;
(d) assessing whether the level of cover is sufficient for the risks that
the client wishes to insure; and
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(e) considering the relevance of any exclusions, excesses, limitations
or conditions.
(f) The policy summary provided by the insurer will assist in complying
with this requirement.
(7) Demands and needs statements
(7) When a firm recommends or arranges insurance then before the
contract is finalised the client must be provided with a statement that:
(a) sets out the client’s demands and needs on the basis of the
information provided by the client;
(b) where a recommendation has been made, explains the reason for
recommending that contract of insurance;
(c) reflects the complexity of the insurance contract being proposed;
(g) The Demands and Needs Statements provided by insurers are not
sufficient to enable compliance with this requirement of the Law Society
rules. Because the firm is conducting insurance mediation activities
directly with the client it is the firm that needs to provide the most
detailed demands and needs statement. Insurers will only have provided
generic statements not specific to the individual client’s situation.
(8) Complaints
(8) Solicitors are regulated by the Law Society. Complaints relating to
solicitors and insurance are therefore governed by the mechanisms
already required by the Law Society.
(8) Complaints relating to the insurer or intermediary will be governed by
the FSA where the insurer and intermediary is authorised and regulated
by the FSA. If the insurer is not UK based then it will be governed by
rules applicable to its domicile and not by the FSA.
G Providers of after the event insurance
[212]–[220] The number of providers of this class of insurance continues to
change. The list contained in the October 2008 edition of Litigation Funding,
published by the Law Society runs to 35 providers. Further advice on providers
can be obtained through insurance brokers, by reference to Litigation Funding
(Law Society Publications) and to the website: www.thejudge.co.uk.
XII Risk assessment
A Risk, costs and profit
[221] Whatever method of risk assessment is to be used, consideration needs
to be given to the purposes which the assessment is designed to serve. The
relationship between risk, the cost of litigating and ultimately the profitability
of the work needs to be understood. There is a common interest between the
client, the insurer and the litigation practice in assessing the risks involved in
bringing and continuing the case.
Client need
[222] Risk assessment is based upon a methodical examination of the case
being presented to the lawyer by the client. The claimant client may or may not
be clear as to the real objective of the proposed litigation. Equally the
defendant client may or may not be clear as to the basis upon which a
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settlement may be sought or the reasoning behind insisting on trial. Assessment
in terms of the risk factors involved in the individual case and the necessary
fact investigation and information gathering needed for that analysis provides
an illumination for the client which better enables the lawyer to meet the needs
of the client. Whilst good interviewing will lead to a sound grasp of client
expectation, the process of risk analysis enables that initial position to be
evaluated in terms of achievability, time and cost. Advice to the client
presented as a result of a risk analysis will be instructive in explaining the legal
context of the case and enable an informed decision to be taken as to its future
conduct. If the case now is ready for negotiation the information marshalled
during the analysis will be readily available for a sound negotiation plan.
Negotiation planning
[223] Fisher and Ury1 maintain that at the heart of successful legal negotia-
tion lies the BATNA. A risk analysis will enable a realistic view to be taken as
to what is the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement and will avoid the
common problem of assumptions being made as to the available options. If
you know the risks involved in trial, a realistic appraisal can be made of any
offer to settle and of the opportunity for making an offer to settle, be that as
claimant or defendant.
1 Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, (New York, Penguin, 1983).
Lawyer needs
[224] The usefulness of risk analysis is by no means confined to conditional
fee agreement (CFA) work. Nonetheless, in this funding field an accurate
assessment of the chances of success is essential for the viability of this category
of work. A risk assessment will enable a refinement of the definition of success
to be made. The definition of success lies at the centre of a CFA and indeed the
viability of this funding mechanism. Without properly investigating client
objectives no sensible agreement can be reached as to what success means for
the funding agreement. Once that assessment has been made it also serves the
purpose of setting the success fee and ensuring the viability of the work. In
cases where the success fee becomes recoverable from the other side it will also
serve to fend off the losing side’s attack on the level of fee. (See AJA 1999, s 271
which inserts s 58A into the CLSA 19902: in force from 1 April 2000).
1 See para [1011].
2 See para [1003].
Insurer’s needs
[225] Insurance products are available to provide cover for other side’s costs
if the case is run on a CFA. Products also provide cover for both sides’ costs
in conventionally funded cases. The essence of such cover is the risk of the case
failing. The risk assessment process of the client’s own lawyer will enable a
clear picture for the insurer and enable a realistic assessment to be made of the
level of costs involved and the appropriate premium level to be set. The level
of case presentation and analysis displayed to insurers does have an influence
on the decisions made in individual cases.
Risk assessment [225]
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[226] The new litigation funding regime places great emphasis on a cost
benefit approach and the ratio of costs, including any success fee and insurance
premium, to quantum must be a major consideration. The Community Legal
Service approach to cost benefit is to link the prediction of success with the
ratio of costs to quantum. Thus where the prediction is 50–60% the predicted
damages must be at least double the predicted costs. Under a CFA with a
success fee the concern must be that the level of costs is not so disproportionate
to the damages as to make it likely that costs will be disallowed in part. The
strict CLS ratios may be viewed here as inappropriate.
B Principles of risk assessment
[227] It is the uncertainty involved in litigation which creates the need for a
risk assessment and it is the uncertainties which are being assessed.
Risk headings
[228] We will examine risk assessment as to:
– the facts;
– the law;
– the client;
– the opponent;
– the procedure;
– the costs.
The factual uncertainty
[229] In many, but not all cases, there will be factual uncertainties which can
affect the likelihood of success. ‘The facts’ refers to two levels – direct facts and
inferred facts. Did the barrel fall out of the window? is a question of direct fact
– why did it fall? may well be a matter for inference. [Did it fall due to the
defendant’s negligence is the ultimate inferential fact]. Uncertainty can arise at
the direct level but it often arises at the second, inferential level. An analysis
aims to throw up these factual uncertainties so that a view can be taken as to
how to remove or minimise the uncertainty or proceed with the uncertainty.
In order to arrive at the uncertainties it is necessary to extract the factual issues
from the materials available.
[230]–[240] In addition to the distinction between direct facts and inferential
facts there will be at least FOUR categories of fact:
• Facts known to the client which support your case – CF;
• Facts known to the client which are adverse to your case – CU;
• Facts which are not yet known but which would be favourable – OF;
and
• Facts which are not known but which would be unfavourable – OU.
An analysis can then be made against the facts in issue showing what evidence
there is and is not, where it comes from and whether it is favourable or not.
Fact analysis form
[241]
KEY: CF favourable facts known to your client CU unfavourable facts
known to your client
[226] Litigation Funding
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OF favourable facts known to opponent OU unfavourable facts known to
opponent
? facts as yet unknown
Claimant Evidence Fact in Issue Defendant Evidence
[242] The legal action will set out the facts which must be established – the
facts in issue. Thus s 2 (1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 –
‘Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made
to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if
the person making the representation would be liable to damages in respect thereof
had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable
notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he
proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the
contract was made that the facts represented were true.’
[243] Here the facts in issue are –
• Contract;
• Misrepresentation;
• By a party;
• Loss; and
• Lack of reasonable grounds.
[For the reference to fraud see uncertainty in law below]
Against each we can now assess the evidence and it would be possible to
express confidence levels by a percentage figure. This goes a long way to
satisfying the requirement of a written assessment when entering a CFA.
Proving the facts
[244] It is necessary, and now possible, to assess how these facts can be
proved. When that is looked at the area of uncertainty will arise in the nature
of the method of proof and any evidence on either side already to hand. The
areas of uncertainty build up a picture which enables an assessment to be made
of the objective of the client and the chances of success. It will highlight
graphically where the gaps are and where the work needs to be done. Thus,
consideration can be given to the source and reliability of evidence, be it
documentary, oral or expert. Establishing the facts piece by piece will throw up
inconsistencies between evidence addressing the same fact and conflicts in the
evidence of the opposing parties. Again this is essential analysis in order to
assess the case.
Contributory negligence
[245] A further illustration of the effects of findings of fact comes from
contributory negligence. Given a case where it is known that the defendant will
raise contributory negligence, a risk assessment can show the effect on
outcome of a particular finding. It cannot show how likely the finding is – that
will always be the area for professional judgment. The costs of the case set
against the various outcomes will again place a value on the risk attached to
the case going to trial.
[246] Example –
Risk assessment [246]
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Assuming loss of £20,000 can be proved
Contrib Neg Effect on Damages Likelihood of finding
Nil 20,000 5%
25% 15,000 25%
50% 10,000 50%
75% 5,000 20%
[247] The client would be advised if offered £5,000 that there was a very
good chance of recovering more – indeed in this example an 80% chance. Were
there to be an offer of £10,000 the advice changes since there is only a 30%
chance of beating it.
The above table can be used to reflect the possibility of an overestimate of the
likelihood factor. Suppose it were only 35% likely that the judge will find 50%
contributory negligence and 30% likely that it will be found to be 75%. We
then get:
Contrib neg Effect on Damages Likelihood
Nil 20,000 5%
25% 15,000 25%
50% 10,000 35%
75% 5,000 35%
Here the change is not dramatic. At £5,000 there is still a 65% chance of a
better outcome. At £10,000 there is still only a 30% chance of a better
outcome.
Looked at another way, how wrong does the calculation have to be before the
risk changes dramatically, a good indication of the value of the risk in the
litigation.
The uncertainty in the law
[248] Assuming the facts are clear and can be proved, do they establish a legal
action? Would a judge agree? Why will the other side not agree?
[249] Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 serves as a good
example where uncertainty in the law can affect the risk assessment. Until
Royscott Trust Ltd v Rogerson1 it was unclear what was meant by the
reference to fraud. This had serious implications for quantum. On the facts of
that case it was possible to see the effects of the law being decided in each of
the possible ways and for a risk assessment to show that effect which could
then influence settlement were that to have been a possibility.
The area of damages is fertile ground for uncertainty savagely affecting the risk
assessment. Consider for example Swingcastle Ltd v Alistair Gibson2, Banque
Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd3, South Australia Asset
Management v York Montague4 and Lloyds Bank plc v Parker Bullen (a firm)5
all of which concern professional negligence and the value of land. See also
Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth6.
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Again, in these cases the risk assessment can be done to show the effects on the
claimant’s case of the various decisions on the law that could have been made.
At that stage some assessment has to be made as to the likelihood of one
decision rather than another and clearly that is a matter for judgment. But, the
isolation of that factor and its implications for the client are hugely useful for
decision-making and especially in identifying prospects of settlement. The
other side is faced with the same uncertainty when it comes to the law – the
difference will be the degree of likelihood which each side’s lawyers are
prepared to put on a favourable decision. In most cases each side will have a
view that the prospects of success are favourable reflecting the difference in
view as to the law.
Putting aside cases where one or even both of the parties wants a court to
decide the law (test case situation), the true value of the case going to trial can
be arrived at by seeing the area of difference in outcome according to each
possible finding on the law. That value is what is at risk should the case
proceed to trial.
1 [1991] 2 QB 297, [1991] 3 All ER 294, CA.
2 [1991] 2 AC 223, [1991] 2 All ER 353, HL.
3 [1995] QB 375, [1995] 2 All ER 769, CA.
4 [1997] AC 191, [1996] 3 All ER 365, HL.
5 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep PN 51, [1999] EGCS 107.
6 [1994] 3 All ER 801, [1994] 1 WLR 650, CA; revsd [1996] AC 344, [1995] 3 All ER 268, HL.
Client risk
[250]–[260] Risk assessment must include an assessment of the client.
Assessment includes the client’s commitment to the case, potential as a witness
and whether the sympathy factor is likely to be positive or negative, why the
client has decided to see a solicitor, have they seen another solicitor(s) already,
are they the aggrieved or a relative of a deceased victim? Are they able to give
a clear account of events? Do they add to their story at a later date? Do they
contradict themselves? What is the level of their expectation as to outcome?
Have they responded to advice or requests for further information? How
emotionally involved in the case are they? Must they have ‘their day in court’?
Do they want revenge over the defendant/person they see as responsible? If the
case reaches a trial, to what extent is the case dependent on the acceptance of
the clients’ version of events?
Note – the requirement to give a written assessment to the client when entering
a CFA may cause some difficulty here. If the client is being taken on
notwithstanding reservations about the client themselves, any recorded risk
assessment ought to reflect that.
Opponent risk
[261] Assessing the other side in terms of solvency is likely to be standard.
This should be reviewed periodically for the obvious reason that the client will
receive nothing from the action against an insolvent defendant and the CFA
will leave the solicitor unpaid if the client is unable to pay. The reputation of
the other side, particularly as a litigant may be of importance as indeed may
the reputation of those representing them. In clinical negligence cases the
Risk assessment [261]
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individual medical practitioner may have from no part to play to a very central
part in the litigation decisions. It may be obvious that the other side is going
to be difficult and therefore costly to deal with. The unrepresented opponent
is likely to add to the time needed to proceed with the case.
Procedural risk
[262] Limitation periods are the firm favourite here but the Pre-action
protocols and indeed the whole of the CPR may hold traps for the unwary.
With the protocols consideration needs to be given to the time period for
completion and the time remaining. Part 36 provides a staging point for
reassessing risk. The use of summary judgment and issues of security for costs
as well as statutory defences will feature in insolvency litigation.
Cost risk
[263] Even outside of conditional fee agreements, the cost risk is a factor to
be assessed. Meeting the costs of pre-action protocols and fact investigation
including potentially the need for experts raises questions for the client and the
solicitor which may well have a bearing on the viability of the case for
litigation. Proportionality of costs and the use and effect of Part 36 offers are
the new regime in this respect. With recoverability of insurance premiums and
the success fee comes the need to assess the suitability of the funding
mechanism CFA or other and the awareness of the ability of a losing opponent
to challenge the recoverability.
Further elements of risk analysis
Theory of the case
[264] With the evidence and assertions available, what explanation(s) best
deals with the material in a way which achieves the client objective?
The material may, certainly early on, suggest more than one theory, but there
is a danger in proceeding with conflicting theories. Far better to proceed with
a chosen theory and be prepared to abandon it later. Equally in the early stages
it is important to keep open the possibilities for fresh theories.
The theory chosen will have an effect on the investigation and the formulation
of negotiation strategy, the making of Part 36 offers and right through to trial
advocacy. The selection of evidence, the preparation of questions, the whole
tenor of the case will wholly differ according to which of the theories you
selected. Use of a theory also leads to effective analysis by seeing the evidence
found as either in line with the theory or not. If not, then the decision has to
made to proceed without the evidence or to reformulate the theory.
Equally crucial is the need to consider the theory of the case form the point of
view of the opponent.
Analysing the evidence
[265] There will be critical stages throughout the litigation process at which
an analysis of the evidence is vital. At first interview the purpose is to look for
facts and assertions which suggest possible hypotheses. Prior to a Part 36 offer
there will have to be a very firm hypothesis to put to the other side with a clear
assessment of the evidence in support. Again at the time of issue of proceed-
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ings. When information and rebuttal come from the other side there needs to
be a reassessment and finally before trial the purpose is to assess the evidence
for trial performance.
At each stage the purpose of analysis must be kept in mind and the amount and
quality of the evidence will vary over time so that the exercise is not a repeat
but a true re-appraisal with new material.
At each stage there must be a formulation or re-formulation of a theory of the
case and a careful analysis of the evidence in the light of the theory.
The analysis is to a great extent a matter of information control and its
mechanics are dealt with below. However, it is worth stating here that the
analysis will as the stages go on increasingly include an evaluation exercise,
that is, some estimate of how well the evidence will achieve its purpose at the
relevant stage. The answer in evaluation at first interview needs only to be in
terms of generating initial hypotheses and routes for investigation, whereas
before trial the field has narrowed in terms of hypotheses and it is necessary to
evaluate the likely effect of the evidence on the trier of fact.
Information control
[266] A systematic approach to the evidence and the facts in issue will lead to
an orderly analysis of the evidence at the various stages and the on-going
appraisal of the theory of the case.
Each piece of evidence, and indeed each question asked, must aim at a fact in
issue. A chart can be drawn up which allocates evidence, favourable and not,
to the facts in issue which arise in the case. Gaps can be immediately seen and
inconsistencies either between own evidence or between it and the other side
will become clear. The litigator will know what they know and know what
they do not.
Claimant evidence Fact in issue Def Evidence
List nature and source
and gaps
See cause of action eg
s 2(1) Misrep Act
Nature/source and
gaps
Facts may be known/unknown, proved or yet to be proved.
Weighting the risk
[267] Using a mathematical basis for risk assessment is popular but it carries
with it the danger, that by allotting a number and then adding to and
subtracting from it, an appearance of precision or objectivity is given to what
is in reality a subjective process.
The basis of risk assessment here then is to try to predict someone else’s de-
cision and evaluation of the evidence in terms of these expressions of
confidence1.
1 See paras [64]–[69].
Chance for settlement
[268] Litigators assess risk, by whatever method they use, with a view to trial.
That is, they are assessing the prospects of success on the assumption that the
Risk assessment [268]
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case goes to trial. It is true that the vast majority of cases do not go to trial but
the assessment must be in terms of trial because all cases have a potential for
trial and settlement depends upon preparedness to go to trial.
Whilst preparedness to go to trial may be an attitude of mind, risk assessing a
case in terms of its prospects for settlement and establishing what is needed for
settlement is a valid activity albeit under the CPR the decisions regarding trial
may arrive quickly. The factors which affect success at trial will overlap with
those giving a successful settlement but the latter will require other factors to
be considered which the process of negotiation demands.
The factors affecting the chance of settlement are –
(A) State of the law
(B) State of the evidence
(C) Value of possible recovery
(D) Legal costs
Each side will have a view on A, B and C which is likely to differ and which
will not be disclosed to the other side. It is more probable that the estimate of
costs will be similar.
From that it is argued that A and B amount to the probability that liability will
be imposed. C gives the value of the claim and D needs to be estimated right
through to trial.
Where the costs exceed the difference in values given by the parties then
objectively there ought to be a settlement.
What causes a case to go to trial?
[269] Other than the test case exception, the litigants’ confidence, the
perceived value of the claim and an information balance are critical factors.
The confidence which each litigant has in a favourable outcome should the
case go to trial is clearly going to be a major influence over whether it does
actually reach the court. That level of confidence can be represented in
percentage terms and often risk assessment is reduced in that way. Whether or
not such a method is effective, it is useful for illustrating the effect of
confidence on this crucial question of what makes a case go to trial.
0% 50% 100%
Where the parties each have levels of confidence which are similar it is less
likely to settle. Where the parties are at either end of the scale from each other,
the pressure will be high to settle. In other words, where the parties roughly
agree on the strength of the case there will be settlement.
Cases where the ruling of the court is sought by one or both for future cases
clearly do not fit this model.
Perceived value
[270]–[280] As might be expected, a similar analysis may be made of the
perceived value placed on the case by each party. The costs associated with
trial and the potential for liability on costs makes sense only in the context of
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the value of the case to the party concerned. Where the parties put similar
values on the case that is conducive to settlement. Where there is a wide
divergence with the claimant’s view much higher than defendant there is less
likely to be settlement. Again, in preparing for negotiation, this factor must be
kept in mind.
Information balance
[281] The bird’s eye view of the cases not likely to settle suggest that the
parties do not have the same information. This situation is common and is
likely to lead to trial because one of the parties has an erroneous view. The
problem is that neither party has the bird’s eye view – they can only have their
own view. Again, in the preparation for negotiation which ought to take place
consideration needs to be given to this analysis. It is an example of risk
assessing settlement as opposed to trial. It may be that where the case is
subjected to a Case Management Conference the bird’s eye view will be
disclosed and the work on settlement can proceed more effectively.
C Risk assessment template
[282]–[300]
Fact Law
Client Opponent
Costs Procedure
Theory of the Case
D Risk factors
[301] The uncertainties in litigation have been classified above into six areas
– Fact, Law, Client, Opponent, Procedure and Costs from which a list of
factors can be produced against which a case can be analysed. Whichever
factor list is used (or both may be used in the case of personal injury in each
case), a profile of the case can be built by ranking the factors in order of
importance to the case. Having ranked the factors it will be clear as to where,
at the time the particular assessment is being made, where the work has to be
done. Thus, for example, if there were serious doubt as to the solvency of the
opponent steps would have to be taken to address that factor before work and
costs are put into other factors.
Factor lists can be constructed for any field of litigation. The method to be
adopted in using them will be the same and is explained below.
Fact in issue factor list for personal injury
[302] This is a fact in issue factor list for personal injury:
(1) Duty of care owed to claimant
(2) Identity of party owing duty to claimant
(3) Question of law involved in duty of care
(4) Standard of care
(5) Contributory negligence
(6) Independent witness
(7) Documentary evidence
Risk assessment [302]
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(8) Solvency of opponent
(9) Likely performance of client as a witness
(10) Reputation of the defendant
(11) More than one prospective defendant
(12) Quantum in relation to costs
(13) Need for expert evidence
(14) Limitation period
(15) Causation in fact
(16) Injury reported
(17) Medical assistance given
(18) Evidence of quantum
Factor list for non-personal injury civil claim
[303] This is a fact in issue factor list for a non-personal injury civil claim:
(1) Dependency on oral evidence of fact
(2) Available documents own side
(3) Available documents other side
(4) Limitation period
(5) Client’s potential as a witness
(6) Arguable question of law
(7) Assessment of damages (Quantum)
(8) Solvency of opponent
(9) Ratio of costs to recovery value
(10) Chances of settlement
(11) Liability likely to be insured
(12) Client wants ‘day in court’
(13) Number of alleged wrongs/breaches
(14) Causation
(15) Mitigation
(16) Need for expert evidence
(17) Reputation of opponent
(18) Realism of client’s case
Applying the factor lists – Individual Factor List
Ranking instructions
[304] In the table below rank the factors from the factor lists by putting the
number corresponding to the chosen factor into the TOP box if it is the top
choice and into the BOTTOM box if it is the last choice. This exercise is then
repeated a further 8 times giving a total of 9 top and 9 bottom choices.
Example: If it is decided that the top factor is existence of documents and the
least relevant factor is level of emotion the number 4 is put into the TOP box
and the number 10 into the BOTTOM box for ranking round one. The
exercise is then repeated with the remaining factors until all 9 rounds are
complete.
Ranking round Top Bottom
1
2
3
[302] Litigation Funding
E-174 BCS • Issue 96
0172 [ST: 3] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 15:59:30 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0002] 0
45
6
7
8
9
Analysis
[305] The profile in terms of the most significant features at this stage and,
therefore, the features which will require work, is given in the first five factors
as ranked. This kind of profile will always benefit from the Theory of the Case
technique1.
1 See para [264].
Weighting the risk
[306] Whenever an expression of confidence is to be made the risk analysis is
used to highlight exactly what factors it is which have been considered in
arriving at that level of confidence. Where there is no information about a
factor eg, solvency, the expression of confidence must reflect that lack of
knowledge. The final expression is to some extent then subjective to the
individual litigator. It is important to recognise that the profile created will
vary from litigator to litigator and that it is a reflection of how the individual
litigator will run the litigation.
Confidence level
[307]–[1000] This sheet is to be completed after the ranking sheet has been
completed
From the ranking sheet enter the top 5 factors in the left hand column and give
a % to each to reflect your confidence in that factor.
Factor Confidence level %
Total % divided by 5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Success Fee
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Composite Legal Expenses
80e (DAS)
Risk assessment [307]
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First Assist Insurance Services
First Legal Indemnity
Free Claim IDC
Funding & Insurance Solutions
LawAssist/Litigation Protection
Litco Partnership
Lowton Ellenbrook
M Young legal Associates
National Accident Helpline
QLP
Saturn Professional Risks
Solicitors Services
Solicitors Support Services
Stirling Financial
Temple Legal Protection
[307] Litigation Funding
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Litigation Funding Materials
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COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT 1990
1990 Chapter 41
Miscellaneous
[1001]
58 [previous version]
(1) In this section “a conditional fee agreement” means an agreement in writing
between a person providing advocacy or litigation services and his client which—
(a) does not relate to proceedings of a kind mentioned in subsection (10);
(b) provides for that person’s fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be
payable only in specified circumstances;
(c) complies with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of State; and
(d) is not a contentious business agreement (as defined by section 59 of the
Solicitors Act 1974).
(2) Where a conditional fee agreement provides for the amount of any fees to which
it applies to be increased, in specified circumstances, above the amount which would
be payable if it were not a conditional fee agreement, it shall specify the percentage by
which that amount is to be increased.
(3) Subject to subsection (6), a conditional fee agreement which relates to specified
proceedings shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a conditional fee
agreement.
(4) In this section ‘specified proceedings’ means proceedings of a description specified
by order made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of subsection (3).
(5) Any such order shall prescribe the maximum permitted percentage for each
description of specified proceedings.
(6) An agreement which falls within subsection (2) shall be unenforceable if, at the
time when it is entered into, the percentage specified in the agreement exceeds the
prescribed maximum permitted percentage for the description of proceedings to which
it relates.
(7) Before making any order under this section the Secretary of State shall consult the
designated judges, the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society and such other
authorised bodies (if any) as he considers appropriate.
(8) Where a party to any proceedings has entered into a conditional fee agreement
and a costs order is made in those proceedings in his favour, the costs payable to him
shall not include any element which takes account of any percentage increase payable
under the agreement.
(9) Rules of court may make provision with respect to the taxing of any costs which
include fees payable under a conditional fee agreement.
(10) The proceedings mentioned in subsection (1)(a) are any criminal proceedings
and any proceedings under—
(a) the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;
(b) the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976;
(c) the Adoption Act 1976;
(d) the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978;
(e) sections 1 and 9 of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983;
(f) Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984;
(g) Parts I, II or IV of the Children Act 1989; or
(h) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to children.
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AMENDMENT
Substituted by new ss 58, 58A (set out below), by the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 27(1). Date
in force: 1 April 2000 (with savings in relation to existing cases): see SI 2000/774, arts 2(b), 5 and
SI 2000/900, art 2.
[1002]
[58 Conditional fee agreements
(1) A conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it
by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a
conditional fee agreement; but (subject to subsection (5)) any other conditional fee
agreement shall be unenforceable.
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 58A—
(a) a conditional fee agreement is an agreement with a person providing
advocacy or litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or
any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances; and
(b) a conditional fee agreement provides for a success fee if it provides for the
amount of any fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified
circumstances, above the amount which would be payable if it were not
payable only in specified circumstances.
(3) The following conditions are applicable to every conditional fee agreement—
(a) it must be in writing;
(b) it must not relate to proceedings which cannot be the subject of an
enforceable conditional fee agreement; and
(c) it must comply with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the
[Lord Chancellor].
(4) The following further conditions are applicable to a conditional fee agreement
which provides for a success fee—
(a) it must relate to proceedings of a description specified by order made by
the [Lord Chancellor];
(b) it must state the percentage by which the amount of the fees which would
be payable if it were not a conditional fee agreement is to be increased; and
(c) that percentage must not exceed the percentage specified in relation to the
description of proceedings to which the agreement relates by order made
by the [Lord Chancellor].
(5) If a conditional fee agreement is an agreement to which section 57 of the
Solicitors Act 1974 (non-contentious business agreements between solicitor and client)
applies, subsection (1) shall not make it unenforceable.]
AMENDMENT
Substituted together with s 58A, for s 58 as originally enacted, by the Access to Justice Act
1999, s 27(1). Date in force: 1 April 2000 (with savings in relation to existing cases): see SI
2000/774, arts 2(b), 5 and SI 2000/900, art 2. Sub-s (3): in para (c) words “Lord Chancellor” in
square brackets substituted by SI 2005/3429, art 8, Schedule, para 2. Date in force: 12 January
2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2). Sub-s (4): in paras (a), (c) words “Lord Chancellor” in square
brackets substituted by SI 2005/3429, art 8, Schedule, para 2. Date in force: 12 January 2006: see
SI 2005/3429, art 1(2).
[1001] Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58
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[1003]
[58A Conditional fee agreements: supplementary
(1) The proceedings which cannot be the subject of an enforceable conditional fee
agreement are—
(a) criminal proceedings, apart from proceedings under section 82 of the
Environmental Protection Act 1990; and
(b) family proceedings.
(2) In subsection (1) ‘family proceedings’ means proceedings under any one or more
of the following—
(a) the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;
[(b) the Adoption and Children Act 2002;]
(c) the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978;
(d) Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984;
(e) Parts I, II and IV of the Children Act 1989;
( f ) [Parts 4 and 4A] of the Family Law Act 1996; . . .
[(fa) Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (proceedings for
dissolution etc of civil partnership);
(fb) Schedule 5 to the 2004 Act (financial relief in the High Court or a county
court etc);
(fc) Schedule 6 to the 2004 Act (financial relief in magistrates’ courts etc);
(fd) Schedule 7 to the 2004 Act (financial relief in England and Wales after
overseas dissolution etc of a civil partnership); and]
(g) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to children.
(3) The requirements which the [Lord Chancellor] may prescribe under
section 58(3)(c)—
(a) include requirements for the person providing advocacy or litigation
services to have provided prescribed information before the agreement is
made; and
(b) may be different for different descriptions of conditional fee agreements
(and, in particular, may be different for those which provide for a success
fee and those which do not).
(4) In section 58 and this section (and in the definitions of ‘advocacy services’ and
‘litigation services’ as they apply for their purposes) ‘proceedings’ includes any sort of
proceedings for resolving disputes (and not just proceedings in a court), whether
commenced or contemplated.
(5) Before making an order under section 58(4), the [Lord Chancellor] shall
consult—
(a) the designated judges;
(b) the General Council of the Bar;
(c) the Law Society; and
(d) such other bodies as he considers appropriate.
(6) A costs order made in any proceedings may, subject in the case of court
proceedings to rules of court, include provision requiring the payment of any fees
payable under a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee.
(7) Rules of court may make provision with respect to the assessment of any costs
which include fees payable under a conditional fee agreement (including one which
provides for a success fee).]
AMENDMENT
Substituted together with s 58, for s 58 as originally enacted, by the Access to Justice Act
1999, s 27(1). Date in force: 1 April 2000 (with savings in relation to existing cases): see SI
2000/774, arts 2(b), 5 and SI 2000/900, art 2.
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58A [1003]
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Sub-s (2): para (b) substituted by the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 139(1), Sch 3,
para 80. Date in force: 30 December 2005: see SI 2005/2213, art 2(o); for transitional provisions
see the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 139(2), Sch 4, para 22. In para ( f ) words in square
brackets substituted by the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, s 3(1), Sch 2, Pt 1,
para 2. Date in force: 25 November 2008: see SI 2008/2779, art 2(c). In para ( f ) word omitted
repealed by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 261(1), (4), Sch 27, para 138, Sch 30. Date in force:
5 December 2005: see SI 2005/3175, art 2(2), (6). Paras (fa)–(fd) inserted by the Civil Partnership
Act 2004, s 261(1), Sch 27, para 138. Date in force: 5 December 2005: see SI 2005/3175,
art 2(2).
Sub-s (3): words “Lord Chancellor” in square brackets substituted by SI 2005/3429, art 8,
Schedule, para 2. Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2).
Sub-s (5): words “Lord Chancellor” in square brackets substituted by SI 2005/3429, art 8,
Schedule, para 2. Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2).
[1003.1]
[58AA Damages-based agreements relating to employment matters
(1) A damages-based agreement which relates to an employment matter and satisfies
the conditions in subsection (4) is not unenforceable by reason only of its being a
damages-based agreement.
(2) But a damages-based agreement which relates to an employment matter and does
not satisfy those conditions is unenforceable.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) a damages-based agreement is an agreement between a person providing
advocacy services, litigation services or claims management services and
the recipient of those services which provides that—
(i) the recipient is to make a payment to the person providing the
services if the recipient obtains a specified financial benefit in
connection with the matter in relation to which the services are
provided, and
(ii) the amount of that payment is to be determined by reference to the
amount of the financial benefit obtained;
(b) a damages-based agreement relates to an employment matter if the matter
in relation to which the services are provided is a matter that is, or could
become, the subject of proceedings before an employment tribunal.
(4) The agreement—
(a) must be in writing;
(b) must not provide for a payment above a prescribed amount or for a
payment above an amount calculated in a prescribed manner;
(c) must comply with such other requirements as to its terms and conditions as
are prescribed; and
(d) must be made only after the person providing services under the agreement
has provided prescribed information.
(5) Regulations under subsection (4) are to be made by the Lord Chancellor and may
make different provision in relation to different descriptions of agreements.
(6) Before making regulations under subsection (4) the Lord Chancellor must
consult—
(a) the designated judges,
(b) the General Council of the Bar,
(c) the Law Society, and
(d) such other bodies as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate.
(7) In this section—
[1003] Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58A
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“payment” includes a transfer of assets and any other transfer of money’s worth
(and the reference in subsection (4)(b) to a payment above a prescribed amount,
or above an amount calculated in a prescribed manner, is to be construed
accordingly);
“claims management services” has the same meaning as in Part 2 of
the Compensation Act 2006 (see section 4(2) of that Act).
(8) Nothing in this section applies to an agreement entered into before the coming
into force of the first regulations made under subsection (4).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 154(1), (2). Date in force: 12 November
2009: see the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 182(1)(e).
[1004]–[1010]
[58B Litigation funding agreements
(1) A litigation funding agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it
by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a
litigation funding agreement.
(2) For the purposes of this section a litigation funding agreement is an agreement
under which—
(a) a person (‘the funder’) agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of
advocacy or litigation services (by someone other than the funder) to
another person (‘the litigant’); and
(b) the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder in specified circumstances.
(3) The following conditions are applicable to a litigation funding agreement—
(a) the funder must be a person, or person of a description, prescribed by the
[Lord Chancellor];
(b) the agreement must be in writing;
(c) the agreement must not relate to proceedings which by virtue of
section 58A(1) and (2) cannot be the subject of an enforceable conditional
fee agreement or to proceedings of any such description as may be
prescribed by the [Lord Chancellor];
(d) the agreement must comply with such requirements (if any) as may be so
prescribed;
(e) the sum to be paid by the litigant must consist of any costs payable to him
in respect of the proceedings to which the agreement relates together with
an amount calculated by reference to the funder’s anticipated expenditure
in funding the provision of the services; and
( f ) that amount must not exceed such percentage of that anticipated
expenditure as may be prescribed by the [Lord Chancellor] in relation to
proceedings of the description to which the agreement relates.
(4) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) may require a person to be approved by the
[Lord Chancellor] or by a prescribed person.
(5) The requirements which the [Lord Chancellor] may prescribe under subsection
(3)(d)—
(a) include requirements for the funder to have provided prescribed
information to the litigant before the agreement is made; and
(b) may be different for different descriptions of litigation funding agreements.
(6) In this section (and in the definitions of ‘advocacy services’ and ‘litigation
services’ as they apply for its purposes) ‘proceedings’ includes any sort of proceedings
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58B [1004]
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for resolving disputes (and not just proceedings in a court), whether commenced or
contemplated.
(7) Before making regulations under this section, the [Lord Chancellor] shall
consult—
(a) the designated judges;
(b) the General Council of the Bar;
(c) the Law Society; and
(d) such other bodies as he considers appropriate.
(8) A costs order made in any proceedings may, subject in the case of court
proceedings to rules of court, include provision requiring the payment of any amount
payable under a litigation funding agreement.
(9) Rules of court may make provision with respect to the assessment of any costs
which include fees payable under a litigation funding agreement.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 28. Date in force: to be appointed: see the Access
to Justice Act 1999, s 108(1). Sub-s (3): in paras (a), (c), ( f ) words “Lord Chancellor” in square
brackets substituted by the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 28 (as amended by SI 2005/3429, art 8,
Schedule, para 4(b)). Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2). Sub-s (4): words
“Lord Chancellor” in square brackets substituted by the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 28 (as
amended by SI 2005/3429, art 8, Schedule, para 4(b)). Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI
2005/3429, art 1(2). Sub-s (5): words “Lord Chancellor” in square brackets substituted by the
Access to Justice Act 1999, s 28 (as amended by SI 2005/3429, art 8, Schedule, para 4(b)). Date
in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2). Sub-s (7): words “Lord Chancellor” in
square brackets substituted by the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 28 (as amended by SI 2005/3429,
art 8, Schedule, para 4(b)). Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2).
[1004] Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58B
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 1999
1999 Chapter 22
[1011]
27 Conditional fee agreements
Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 substituted by new ss 58 and
58A: see E[1002], E[1003].
[1012]
28 Litigation funding agreements
Inserts new s 58B in the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
[1013]–[1020]
30 Recovery where body undertakes to meet costs liabilities
(1) This section applies where a body of a prescribed description undertakes to meet
(in accordance with arrangements satisfying prescribed conditions) liabilities which
members of the body or other persons who are parties to proceedings may incur to pay
the costs of other parties to the proceedings.
(2) If in any of the proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any of the members
or other persons, the costs payable to him may, subject to subsection (3) and (in the
case of court proceedings) to rules of court, include an additional amount in respect of
any provision made by or on behalf of the body in connection with the proceedings
against the risk of having to meet such liabilities.
(3) But the additional amount shall not exceed a sum determined in a prescribed
manner; and there may, in particular, be prescribed as a manner of determination one
which takes into account the likely cost to the member or other person of the premium
of an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability to pay the costs of other
parties to the proceedings.
(4) In this section ‘prescribed’ means prescribed by regulations made by the [Lord
Chancellor] by statutory instrument; and a statutory instrument containing such
regulations shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House
of Parliament.
(5) Regulations under subsection (1) may, in particular, prescribe as a description of
body one which is for the time being approved by the [Lord Chancellor] or by a
prescribed person.
Amendments Sub-ss (4), (5): words “Lord Chancellor” in square brackets substituted by SI
2005/3429, art 8, Schedule, para 4(c). Date in force: 12 January 2006: see SI 2005/3429, art 1(2).
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SI 1995/1674
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER 1995
DATE IN FORCE:
5 July 1995. Revoked by SI 1998/1860, art 2 as from 30 July 1998: see SI 1998/1860, art 1(1).
[1021]–[1030]
1 Citation and commencement
This Order may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 and shall
come into force on the day after the day on which it was made.
2 Specified proceedings
(1) The proceedings specified for the purpose of section 58(4) of the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990 (conditional fee agreements in respect of specified proceedings
not to be unenforceable) are the following: –
(a) proceedings in which there is a claim for damages in respect of personal
injuries or in respect of a person’s death, and ‘personal injuries’ includes
any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition;
(b) proceedings in England and Wales by a company which is being wound up
in England and Wales or Scotland;
(c) proceedings by a company in respect of which an administration
order made under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 is in force;
(d) proceedings in England and Wales by a person acting in the capacity of –
(i) liquidator of a company which is being wound up in England and
Wales or Scotland; or
(ii) trustee of a bankrupt’s estate;
(e) proceedings by a person acting in the capacity of an administrator
appointed pursuant to the provisions of Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986;
(f) proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights established under article 19 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms opened for signature at Rome on 4th November 1950, ratified
by the United Kingdom on 8th March 1951, which came into force on 3rd
August 1953,
provided that the client does not have legal aid in respect of the proceedings.
(2) Proceedings specified in paragraph (1) shall be specified proceedings
notwithstanding that they are concluded without the commencement of court
proceedings.
(3) In paragraphs (1)(b) and (1)(d) ‘company’ means a company within the meaning
of section 735(1) of the Companies Act 1985 or a company which may be wound up
under Part V of the Insolvency Act 1986.
(4) Where legal aid in respect of the proceedings to which a conditional fee
agreement relates is granted after that agreement is entered into the proceedings shall
cease to be specified from the date of the grant.
(5) In this article, ‘legal aid’ means representation under Part IV of the Legal Aid Act
1988.
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3 Maximum permitted percentage increase on fees
For the purpose of section 58(5) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 the
maximum permitted percentage by which fees may be increased in respect of each
description of proceedings specified in article 2 is 100%.
[1021] Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995, art 3
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SI 1995/1675
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS REGULATIONS 1995
DATE IN FORCE:
5 July 1995. Revoked by SI 2000/692, reg 7 as from 1 April 2000: see SI 2000/692, reg 1(2).
[1031]–[1040]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
1995 and shall come into force on the day after the day on which they are made.
(2) In these Regulations –
“agreement”, in relation to an agreement between a legal representative and an
additional legal representative, includes a retainer;
“legal aid” means representation under Part IV of the Legal Aid Act 1988;
“legal representative” means a person providing advocacy or litigation services.
2 Agreements to comply with prescribed requirements
An agreement shall not be a conditional fee agreement unless it complies with the
requirements of the following regulations.
3 Requirements of an agreement
An agreement shall state –
(a) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates (including
whether it relates to any counterclaim, appeal or proceedings to enforce a
judgment or order);
(b) the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and expenses or
part of them are payable;
(c) what, if any, payment is due –
(i) upon partial failure of the specified circumstances to occur;
(ii) irrespective of the specified circumstances occurring; and
(iii) upon termination of the agreement for any reason;
(d) the amount payable in accordance with sub-paragraphs (b) or (c) above or
the method to be used to calculate the amount payable; and in particular
whether or not the amount payable is limited by reference to the amount of
any damages which may be recovered on behalf of the client.
4 Additional requirements
(1) The agreement shall also state that, immediately before it was entered into, the
legal representative drew the client’s attention to the matters specified in paragraph (2).
(2) The matters are –
(a) whether the client might be entitled to legal aid in respect of the
proceedings to which the agreement relates, the conditions upon which
legal aid is available and the application of those conditions to the client in
respect of the proceedings;
(b) the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the fees and
expenses of the legal representative in accordance with the agreement;
(c) the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the costs of any
other party to the proceedings; and
BCS • Issue 96 E-195
0001 [ST: 195] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] (Beg Group) Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:00:22 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0007] 0
(d) the circumstances in which the client may seek taxation of the fees and
expenses of the legal representative and the procedure for so doing.
5 Application of regulation 4
Regulation 4 shall not apply to an agreement between a legal representative and an
additional legal representative.
6 Form of agreement
An agreement shall be in writing and, except in the case of an agreement between a
legal representative and an additional legal representative, shall be signed by the client
and the legal representative.
7 Amendment of agreement
Where it is proposed to extend the agreement to cover further proceedings or parts of
them regulations 3 to 6 shall apply to the agreement as extended.
[1031] Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995, reg 4
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SI 1998/1860
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER 1998
Date in force 30 July 1998. Revoked by SI 2000/823, art 2 as from 1 April 2000: see SI 2000/823,
art 1(1).
[1041]–[1050]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) This Order may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998 and
shall come into force on the day after the day on which it is made.
(2) In this Order ‘the Act’ means the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
2 Revocation of 1995 order
The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 is revoked.
3 Specified proceedings
(1) All proceedings are proceedings specified for the purposes of section 58(3) of the
Act (conditional fee agreements in respect of specified proceedings not to be
unenforceable).
(2) Proceedings specified in paragraph (1) shall be specified proceedings
notwithstanding that they are concluded without the commencement of court
proceedings.
4 Maximum permitted percentage increase on fees
For the purposes of section 58(5) of the Act the maximum permitted percentage by
which fees may be increased in respect of any proceedings designated by article 3 as
proceedings specified for the purposes of section 58(3) of the Act is 100%.
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SI 2000/692
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS REGULATIONS 2000
AMENDMENT
Revoked by SI 2005/2305, reg 2. Date in force: 1 November 2005 (except in relation to a
conditional fee agreement entered into before that date): see SI 2005/2305, regs 1, 3(1).
[1051]–[1060]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
2000.
(2) These Regulations come into force on 1st April 2000.
(3) In these Regulations –
‘client’ includes, except where the context otherwise requires, a person who –
(a) has instructed the legal representative to provide the advocacy or
litigation services to which the conditional fee agreement relates, or
(b) is liable to pay the legal representative’s fees in respect of those
services; and
‘legal representative’ means the person providing the advocacy or litigation
services to which the conditional fee agreement relates.
2 Requirements for contents of conditional fee agreements: general
(1) A conditional fee agreement must specify –
(a) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates (including
whether it relates to any appeal, counterclaim or proceedings to enforce a
judgment or order),
(b) the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and expenses, or
part of them, are payable,
(c) what payment, if any, is due –
(i) if those circumstances only partly occur,
(ii) irrespective of whether those circumstances occur, and
(iii) on the termination of the agreement for any reason, and
(d) the amounts which are payable in all the circumstances and cases specified
or the method to be used to calculate them and, in particular, whether the
amounts are limited by reference to the damages which may be recovered
on behalf of the client.
(2) A conditional fee agreement to which regulation 4 applies must contain a
statement that the requirements of that regulation which apply in the case of that
agreement have been complied with.
3 Requirements for contents of conditional fee agreements providing for success fees
(1) A conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee –
(a) must briefly specify the reasons for setting the percentage increase at the
level stated in the agreement, and
(b) must specify how much of the percentage increase, if any, relates to the cost
to the legal representative of the postponement of the payment of his fees
and expenses.
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(2) If the agreement relates to court proceedings, it must provide that where the
percentage increase becomes payable as a result of those proceedings, then –
(a) if –
(i) any fees subject to the increase are assessed, and
(ii) the legal representative or the client is required by the court to
disclose to the court or any other person the reasons for setting the
percentage increase at the level stated in the agreement,
he may do so,
(b) if –
(i) any such fees are assessed, and
(ii) any amount in respect of the percentage increase is disallowed on the
assessment on the ground that the level at which the increase was set
was unreasonable in view of facts which were or should have been
known to the legal representative at the time it was set,
that amount ceases to be payable under the agreement, unless the court is
satisfied that it should continue to be so payable, and
(c) if –
(i) sub-paragraph (b) does not apply, and
(ii) the legal representative agrees with any person liable as a result of the
proceedings to pay fees subject to the percentage increase that a lower
amount than the amount payable in accordance with the conditional
fee agreement is to be paid instead,
the amount payable under the conditional fee agreement in respect of those
fees shall be reduced accordingly, unless the court is satisfied that the full
amount should continue to be payable under it.
(3) In this regulation ‘percentage increase’ means the percentage by which the
amount of the fees which would be payable if the agreement were not a conditional fee
agreement is to be increased under the agreement.
3A [Requirements where the client’s liability is limited to sums recovered
[(1) This regulation applies to a conditional fee agreement under which, except in the
circumstances set out in [paragraphs (5) and (5A)], the client is liable to pay his legal
representative’s fees and expenses only to the extent that sums are recovered in respect
of the relevant proceedings, whether by way of costs or otherwise.
(2) In determining for the purposes of paragraph (1) the circumstances in which a
client is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and expenses, no account is to be
taken of any obligation to pay costs in respect of the premium of a policy taken out to
insure against the risk of incurring a liability in the relevant proceedings.
(3) Regulations 2, 3 and 4 do not apply to a conditional fee agreement to which this
regulation applies.
(4) A conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies must—
(a) specify—
(i) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates
(including whether it relates to any appeal, counterclaim or
proceedings to enforce a judgment or order); and
(ii) the circumstances in which the legal representative’s fees and
expenses, or part of them, are payable; and
(b) if it provides for a success fee—
(i) briefly specify the reasons for setting the percentage increase at the
level stated in the agreement; and
(ii) provide that if, in court proceedings, the percentage increase becomes
payable as a result of those proceedings and the legal representative or
the client is ordered to disclose to the court or any other person the
[1051] Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000, reg 3
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reasons for setting the percentage increase at the level stated in the
agreement, he may do so.
(5) A conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies may specify that the
client will be liable to pay the legal representative’s fees and expenses whether or not
sums are recovered in respect of the relevant proceedings, if the client—
(a) fails to co-operate with the legal representative;
(b) fails to attend any medical or expert examination or court hearing which
the legal representative reasonably requests him to attend;
(c) fails to give necessary instructions to the legal representative; ..
(d) withdraws instructions from the legal representative;
[(e) is an individual who is adjudged bankrupt or enters into an arrangement or
a composition with his creditors, or against whom an administration
order is made; or
(f) is a company for which a receiver, administrative receiver or liquidator is
appointed].
[(5A) A conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies may specify that,
in the event of the client dying in the course of the relevant proceedings, his estate will
be liable for the legal representative’s fees and expenses, whether or not sums are
recovered in respect of those proceedings.]
(6) Before a conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies is made, the
legal representative must inform the client as to the circumstances in which the client
[or his estate] may be liable to pay the legal representative’s fees and expenses, and
provide such further explanation, advice or other information as to those
circumstances as the client may reasonably require.]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 2(1), (2). Date in force: 2 June 2003: see SI 2003/1240,
reg 1.Para (1): words “paragraphs (5) and (5A)” in square brackets substituted by SI 2003/3344,
reg 2(1), (2). Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1. Para (5): in sub-para (c)
word omitted revoked by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (3)(a). Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI
2003/3344, reg 1.Para (5): sub-paras (e), (f) inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (3)(b). Date in
force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1.Para (5A): inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (4).
Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1.Para (6): words “or his estate” in square
brackets inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 2(1), (5). Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344,
reg 1.
4 Information to be given before conditional fee agreements made
(1) Before a conditional fee agreement is made the legal representative must –
(a) inform the client about the following matters, and
(b) if the client requires any further explanation, advice or other information
about any of those matters, provide such further explanation, advice or
other information about them as the client may reasonably require.
(2) Those matters are –
(a) the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the costs of the
legal representative in accordance with the agreement,
(b) the circumstances in which the client may seek assessment of the fees and
expenses of the legal representative and the procedure for doing so,
(c) whether the legal representative considers that the client’s risk of incurring
liability for costs in respect of the proceedings to which agreement relates is
insured against under an existing contract of insurance,
(d) whether other methods of financing those costs are available, and, if so,
how they apply to the client and the proceedings in question,
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000, reg 4 [1051]
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(e) whether the legal representative considers that any particular method or
methods of financing any or all of those costs is appropriate and, if he
considers that a contract of insurance is appropriate or recommends a
particular such contract –
(i) his reasons for doing so, and
(ii) whether he has an interest in doing so.
(3) Before a conditional fee agreement is made the legal representative must explain
its effect to the client.
(4) In the case of an agreement where –
(a) the legal representative is a body to which section 30 of the Access to
Justice Act 1999 (recovery where body undertakes to meet costs liabilities)
applies, and
(b) there are no circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay any
costs in respect of the proceedings,
paragraph (1) does not apply.
(5) Information required to be given under paragraph (1) about the matters in
paragraph (2)(a) to (d) must be given orally (whether or not it is also given in writing),
but information required to be so given about the matters in paragraph (2)(e) and the
explanation required by paragraph (3) must be given both orally and in writing.
(6) This regulation does not apply in the case of an agreement between a legal
representative and an additional legal representative.
5 Form of agreement
(1) A conditional fee agreement must be signed by the client and the legal
representative.
(2) This regulation does not apply in the case of an agreement between a legal
representative and an additional legal representative.
6 Amendment of agreement
Where an agreement is amended to cover further proceedings or parts of them –
(a) regulations 2, 3 [,3A] and 5 apply to the amended agreement as if it were
a fresh agreement made at the time of the amendment, and
(b) the obligations under regulation 4 apply in relation to the amendments in
so far as they affect the matters mentioned in that regulation.
AMENDMENTS
In para (a) reference to “, 3A” in square brackets inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 2(1), (3). Date
in force: 2 June 2003: see SI 2003/1240, reg 1.
7 Revocation of 1995 Regulations
The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995 are revoked.
[8 Exclusion of Collective Conditional Fee Agreements
These Regulations shall not apply to collective conditional fee agreements within the
meaning of regulation 3 of the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
2000.]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2000/2988, reg 7.
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SI 2000/823
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER 2000
[1061]–[1070]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) This Order may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000 and shall
come into force on 1st April 2000.
(2) In this Order “the Act” means the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
2 Revocation of 1998 Order
The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998 is revoked.
3 Agreements providing for success fees
All proceedings which, under section 58 of the Act, can be the subject of an
enforceable conditional fee agreement, except proceedings under section 82 of the
Environmental Protection Act 1990, are proceedings specified for the purposes of
section 58(4)(a) of the Act.
4 Amount of success fees
In relation to all proceedings specified in article 3, the percentage specified for the
purposes of section 58(4)(c) of the Act shall be 100%.
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SI 2000/900
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 1999 (TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS)
ORDER 2000
[1071]–[1079]
1
(1) This Order may be cited as the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional
Provisions) Order 2000 and shall come into force on 1st April 2000.
(2) In this Order a reference to a section by number alone means the section so
numbered in the Access to Justice Act 1999.
2
(1) Section 58A(6) and (7) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 shall not apply,
as regards a party to proceedings, to:
(a) any proceedings in relation to which that party entered into a conditional
fee agreement before 1st April 2000; or
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings
to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.
(2) The coming into force of section 27 (Conditional fee agreements) shall not affect
the validity of any conditional fee agreement entered into before 1st April 2000, and
any such agreement shall continue to have effect after that date as if section 27 had not
come into force.
(3) In paragraphs 1(a) and (2) ‘conditional fee agreement’ has the same meaning as in
section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as that section stands
immediately before the coming into force of section 27 of the Access to Justice Act
1999.
3
Section 29 (Recovery of insurance premiums by way of costs) shall not apply, as
regards a party to proceedings, to:
(a) any proceedings in relation to which that party took out an insurance
policy of the sort referred to in section 29 before 1st April 2000; or
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings
to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.
4
Section 30 (Recovery where body undertakes to meet costs liabilities) shall not apply,
as regards a party to proceedings, to:
(a) any proceedings in relation to which that party gave an undertaking before
1st April 2000 which, if it had been given after that date, would have been
an undertaking to which section 30(1) applied; or
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings
to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.
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SI 2000/2988
COLLECTIVE CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS
REGULATIONS 2000
AMENDMENT
Revoked by SI 2005/2305, reg 2. Date in force: 1 November 2005 (except in relation to a
collective conditional fee agreement entered into before that date): see SI 2005/2305, regs 1, 3.
[1080]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These regulations may be cited as the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements
Regulations 2000, and shall come into force on 30th November 2000.
(2) In these Regulations, except where the context requires otherwise—
“client” means a person who will receive advocacy or litigation services to which the
agreement relates;
“collective conditional fee agreement” has the meaning given in regulation 3;
“conditional fee agreement” has the same meaning as in section 58 of the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990;
“funder” means the party to a collective conditional fee agreement who, under that
agreement, is liable to pay the legal representative’s fees;
“legal representative” means the person providing the advocacy or litigation services
to which the agreement relates.
MODIFICATION
A registered European lawyer may provide professional activities by way of legal advice and
assistance or legal aid, and these Regulations shall be interpreted accordingly: see the Euro-
pean Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/1119, reg 14.
2
These Regulations shall apply to agreements entered into on or after 30th November
2000, and agreements entered into before that date shall be treated as if these
Regulations had not come into force.
3 Definition of “collective conditional fee agreement”
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this regulation, a collective conditional fee agreement
is an agreement which—
(a) disregarding section 58(3)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
would be a conditional fee agreement; and
(b) does not refer to specific proceedings, but provides for fees to be payable
on a common basis in relation to a class of proceedings, or, if it refers to
more than one class of proceedings, on a common basis in relation to each
class.
(2) An agreement may be a collective conditional fee agreement whether or not—
(a) the funder is a client; or
(b) any clients are named in the agreement.
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4 Requirements for contents of collective conditional fee agreements: general
(1) A collective conditional fee agreement must specify the circumstances in which
the legal representative’s fees and expenses, or part of them, are payable.
[(1A) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) may include the fact that the
legal representative’s fees and expenses are payable only to the extent that sums are
recovered in respect of the proceedings, whether by way of costs or otherwise.]
(2) A collective conditional fee agreement must provide that, when accepting
instructions in relation to any specific proceedings the legal representative must—
(a) inform the client as to the circumstances in which the client [or his estate]
may be liable to pay the costs of the legal representative; and
(b) if the client requires any further explanation, advice or other information
about the matter referred to in sub-paragraph (a), provide such further
explanation, advice or other information about it as the client may
reasonably require.
(3) Paragraph (2) does not apply in the case of an agreement between a legal
representative and an additional legal representative.
(4) A collective conditional fee agreement must provide that, after accepting
instructions in relation to any specific proceedings, the legal representative must
confirm his acceptance of instructions in writing to the client.
AMENDMENTS
Para (1A): inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 3(1), (2). Date in force: 2 June 2003: see SI
2003/1240, reg 1. Para (2): in sub-para (a) words “or his estate” in square brackets inserted by SI
2003/3344, reg 3(1), (2). Para (2): in sub-para (a) words “or his estate” in square brackets inserted
by SI 2003/3344, reg 3(1), (2).
5 Requirements for contents of collective conditional fee agreements providing for
success fees
(1) Where a collective conditional fee agreement provides for a success fee the
agreement must provide that, when accepting instructions in relation to any specific
proceedings the legal representative must prepare and retain a written statement
containing—
(a) his assessment of the probability of the circumstances arising in which the
percentage increase will become payable in relation to those proceedings
(“the risk assessment”);
(b) his assessment of the amount of the percentage increase in relation to those
proceedings, having regard to the risk assessment; and
(c) the reasons, by reference to the risk assessment, for setting the percentage
increase at that level.
(2) If the agreement relates to court proceedings it must provide that where the
success fee becomes payable as a result of those proceedings, then—
(a) if—
(i) any fees subject to the increase are assessed, and
(ii) the legal representative or the client is required by the court to
disclose to the court or any other person the reasons for setting the
percentage increase at the level assessed by the legal representative,
he may do so,
(b) if—
(i) any such fees are assessed by the court, and
(ii) any amount in respect of the percentage increase is disallowed on the
assessment on the ground that the level at which the increase was set
[1080] Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regs 2000, reg 4
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was unreasonable in view of facts which were or should have been
known to the legal representative at the time it was set
that amount ceases to be payable under the agreement, unless the court is
satisfied that it should continue to be so payable, and
(c) if—
(i) sub-paragraph (b) does not apply, and
(ii) the legal representative agrees with any person liable as a result of the
proceedings to pay fees subject to the percentage increase that a lower
amount than the amount payable in accordance with the conditional
fee agreement is to be paid instead,
the amount payable under the collective conditional fee agreement in
respect of those fees shall be reduced accordingly, unless the court is
satisfied that the full amount should continue to be payable under it.
(3) In this regulation “percentage increase” means the percentage by which the
amount of the fees which would have been payable if the agreement were not a
conditional fee agreement is to be increased under the agreement.
[[(4) Sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph (2) do not apply to a collective
conditional fee agreement under which, except in the circumstances set out in
[paragraphs (6) and (7)], the client is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and
expenses only to the extent that sums are recovered in respect of the proceedings,
whether by way of costs or otherwise.
(5) In determining for the purposes of paragraph (4) the circumstances in which a
client is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and expenses, no account is to be
taken of any obligation to pay costs in respect of the premium of a policy taken out to
insure against the risk of incurring a liability in the relevant proceedings.
(6) A collective conditional fee agreement to which paragraph (4) applies may specify
that the client will be liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and expenses whether
or not sums are recovered in respect of the relevant proceedings, if the client—
(a) fails to co-operate with the legal representative;
(b) fails to attend any medical or expert examination or court hearing which
the legal representative reasonably requests him to attend;
(c) fails to give necessary instructions to the legal representative; . . .
(d) withdraws instructions from the legal representative;]
[(e) is an individual who is adjudged bankrupt or enters into an arrangement or
a composition with his creditors, or against whom an administration
order is made; or
(f) is a company for which a receiver, administrative receiver or liquidator is
appointed].]
[(7) A collective conditional fee agreement to which paragraph (4) applies may
specify that, in the event of the client dying in the course of the relevant proceedings,
his estate will be liable for the legal representative’s fees and expenses, whether or not
sums are recovered in respect of those proceedings.]
Paras (4)–(6): inserted by SI 2003/1240, reg 3(1), (3). Date in force: 2 June 2003: see SI
2003/1240, reg 1. Para (4): words “paragraphs (6) and (7)” in square brackets substituted by SI
2003/3344, reg 3(1), (3)(a). Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1. Para (6): in
sub-para (c) word omitted revoked by SI 2003/3344, reg 3(1), (3)(b)(i). Date in force: 2 February
2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1. Para (6): sub-paras (e), (f) inserted by SI 2003/3344, reg 3(1),
(3)(b)(ii).Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1. Para (7): inserted by SI
2003/3344, reg 3(1), (3)(c). Date in force: 2 February 2004: see SI 2003/3344, reg 1.
Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regs 2000, reg 5 [1080]
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6 Form and amendment of collective conditional fee agreement
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a collective conditional fee agreement must be signed by
the funder, and by the legal representative.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in the case of an agreement between a legal
representative and an additional legal representative.
(3) Where a collective conditional fee agreement is amended, regulations 4 and 5
apply to the amended agreement as if it were a fresh agreement made at the time of the
amendment.
7 Amendment to the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000
After regulation 7 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 there shall be
inserted the following new regulation:—
8 “Exclusion of collective conditional fee agreements
These Regulations shall not apply to collective conditional fee agreements within the
meaning of regulation 3 of the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
2000.”.
[1080] Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regs 2000, reg 6
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SI 2000/693
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (MEMBERSHIP ORGANISATIONS)
REGULATIONS 2000
Revoked by SI 2005/2306, reg 2(1). Date in force: 1 November 2005 (except in
relation to arrangements entered into before that date): see SI 2005/2306, regs 1(1),
2(2).
[1081]–[1090]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Access to Justice (Membership
Organisations) Regulations 2000.
(2) These Regulations come into force on 1st April 2000.
2 Bodies of a prescribed description
The bodies which are prescribed for the purpose of section 30 of the Access to Justice
Act 1999 (recovery where body undertakes to meet costs liabilities) are those bodies
which are for the time being approved by the Lord Chancellor for that purpose.
3 Requirements for arrangements to meet costs liabilities
(1) Section 30(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applies to arrangements which
satisfy the following conditions.
(2) The arrangements must be in writing.
(3) The arrangements must contain a statement specifying—
(a) the circumstances in which the member or other party may be liable to pay
costs of the proceedings,
(b) whether such a liability arises—
(i) if those circumstances only partly occur,
(ii) irrespective of whether those circumstances occur, and
(iii) on the termination of the arrangements for any reason,
(c) the basis on which the amount of the liability is calculated, and
(d) the procedure for seeking assessment of costs.
(4) A copy of the part of the arrangements containing the statement must be given to
the member or other party to the proceedings whose liabilities the body is undertaking
to meet as soon as possible after the undertaking is given.
4 Recovery of additional amount for insurance costs
(1) Where an additional amount is included in costs by virtue of section 30(2) of the
Access to Justice Act 1999 (costs payable to a member of a body or other person party
to the proceedings to include an additional amount in respect of provision made by the
body against the risk of having to meet the member’s or other person’s liabilities to pay
other parties’ costs), that additional amount must not exceed the following sum.
(2) That sum is the likely cost to the member of the body or, as the case may be, the
other person who is a party to the proceedings in which the costs order is made of the
premium of an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability to pay the costs
of other parties to the proceedings.
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SI 2000/1317
CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT NO 3) RULES 2000
[1091]–[1100]
39 Transitional provisions
(1) This rule applies where a person has –
(a) entered into a funding arrangement, and
(b) started proceedings in respect of a claim the subject of that funding
arrangement, before the date on which these Rules come into force.
(2) Any requirement imposed –
(a) by any provision of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 amended by these
Rules, or
(b) by a practice direction
in respect of that funding arrangement may be complied with within 28 days of the
coming into force of these Rules, and that compliance shall be treated as
compliance with the relevant rule or practice direction.
(3) For the purpose of this rule, ‘funding arrangement’ means an arrangement where
a person has –
(a) entered into a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee
within the meaning of section 58(2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act
1990;
(b) taken out an insurance policy to which section 29 of the Access to Justice
Act 1999 (recovery of insurance premiums by way of costs) applies; or
(c) made an agreement with a membership organisation prescribed for the
purpose of section 30 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (recovery where
body undertakes to meet cost liabilities) to meet his legal costs.
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SI 1998/3132
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 1998
PART 7
HOW TO START PROCEEDINGS – THE CLAIM FORM
[1101]
7.1 Where to start proceedings
Restrictions on where proceedings may be started are set out in the [the relevant
practice directions supplementing this Part].
AMENDMENT
Words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 6. Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI
2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1102]
7.2 How to start proceedings
(1) Proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the
claimant.
(2) A claim form is issued on the date entered on the form by the court.
(A person who seeks a remedy from the court before proceedings are started or in
relation to proceedings which are taking place, or will take place, in another
jurisdiction must make an application under Part 23)
(Part 16 sets out what the claim form must include)
[(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the information about a funding arrangement
to be provided with the claim form where the claimant intends to seek to recover an
additional liability)
(‘Funding arrangements’ and ‘additional liability’ are defined in rule 43.2)]
[ . . . ]
AMENDMENT
Third and fourth parentheses below para (2): inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 4. Date in force:
3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the
subject of a funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Third
parenthesis below para (2): words “Costs Practice Direction” in square brackets substituted by SI
2009/3390, r 6(b). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2). Fifth parenthesis below
para (2): inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 6(a) and revoked by SI 2011/88, r 5. Date in force: 6 April
2011: see SI 2011/88, r 1.
[1102.1]
7.2A
[[Practice Direction 7A] makes provision for procedures to be followed when claims
are brought by or against a partnership within the jurisdiction.]
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Inserted by SI 2006/1689, r 4. Date in force: 2 October 2006: see SI 2006/1689, r 1. Words in
square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 6. Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390,
r 1(2).
[1103]
7.3 Right to use one claim form to start two or more claims
A claimant may use a single claim form to start all claims which can be conveniently
disposed of in the same proceedings.
[1104]
7.4 Particulars of claim
(1) Particulars of claim must –
(a) be contained in or served with the claim form; or
(b) subject to paragraph (2) be served on the defendant by the claimant within
14 days after service of the claim form.
(2) Particulars of claim must be served on the defendant no later than the latest time
for serving a claim form.
(Rule 7.5 sets out the latest time for serving a claim form).
[(3) Where the claimant serves particulars of claim separately from the claim form in
accordance with paragraph (1)(b), the claimant must, within 7 days of service on the
defendant, file a copy of the particulars except where—
(a) paragraph 5.2(4) of [Practice Direction 7C] applies; or
(b) paragraph 6.4 of [Practice Direction 7E] applies.]
(Part 16 sets out what the particulars of claim must include)
(Part 22 requires particulars of claim to be verified by a statement of truth)
. . .
AMENDMENT
Para (3): substituted by SI 2008/3327, r 4. Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1.
Para (3): words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 6. Date in force: 6 April 2010:
see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2). Third parenthesis below para (3) (omitted) revoked by SI 2008/2178,
r 6(b)(ii), (c). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1105]
[7.5 Service of a claim form
(1) Where the claim form is served within the jurisdiction, the claimant must
complete the step required by the following table in relation to the particular method
of service chosen, before 12.00 midnight on the calendar day four months after the
date of issue of the claim form.
Method of service Step required
First class post, document exchange or
other service which provides for delivery
on the next business day
Posting, leaving with, delivering to or
collection by the relevant service
provider
Delivery of the document to or leaving
it at the relevant place
Delivering to or leaving the document at
the relevant place
[1102.1] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 7.2A
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Method of service Step required
Personal service under rule 6.5 Completing the relevant step required
by rule 6.5(3)
Fax Completing the transmission of the fax
Other electronic method Sending the e-mail or other electronic
transmission
(2) Where the claim form is to be served out of the jurisdiction, the claim form must
be served in accordance with Section IV of Part 6 within 6 months of the date of issue.]
AMENDMENT
Substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 6(d). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1106]
[7.6 Extension of time for serving a claim form
(1) The claimant may apply for an order extending the period for compliance with
rule 7.5.
(2) The general rule is that an application to extend the time for compliance with
rule 7.5 must be made—
(a) within the period specified by rule 7.5; or
(b) where an order has been made under this rule, within the period for service
specified by that order.
(3) If the claimant applies for an order to extend the time for compliance after the
end of the period specified by rule 7.5 or by an order made under this rule, the court
may make such an order only if—
(a) the court has failed to serve the claim form; or
(b) the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has
been unable to do so; and
(c) in either case, the claimant has acted promptly in making the application.
(4) An application for an order extending the time for compliance with rule 7.5—
(a) must be supported by evidence; and
(b) may be made without notice.]
AMENDMENT
Substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 6(d). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1107]
7.7 Application by defendant for service of claim form
(1) Where a claim form has been issued against a defendant, but has not yet been
served on him, the defendant may serve a notice on the claimant requiring him to serve
the claim form or discontinue the claim within a period specified in the notice.
(2) The period specified in a notice served under paragraph (1) must be at least 14
days after service of the notice.
(3) If the claimant fails to comply with the notice, the court may, on the application
of the defendant –
(a) dismiss the claim; or
(b) make any other order it thinks just.
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 7.7 [1107]
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[1108]
7.8 Form for defence etc. must be served with particulars of claim
(1) When particulars of claim are served on a defendant, whether they are contained
in the claim form, served with it or served subsequently, they must be accompanied by
–
(a) a form for defending the claim;
(b) a form for admitting the claim; and
(c) a form for acknowledging service.
(2) Where the claimant is using the procedure set out in Part 8 (alternative procedure
for claims) –
(a) paragraph (1) does not apply; and
(b) a form for acknowledging service must accompany the claim form.
[1109]
7.9 Fixed date and other claims
A practice direction –
(a) may set out the circumstances in which the court may give a fixed date for
a hearing when it issues a claim;
(b) may list claims in respect of which there is a specific claim form for use and
set out the claim form in question; and
(c) may disapply or modify these Rules as appropriate in relation to the claims
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).
[1110]
7.10 Production centre for claims
(1) There shall be a Production Centre for the issue of claim forms and other related
matters.
(2) [Practice Direction 7C] makes provision for –
(a) which claimants may use the Production Centre;
(b) the type of claims which the Production Centre may issue;
(c) the functions which are to be discharged by the Production Centre;
(d) the place where the Production Centre is to be located; and
(e) other related matters.
(3) [Practice Direction 7C] may disapply or modify these Rules as appropriate in
relation to claims issued by the Production Centre.
AMENDMENT
Paras (2), (3): words “Practice Direction 7C” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390,
r 6(e). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1111]
[7.11 Human Rights
(1) A claim under section 7(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of a
judicial act may be brought only in the High Court.
(2) Any other claim under section 7(1)(a) of that Act may be brought in any court.]
AMENDMENT
[1108] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 7.8
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Inserted by SI 2000/2092, r 6. Date in force: 2 October 2000: see SI 2000/2092, r 1.
[1112]–[1120]
[7.12 Electronic issue of claims
(1) A practice direction may make provision for a claimant to start a claim by
requesting the issue of a claim form electronically.
(2) The practice direction may, in particular—
(a) specify—
(i) the types of claim which may be issued electronically; and
(ii) the conditions which a claim must meet before it may be issued
electronically;
(b) specify—
(i) the court where the claim will be issued; and
(ii) the circumstances in which the claim will be transferred to another
court;
(c) provide for the filing of other documents electronically where a claim has
been started electronically;
(d) specify the requirements that must be fulfilled for any document filed
electronically; and
(e) provide how a fee payable on the filing of any document is to be paid
where that document is filed electronically.
(3) The practice direction may disapply or modify these Rules as appropriate in
relation to claims started electronically.]
[(Practice Direction 5C deals with electronic issue of claims started or continued under
the Electronic Working scheme.) ]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/3361, r 3. Date in force: 1 February 2004: see SI 2003/3361, r 1(a).
Parenthesis below para (3) inserted by SI 2009/3390, r 6. Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI
2009/3390, r 1(2).
PART 8
ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS
[1121]
8.1 Types of claim in which part 8 procedure may be followed
(1) The Part 8 procedure is the procedure set out in this Part.
(2) A claimant may use the Part 8 procedure where –
(a) he seeks the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a
substantial dispute of fact; or
(b) paragraph (6) applies.
(3) The court may at any stage order the claim to continue as if the claimant had not
used the Part 8 procedure and, if it does so, the court may give any directions it
considers appropriate.
(4) Paragraph (2) does not apply if a practice direction provides that the Part 8
procedure may not be used in relation to the type of claim in question.
(5) Where the claimant uses the Part 8 procedure he may not obtain default
judgment under Part 12.
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(6) A rule or practice direction may, in relation to a specified type of proceedings –
(a) require or permit the use of the Part 8 procedure; and
(b) disapply or modify any of the rules set out in this Part as they apply to
those proceedings.
(Rule 8.9 provides for other modifications to the general rules where the Part 8
procedure is being used)
[(Part 78 provides procedures for European orders for payment and for the European
small claims procedure. [It also provides procedures for applications for mediation
settlement enforcement orders in relation to certain cross-border disputes.])]
Amendment Second parenthesis below para (6): inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 7. Date in force
(for certain purposes): 12 December 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(3)(a). Date in force (for
remaining purposes): 1 January 2009: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(3)(b). Second parenthesis below
para (6): words from “It also provides” to “certain cross-border disputes.” in square brackets
inserted by SI 2011/88, r 6. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI 2011/88, r 1.
[1122]
8.2 Contents of the claim form
Where the claimant uses the Part 8 procedure the claim form must state –
(a) that this Part applies;
(b)
(i) the question which the claimant wants the court to decide; or
(ii) the remedy which the claimant is seeking and the legal basis for the
claim to that remedy;
(c) if the claim is being made under an enactment, what that enactment is;
(d) if the claimant is claiming in a representative capacity, what that capacity
is; and
(e) if the defendant is sued in a representative capacity, what that capacity is.
(Part 22 provides for the claim form to be verified by a statement of truth)
(Rule 7.5 provides for service of the claim form)
[(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the information about a funding arrangement
to be provided with the claim form where the claimant intends to seek to recover an
additional liability)
(‘Funding arrangement’ and ‘additional liability’ are defined in rule 43.2)].
AMENDMENT
Third and fourth parentheses: inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 5. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with
transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Third parenthesis:
words “Costs Practice Direction” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 7(a). Date in
force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1123]
[8.2A Issue of claim form without naming defendants
[(1) A practice direction may set out the circumstances in which a claim form may be
issued under this Part without naming a defendant.
(2) The practice direction may set out those cases in which an application for
permission must be made by application notice before the claim form is issued.]
(3) The application notice for permission –
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(a) need not be served on any other person; and
(b) must be accompanied by a copy of the claim form that the applicant
proposes to issue.
(4) Where the court gives permission it will give directions about the future
management of the claim.]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2000/221, r 5. Date in force: 2 May 2000: see SI 2000/221, r 1(b). Paras (1),
(2): substituted by SI 2001/256, r 5. Date in force: 26 March 2001: see SI 2001/256, r 1(a).
[1124]
8.3 Acknowledgment of service
(1) The defendant must –
(a) file an acknowledgment of service in the relevant practice form not more
than 14 days after service of the claim form; and
(b) serve the acknowledgment of service on the claimant and any other party.
(2) The acknowledgment of service must state –
(a) whether the defendant contests the claim; and
(b) if the defendant seeks a different remedy from that set out in the claim
form, what that remedy is.
(3) The following rules of Part 10 (acknowledgment of service) apply –
(a) rule 10.3(2) (exceptions to the period for filing an acknowledgment of
service); and
(b) rule 10.5 (contents of acknowledgment of service).
(4) . . .
[(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the information about a funding arrangement
to be provided with the acknowledgment of service where the defendant intends to
seek to recover an additional liability)
(‘Funding arrangement’ and ‘additional liability’ are defined in rule 43.2)]
AMENDMENTS
Para (4): revoked by SI 2001/4015, r 11. Date in force: 25 March 2002: see SI 2001/4015,
r 1(c). Parentheses below para (4) inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 6. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with
transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. In first parenthesis
words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 7. Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI
2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1125]
8.4 Consequence of not filing an acknowledgment of service
(1) This rule applies where –
(a) the defendant has failed to file an acknowledgment of service; and
(b) the time period for doing so has expired.
(2) The defendant may attend the hearing of the claim but may not take part in the
hearing unless the court gives permission.
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[1126]
8.5 Filing and serving written evidence
(1) The claimant must file any written evidence on which he intends to rely when he
files his claim form.
(2) The claimant’s evidence must be served on the defendant with the claim form.
(3) A defendant who wishes to rely on written evidence must file it when he files his
acknowledgment of service.
(4) If he does so, he must also, at the same time, serve a copy of his evidence on the
other parties.
(5) The claimant may, within 14 days of service of the defendant’s evidence on him,
file further written evidence in reply.
(6) If he does so, he must also, within the same time limit, serve a copy of his
evidence on the other parties.
(7) The claimant may rely on the matters set out in his claim form as evidence under
this rule if the claim form is verified by a statement of truth.
[1127]
8.6 Evidence – general
(1) No written evidence may be relied on at the hearing of the claim unless –
(a) it has been served in accordance with rule 8.5; or
(b) the court gives permission.
(2) The court may require or permit a party to give oral evidence at the hearing.
(3) The court may give directions requiring the attendance for cross-examination of
a witness who has given written evidence.
(Rule 32.1 contains a general power for the court to control evidence)
[1128]
8.7 Part 20 claims
Where the Part 8 procedure is used, Part 20 (counterclaims and other additional
claims) applies except that a party may not make a Part 20 claim (as defined by
rule 20.2) without the court’s permission.
[1129]
8.8 Procedure where defendant objects to use of the part 8 procedure
(1) Where the defendant contends that the Part 8 procedure should not be used
because –
(a) there is a substantial dispute of fact; and
(b) the use of the Part 8 procedure is not required or permitted by a rule or
practice direction,
he must state his reasons when he files his acknowledgment of service.
(Rule 8.5 requires a defendant who wishes to rely on written evidence to file it when he
files his acknowledgment of service)
(2) When the court receives the acknowledgment of service and any written evidence
it will give directions as to the future management of the case.
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(Rule 8.1(3) allows the court to make an order that the claim continue as if the claimant had
not used the Part 8 procedure)
[1130]–[1140]
8.9 Modifications to the general rules
Where the Part 8 procedure is followed –
(a) provision is made in this Part for the matters which must be stated in the
claim form and the defendant is not required to file a defence and therefore
–
(i) Part 16 (statements of case) does not apply;
(ii) Part 15 (defence and reply) does not apply;
(iii) any time limit in these Rules which prevents the parties from taking a
step before a defence is filed does not apply;
(iv) the requirement under rule 7.8 to serve on the defendant a form for
defending the claim does not apply;
(b) the claimant may not obtain judgment by request on an admission and
therefore –
(i) rules 14.4 to 14.7 do not apply; and
(ii) the requirement under rule 7.8 to serve on the defendant a form for
admitting the claim does not apply; and
(c) the claim shall be treated as allocated to the multi-track and therefore
Part 26 does not apply.
PART 15
DEFENCE AND REPLY
[1141]
15.1 Part not to apply where claimant uses Part 8 procedure
This Part does not apply where the claimant uses the procedure set out in Part 8
(alternative procedure for claims).
[1142]
15.2 Filing a defence
A defendant who wishes to defend all or part of a claim must file a defence.
(Part 14 contains further provisions which apply where the defendant admits a claim)
[1143]
15.3 Consequence of not filing a defence
If a defendant fails to file a defence, the claimant may obtain default judgment if
Part 12 allows it.
[1144]
15.4 The period for filing a defence
(1) The general rule is that the period for filing a defence is –
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(a) 14 days after service of the particulars of claim; or
(b) if the defendant files an acknowledgment of service under Part 10, 28 days
after service of the particulars of claim.
(Rule 7.4 provides for the particulars of claim to be contained in or served with the
claim form or served within 14 days of service of the claim form)
(2) The general rule is subject to the following rules –
(a) [rule [6.35] (which specifies how the period for filing a defence is calculated
where the claim form is served out of the jurisdiction [under rule 6.32 or
6.33]);
(b) rule 11(which provides that, where the defendant makes an application
disputing the court’s jurisdiction, [the defendant] need not file a defence
before the hearing);
(c) rule 24.4(2) (which provides that, if the claimant applies for summary
judgment before the defendant has filed a defence, the defendant need not
file a defence before the summary judgment hearing); and
(d) rule [6.12(3)] (which requires the court to specify the period for
responding to the particulars of claim when it makes an order under that
rule).
AMENDMENT
Para (2): in sub-para (a) words in square brackets beginning with the word “rule” substituted
by SI 2000/940, r 10. Date in force: 2 May 2000: see SI 2000/940, r 1. Para (2): in sub-para (a)
reference to “6.35” in square brackets substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 12(a)(i). Date in force:
1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2). Para (2): in sub-para (a) words “under rule 6.32 or
6.33” in square brackets inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 12(a)(ii). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see
SI 2008/2178, r 1(2). Para (2): in sub-para (b) words “the defendant” in square brackets
substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 12(b). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
Para (2): in sub-para (d) reference to “6.12(3)” in square brackets substituted by SI 2008/2178,
r 12(c). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1145]
15.5 Agreement extending the period for filing a defence
(1) The defendant and the claimant may agree that the period for filing a defence
specified in rule 15.4 shall be extended by up to 28 days.
(2) Where the defendant and the claimant agree to extend the period for filing a
defence, the defendant must notify the court in writing.
[1146]
15.6 Service of copy of defence
A copy of the defence must be served on every other party.
(Part 16 sets out what a defence must contain)
[(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the information about a funding arrangement
to be provided with the defence where the defendant intends to seek to recover an
additional liability)
(‘Funding arrangement’ and ‘additional liability’ are defined in rule 43.2)]
AMENDMENTS
Second and third parentheses inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 7. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with
transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. In second
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parenthesis words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 11. Date in force: 6 April
2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1147]
15.7 Making a counterclaim
Part 20 applies to a defendant who wishes to make a counterclaim.
[1148]
15.8 Reply to defence
If a claimant files a reply to the defence, he must –
file his reply when he files his allocation questionnaire; and
serve his reply on the other parties at the same time as he files it.
(Rule 26.3(6) requires the parties to file allocation questionnaires and specifies the
period for doing so)
(Part 22 requires a reply to be verified by a statement of truth)
[1149]
15.9 No statement of case after a reply to be filed without court’s permission
A party may not file or serve any statement of case after a reply without the permission
of the court.
[1150]
15.10 Claimant’s notice where defence is that money claimed has been paid
(1) Where –
(a) the only claim (apart from a claim for costs and interest) is for a specified
amount of money; and
(b) the defendant states in his defence that he has paid to the claimant the
amount claimed,
the court will send notice to the claimant requiring him to state in writing whether
he wishes the proceedings to continue.
(2) When the claimant responds, he must serve a copy of his response on the
defendant.
(3) If the claimant fails to respond under this rule within 28 days after service of the
court’s notice on him the claim shall be stayed.
(4) Where a claim is stayed under this rule any party may apply for the stay to be
lifted.
(If the claimant files notice under this rule that he wishes the proceedings to continue,
the procedure which then follows is set out in Part 26)
[1151]–[1160]
15.11 Claim stayed if it is not defended or admitted
(1) Where –
(a) at least 6 months have expired since the end of the period for filing a
defence specified in rule 15.4;
(b) no defendant has served or filed an admission or filed a defence or
counterclaim; and
(c) the claimant has not entered or applied for judgment under Part 12
(default judgment), or Part 24 (summary judgment),
the claim shall be stayed.
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(2) Where a claim is stayed under this rule any party may apply for the stay to be
lifted.
PART 43
SCOPE OF COSTS RULES AND DEFINITIONS
[1161]
43.1 Scope of this part
This Part contains definitions and interpretation of certain matters set out in the
rules about costs contained in Parts 44 to 48.
(Part 44 contains general rules about costs; Part 45 deals with fixed costs; Part 46
deals with fast track trial costs; Part 47 deals with the detailed assessment of costs and
related appeals and Part 48 deals with costs payable in special cases)
[1162]
43.2 Definitions and application
(1) In Parts 44 to 48, unless the context otherwise requires –
(a) “costs” includes fees, charges, disbursements, expenses, remuneration,
reimbursement allowed to a litigant in person under rule 48.6[, any
additional liability incurred under a funding arrangement] and any fee or
reward charged by a lay representative for acting on behalf of a party in
proceedings allocated to the small claims track;
(b) “costs judge” means a taxing master of the [Senior Courts];
[(ba “Costs Office” means the Senior Courts Costs Office;]
(c) “costs officer” means –
(i) a costs judge;
(ii) a district judge; and
(iii) an authorised court officer;
(d) “authorised court officer” means any officer of –
(i) a county court;
(ii) a district registry;
(iii) the Principal Registry of the Family Division; or
(iv) the [Costs Office],
whom the Lord Chancellor has authorised to assess costs.
(e) “fund” includes any estate or property held for the benefit of any person or
class of person and any fund to which a trustee or personal representative
is entitled in [that] capacity . . . ;
( f ) “receiving party” means a party entitled to be paid costs;
(g) “paying party” means a party liable to pay costs;
(h) “assisted person” means an assisted person within the statutory provisions
relating to legal aid; . . .
[(i) “LSC funded client” means an individual who receives services funded by
the Legal Services Commission as part of the Community Legal Service
within the meaning of Part I of the Access to Justice Act 1999;]
[( j )] ‘fixed costs” means the amounts which are to be allowed in respect of
solicitors’ charges in the circumstances set out in [Section I of] Part 45.
[(k) “funding arrangement” means an arrangement where a person has –
(i) entered into a conditional fee agreement [or a collective conditional
fee agreement] which provides for a success fee within the meaning of
section 58(2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990;
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(ii) taken out an insurance policy to which section 29 of the Access to
Justice Act 1999 (recovery of insurance premiums by way of costs)
applies; or
(iii) made an agreement with a membership organisation to meet [that
person’s] legal costs;
(l) “percentage increase” means the percentage by which the amount of a
legal representative’s fee can be increased in accordance with a conditional
fee agreement which provides for a success fee;
(m) “insurance premium” means a sum of money paid or payable for insurance
against the risk of incurring a costs liability in the proceedings, taken out
after the event that is the subject matter of the claim;
(n) “membership organisation” means a body prescribed for the purposes of
section 30 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (recovery where body
undertakes to meet costs liabilities); . . .
(o) “additional liability” means the percentage increase, the insurance
premium, or the additional amount in respect of provision made by a
membership organisation, as the case may be;
[(p) “free of charge” has the same meaning as in section 194(10) of the Legal
Services Act 2007;
(q) “pro bono representation” has the same meaning as in section 194(10) of
the Legal Services Act 2007;
(r) “the prescribed charity” has the same meaning as in section 194(8) of the
Legal Services Act 2007].
. . .
(2) The costs to which Parts 44 to 48 apply include –
(a) the following costs where those costs may be assessed by the court –
(i) costs of proceedings before an arbitrator or umpire;
(ii) costs of proceedings before a tribunal or other statutory body; and
(iii) costs payable by a client to his solicitor; and
(b) costs which are payable by one party to another party under the terms of a
contract, where the court makes an order for an assessment of those costs.
[(3) Where advocacy or litigation services are provided to a client under a
conditional fee agreement, costs are recoverable under Parts 44 to 48 notwithstanding
that the client is liable to pay his legal representative’s fees and expenses only to the
extent that sums are recovered in respect of the [proceedings], whether by way of costs
or otherwise.
(4) In paragraph (3), the reference to a conditional fee agreement is to an agreement
which satisfies all the conditions applicable to it by virtue of section 58 of the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990.]
AMENDMENT
Para (1): in sub-para (a) words “, any additional liability incurred under a funding
arrangement” in square brackets inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 12(a). Date in force: 3 July 2000
(with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): in sub-
para (b) words “Senior Courts” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/2092, r 6(a). Date in
force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): sub-para (ba) inserted by SI 2009/2092,
r 6(b). Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (d)(iv) words
“Costs Office” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/2092, r 6(c). Date in force: 1 October
2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (e) word “that” in square brackets
substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 22(a). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
Para (1): in sub-para (e) words omitted revoked by SI 2009/2092, r 6(d). Date in force: 1 October
2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (h) word omitted revoked by SI 2000/1317,
r 12(b). Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in
respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI
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2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): sub-para (i) inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 12(d). Date in force: 3 July
2000 (with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject
of a funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): sub-
para ( j ) renumbered as such by SI 2000/1317, r 12(c). Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with
transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): in sub-
para ( j ) words “Section I of” in square brackets inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 10. Date in force:
6 October 2003: see SI 2003/2113, r 1(c). Para (1): sub-paras (k)–(o) inserted by SI 2000/1317,
r 12(e). Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in
respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI
2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): in sub-para (k)(i) words “or a collective conditional fee agreement”
in square brackets inserted by SI 2001/256, r 14(a). Date in force: 26 March 2001: see SI
2001/256, r 1(a). Para (1): in sub-para (k)(iii) words “that person’s” in square brackets
substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 22(b). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
Para (1): in sub-para (n) word omitted revoked by SI 2008/2178, r 22(c). Date in force: 1 October
2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2). Para (1): sub-paras (p)–(r) inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 22(e). Date
in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2). Parenthesis below para (1): revoked by SI
2003/1242, r 5(a). Date in force: 2 June 2003: see SI 2003/1242, r 1. Paras (3), (4): inserted by SI
2003/1242, r 5(b). Date in force: 2 June 2003 (in relation to a conditional fee agreement in issue
which was entered into on or after that date): see SI 2003/1242, rr 1, 6. Para (3): word
“proceedings” in square brackets substituted by SI 2003/1329, r 3. Date in force: 9 June 2003:
see SI 2003/1329, r 1.
[1163]
43.3 Meaning of summary assessment
“Summary assessment” means the procedure by which the court, when making an
order about costs, orders payment of a sum of money instead of fixed costs or ‘detailed
assessment’.
[1164]–[1170]
43.4 Meaning of detailed assessment
“Detailed assessment” means the procedure by which the amount of costs is decided
by a costs officer in accordance with Part 47.
PART 44
GENERAL RULES ABOUT COSTS
[1171]
44.1 Scope of this Part
This Part contains general rules about [costs, entitlement to costs and orders in respect
of pro bono representation].
(The definitions contained in Part 43 are relevant to this Part)
AMENDMENT
Words in square brackets substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 23(b). Date in force: 1 October
2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1172]
44.2 Solicitor’s duty to notify client
Where –
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(a) the court makes a costs order against a legally represented party; and
(b) the party is not present when the order is made,
the party’s solicitor must notify his client in writing of the costs order no later than
7 days after the solicitor receives notice of the order.
[1173]
44.3 Court’s discretion and circumstances to be taken into account when exercising its
discretion as to costs
(1) The court has discretion as to—
(a) whether costs are payable by one party to another;
(b) the amount of those costs; and
(c) when they are to be paid.
(2) If the court decides to make an order about costs—
(a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the
costs of the successful party; but
(b) the court may make a different order.
(3) The general rule does not apply to the following proceedings—
(a) proceedings in the Court of Appeal on an application or appeal made in
connection with proceedings in the Family Division; or
(b) proceedings in the Court of Appeal from a judgment, direction, decision or
order given or made in probate proceedings or family proceedings.
(4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must have regard
to all the circumstances, including—
(a) the conduct of all the parties;
(b) whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been
wholly successful; and
(c) any payment into court or admissible offer to settle made by a party which
is drawn to the court’s attention[, and which is not an offer to which costs
consequences under Part 36 apply].
. . .
(5) The conduct of the parties includes—
(a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the
extent to which the parties followed [the Practice Direction (Pre-
Action Conduct) or] any relevant pre-action protocol;
(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a
particular allegation or issue;
(c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a
particular allegation or issue; and
(d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part,
exaggerated his claim.
(6) The orders which the court may make under this rule include an order that a
party must pay—
(a) a proportion of another party’s costs;
(b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s costs;
(c) costs from or until a certain date only;
(d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun;
(e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings;
( f ) costs relating only to a distinct part of the proceedings; and
(g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before
judgment.
(7) Where the court would otherwise consider making an order under
paragraph (6)( f ), it must instead, if practicable, make an order under paragraph (6)(a)
or (c).
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(8) Where the court has ordered a party to pay costs, it may order an amount to be
paid on account before the costs are assessed.
(9) Where a party entitled to costs is also liable to pay costs the court may assess the
costs which that party is liable to pay and either—
(a) set off the amount assessed against the amount the party is entitled to be
paid and direct him to pay any balance; or
(b) delay the issue of a certificate for the costs to which the party is entitled
until he has paid the amount which he is liable to pay.
AMENDMENT
Para (4): in sub-para (c) words in square brackets substituted by SI 2006/3435, r 10(a)(i).
Date in force: 6 April 2007: see SI 2006/3435, r 1. Para (4): words omitted revoked by SI
2006/3435, r 10(a)(ii). Date in force: 6 April 2007: see SI 2006/3435, r 1. Para (5): in sub-para (a)
words in square brackets inserted by SI 2008/3327, r 9(b). Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI
2008/3327, r 1.
[1174]
[44.3A Costs orders relating to funding arrangements
(1) The court will not assess any additional liability until the conclusion of the
proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to which the funding arrangement relates.
(“Funding arrangement” and “additional liability” are defined in rule 43.2)
(2) At the conclusion of the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, to which the
funding arrangement relates the court may—
(a) make a summary assessment of all the costs, including any additional
liability;
(b) make an order for detailed assessment of the additional liability but make
a summary assessment of the other costs; or
(c) make an order for detailed assessment of all the costs.
(Part 47 sets out the procedure for the detailed assessment of costs).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 14. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions
relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered
into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39.
[1175]
[44.3B Limits on recovery under funding arrangements
(1) [Unless the court orders otherwise, a] party may not recover as an additional
liability –
(a) any proportion of the percentage increase relating to the cost to the legal
representative of the postponement of the payment of his fees and
expenses;
(b) any provision made by a membership organisation which exceeds the likely
cost to that party of the premium of an insurance policy against the risk of
incurring a liability to pay the costs of other parties to the proceedings;
(c) any additional liability for any period . . . during which [that party]
failed to provide information about a funding arrangement in accordance
with a rule, practice direction or court order;
(d) any percentage increase where [that party] has failed to comply with –
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(i) a requirement in the [Costs Practice Direction]; or
(ii) a court order,
to disclose in any assessment proceedings the reasons for setting the
percentage increase at the level stated in the [conditional fee agreement].
[(e) any insurance premium where that party has failed to provide information
about the insurance policy in question by the time required by a rule,
practice direction or court order.
(Paragraph 9.3 of the Practice Direction (Pre-Action Conduct) provides that a party
must inform any other party as soon as possible about a funding arrangement entered
into before the start of proceedings.)]
(2) This rule does not apply in an assessment under rule 48.9 (assessment of a
solicitor’s bill to his client).
(Rule 3.9 sets out the circumstances the court will consider on an application for relief
from a sanction for failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 14. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions
relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered
into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): words in square brackets inserted by
SI 2009/2092, r 7(b)(i). Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-
para (c) words omitted revoked and words in square brackets inserted by SI 2009/2092, r 7(b)(ii).
Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (d) words in square
brackets inserted by SI 2009/2092, r 7(b)(iii). Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092,
r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (d)(i) words in square brackets inserted by SI 2009/3390, r 22(a)(i).
Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (d) words “conditional
fee agreement;” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/2092, r 7(b)(iii)(bb). Date in force:
1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2); for transitional provisions see r 23 thereof. Para (1):
sub-para (e) and words in parentheses following inserted by SI 2009/2092, r 7(b)(iv). Date in
force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2).
[1175.1]
[44.3C Orders in respect of pro bono representation
(1) In this rule, “the 2007 Act” means the Legal Services Act 2007.
(2) Where the court makes an order under section 194(3) of the 2007 Act—
(a) the court may order the payment to the prescribed charity of a sum no
greater than the costs specified in Part 45 to which the party with pro bono
representation would have been entitled in accordance with that Part and
in respect of that representation had it not been provided free of charge; or
(b) where Part 45 does not apply, the court may determine the amount of the
payment (other than a sum equivalent to fixed costs) to be made by the
paying party to the prescribed charity by—
(i) making a summary assessment; or
(ii) making an order for detailed assessment,
of a sum equivalent to all or part of the costs the paying party would have been
ordered to pay to the party with pro bono representation in respect of that
representation had it not been provided free of charge.
(3) Where the court makes an order under section 194(3) of the 2007 Act, the
order must specify that the payment by the paying party must be made to the
prescribed charity.
(4) The receiving party must send a copy of the order to the prescribed charity within
7 days of receipt of the order.
(5) Where the court considers making or makes an order under section 194(3) of the
2007 Act, Parts 43 to 48 apply, where appropriate, with the following modifications—
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(a) references to “costs orders”, “orders about costs” or “orders for the
payment of costs” are to be read, unless otherwise stated, as if they refer to
an order under section 194(3);
(b) references to “costs” are to be read, as if they referred to a sum equivalent
to the costs that would have been claimed by, incurred by or awarded to
the party with pro bono representation in respect of that representation
had it not been provided free of charge; and
(c) references to “receiving party” are to be read, as meaning a party who has
pro bono representation and who would have been entitled to be paid costs
in respect of that representation had it not been provided free of charge.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 23(c). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1176]
44.4 Basis of assessment
(1) Where the court is to assess the amount of costs (whether by summary or detailed
assessment) it will assess those costs –
(a) on the standard basis; or
(b) on the indemnity basis,
but the court will not in either case allow costs which have been unreasonably
incurred or are unreasonable in amount.
(Rule 48.3 sets out how the court decides the amount of costs payable under a
contract)
(2) Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will
–
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably
incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the
paying party.
(Factors which the court may take into account are set out in rule 44.5)
(3) Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the indemnity basis, the court will
resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or
were reasonable in amount in favour of the receiving party.
(4) Where –
(a) the court makes an order about costs without indicating the basis on which
the costs are to be assessed; or
(b) the court makes an order for costs to be assessed on a basis other than the
standard basis or the indemnity basis,
the costs will be assessed on the standard basis.
(5) . . .
(6) Where the amount of a solicitor’s remuneration in respect of non-contentious
business is regulated by any general orders made under the Solicitors Act 1974, the
amount of the costs to be allowed in respect of any such business which falls to be
assessed by the court will be decided in accordance with those general orders rather
than this rule and rule 44.5.
AMENDMENT
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Para (5): revoked by SI 2000/1317, r 15. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional
provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding
arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39.
[1177]
44.5 Factors to be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs
(1) The court is to have regard to all the circumstances in deciding whether costs
were –
(a) if it is assessing costs on the standard basis –
(i) proportionately and reasonably incurred; or
(ii) were proportionate and reasonable in amount, or
(b) if it is assessing costs on the indemnity basis –
(i) unreasonably incurred; or
(ii) unreasonable in amount.
(2) In particular the court must give effect to any orders which have already been
made.
(3) The court must also have regard to –
(a) the conduct of all the parties, including in particular –
(i) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings; and
(ii) the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to
try to resolve the dispute;
(b) the amount or value of any money or property involved;
(c) the importance of the matter to all the parties;
(d) the particular complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the
questions raised;
(e) the skill, effort, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved;
( f ) the time spent on the case; and
(g) the place where and the circumstances in which work or any part of it was
done.
(Rule 35.4(4) gives the court power to limit the amount that a party may recover with
regard to the fees and expenses of an expert)
[1178]
44.6 Fixed costs
A party may recover the fixed costs specified in Part 45 in accordance with that Part.
[1179]
44.7 Procedure for assessing costs
Where the court orders a party to pay costs to another party (other than fixed costs) it
may either–
(a) make a summary assessment of the costs; or
(b) order detailed assessment of the costs by a costs officer,
unless any rule, practice direction or other enactment provides otherwise.
(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the factors which will affect the
court’s decision under this rule)
AMENDMENT
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Parenthesis: words “Costs Practice Direction” in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390,
r 22(a)(ii). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1180]
44.8 Time for complying with an order for costs
A party must comply with an order for the payment of costs within 14 days of –
(a) the date of the judgment or order if it states the amount of those costs;
. . .
(b) if the amount of those costs (or part of them) is decided later in accordance
with Part 47, the date of the certificate which states the amount[; or]
[(c) in either case, such later date as the court may specify.]
(Part 47 sets out the procedure for detailed assessment of costs)
AMENDMENT
Word omitted revoked and words in square brackets inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 16. Date in
force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a
claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1,
39.
[1181]
44.9 Costs on the small claims track and fast track
(1) Part 27 (small claims) and Part 46 (fast track trial costs) contain special
rules about –
(a) liability for costs;
(b) the amount of costs which the court may award; and
(c) the procedure for assessing costs.
[(2) Once a claim is allocated to a particular track, those special rules shall apply to
the period before, as well as after, allocation except where the court or a practice
direction provides otherwise.]
AMENDMENT
Para (2): substituted by SI 1999/1008, r 17. Date in force: 26 April 1999: see SI 1999/1008,
r 1.
[1182]
44.10 Limitation on amount court may allow where a claim allocated to the fast track
settles before trial
(1) Where the court –
(a) assesses costs in relation to a claim which –
(i) has been allocated to the fast track; and
(ii) settles before the start of the trial; and
(b) is considering the amount of costs to be allowed in respect of a
party’s advocate for preparing for the trial,
it may not allow, in respect of those advocate’s costs, an amount that exceeds the
amount of fast track trial costs which would have been payable in relation to the
claim had the trial taken place.
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(2) When deciding the amount to be allowed in respect of the advocate’s costs, the
court shall have regard to –
(a) when the claim was settled; and
(b) when the court was notified that the claim had settled.
(3) In this rule, ‘advocate’ and ‘fast track trial costs’ have the meanings given to them
by Part 46.
(Part 46 sets out the amount of fast track trial costs which may be awarded)
[1183]
44.11 Costs following allocation and re-allocation
(1) Any costs orders made before a claim is allocated will not be affected by
allocation.
(2) Where –
(a) a claim is allocated to a track; and
(b) the court subsequently re-allocates that claim to a different track,
then unless the court orders otherwise, any special rules about costs applying –
(i) to the first track, will apply to the claim up to the date of re-
allocation; and
(ii) to the second track, will apply from the date of re-allocation.
(Part 26 deals with the allocation and re-allocation of claims between tracks).
[1184]
44.12 Cases where costs orders deemed to have been made
(1) Where a right to costs arises under –
(a) rule 3.7 (defendant’s right to costs where claim struck out for non-payment
of fees);
[(b) rule 36.10(1) or (2) (claimant’s entitlement to costs where a Part 36 offer is
accepted);]
(c) . . .
(d) rule 38.6 (defendant’s right to costs where claimant discontinues),
a costs order will be deemed to have been made on the standard basis.
[(1A) Where such an order is deemed to be made in favour of a party with pro bono
representation, that party may apply for an order under section 194(3) of the Legal
Services Act 2007.]
(2) Interest payable pursuant to section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 or section 74
of the County Courts Act 1984 on the costs deemed to have been ordered under
paragraph(1) shall begin to run from the date on which the event which gave rise to
the entitlement to costs occurred.
AMENDMENTS
Para (1): sub-para (b) substituted by SI 2006/3435, r 10(b)(i). Date in force: 6 April 2007: see
SI 2006/3435, r 1. Para (1): sub-para (c) revoked by SI 2006/3435, r 10(b)(ii). Date in force:
6 April 2007: see SI 2006/3435, r 1. Para (1A): inserted by SI 2008/2178, r 23(d). Date in force:
1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
[1185]
[44.12A Costs-only proceedings
(1) This rule sets out a procedure which may be followed where –
(a) the parties to a dispute have reached an agreement on all issues (including
which party is to pay the costs) which is made or confirmed in writing; but
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(b) they have failed to agree the amount of those costs; and
[(c) . . . no proceedings have been started.]
[(1A) . . . ]
(2) Either party to the agreement may start proceedings under this rule by issuing a
claim form in accordance with Part 8.
(3) The claim form must contain or be accompanied by the agreement or
confirmation.
(4) [Except as provided in paragraph (4A) [(and subject to rule 44.12B)], in]
proceedings to which this rule applies the court –
(a) may
(i) make an order for costs [to be determined by detailed assessment]; or
(ii) dismiss the claim;
and
(b) must dismiss the claim if it is opposed.
[(4A) In proceedings to which Section II [or Section VI] of Part 45 applies, the court
shall assess the costs in the manner set out in that Section.]
(5) Rule 48.3 (amount of costs where costs are payable pursuant to a contract) does
not apply to claims started under the procedure in this rule.
Rule 7.2 provides that proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at
the request of the claimant)
(Rule 8.1(6) provides that a practice direction may modify the Part 8 procedure).]
AMENDMENT
Amendments Inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 17. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional
provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding
arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (1): sub-para (c)
substituted by SI 2003/2113, r 11(a). Date in force: 6 October 2003: see SI 2003/2113, r 1(c).
Para (1): in sub-para (c) words omitted revoked by SI 2004/3419, r 8(a). Date in force: 1 April
2005: see SI 2004/3419, r 1. Para (1A): inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 11(b). Date in force:
6 October 2003: see SI 2003/2113, r 1(c) and revoked by SI 2004/3419, r 8(b). Date in force:
1 April 2005: see SI 2004/3419, r 1. Para (4): words “Except as provided in paragraph (4A), in”
in square brackets substituted by SI 2003/2113, r 11(c). Date in force: 6 October 2003: see SI
2003/2113, r 1(c). Para (4): words “(and subject to rule 44.12B)” in square brackets substituted
by SI 2009/2092, r 7(c). Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2). Para (4): in sub-
para (a)(i) words “to be determined by detailed assessment” in square brackets inserted by SI
2002/2058, r 14. Date in force: 2 December 2002: see SI 2002/2058, r 1(b). Para (4A): inserted
by SI 2003/2113, r 11(d). Date in force: 6 October 2003: see SI 2003/2113, r 1(c). Para (4A):
words in square brackets inserted by SI 2010/621, r 7(a). Date in force: 30 April 2010: see SI
2010/621, r 1(2).
[1185.1]
[Rule 44.12B Costs-only proceedings—costs in respect of insurance premium in
publication cases
(1) If in proceedings to which rule 44.12A applies it appears to the court that—
(a) if proceedings had been started, they would have been publication
proceedings;
(b) one party admitted liability and made an offer of settlement on the basis of
that admission;
(c) agreement was reached after that admission of liability and offer of
settlement; and
(d) either—
[1185] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 44.12A
E-236 BCS • Issue 96
0022 [ST: 215] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:12 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0015] 0
(i) the party making the admission of liability and offer of settlement
was not provided by the other party with the information about an
insurance policy as required by the Practice Direction (Pre-
Action Conduct); or
(ii) that party made the admission of liability and offer of settlement
before, or within 42 days of, being provided by the other party with
that information, no costs may be recovered by the other party in
respect of the insurance premium.
(2) In this rule, “publication proceedings” means proceedings for—
(a) defamation;
(b) malicious falsehood; or
(c) breach of confidence involving publication to the public at large.]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2009/2092, r 7(d). Date in force: 1 October 2009: see SI 2009/2092, r 1(2).
[1185.2]
[Rule 44.12C Costs-only application after a claim is started under Part 8 in accordance
with Practice Direction 8B
(1) This rule sets out the procedure where—
(a) the parties to a dispute have reached an agreement on all issues (including
which party is to pay the costs) which is made or confirmed in writing; but
(b) they have failed to agree the amount of those costs; and
(c) proceedings have been started under Part 8 in accordance with Practice
Direction 8B.
(2) Either party may make an application for the court to determine the costs.
(3) Where an application is made under this rule the court will assess the costs in
accordance with rule 45.34 or rule 45.37.
(4) Rule 48.3 (amount of costs where costs are payable pursuant to a contract) does
not apply to an application under this rule.
(Practice Direction 8B sets out the procedure for a claim where the parties have followed the
Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents.)]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 7(b). Date in force: 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1186]
44.13 Special situations
[(1) Where the court makes an order which does not mention costs—
[(a) subject to paragraphs (1A) and (1B), the general rule is that no party is
entitled—
(i) to costs; or
(ii) to seek an order under section 194(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007,
in relation to that order; but]
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(b) this does not affect any entitlement of a party to recover costs out of a fund
held by [that party] as trustee or personal representative, or pursuant to
any lease, mortgage or other security.]
[(1A) Where the court makes—
(a) an order granting permission to appeal;
(b) an order granting permission to apply for judicial review; or
(c) any other order or direction sought by a party on an application without
notice, and its order does not mention costs, it will be deemed to include an
order for applicant’s costs in the case.
(1B) Any party affected by a deemed order for costs under paragraph (1A) may apply
at any time to vary the order.]
(2) The court hearing an appeal may, unless it dismisses the appeal, make
orders about the costs of the proceedings giving rise to the appeal as well as the costs
of the appeal.
(3) Where proceedings are transferred from one court to another, the court to which
they are transferred may deal with all the costs, including the costs before the transfer.
(4) Paragraph (3) is subject to any order of the court which ordered the transfer.
AMENDMENTS
Para (1): substituted by SI 2001/4015, r 24. Date in force: 25 March 2002: see SI 2001/4015,
r 1(c). Para (1): sub-para (a) substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 23(e)(i). Date in force: 1 October
2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2). Para (1): in sub-para (b) words “that party” in square brackets
substituted by SI 2008/2178, r 23(e)(ii). Date in force: 1 October 2008: see SI 2008/2178, r 1(2).
Paras (1A), (1B): inserted by SI 2005/2292, r 38(b). Date in force: 1 October 2005: see SI
2005/2292, r 1(c).
[1187]
44.14 Court’s powers in relation to misconduct
(1) The court may make an order under this rule where –
[(a) a party or his legal representative, in connection with a summary or
detailed assessment, fails to comply with a rule, practice direction or court
order; or]
(b) it appears to the court that the conduct of a party or his legal
representative, before or during the proceedings which gave rise to the
assessment proceedings, was unreasonable or improper.
(2) Where paragraph (1) applies, the court may –
(a) disallow all or part of the costs which are being assessed; or
(b) order the party at fault or his legal representative to pay costs which he has
caused any other party to incur.
(3) Where –
(a) the court makes an order under paragraph (2) against a legally represented
party; and
(b) the party is not present when the order is made,
the party’s solicitor must notify his client in writing of the order no later than 7
days after the solicitor receives notice of the order.
AMENDMENT
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Para (1): sub-para (a) substituted by SI 2000/1317, r 18. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with
transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39.
[1188]
[44.15 Providing information about funding arrangements
(1) A party who seeks to recover an additional liability must provide information
about the funding arrangement to the court and to other parties as required by a rule,
practice direction or court order.
(2) Where the funding arrangement has changed, and the information a party has
previously provided in accordance with paragraph (1) is no longer accurate, that party
must file notice of the change and serve it on all other parties within 7 days.
(3) Where paragraph (2) applies, and a party has already filed –
(a) an allocation questionnaire; or
(b) a [pre-trial check list (listing questionnaire)],
he must file and serve a new estimate of costs with the notice.
(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out –
the information to be provided when a party issues or responds to a claim form, files
an allocation questionnaire, a [pre-trial check list], and a claim for costs;
the meaning of estimate of costs and the information required in it)
(Rule 44.3B sets out situations where a party will not recover a sum representing any
additional liability)
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 19. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions
relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered
into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Para (3): in sub-para (b) words “pre-trial
checklist (listing questionnaire)” in square brackets substituted by SI 2002/2058, r 15(a). Date in
force: 2 December 2002: see SI 2002/2058, r 1(b). Parenthesis below para (3): first words in
square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 22(a)(iii). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI
2009/3390, r 1(2). Parenthesis below para (3): second words in square brackets substituted by SI
2002/2058, r 15(b). Date in force: 2 December 2002: see SI 2002/2058, r 1(b).
[1189]
[44.16
(1) This rule applies where the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 or
the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 continues to apply to an
agreement which provides for a success fee.
Where –
(a) the court disallows any amount of a legal representative’s percentage
increase in summary or detailed assessment proceedings; and
(b) the legal representative applies for an order that the disallowed amount
should continue to be payable by his client,
the court may adjourn the hearing to allow the client to be—
(i) notified of the order sought; and
(ii) separately represented.
(Regulation 3(2)(b) of the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 provides that
a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee must state that any
amount of a percentage increase disallowed on assessment ceases to be payable unless
the court is satisfied that it should continue to be so payable) Regulation 5(2)(b) of
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 44.16 [1189]
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the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 makes similar provision
in relation to collective conditional fee agreements.)]
AMENDMENTS
Substituted (for this Rule as inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 19) by SI 2005/3515, r 10. Date in
force: 6 April 2006: see SI 2005/3515, r 1.
[1190]
[44.17 Application of costs rules
This Part and Part 45 (fixed costs), Part 46 (fast track trial costs), Part 47 (procedure
for detailed assessment of costs and default provisions) and Part 48 (special cases), do
not apply to the assessment of costs in proceedings to the extent that –
(a) section 11 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, and provisions made under
that Act, or
(b) regulations made under the Legal Aid Act 1988,
make different provision.
(The [Costs Practice Direction] sets out the procedure to be followed where a party
was wholly or partially funded by the Legal Services Commission).]
AMENDMENTS
Inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 19. Date in force: 3 July 2000 (with transitional provisions
relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a funding arrangement entered
into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. Parenthesis: words in square brackets
substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 22(a)(ii). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
PART 45
FIXED COSTS
[II
ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS—FIXED RECOVERABLE COSTS . . . ]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Words
omitted revoked by SI 2004/3419, r 10. Date in force: 1 April 2005: see SI 2004/3419, r 1.
[1190.1]
[45.7 Scope and interpretation
[(1) This Section sets out the costs which are to be allowed in—
(a) costs-only proceedings under the procedure set out in rule 44.12A; or
(b) proceedings for approval of a settlement or compromise under
rule 21.10(2),
in cases to which this Section applies.]
. . .
(2) This Section applies where—
[1189] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 44.16
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(a) the dispute arises from a road traffic accident;
(b) the agreed damages include damages in respect of personal injury, damage
to property, or both;
(c) the total value of the agreed damages does not exceed £10,000; and
(d) if a claim had been issued for the amount of the agreed damages, the small
claims track would not have been the normal track for that claim.
[(3) This Section does not apply where—
(a) the claimant is a litigant in person; or
(b) Section VI of this Part applies.]
(Rule 2.3 defines “personal injuries” as including any disease and any impairment of a
person’s physical or mental condition).
(Rule 26.6 provides for when the small claims track is the normal track).
(4) In this Section—
(a) “road traffic accident” means an accident resulting in bodily injury to any
person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of a
motor vehicle on a road or other public place in England and Wales;
(b) “motor vehicle” means a mechanically propelled vehicle intended for use
on roads; and
(c) “road” means any highway and any other road to which the public has
access and includes bridges over which a road passes.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Para (1):
substituted by SI 2004/3419, r 11(a). Date in force: 1 April 2005: see SI 2004/3419, r 1. Para (1):
words omitted revoked by SI 2004/3419, r 11(b). Date in force: 1 April 2005: see SI 2004/3419,
r 1. Para (3): substituted by SI 2010/621, r 8(b). Date in force: 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621,
r 1(2)
[1190.2]
[45.8 Application of fixed recoverable costs
Subject to rule 45.12, the only costs which are to be allowed are—
(a) fixed recoverable costs calculated in accordance with rule 45.9;
(b) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.10; and
(c) a success fee allowed in accordance with rule 45.11.
(Rule 45.12 provides for where a party issues a claim for more than the fixed
recoverable costs).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18.
[1190.3]
[45.9 Amount of fixed recoverable costs
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the amount of fixed recoverable costs is the
total of—
(a) £800;
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.9 [1190.3]
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(b) 20% of the damages agreed up to £5,000; and
(c) 15% of the damages agreed between £5,000 and £10,000.
(2) Where the claimant—
(a) lives or works in an area set out in the [Costs Practice Direction]; and
(b) instructs a solicitor or firm of solicitors who practise in that area,
the fixed recoverable costs shall include, in addition to the costs specified in
paragraph (1), an amount equal to 12.5% of the costs allowable under that
paragraph.
(3) Where appropriate, value added tax (VAT) may be recovered in addition to the
amount of fixed recoverable costs and any reference in this Section to fixed recoverable
costs is a reference to those costs net of any such VAT.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Para (2):
words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, art 23. Date in force: 6 April 2010: see
r 1(2).
[1190.4]
[45.10 Disbursements
(1) The court—
(a) may allow a claim for a disbursement of a type mentioned in
paragraph (2); but
(b) must not allow a claim for any other type of disbursement.
(2) The disbursements referred to in paragraph (1) are—
(a) the cost of obtaining—
(i) medical records;
(ii) a medical report;
(iii) a police report;
(iv) an engineer’s report; or
(v) a search of the records of the Driver Vehicle Licensing Authority;
(b) the amount of an insurance premium [or, where a [membership
organisation] undertakes to meet liabilities incurred to pay the costs of
other parties to proceedings, a sum not exceeding such additional amount
of costs as would be allowed under section 30 in respect of provision made
against the risk of having to meet such liabilities];
(c) where they are necessarily incurred by reason of one or more of the
claimants being a child or [protected party] as defined in Part 21—
(i) fees payable for instructing counsel; or
(ii) court fees payable on an application to the court;
(d) any other disbursement that has arisen due to a particular feature of the
dispute.
(“insurance premium” is defined in rule 43.2).
[(“membership organisation” is defined in rule 43.2(1)(n)).]]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Para (2):
in sub-para (b) words from “or, where a” to “meet such liabilities” in square brackets inserted by
[1190.3] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.9
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SI 2003/3361, r 8. Date in force: 1 February 2004: see SI 2003/3361, r 1(a). Para (2): in sub-para
(b) words “membership organisation” in square brackets substituted by SI 2004/2072, r 11(a).
Date in force: 1 October 2004: see SI 2004/2072, r 1(b). Para (2): in sub-para (c) words
“protected party” in square brackets substituted by SI 2007/2204, r 13. Date in force: 1 October
2007: see SI 2007/2204, r 1. Para (2): words “(“membership organisation” is defined in
rule 43.2(1)(n)).” in square brackets inserted by SI 2004/2072, r 11(b). Date in force: 1 October
2004: see SI 2004/2072, r 1(b).
[1190.5]
[45.11 Success fee
(1) A claimant may recover a success fee if he has entered into a funding arrangement
of a type specified in rule 43.2(k)(i).
[(2) The amount of the success fee shall be 12.5% of the fixed recoverable costs
calculated in accordance with rule 45.9(1), disregarding any additional amount which
may be included in the fixed recoverable costs by virtue of rule 45.9(2).]]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Para (2):
substituted by SI 2003/3361, r 9. Date in force: 1 March 2004: see SI 2003/3361, r 1(b).
[1190.6]
[45.12 Claims for an amount of costs exceeding fixed recoverable costs
(1) The court will entertain a claim for an amount of costs (excluding any success fee
or disbursements) greater than the fixed recoverable costs but only if it considers that
there are exceptional circumstances making it appropriate to do so.
(2) If the court considers such a claim appropriate, it may—
(a) assess the costs; or
(b) make an order for the costs to be assessed.
(3) If the court does not consider the claim appropriate, it must make an order for
fixed recoverable costs only.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18.
[1190.7]
[45.13 Failure to achieve costs greater than fixed recoverable costs
(1) This rule applies where—
(a) costs are assessed in accordance with rule 45.12(2); and
(b) the court assesses the costs (excluding any VAT) as being an amount which
is less than 20% greater than the amount of the fixed recoverable costs.
(2) The court must order the defendant to pay to the claimant the lesser of—
(a) the fixed recoverable costs; and
(b) the assessed costs.]
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.13 [1190.7]
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AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18.
[1190.8]
[45.14 Costs of the costs-only proceedings [or the detailed assessment]
Where—
(a) the court makes an order for fixed recoverable costs in accordance with
rule 45.12(3); or
(b) rule 45.13 applies,
the court must—
(i) make no award for the payment of the claimant’s costs in bringing the
proceedings under rule 44.12A; and
(ii) order that the claimant pay the defendant’s costs of defending those
proceedings.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2003/2113, r 12(d), Sch 2, Pt II. Date in force: 6 October 2003 (except in
relation to any costs-only proceedings arising out of a dispute, where the road traffic accident
which gave rise to the dispute occurred before that date): see SI 2003/2113, rr 1(c), 18. Provision
heading: words “or the detailed assessment” in square brackets inserted by SI 2004/3419, r 12.
Date in force: 1 April 2005: see SI 2004/3419, r 1.
[III
FIXED PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CLAIMS]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI 2004/1306,
r 1(a).
[1191]
[45.15 Scope and interpretation
(1) This Section sets out the percentage increase which is to be allowed in the cases to
which this Section applies.
(Rule 43.2(1)(l) defines ‘percentage increase’ as the percentage by which the amount of
a legal representative’s fee can be increased in accordance with a conditional fee
agreement which provides for a success fee)
(2) This Section applies where—
(a) the dispute arises from a road traffic accident; and
(b) the claimant has entered into a funding arrangement of a type specified in
rule 43.2(k)(i).
(Rule 43.2(k)(i) defines a funding arrangement as including an arrangement where a
person has entered into a conditional fee agreement or collective conditional fee
agreement which provides for a success fee)
[1190.7] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.13
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(3) This Section does not apply if the proceedings are costs only proceedings to which
Section II of this Part applies.
(4) This Section does not apply—
(a) to a claim which has been allocated to the small claims track;
(b) to a claim not allocated to a track, but for which the small claims track is
the normal track; . . .
(c) where the road traffic accident which gave rise to the dispute occurred
before 6th October 2003[; or]
[ (d)to a claim to which Section VI of this Part applies].
(5) The definitions in rule 45.7(4) apply to this Section as they apply to Section II.
(6) In this Section—
(a) a reference to ‘fees’ is a reference to fees for work done under a conditional
fee agreement or collective conditional fee agreement;
(b) a reference to ‘trial’ is a reference to the final contested hearing or to the
contested hearing of any issue ordered to be tried separately;
(c) a reference to a claim concluding at trial is a reference to a claim
concluding by settlement after the trial has commenced or by judgment;
and
(d) ‘trial period’ means a period of time fixed by the court within which the
trial is to take place and where the court fixes more than one such period
in relation to a claim, means the most recent period to be fixed.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI 2004/1306,
r 1(a). Para (4): in sub-para (b) word omitted revoked by SI 2010/621, r 8(c)(i). Date in force:
30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2). Para (4): in sub-para (c) word “; or” in square brackets
inserted by virtue of SI 2010/621, r 8(c)(ii). Date in force: 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
Para (4): sub-para (d) inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(c)(iii). Date in force: 30 April 2010: see SI
2010/621, r 1(2).
[1192]
[45.16 Percentage increase of solicitors’ fees
Subject to rule 45.18, the percentage increase which is to be allowed in relation to
solicitors’ fees is—
(a) 100% where the claim concludes at trial; or
(b) 12.5% where—
(i) the claim concludes before a trial has commenced; or
(ii) the dispute is settled before a claim is issued.]
Amendment Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI
2004/1306, r 1(a).
[1193]
[45.17 Percentage increase of counsel’s fees
(1) Subject to rule 45.18, the percentage increase which is to be allowed in relation to
counsel’s fees is—
(a) 100% where the claim concludes at trial;
(b) if the claim has been allocated to the fast track—
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.17 [1193]
BCS • Issue 96 E-245
0031 [ST: 215] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:12 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0015] 0
(i) 50% if the claim concludes 14 days or less before the date fixed for
the commencement of the trial; or
(ii) 12.5% if the claim concludes more than 14 days before the date fixed
for the commencement of the trial or before any such date has been
fixed;
(c) if the claim has been allocated to the multi-track—
(i) 75% if the claim concludes 21 days or less before the date fixed for
the commencement of the trial; or
(ii) 12.5% if the claim concludes more than 21 days before the date fixed
for the commencement of the trial or before any such date has been
fixed;
(d) 12.5% where—
(i) the claim has been issued but concludes before it has been allocated to
a track; or
(ii) in relation to costs-only proceedings, the dispute is settled before a
claim is issued.
(2) Where a trial period has been fixed, if—
(a) the claim concludes before the first day of that period; and
(b) no trial date has been fixed within that period before the claim concludes,
the first day of that period is treated as the date fixed for the commencement of the
trial for the purposes of paragraph (1).
(3) Where a trial period has been fixed, if—
(a) the claim concludes before the first day of that period; but
(b) before the claim concludes, a trial date had been fixed within that period,
the trial date is the date fixed for the commencement of the trial for the purposes of
paragraph (1).
(4) Where a trial period has been fixed and the claim concludes—
(a) on or after the first day of that period; but
(b) before commencement of the trial,
the percentage increase in paragraph (1)(b)(i) or (1)(c)(i) shall apply as appropriate,
whether or not a trial date has been fixed within that period.
(5) For the purposes of this rule, in calculating the periods of time, the day fixed for
the commencement of the trial (or the first day of the trial period, where appropriate)
is not included.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI 2004/1306,
r 1(a).
[1194]
[45.18 Application for an alternative percentage increase where the fixed increase is
12.5%
(1) This rule applies where the percentage increase to be allowed—
(a) in relation to solicitors’ fees under the provisions of rule 45.16; or
(b) in relation to counsel’s fees under rule 45.17,
is 12.5%.
(2) A party may apply for a percentage increase greater or less than that amount if—
(a) the parties agree damages of an amount greater than £500,000 or the court
awards damages of an amount greater than £500,000; or
[1193] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.17
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(b) the court awards damages of £500,000 or less but would have awarded
damages greater than £500,000 if it had not made a finding of
contributory negligence; or
[(c) the parties agree damages of £500,000 or less and it is reasonable to expect
that if the court had made an award of damages, it would have awarded
damages greater than £500,000, disregarding any reduction the court may
have made in respect of contributory negligence].
(3) In paragraph (2), a reference to a lump sum of damages includes a reference to
periodical payments of equivalent value.
(4) If the court is satisfied that the circumstances set out in paragraph (2) apply it
must—
(a) assess the percentage increase; or
(b) make an order for the percentage increase to be assessed.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI 2004/1306,
r 1(a). Para (2): sub-para (c) substituted by SI 2004/3419, r 13. Date in force: 1 April 2005: see
SI 2004/3419, r 1.
[1195]
[45.19 Assessment of alternative percentage increase
(1) This rule applies where the percentage increase of fees is assessed under
rule 45.18(4).
(2) If the percentage increase is assessed as greater than 20% or less than 7.5%, the
percentage increase to be allowed shall be that assessed by the court.
(3) If the percentage increase is assessed as no greater than 20% and no less than
7.5%—
(a) the percentage increase to be allowed shall be 12.5%; and
(b) the costs of the application and assessment shall be paid by the applicant.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/1306, r 9(b), Sch 1, Pt II. Date in force: 1 June 2004: see SI 2004/1306,
r 1(a).
[IV
FIXED PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN EMPLOYERS LIABILITY CLAIMS]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/2072, r 12, Schedule, Pt II. Date in force: 1 October 2004: see SI
2004/2072, r 1(b).
[1196]
[45.20 Scope and interpretation
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), this Section applies where—
(a) the dispute is between an employee and his employer arising from a bodily
injury sustained by the employee in the course of his employment; and
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.20 [1196]
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(b) the claimant has entered into a funding arrangement of a type specified in
rule 43.2(1)(k)(i).
(2) This Section does not apply—
(a) where the dispute—
(i) relates to a disease;
(ii) relates to an injury sustained before 1st October 2004; or
(iii) arises from a road traffic accident (as defined in rule 45.7(4)(a)); or
[(iv) relates to an injury to which Section V of this Part applies; or]
(b) to a claim—
(i) which has been allocated to the small claims track; or
(ii) not allocated to a track, but for which the small claims track is the
normal track.
(3) For the purposes of this Section—
(a) “employee” has the meaning given to it by section 2(1) of the Employers’
Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969; and
(b) a reference to “fees” is a reference to fees for work done under a
conditional fee agreement or collective conditional fee agreement.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/2072, r 12, Schedule, Pt II. Date in force: 1 October 2004: see SI
2004/2072, r 1(b). Para (2): sub-para (a)(iv) inserted by SI 2005/2292, r 39. Date in force:
1 October 2005: see SI 2005/2292, r 1(c).
[1197]
[45.21 Percentage increase of solicitors’ and counsel’s fees
In the cases to which this Section applies, subject to rule 45.22 the percentage increase
which is to be allowed in relation to solicitors’ and counsel’s fees is to be determined in
accordance with rules 45.16 and 45.17, subject to the modifications that—
(a) the percentage increase which is to be allowed in relation to solicitors’ fees
under rule 45.16(b) is—
(i) 27.5% if a membership organisation has undertaken to meet the
claimant’s liabilities for legal costs in accordance with section 30 of
the Access to Justice Act 1999; and
(ii) 25% in any other case; and
(b) the percentage increase which is to be allowed in relation to counsel’s fees
under rule 45.17(1)(b)(ii), (1)(c)(ii) or (1)(d) is 25%.
(“membership organisation” is defined in rule 43.2(1)(n))]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/2072, r 12, Schedule, Pt II. Date in force: 1 October 2004: see SI
2004/2072, r 1(b).
[1198]
[45.22 Alternative percentage increase
(1) In the cases to which this Section applies, rule 45.18(2)–(4) applies where—
(a) the percentage increase of solicitors’ fees to be allowed in accordance with
rule 45.21 is 25% or 27.5%; or
(b) the percentage increase of counsel’s fees to be allowed is 25%.
[1196] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.20
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(2) Where the percentage increase of fees is assessed by the court under rule 45.18(4)
as applied by paragraph (1) above—
(a) if the percentage increase is assessed as greater than 40% or less than 15%,
the percentage increase to be allowed shall be that assessed by the court;
and
(b) if the percentage increase is assessed as no greater than 40% and no less
than 15%—
(i) the percentage increase to be allowed shall be 25% or 27.5% (as the
case may be); and
(ii) the costs of the application and assessment shall be paid by the
applicant.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2004/2072, r 12, Schedule, Pt II. Date in force: 1 October 2004: see SI
2004/2072, r 1(b).
[VI – PRE-ACTION PROTOCOL FOR LOW VALUE PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMS IN ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
[1199]
Rule 45.27 Scope and interpretation
(1) This Section applies to claims that have been or should have been started under
Part 8 in accordance with Practice Direction 8B (“the Stage 3 Procedure”).
(2) Where a party has not complied with the RTA Protocol rule 45.36 will apply.
(3) “RTA Protocol” means the Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims in
Road Traffic Accidents.
(4) A reference to “Claim Notification Form” is a reference to the form used in the
RTA Protocol.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted, together with preceding heading, by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April
2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.1]
[Rule 45.28 Application of fixed costs, disbursements and success fee
The only costs allowed are—
(a) fixed costs in rule 45.29;
(b) disbursements in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(c) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
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[1199.2]
[Rule 45.29 Amount of fixed costs
(1) Subject to paragraph (4), the amount of fixed costs is set out in Table 1.
(2) In Table 1—
(a) “Type A fixed costs” means the legal representative’s costs;
(b) “Type B fixed costs” means the advocate’s costs; and
(c) “Type C fixed costs” means the costs for the advice on the amount of
damages where the claimant is a child.
(3) Advocate has the same meaning as in rule 46.1(2)(a).
(4) Subject to rule 45.36(2) the court will not award more or less than the amounts
shown in Table 1.
(5) Where the claimant—
(a) lives or works in an area set out in the Costs Practice Direction; and
(b) instructs a legal representative who practices in that area,
the fixed costs will include, in addition to the costs set out in Table 1, an amount
equal to 12.5% of the Stage 1 and 2 and Stage 3 Type A fixed costs.
(6) Where appropriate, value added tax (VAT) may be recovered in addition to the
amount of fixed costs and any reference in this Section to fixed costs is a reference to
those costs net of any such VAT.
Table 1 – fixed costs in relation to the RTA Protocol
Stage 1 fixed costs £400
Stage 2 fixed costs £800
Stage 3–
Type A fixed costs £250
Type B fixed costs £250
Type C fixed costs £150]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.3]
[Rule 45.30 Disbursements
(1) The court—
(a) may allow a claim for a disbursement of a type mentioned in
paragraph (2); but
(b) must not allow a claim for any other type of disbursement.
(2) The disbursements referred to in paragraph (1) are—
(a) the cost of obtaining—
(i) medical records;
(ii) a medical report or reports as provided for in the RTA Protocol;
(iii) an engineer’s report;
(iv) a search of the records of the—
(aa) Driver Vehicle Licensing Authority;
(bb) Motor Insurance Database;
(b) the amount of the insurance premium or, where a membership
organisation undertakes to meet liabilities incurred to pay the costs of
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other parties to proceedings, a sum not exceeding such additional amount
of costs as would be allowed under section 30 of the Access to Justice Act
1999 in respect of provision made against the risk of having to meet such
liabilities;
(c) court fees as a result of Part 21 being applicable;
(d) court fees payable where proceedings are started as a result of a limitation
period that is about to expire;
(e) court fees in respect of the Stage 3 Procedure;
( f ) any other disbursement that has arisen due to a particular feature of the
dispute.
(insurance premium is defined in rule 43.2(1)(m).)
(membership organisation is defined in rule 43.2(1)(n).)]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.4]
[Rule 45.31 Success fee
(1) A party who has entered into a funding arrangement of a type specified in
rule 43.2(1)(k)(i) in respect of any element of the fixed costs in rule 45.29 may recover
a success fee on that element of the fixed costs.
(2) A reference to a success fee in this Section is a reference to a success fee in
accordance with paragraph (1).
(3) Where the court—
(a) determines the claim at a Stage 3 hearing or on the papers; and
(b) awards an amount of damages that is more than the defendant’s RTA
Protocol offer,
the amount of the claimant’s success fee is—
(i) 12.5% of the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs; and
(ii) 100% of the relevant Stage 3 fixed costs.
(RTA Protocol offer is defined in rule 36.17.)
(4) Where the court—
(a) determines the claim at a Stage 3 hearing or on the papers; and
(b) awards an amount of damages that is equal to or less than the
defendant’s RTA Protocol offer,
the amount of the defendant’s success fee is 100% of the relevant Stage 3 fixed
costs.
(5) Where the claimant is a child and the court—
(a) does not approve a settlement at a settlement hearing;
(b) determines the claim at a Stage 3 hearing; and
(c) awards an amount of damages that is more than the amount of the
settlement considered by the court at the first settlement hearing;
the amount of the claimant’s success fee is—
(i) 12.5% of the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs;
(ii) 100% of the relevant Stage 3 fixed costs.
(6) Where paragraphs (3) to (5) do not apply the success fee is—
(a) 12.5% of Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs; and
(b) 12.5% of the relevant Stage 3 fixed costs.
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(7) The amount of the success fee set out in paragraphs (3) to (6) will be calculated
without regard to any additional amount which may be included in the fixed costs by
virtue of rule 45.29(5).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.5]
[Rule 45.32 Where the claimant obtains judgment for an amount more than the
defendant’s RTA Protocol offer
(1) Where rule 36.21(1)(b) or (c) applies, the court will order the defendant to pay—
(a) where not already paid by the defendant, the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs;
(b) where the claim is determined—
(i) on the papers, Stage 3 Type A fixed costs;
(ii) at a Stage 3 hearing, Stage 3 Type A and B fixed costs; or
(iii) at a Stage 3 hearing and the claimant is a child, Type A, B and C fixed
costs;
(c) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(3).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.6]
[Rule 45.33 Settlement at Stage 2 where the claimant is a child
(1) This rule applies where—
(a) the claimant is a child;
(b) there is a settlement at Stage 2 of the RTA Protocol; and
(c) an application is made to the court to approve the settlement.
(2) Where the court approves the settlement at a settlement hearing it will order the
defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs;
(b) the Stage 3 Type A, B and C fixed costs;
(c) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6).
(3) Where the court does not approve the settlement at a settlement hearing it will
order the defendant to pay the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs.
(4) Paragraphs (5) and (6) apply where the court does not approve the settlement at
the first settlement hearing but does approve the settlement at a second settlement
hearing.
(5) At the second settlement hearing the court will order the defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 3 Type A and C fixed costs for the first settlement hearing;
(b) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30;
(c) the Stage 3 Type B fixed costs for one of the hearings; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6) on the Stage 1 and 2 fixed
costs and the Stage 3 Type A, B and C fixed costs.
(6) The court in its discretion may also order—
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(a) the defendant to pay—
(i) an additional amount of either or both the Stage 3—
(aa) Type A fixed costs;
(bb) Type B fixed costs; and
(ii) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6) on the additional Stage
3 fixed costs in sub-paragraph (a)(i);
(b) the claimant to pay an amount equivalent to either or both the Stage 3—
(i) Type A fixed costs;
(ii) Type B fixed costs.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.7]
[Rule 45.34 Settlement at Stage 3 where the claimant is a child
(1) This rule applies where—
(a) the claimant is a child;
(b) there is a settlement after proceedings are started under the Stage 3
Procedure;
(c) the settlement is more than the defendant’s RTA Protocol offer; and
(d) an application is made to the court to approve the settlement.
(2) Where the court approves the settlement at the settlement hearing it will order the
defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs;
(b) the Stage 3 Type A, B and C fixed costs;
(c) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6).
(3) Where the court does not approve the settlement at the settlement hearing it will
order the defendant to pay the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs.
(3) Paragraphs (5) and (6) apply where the court does not approve the settlement at
the first settlement hearing but does approve the settlement at the Stage 3 hearing.
(5) At the Stage 3 hearing the court will order the defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 3 Type A and C fixed costs for the settlement hearing;
(b) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30;
(c) the Stage 3 Type B fixed costs for one of the hearings; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6) on the Stage 1 and 2 fixed
costs and the Stage 3 Type A, B and C fixed costs.
(6) The court in its discretion may also order—
(a) the defendant to pay—
(i) an additional amount of either or both the Stage 3—
(aa) Type A fixed costs;
(bb) Type B fixed costs; and
(ii) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6) on the additional Stage
3 fixed costs in sub-paragraph (a)(i); or
(b) the claimant to pay an amount equivalent to either or both of the Stage 3—
(i) Type A fixed costs;
(ii) Type B fixed costs.
(7) Where the settlement is not approved at the Stage 3 hearing the court will
order the defendant to pay the Stage 3 Type A fixed costs.]
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AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.8]
[Rule 45.35 Where the court orders the claim is not suitable to be determined under
the Stage 3 Procedure and the claimant is a child
Where—
(a) the claimant is a child; and
(b) at a settlement hearing or the Stage 3 hearing the court orders that the
claim is not suitable to be determined under the Stage 3 Procedure, the
court will order the defendant to pay—
(i) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs; and
(ii) the Stage 3 Type A, B and C fixed costs.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.9]
[Rule 45.36 Failure to comply or electing not to continue with the RTA Protocol –
costs consequences
(1) This rule applies where the claimant—
(a) does not comply with the process set out in the RTA Protocol;
(b) elects not to continue with that process, and starts proceedings under
Part 7.
(2) Where a judgment is given in favour of the claimant but—
(a) the court determines that the defendant did not proceed with the process
set out in the RTA Protocol because the claimant provided insufficient
information on the Claim Notification Form;
(b) the court considers that the claimant acted unreasonably—
(i) by discontinuing the process set out in the RTA Protocol and starting
proceedings under Part 7;
(ii) by valuing the claim at more than £10,000, so that the claimant did
not need to comply with the RTA Protocol; or
(iii) except for paragraph (2)(a), in any other way that caused the process
in the RTA Protocol to be discontinued; or
(c) the claimant did not comply with the RTA Protocol at all despite the claim
falling within the scope of the RTA Protocol;
the court may order the defendant to pay no more than the fixed costs in rule 45.29
together with the disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30 and success
fee in accordance with rule 45.31(3).
(3) Where the claimant starts proceedings under paragraph 7.22 of the RTA Protocol
and the court orders the defendant to make an interim payment of no more than the
interim payment made under paragraph 7.14(2) or (3) of that Protocol the court will,
on the final determination of the proceedings, order the defendant to pay no more
than—
(a) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs;
(b) the disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
[1199.7] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 45.34
E-254 BCS • Issue 96
0040 [ST: 215] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:13 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0015] 0
(c) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(3).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.10]
[Rule 45.37 Where the parties have settled after proceedings have started
(1) This rule applies where an application is made under rule 44.12C (costs-only
application after a claim is started under Part 8 in accordance with Practice Direction
8B).
(2) Where the settlement is more than the defendant’s RTA Protocol offer the court
will order the defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs where not already paid by the defendant;
(b) the Stage 3 Type A fixed costs;
(c) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(d) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6).
(3) Where the settlement is less than or equal to the defendant’s RTA Protocol offer
the court will order the defendant to pay—
(a) the Stage 1 and 2 fixed costs where not already paid by the defendant;
(b) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(c) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(6).
(4) The court may, in its discretion, order either party to pay the costs of the
application.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.11]
[Rule 45.38 Where the claimant obtains judgment for an amount equal to or less than
the defendant’s RTA Protocol offer
Where rule 36.21(1)(a) applies, the court will order the claimant to pay—
(a) where the claim is determined—
(i) on the papers, Stage 3 Type A fixed costs; or
(ii) at a hearing, Stage 3 Type A and B fixed costs;
(b) disbursements allowed in accordance with rule 45.30; and
(c) a success fee in accordance with rule 45.31(4).]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.12]
[Rule 45.39 Adjournment
Where the court adjourns a settlement hearing or a Stage 3 hearing it may, in its
discretion, order a party to pay—
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(a) an additional amount of the Stage 3 Type B fixed costs; and
(b) any court fee for that adjournment.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[1199.13]
[Rule 45.40 Account of payment of Stage 1 fixed costs
Where a claim no longer continues under the RTA Protocol the court will, when
making any order as to costs including an order for fixed recoverable costs under
Section II of this Part, take into account the Stage 1 fixed costs together with any
success fee on those costs that have been paid by the defendant.]
AMENDMENT
Inserted by SI 2010/621, r 8(d), Sch 2 as from 30 April 2010: see SI 2010/621, r 1(2).
[VII
SCALE COSTS FOR CLAIMS IN A PATENTS COUNTY COURT]
Amendment Inserted by SI 2010/1953, r 5(b), Sch 2. Date in force: 1 October 2010: see SI
2010/1953, r 1(2).
[1199.14]
[45.41 Scope and interpretation
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) this Section applies to proceedings in a patents county
court.
(2) This Section does not apply where—
(a) the court considers that a party has behaved in a manner which amounts to
an abuse of the court’s process; or
(b) the claim concerns the infringement or revocation of a patent or registered
design the validity of which has been certified by a court in earlier
proceedings.
(3) The court will make a summary assessment of the costs of the party in whose
favour any order for costs is made. Rules 44.3(8), 44.3A(2)(b) and (c), 44.7(b) and
Part 47 do not apply to this Section.
(4) “Scale costs” means costs as defined in rule 43.2(1)(a).]
Amendment Inserted by SI 2010/1953, r 5(b), Sch 2. Date in force: 1 October 2010: see SI
2010/1953, r 1(2).
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[1199.15]
[45.42 Amount of scale costs
(1) Subject to rule 45.43 the court will not order a party to pay total costs of more
than—
(a) £50,000 on the final determination of a claim in relation to liability; and
(b) £25,000 on an inquiry as to damages or account of profits.
(2) The amounts in paragraph (1) apply after the court has applied the provision on
set off in accordance with rule 44.3(9)(a).
(3) The maximum amount of scale costs that the court will award for each stage of
the claim is set out in the Costs Practice Direction.
(4) The amount of the scale costs awarded by the court in accordance with
paragraph (3) will depend on the nature and complexity of the claim.
(5) The amount of the scale costs awarded by the court in accordance with
paragraph (3) will depend on the nature and complexity of the claim.]
Amendment Inserted by SI 2010/1953, r 5(b), Sch 2. Date in force: 1 October 2010: see SI
2010/1953, r 1(2).
[1199.16]
[45.43 Summary assessment of the costs of an application where a party has
behaved unreasonably
Costs awarded to a party under rule 63.26(2) are in addition to the total costs that
may be awarded to that party under rule 45.42.]
Amendment Inserted by SI 2010/1953, r 5(b), Sch 2. Date in force: 1 October 2010: see SI
2010/1953, r 1(2).
[VIII
FIXED COSTS: HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS]
Amendments Inserted by SI 2011/88, r 11(b), Sch 1. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI
2011/88, r 1.
[1199.17]
[45.44 Scope, interpretation and application
(1) This Section sets out the amounts which, unless the court orders otherwise, are to
be allowed in respect of HM Revenue & Customs charges (“HMRC charges”) in the
cases to which this Section applies.
(2) For the purpose of this Section—
“HMRC Officer” means a person appointed by the Commissioners under section 2 of
the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 and authorised to conduct
county court proceedings for recovery of debt under section 25(1A) of that Act;
“debt” means any sum payable to the Commissioners under or by virtue of an
enactment or under a contract settlement; and
“HMRC charges” means the fixed costs set out in Tables 9 and 10 in this Section.
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(3) HMRC charges shall, for the purpose of this Section, be claimed as “solicitor
costs” on relevant court forms.
(4) This Section applies where the only claim is a claim conducted by an HMRC
Officer in the county court for recovery of a debt and the Commissioners obtain
judgment on the claim
(5) Any appropriate court fee will be allowed in addition to the costs set out in this
Section.
(6) The claim form may include a claim for fixed commencement costs.]
Amendments Inserted by SI 2011/88, r 11(b), Sch 1. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI
2011/88, r 1.
[1199.18]
[45.45 Amount of fixed commencement costs in a county court claim for the recovery
of money
Where—
(a) shall be calculated by reference to Table 9; and
(b) the amount claimed in the claim form is to be used for determining which
claim band in Table 9 applies.
TABLE 9
FIXED COSTS ON COMMENCEMENT OF A COUNTY COURT CLAIM
CONDUCTED BY AN HMRC OFFICER
Where the value of the claim exceeds £25
but does not exceed £500
£33
Where the value of the claim exceeds £500
but does not exceed £1,000
£47
Where the value of the claim exceeds £1,000
but does not exceed £5,000
£56
Where the value of the claim exceeds £5,000
but does not exceed £15,000
£67
Where the value of the claim exceeds £15,000
but does not exceed £50,000
£90
Where the value of the claim exceeds £50,000
but does not exceed £100,000
£113
Where the value of the claim exceeds £100,000
but does not exceed £150,000
£127
Where the value of the claim exceeds £150,000
but does not exceed £200,000
£140
Where the value of the claim exceeds £200,000
but does not exceed £250,000
£153
Where the value of the claim exceeds £250,000
but does not exceed £300,000
£167
Where the value of the claim exceeds £300,000 £180]
Amendments Inserted by SI 2011/88, r 11(b), Sch 1. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI
2011/88, r 1.
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[1199.19]
[45.46 Costs on entry of judgment in a county court claim for recovery of money
Where—
(a) an HMRC Officer has claimed fixed commencement costs under Rule
45.45; and
(b) judgment is entered in a claim to which rule 45.44 applies the amount to
be included in the judgment for HMRC charges is the total of—
(i) the fixed commencement costs; and
(ii) the amount in Table 10 relevant to the value of the claim.
TABLE 10
FIXED COSTS ON ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN A COUNTY COURT CLAIM
CONDUCTED BY AN HMRC OFFICER
Where the value of the claim does not exceed £5,000 £15
Where the value of the claim exceeds £5,000 £20]
Amendments Inserted by SI 2011/88, r 11(b), Sch 1. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI
2011/88, r 1.
[1199.20]–[1200]
[45.47 When the defendant is only liable for fixed commencement costs
Where—
(a) the only claim is for a specified sum of money; and
(b) the defendant pays the money claimed within 14 days after service of the
particulars of claim, together with the fixed commencement costs stated in
the claim form,
the defendant is not liable for any further costs unless the court orders otherwise.]
Amendments Inserted by SI 2011/88, r 11(b), Sch 1. Date in force: 6 April 2011: see SI
2011/88, r 1.
PART 46
FAST TRACK TRIAL COSTS
[1201]
46.1 Scope of this part
(1) This Part deals with the amount of costs which the court may award as the costs
of an advocate for preparing for and appearing at the trial of a claim in the fast track
(referred to in this rule as ‘fast track trial costs’).
(2) For the purposes of this Part –
(a) ‘advocate’ means a person exercising a right of audience as a representative
of, or on behalf of, a party;
(b) ‘fast track trial costs’ means the costs of a party’s advocate for preparing
for and appearing at the trial, but does not include –
(i) any other disbursements; or
(ii) any value added tax payable on the fees of a party’s advocate; and
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(c) ‘trial’ includes a hearing where the court decides an amount of money or
the value of goods following a judgment under Part 12 (default judgment)
or Part 14 (admissions) but does not include –
(i) the hearing of an application for summary judgment under Part 24;
or
(ii) the court’s approval of a settlement or other compromise under
rule 21.10.
(Part 21 deals with claims made by or on behalf of, or against, children and [protected
parties])
AMENDMENT
Para (2): words “protected parties” in square brackets substituted by SI 2007/2204, r 14(a).
Date in force: 1 October 2007: see SI 2007/2204, r 1.
[1202]
46.2 Amount of fast track trial costs
(1) The following table shows the amount of fast track trial costs which the court
may award (whether by summary or detailed assessment).
VALUE OF THE CLAIM AMOUNT OF FAST TRACK
TRIAL COSTS WHICH THE
COURT MAY AWARD
[No more than £3,000] [£485]
More than £3,000 but not more than £10,000 [£690]
More than £10,000 [but not more than £15,000] [£1,035]
[For proceedings issued on or after 6th April
2009, more than £15,000
£1,650]
(2) The court may not award more or less than the amount shown in the table except
where—
(a) it decides not to award any fast track trial costs; or
(b) rule 46.3 applies,
but the court may apportion the amount awarded between the parties to reflect
their respective degrees of success on the issues at trial.
(3) Where the only claim is for the payment of money –
(a) for the purpose of quantifying fast track trial costs awarded to a claimant,
the value of the claim is the total amount of the judgment excluding—
(i) interest and costs; and
(ii) any reduction made for contributory negligence,
(b) for the purpose [of quantifying] fast track trial costs awarded to a
defendant, the value of the claim is –
(i) the amount specified in the claim form (excluding interest and costs);
(ii) if no amount is specified, the maximum amount which the claimant
reasonably expected to recover according to the statement of value
included in the claim form under rule 16.3; or
(iii) more than [£15,000], if the claim form states that the claimant cannot
reasonably say how much [is likely to be recovered].
(4) Where the claim is only for a remedy other than the payment of money the value
of the claim is deemed to be more than £3,000 but not more than £10,000, unless the
court orders otherwise.
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(5) Where the claim includes both a claim for the payment of money and for a
remedy other than the payment of money, the value of the claim is deemed to be the
higher of –
(a) the value of the money claim decided in accordance with paragraph (3); or
(b) the deemed value of the other remedy decided in accordance with
paragraph (4),
unless the court orders otherwise.
(6) Where –
(a) a defendant has made a counterclaim against the claimant;
(b) the counterclaim has a higher value than the claim; and
(c) the claimant succeeds at trial both on [the] claim and the counterclaim,
. . .
(Rule 20.4 sets out how a defendant may make a counterclaim)
AMENDMENT
Para (1): in table words “No more than £3,000” in square brackets substituted by SI
2007/2204, r 14(b)(i). Date in force: 1 October 2007 (except where the hearing of the fast track
trial commences before that date): see SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22. Para (1): in table sum “£485” in
square brackets substituted by SI 2007/2204, r 14(b)(ii). Date in force: 1 October 2007 (except
where the hearing of the fast track trial commences before that date): see SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22.
Para (1): in table sum “£690” in square brackets substituted by SI 2007/2204, r 14(b)(iii). Date
in force: 1 October 2007 (except where the hearing of the fast track trial commences before that
date): see SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22. Para (1): in table sum “£1,035” in square brackets substituted
by SI 2007/2204, r 14(b)(iv). Date in force: 1 October 2007 (except where the hearing of the fast
track trial commences before that date): see SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22. Para (1): in table words “but
not more than £15,000” in square brackets inserted by SI 2008/3327, r 10(a)(i). Date in force:
6 April 2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1. Para (1): in table entry beginning “For proceedings issued on
or after 6th April 2009” inserted by SI 2008/3327, r 10(a)(ii). Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI
2008/3327, r 1. Para (3): in sub-para (b) words “of quantifying” in square brackets substituted
by SI 2008/3327, r 10(b)(i). Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1. Para (3): in sub-
para (b)(iii) sum “£15,000” in square brackets substituted by SI 2008/3327, r 10(b)(ii)(aa). Date
in force: 6 April 2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1. Para (3): in sub-para (b)(iii) words “is likely to be
recovered” in square brackets substituted by SI 2008/3327, r 10(b)(ii)(bb). Date in force: 6 April
2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1. Para (6): in sub-para (c) word “the” in square brackets substituted
by SI 2008/3327, r 10(c). Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI 2008/3327, r 1. Parenthesis below
para (6) (omitted) revoked by SI 2008/3327, r 10(d). Date in force: 6 April 2009: see SI
2008/3327, r 1.
[1203]
46.3 Power to award more or less than the amount of fast track trial costs
(1) This rule sets out when a court may award –
(a) an additional amount to the amount of fast track trial costs shown in the
table in rule 46.2(1); and
(b) less than those amounts.
(2) If –
(a) in addition to the advocate, a party’s legal representative attends the trial;
(b) the court considers that it was necessary for a legal representative to attend
to assist the advocate; and
(c) the court awards fast track trial costs to that party,
the court may award an additional [£345] in respect of the legal
representative’s attendance at the trial.
(Legal representative is defined in rule 2.3)
[(2A) The court may in addition award a sum representing an additional liability.
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(The requirements to provide information about a funding arrangement where a party
wishes to recover any additional liability under a funding arrangement are set out in
the [Costs Practice Direction])
(‘Additional liability’ is defined in rule 43.2)]
(3) If the court considers that it is necessary to direct a separate trial of an issue then
the court may award an additional amount in respect of the separate trial but that
amount is limited in accordance with paragraph (4) of this rule.
(4) The additional amount the court may award under paragraph 3 must not exceed
two-thirds of the amount payable for that claim, subject to a minimum award of
[£485].
(5) Where the party to whom fast track trial costs are to be awarded is a litigant in
person, the court will award –
(a) if the litigant in person can prove financial loss, two-thirds of the amount
that would otherwise be awarded; or
(b) if the litigant in person fails to prove financial loss, an amount in respect of
the time spent reasonably doing the work at the rate specified in the [Costs
Practice Direction].
(6) Where a defendant has made a counterclaim against the claimant, and—
(a) the claimant has succeeded on his claim; and
(b) the defendant has succeeded on his counterclaim, the court will quantify
the amount of the award of fast track trial costs to which –
(i) but for the counterclaim, the claimant would be entitled for
succeeding on his claim; and
(ii) but for the claim, the defendant would be entitled for succeeding on
his counterclaim,
and make one award of the difference, if any, to the party entitled to the higher
award of costs.
(7) Where the court considers that the party to whom fast track trial costs are to be
awarded has behaved unreasonably or improperly during the trial, it may award that
party an amount less than would otherwise be payable for that claim, as it considers
appropriate.
(8) Where the court considers that the party who is to pay the fast track trial costs
has behaved improperly during the trial the court may award such additional amount
to the other party as it considers appropriate.
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AMENDMENT
Para (2): sum “£345” in square brackets substituted by SI 2007/2204, r 14(c). Date in force:
1 October 2007 (except where the hearing of the fast track trial commences before that date): see
SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22. Para (2A): inserted by SI 2000/1317, r 21. Date in force: 3 July 2000
(with transitional provisions relating to proceedings started in respect of a claim the subject of a
funding arrangement entered into before that date): see SI 2000/1317, rr 1, 39. First parenthesis
below para (2A): words in square brackets substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 24(a). Date in force:
6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2). Para (4): sum “£485” in square brackets substituted by SI
2007/2204, r 14(d). Date in force: 1 October 2007 (except where the hearing of the fast track
trial commences before that date): see SI 2007/2204, rr 1, 22. Para (5): words in square brackets
substituted by SI 2009/3390, r 24(b). Date in force: 6 April 2010: see SI 2009/3390, r 1(2).
[1204]–[1220]
46.4 Fast track trial costs where there is more than one claimant or defendant
(1) Where the same advocate is acting for more than one party –
(a) the court may make only one award in respect of fast track trial costs
payable to that advocate; and
(b) the parties for whom the advocate is acting are jointly entitled to any fast
track trial costs awarded by the court.
(2) Where –
(a) the same advocate is acting for more than one claimant; and
(b) each claimant has a separate claim against the defendant,
the value of the claim, for the purpose of quantifying the award in respect of fast track
trial costs is to be ascertained in accordance with paragraph (3).
(3) The value of the claim in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (2) is –
(a) where the only claim of each claimant is for the payment of money –
(i) if the award of fast track trial costs is in favour of the claimants, the
total amount of the judgment made in favour of all the claimants
jointly represented; or
(ii) if the award is in favour of the defendant, the total amount claimed
by the claimants,
and in either case, quantified in accordance with rule 46.2(3);
(b) where the only claim of each claimant is for a remedy other than the
payment of money, deemed to be more than £3,000 but not more than
£10,000; and
(c) where claims of the claimants include both a claim for the payment of
money and for a remedy other than the payment of money, deemed to be—
(i) more than £3,000 but not more than £10,000; or
(ii) if greater, the value of the money claims calculated in accordance with
sub paragraph (a) above.
(4) Where—
(a) there is more than one defendant; and
(b) any or all of the defendants are separately represented,
the court may award fast track trial costs to each party who is separately
represented.
(5) Where—
(a) there is more than one claimant; and
(b) a single defendant,
the court may make only one award to the defendant of fast track trial costs, for
which the claimants are jointly and severally liable.
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(6) For the purpose of quantifying the fast track trial costs awarded to the single
defendant under paragraph (5), the value of the claim is to be calculated in accordance
with paragraph (3) of this rule.
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PRACTICE DIRECTION ABOUT COSTS
SECTION 8 COURT’S DISCRETION AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT WHEN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION AS TO COSTS:
RULE 44.3
[1221]
8.3
(1) The court may make an order about costs at any stage in a case.
(2) In particular the court may make an order about costs when it deals with any
application, makes any order or holds any hearing and that order about costs
may relate to the costs of that application, order or hearing.
(3) Rule 44.3A(1) provides that the court will not assess any additional liability
until the conclusion of the proceedings or the part of the proceedings to which
the funding arrangement relates. (Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 above explain when
proceedings are concluded. As to the time when detailed assessment may be
carried out see paragraphs 28.1, below.)
SECTION 9 COSTS ORDERS RELATING TO FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS:
RULE 44.3A
[1222]
9.1 Under an order for payment of ‘costs’ the costs payable will include an additional
liability incurred under a funding arrangement.
9.2 (1) If before the conclusion of the proceedings the court carries out a summary
assessment of the base costs it may identify separately the amount allowed in respect of:
solicitors’ charges; counsels’ fees; other disbursements; and any value added tax (VAT).
(Sections 13 and 14 of this Practice Direction deal with summary assessment.)
(2) If an order for the base costs of a previous application or hearing did not identify
separately the amounts allowed for solicitor’s charges, counsel’s fees and other
disbursements, a court which later makes an assessment of an additional liability may
apportion the base costs previously ordered.
SECTION 10 LIMITS ON RECOVERY UNDER FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS:
RULE 44.3B
[1223]
10.1 In a case to which rule 44.3B(1)(c) or (d) applies the party in default may apply
for relief from the sanction. He should do so as quickly as possible after he becomes
aware of the default. An application, supported by evidence, should be made under
Part 23 to a costs judge or district judge of the court which is dealing with the case.
(Attention is drawn to rules 3.8 and 3.9 which deal with sanctions and relief from
sanctions).
10.2 Where the amount of any percentage increase recoverable by counsel may be
affected by the outcome of the application, the solicitor issuing the application must
serve on counsel a copy of the application notice and notice of the hearing as soon as
practicable and in any event at least 2 days before the hearing. Counsel may make
written submissions or may attend and make oral submissions at the hearing.
(Paragraph 1.4 contains definitions of the terms ‘counsel’ and ‘solicitor’.)
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SECTION 13 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT: GENERAL PROVISIONS
[1224]
13.12 (1) Attention is drawn to rule 44.3A which prevents the court from making a
summary assessment of an additional liability before the conclusion of the proceedings
or the part of the proceedings to which the funding arrangement relates. Where this
applies, the court should nonetheless make a summary assessment of the base costs of
the hearing or application unless there is a good reason not to do so.
(2) Where the court makes a summary assessment of the base costs all statements of
costs and costs estimates put before the judge will be retained on the court file.
SECTION 14 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT WHERE COSTS CLAIMED INCLUDE
AN ADDITIONAL LIABILITY
Orders made before the conclusion of the proceedings
[1225]
14.1 The existence of a conditional fee agreement or other funding arrangement
within the meaning of rule 43.2 is not by itself a sufficient reason for not carrying out
a summary assessment.
14.2 Where a legal representative acting for the receiving party has entered into a
conditional fee agreement the court may summarily assess all the costs (other than any
additional liability).
14.3 Where costs have been summarily assessed an order for payment will not be
made unless the court has been satisfied that in respect of the costs claimed, the
receiving party is at the time liable to pay to his legal representative an amount equal
to or greater than the costs claimed. A statement in the form of the certificate appended
at the end of Form N260 may be sufficient proof of liability. The giving of information
under rule 44.15(where that rule applies) is not sufficient.
14.4 The court may direct that any costs, for which the receiving party may not in the
event be liable, shall be paid into court to await the outcome of the case, or shall not
be enforceable until further order, or it may postpone the receiving party’s right to
receive payment in some other way.
Orders made at the conclusion of the proceedings
14.5 Where there has been a trial of one or more issues separately from other issues,
the court will not normally order detailed assessment of the additional liability until all
issues have been tried unless the parties agree.
14.6 Rule 44.3A(2) sets out the ways in which the court may deal with the assessment
of the costs where there is a funding arrangement. Where the court makes a summary
assessment of the base costs:
(1) The order may state separately the base costs allowed as (a) solicitor’s charges,
(b) counsel’s fees, (c) any other disbursements and (d) any VAT;
(2) the statements of costs upon which the judge based his summary assessment will
be retained on the court file.
14.7 Where the court makes a summary assessment of an additional liability at the
conclusion of proceedings, that assessment must relate to the whole of the proceedings;
this will include any additional liability relating to base costs allowed by the court when
making a summary assessment on a previous application or hearing.
[1223] Practice Direction about Costs
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14.8 Paragraph 13.13 applies where the parties are agreed about the total amount to
be paid by way of costs, or are agreed about the amount of the base costs that will be
paid. Where they disagree about the additional liability the court may summarily assess
that liability or make an order for a detailed assessment.
14.9 In order to facilitate the court in making a summary assessment of any
additional liability at the conclusion of the proceedings the party seeking such costs
must prepare and have available for the court a bundle of documents which must
include –
(1) a copy of every notice of funding arrangement (Form N251) which has been filed
by him;
(2) a copy of every estimate and statement of costs filed by him;
(3) a copy of the risk assessment prepared at the time any relevant funding
arrangement was entered into and on the basis of which the amount of the
additional liability was fixed.
SECTION 17 COSTS – ONLY PROCEEDINGS: RULE 44.12A
[1226]
17.1 A claim form under this rule should be issued in the court which would have
been the appropriate office in accordance with rule 47.4 had proceedings been brought
in relation to the substantive claim. A claim form under this rule should not be issued
in the High Court unless the dispute to which the agreement relates was of such a value
or type that had proceedings been begun they would have been commenced in the
High Court.
17.2 A claim form which is to be issued in the High Court at the Royal Courts of
Justice will be issued in the [Costs Office].
17.3 Attention is drawn to rule 8.2 (in particular to paragraph (b)(ii)) and to
rule 44.12A(3). The claim form must:
(1) identify the claim or dispute to which the agreement to pay costs relates;
(2) state the date and terms of the agreement on which the claimant relies;
(3) set out or have attached to it a draft of the order which the claimant seeks;
(4) state the amount of the costs claimed; and,
(5) state whether the costs are claimed on the standard or indemnity basis. If no
basis is specified the costs will be treated as being claimed on the standard basis.
17.4 The evidence to be filed and served with the claim form under Rule 8.5 must
include copies of the documents on which the claimant relies to prove the defen-
dant’s agreement to pay costs.
17.5 A costs judge or a district judge has jurisdiction to hear and decide any issue
which may arise in a claim issued under this rule irrespective of the amount of the costs
claimed or of the value of the claim to which the agreement to pay costs relates. A court
officer may make an order by consent under paragraph 17.7, or an order dismissing a
claim under paragraph 17.9 below.
17.6 When the time for filing the defendant’s acknowledgement of service has
expired, the claimant may by letter request the court to make an order in the terms of
his claim, unless the defendant has filed an acknowledgement of service stating that he
intends to contest the claim or to seek a different order.
17.7 Rule 40.6 applies where an order is to be made by consent. An order may be
made by consent in terms which differ from those set out in the claim form.
17.8 (1) An order for costs made under this rule will be treated as an order for the
amount of costs to be decided by a detailed assessment to which Part 47 and the
practice directions relating to it apply. Rule 44.4(4) (determination of basis of
assessment) also applies to the order.
Practice Direction about Costs [1226]
BCS • Issue 96 E-267
0003 [ST: 265] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:23 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0016] 0
. . .
17.9 A claim will be treated as opposed for the purposes of rule 44.12A(4)(b) if the
defendant files an acknowledgement of service stating that he intends to contest the
proceedings or to seek a different remedy. An order dismissing it will be made as soon
as such an acknowledgement is filed. The dismissal of a claim under rule 44.12A(4)
does not prevent the claimant from issuing another claim form under Part 7 or Part 8
based on the agreement or alleged agreement to which the proceedings under this
rule related.
17.10 (1) Rule 8.9 (which provides that claims issued under Part 8 shall be treated as
allocated to the multi-track) shall not apply to claims issued under this rule. A claim
issued under this rule may be dealt with without being allocated to a track.
(2) Rule 8.1(3) and Part 24 do not apply to proceedings brought under rule 44.12A.
17.11 Nothing in this rule prevents a person from issuing a claim form under Part 7
or Part 8 to sue on an agreement made in settlement of a dispute where that agreement
makes provision for costs, nor from claiming in that case an order for costs or a
specified sum in respect of costs.
AMENDMENT
Para 17.2: words in square brackets substituted by the 50th Practice Direction update, with effect
from 1 October 2009. Para 17.8(2): omitted by the 51st Practice Direction update, with effect
from 6 April 2010.
SECTION 19 PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT FUNDING
ARRANGEMENTS: RULE 44.15
[1227]
19.1 (1) A party who wishes to claim an additional liability in respect of a funding
arrangement must give any other party information about that claim if he is to recover
the additional liability. There is no requirement to specify the amount of the additional
liability separately nor to state how it is calculated until it falls to be assessed. That
principle is reflected in rules 44.3A and 44.15, in the following paragraphs and in
Sections 6, 13, 14 and 31 of this Practice Direction. Section 6 deals with estimates of
costs, Sections 13 and 14 deal with summary assessment and Section 31 deals with
detailed assessment.
(2) In the following paragraphs a party who has entered into a funding arrangement is
treated as a person who intends to recover a sum representing an additional liability by
way of costs.
(3) Attention is drawn to paragraph 57.9 of this Practice Direction which sets out time
limits for the provision of information where a funding arrangement is entered into
between 31 March and 2 July 2000 and proceedings relevant to that arrangement are
commenced before 3 July 2000.
Method of giving information
19.2 (1) In this paragraph, ‘claim form’ includes petition and application notice, and
the notice of funding to be filed or served is a notice containing the information set out
in Form N251.
(2)
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(a) A claimant who has entered into a funding arrangement before starting the
proceedings to which it relates must provide information to the court by filing
the notice when he issues the claim form.
(b) He must provide information to every other party by serving the notice. If he
serves the claim form himself he must serve the notice with the claim form. If the
court is to serve the claim form, the court will also serve the notice if the
claimant provides it with sufficient copies for service.
(3) A defendant who has entered into a funding arrangement before filing any
document
(a) must provide information to the court by filing notice with his first document.
A ‘first document’ may be an acknowledgement of service, a defence, or any
other document, such as an application to set aside a default judgment.
(b) must provide information to every party by serving notice. If he serves his first
document himself he must serve the notice with that document. If the court is to
serve his first document the court will also serve the notice if the defendant
provides it with sufficient copies for service.
(4) In all other circumstances a party must file and serve notice within 7 days of entering
into the funding arrangement concerned.
[(Practice Direction (Pre-Action Conduct) provides that a party must inform any other
party as soon as possible about a funding arrangement entered into prior to the start of
proceedings.)]
Notice of change of information
19.3 (1) Rule 44.15 imposes a duty on a party to give notice of change if the
information he has previously provided is no longer accurate. To comply he must file
and serve notice containing the information set out in Form N251. Rule 44.15(3) may
impose other duties in relation to new estimates of costs.
(2) Further notification need not be provided where a party has already given notice:
(a) that he has entered into a conditional fee agreement with a legal representative
and during the currency of that agreement either of them enters into another
such agreement with an additional legal representative; or
(b) of some insurance cover, unless that cover is cancelled or unless new cover is
taken out with a different insurer.
(3) Part 6 applies to the service of notices.
(4) The notice must be signed by the party or by his legal representative.
Information which must be provided
19.4 (1) Unless the court otherwise orders, a party who is required to supply
information about a funding arrangement must state whether he has –
entered into a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee within the
meaning of section 58(2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990; taken out an
insurance policy to which section 29 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applies;
made an arrangement with a body which is prescribed for the purpose of section 30 of
that Act;
or more than one of these.
(2) Where the funding arrangement is a conditional fee agreement, the party must state
the date of the agreement and identify the claim or claims to which it relates (including
Part 20 claims if any).
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[(3) Where the funding arrangement is an insurance policy, the party must—
(a) state the name and address of the insurer, the policy number and the date of the
policy and identify the claim or claims to which it relates (including
Part 20 claims if any);
(b) state the level of cover provided by the insurance; and
(c) state whether the insurance premiums are staged and, if so, the points at which
an increased premium is payable.]
(4) Where the funding arrangement is by way of an arrangement with a relevant body
the party must state the name of the body and set out the date and terms of the
undertaking it has given and must identify the claim or claims to which it relates
(including Part 20 claims if any).
(5) Where a party has entered into more than one funding arrangement in respect of a
claim, for example a conditional fee agreement and an insurance policy, a single notice
containing the information set out in Form N251 may contain the required information
about both or all of them
19.5 Where the court makes a Group Litigation Order, the court may give directions
as to the extent to which individual parties should provide information in accordance
with rule 44.15.
[(Part 19 deals with Group Litigation Orders.)]
AMENDMENT
Paras 19.2, 19.4(3), 19.5: words in square brackets substituted by the 50th Practice Direction
update, with effect from 1 October 2009.
SECTION 20 PROCEDURE WHERE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE WISHES TO
Recover from his Client an Agreed percentage Increase Which has been Disallowed
or Reduced on Assessment: Rule 44.16
[1228]
20.1 Attention is drawn to Regulation 3(2)(b) of the Conditional Fee Agreements
Regulations 2000, which provides that any amount of an agreed percentage increase,
which is disallowed on assessment, ceases to be payable under that agreement unless the
court is satisfied that it should continue to be so payable. Rule 44.16 allows the court
to adjourn a hearing at which the legal representative acting for the receiving party
applies for an order that a disallowed amount should continue to be payable under the
agreement.
20.2 In the following paragraphs ‘counsel’ means counsel who has acted in the case
under a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee. A reference to
counsel includes a reference to any person who appeared as an advocate in the case and
who is not a partner or employee of the solicitor or firm which is conducting the claim
or defence(as the case may be) on behalf of the receiving party.
Procedure following summary assessment
20.3 (1) If the court disallows any amount of a legal representative’s percentage
increase, the court will, unless sub-paragraph(2) applies, give directions to enable an
application to be made by the legal representative for the disallowed amount to be
payable by his client, including, if appropriate, a direction that the application will be
determined by a costs judge or district judge of the court dealing with the case.
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(2) The court that has made the summary assessment may then and there decide the
issue whether the disallowed amount should continue to be payable, if:
(a) the receiving party and all parties to the relevant agreement consent to the court
doing so;
(b) the receiving party (or, if corporate, an officer) is present in court; and
(c) the court is satisfied that the issue can be fairly decided then and there.
Procedure following detailed assessment
20.4 (1) Where detailed assessment proceedings have been commenced, and the
paying party serves points of dispute(as to which see Section 34 of this Practice
Direction), which show that he is seeking a reduction in any percentage increase
charged by counsel on his fees, the solicitor acting for the receiving party must within
3 days of service deliver to counsel a copy of the relevant points of dispute and the bill
of costs or the relevant parts of the bill.
(2) Counsel must within 10 days thereafter inform the solicitor in writing whether or
not he will accept the reduction sought or some other reduction. Counsel may state any
points he wishes to have made in a reply to the points of dispute, and the solicitor must
serve them on the paying party as or as part of a reply.
(3) Counsel who fails to inform the solicitor within the time limits set out above will be
taken to accept the reduction unless the court otherwise orders.
20.5 Where the paying party serves points of dispute seeking a reduction in any
percentage increase charged by a legal representative acting for the receiving party, and
that legal representative intends, if necessary, to apply for an order that any amount of
the percentage disallowed as against the paying party shall continue to be payable by
his client, the solicitor acting for the receiving party must, within 14 days of service of
the points of dispute, give to his client a clear written explanation of the nature of the
relevant point of dispute and the effect it will have if it is upheld in whole or in part by
the court, and of the client’s right to attend any subsequent hearings at court when the
matter is raised.
20.6 Where the solicitor acting for a receiving party files a request for a detailed
assessment hearing it must if appropriate, be accompanied by a certificate signed by him
stating:
(1) that the amount of the percentage increase in respect of counsel’s fees or
solicitor’s charges is disputed;
(2) whether an application will be made for an order that any amount of that
increase which is disallowed should continue to be payable by his client;
(3) that he has given his client an explanation in accordance with paragraph 20.5;
and,
(4) whether his client wishes to attend court when the amount of any relevant
percentage increase may be decided.
20.7 (1) The solicitor acting for the receiving party must within 7 days of receiving
from the court notice of the date of the assessment hearing, notify his client, and if
appropriate, counsel in writing of the date, time and place of the hearing.
(2) Counsel may attend or be represented at the detailed assessment hearing and may
make oral or written submissions.
20.8 (1) At the detailed assessment hearing, the court will deal with the assessment of
the costs payable by one party to another, including the amount of the percentage
increase, and give a certificate accordingly.
(2) The court may decide the issue whether the disallowed amount should continue to
be payable under the relevant conditional fee agreement without an adjournment if:
Practice Direction about Costs [1228]
BCS • Issue 96 E-271
0007 [ST: 265] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:23 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0016] 0
(a) the receiving party and all parties to the relevant agreement consent to the court
deciding the issue without an adjournment,
(b) the receiving party (or, if corporate, an officer or employee who has authority to
consent on behalf of the receiving party) is present in court, and
(c) the court is satisfied that the issue can be fairly decided without an adjournment.
(3) In any other case the court will give directions and fix a date for the hearing of the
application.
SECTION 55 CONDITIONAL FEES: RULE 48.9
[1229]
55.1 (1) Attention is drawn to rule 48.9(1) as amended by the Civil Procedure
(Amendment No 3) Rules 2000 (SI 2000/1317) with effect from 3 July 2000. Rule 48.9
applies only where the solicitor and the client have entered into a conditional fee
agreement as defined in section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as it was
in force before 1 April 2000. A client who has entered into a conditional fee agreement
with a solicitor may apply for assessment of the base costs (which is carried out in
accordance with rule 48.8(2) as if there were no conditional fee agreement) or for
assessment of the percentage increase (success fee) or both.
(2) Where the court is to assess the percentage increase the court will have regard to all
the relevant factors as they appeared to the solicitor or counsel when the conditional fee
agreement was entered into.
55.2 Where the client applies to the court to reduce the percentage increase which the
solicitor has charged the client under the conditional fee agreement, the client must set
out in his application notice:
(a) the reasons why the percentage increase should be reduced; and
(b) what the percentage increase should be.
55.3 The factors relevant to assessing the percentage increase include –
(a) the risk that the circumstances in which the fees or expenses would be payable
might not occur;
(b) the disadvantages relating to the absence of payment on account;
(c) whether the amount which might be payable under the conditional fee agree-
ment is limited to a certain proportion of any damages recovered by the client;
(d) whether there is a conditional fee agreement between the solicitor and counsel;
(e) the solicitor’s liability for any disbursements.
55.4 When the court is considering the factors to be taken into account, it will have
regard to the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the solicitor or counsel
when the conditional fee agreement was entered into.
SECTION 57 TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:
[1230]–[1240]
57.1 In this section ‘the previous rules’ means the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965
(‘RSC’) or County Court Rules 1981 (‘CCR’), as appropriate.
General scheme of transitional arrangements concerning costs proceedings
57.2 (1) Paragraph 18 of [Practice Direction Part 51A] provides that the CPR govern
any assessments of costs which take place on or after 26th April 1999 and states a
presumption to be applied in respect of costs for work undertaken before 26th April
1999.
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(2) The following paragraphs provide five further transitional arrangements:
(a) to provide an additional presumption to be applied when assessing costs which
were awarded by an order made in a county court before 26th April 1999 which
allowed costs ‘on Scale 1’ to be determined in accordance with CCR Appendix
A, or ‘on the lower scale’ to be determined in accordance with CCR Appendix
C.
(b) to preserve the effect of CCR Appendix B Part III, paragraph 2;
(c) to clarify the approach to be taken where a bill of costs was provisionally taxed
before 26th April 1999 and the receiving party is unwilling to accept the result
of the provisional taxation.
(d) to preserve the right to carry in objections or apply for a reconsideration in all
taxation proceedings commenced before 26th April 1999.
(e) to deal with funding arrangements made before 3 July 2000.
Scale 1 or lower scale costs
57.3 Where an order was made in county court proceedings before 26th April 1999
under which the costs were allowed on Scale 1 or the lower scale, the general
presumption is that no costs will be allowed under that order which would not have
been allowed in a taxation before 26th April 1999.
Fixed costs on the lower scale
57.4 The amount to be allowed as fixed costs for making or opposing an application
for a rehearing to set aside a judgment given before 26th April 1999 where the costs are
on lower scale is £11.25.
Bills provisionally taxed before 26th April 1999
57.5 In respect of bills of costs provisionally taxed before 26th April 1999:
(1) The previous rules apply on the question who can request a hearing and the time
limits for doing so; and
(2) The CPR govern any subsequent hearing in that case.
Bills taxed before 26th April 1999
57.6 Where a bill of costs was taxed before 26th April 1999, the previous rules gov-
ern the steps which can be taken to challenge that taxation.
Other taxation proceedings
57.7 (1) This paragraph applies to taxation proceedings which were commenced
before 26th April 1999, were assigned for taxation to a Taxing Master or District
Judge, and which were still pending on 26th April 1999.
(2) Any assessment of costs that takes place in cases to which this paragraph applies
which is conducted on or after 26th April 1999, will be conducted in accordance with
the CPR.
(3) In addition to the possibility of appeal under rules 47.20 to 47.23 and Part 52 any
party to a detailed assessment who is dissatisfied with any decision on a detailed
assessment made by a costs judge or district judge may apply to that costs judge or
district judge for a review of the decision. The review shall, for procedural purposes, be
treated as if it were an appeal from an authorised court officer.
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(4) The right of review provided by paragraph (3) above, will not apply in cases in
which, at least 28 days before the date of the assessment hearing, all parties were served
with notice that the rights of appeal in respect of that hearing would be governed by
Part 47 Section VIII (Appeals from Authorised Court Officers in Detailed Assessment
Proceedings) and Part 52 (Appeals).
(5) An order for the service of notice under sub-paragraph(4) above may be made on
the application of any party to the detailed assessment proceedings or may be made by
the court of its own initiative.
Transitional provisions concerning the Access to Justice Act 1999 sections 28 to 31
57.8 (1) Sections 28 to 31 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, the Conditional Fee
Agreements Regulations 2000, the Access to Justice (Membership Organisations)
Regulations 2000, and the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order
2000 came into force on 1 April 2000. The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules
come into force on 3 July 2000.
(2) The Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2000 provides that
no conditional fee agreement or other arrangement about costs entered into before
1 April 2000 can be a funding arrangement, as defined in rule 43.2 The order also has
the effect that where an conditional fee agreement or other funding arrangement has
been entered into before 1 April 2000 and a second or subsequent funding arrangement
is entered into on or after 1 April 2000, the second or subsequent funding arrangement
does not give rise to an additional liability which is recoverable from a paying party.
57.9 (1) Rule 39 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2000 applies where
between 1 April and 2 July 2000 (including both dates) –
a funding arrangement is entered into, and proceedings are started in respect of a claim
which is the subject of that agreement.
(2) Attention is drawn to the need to act promptly so as to comply with the
requirements of the Rules and the Practice Directions by 31 July 2000 (i.e. within the
28 days from 3 July 2000 permitted by Rule 39) if that compliance is to be treated as
compliance with the relevant provision. Attention is drawn in particular to Rule 44.15
(Providing Information about Funding Arrangements) and Section 19 of this Practice
Direction.
(3) Nothing in the legislation referred to above makes provision for a party who has
entered into a funding arrangement to recover from another party any amount of an
additional liability which relates to anything done or any costs incurred before the
arrangement was entered into.
AMENDMENT
Para 57.2: words in square brackets substituted by the 51st Practice Direction update, with effect
from 6 April 2010.
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[1241]–[1242]
.
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THE LAW SOCIETY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1996
IN FORCE 1996
Practice Rule 8
[1251]
(1) A solicitor who is retained or employed to prosecute or defend any action, suit or
other contentious proceeding shall not enter into any arrangement to receive a
contingency fee in respect of that proceeding.
(1A) Paragraph (1) of this rule shall not apply to a conditional fee agreement relating
to specified proceedings as defined in s 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,
provided the agreement complies with all the requirements of that section and any
order made thereunder.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this rule shall not apply to an arrangement in respect of an action,
suit or other contentious proceeding in any country other than England and Wales to
the extent that a local lawyer would be permitted to receive a contingency fee in respect
of that proceeding.
Practice Rule 18(2)(c)
[1252]–[1253]
A contingency fee is any sum (whether fixed, or calculated either as a percentage of the
proceeds or otherwise howsoever) payable only in the event of success in the
prosecution or defence of any action, suit or other contentious proceeding.
In force 7 January 1999
RULE 8
(1) A solicitor who is retained or employed to prosecute or defend any action, suit
or other contentious proceeding shall not enter into any arrangement to receive
a contingency fee in respect of that proceeding, save one permitted under
statute or by the common law.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this rule shall not apply to an arrangement in respect of an
action, suit or other contentious proceeding in any country other than England
and Wales to the extent that a local lawyer would be permitted to receive a
contingency fee in respect of that proceeding.
Rule 18 (2)
[1254]–[1260]
(c) ‘contingency fee’ means any sum (whether fixed, or calculated either as a percentage
of the proceeds or otherwise howsoever) payable only in the event of success in the
prosecution or defence of any action, suit or other contentious proceeding.
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Law Society Model Conditional Fee Agreement
For use in personal injury cases, but not clinical negligence
[1261]–[1270]
This agreement is a binding legal contract between you and your solicitor/s. Before you
sign, please read everything carefully.
Words like ‘our disbursements’, ‘basic charges’, ‘win’ and ‘lose’ are explained in
condition 3 of the Law Society Conditions which you should also read carefully.
Agreement date
[. . . . . . . . . . . ]
I/We, the solicitor/s
[. . . . . . . . . . . ]
You, the client
[. . . . . . . . . . . ]
What is covered by this agreement
• Your claim against [. . . . . . . . . . ] for damages for personal injury
suffered on [. . . . . . . . . . ].
• Any appeal by your opponent.
• Any appeal you make against an interim order during the proceedings.
• Any proceedings you take to enforce a judgment, order or agreement.
What is not covered by this agreement
• Any counterclaim against you.
• Any appeal you make against the final judgment order.
Paying us
If you win your claim, you pay our basic charges, our disbursements and a success fee.
The amount of these is not based on or limited by the damages. You are entitled to seek
recovery from your opponent of part or all of our basic charges, our disbursements, a
success fee and insurance premium. Please also see conditions 4 and 6.
It may be that your opponent makes a Part 36 offer or payment which you reject and,
on our advice, your claim for damages goes ahead to trial where you recover damages
that are less than that offer or payment. We will not add our success fee to the basic
charges for the work done after we received notice of the offer or payment.
If you receive interim damages, we may require you to pay our disbursements at that
point and a reasonable amount for our future disbursements.
If you receive provisional damages, we are entitled to payment of our basic charges our
disbursements and success fee at that point.
If you win but on the way lose an interim hearing, you may be required to pay your
opponent’s charges of that hearing. Please see conditions 3(h) and 5.
If on the way to winning or losing you win an interim hearing, then we are entitled to
payment of our basic charges and disbursements related to that hearing together with
a success fee on those charges if you win overall.
If you lose, you pay your opponent’s charges and disbursements. You may be able to
take out an insurance policy against this risk. Please also see conditions 3(j) and 5. If
you lose, you do not pay our charges but we may require you to pay our disbursements.
If you end this agreement before you win or lose, you pay our basic charges. If you go
on to win, you pay a success fee. Please also see condition 7(a).
We may end this agreement before you win or lose. Please also see condition 7(b) for
details.
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Basic charges
These are for work done from now until this agreement ends.
How we calculate our basic charges
These are calculated for each hour engaged on your matter [from now until the review
date on [. . . . . . . . . . . ]. . . . . . . . . . . ]. Routine letters and telephone calls
will be charged as units of one tenth of an hour. Other letters and telephone calls will
be charged on a time basis. The hourly rates are:
• Solicitors with over four years’ experience after qualification
£ [. . . . . . . . . . ]
• Other solicitors and legal executives and other staff of equivalent
experience
£ [. . . . . . . . . . ]
• Trainee solicitors and other staff of equivalent experience
£ [. . . . . . . . . . ]
[We will review the hourly rate on the review date and on each anniversary of the
review date. We will not increase the rate by more than the rise in the Retail Prices
Index and will notify you of the increased rate in writing.]
Success fee
This is [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% of our basic charges
The reasons for calculating the success fee at this level are set out in Schedule 1 to this
agreement.
You cannot recover from your opponent the part of the success fee that relates to the
cost to us of postponing receipt of our charges and disbursements (as set out at
paragraphs (a) and (b) at Schedule 1). This part of the success fee remains payable by
you.
Value added tax (VAT)
We add VAT, at the rate (now [. . . . . . . . . . . ]%) that applies when the work is
done, to the total of the basic charges and success fee.
Law Society Conditions
The Law Society Conditions are attached because they are part of this agreement. Any
amendments or additions to them will apply to you. You should read the conditions
carefully and ask us about anything you find unclear.
Other points
Immediately before you signed this agreement, we verbally explained to you the effect
of this agreement and in particular the following:
(a) the circumstances in which you may be liable to pay our disbursements and
charges;
(b) the circumstances in which you may seek assessment of our charges and
disbursements and the procedure for doing so;
(c) whether we consider that your risk of becoming liable for any costs in these
proceedings is insured under an existing contract of insurance;
(d) other methods of financing those costs, including private funding, Community
Legal Service funding, legal expenses insurance, trade union funding;
(e)
(i) In all the circumstances, on the information currently available to us, we
believe that a contract of insurance with [. . . . . . . . . . . ] is appro-
priate. Detailed reasons for this are set out in Schedule 2.
(ii) In any event, we believe it is desirable for you to insure your oppo-
nent’s charges and disbursements in case you lose.
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(iii) We confirm that we do not have an interest in recommending this
particular insurance agreement.
Signatures
Signed for the solicitor/s
Signed by the client
I confirm that my solicitor has verbally explained to me the matters in paragraphs (a)
to (e) under “Other points” above.
Signed. . . . . . . . . . . (Client)
I specifically confirm that I verbally explained to the client the matters in paragraphs (a)
to (e) under “Other points” and confirm the matters at (e) in writing in Schedule 2.
Signed. . . . . . . . . . . (Solicitors)
This agreement complies with the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (SI
2000 No.692).
Schedule 1
The Success Fee
The success fee is set at [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% of basic charges and cannot be more
than 100% of the basic charges.
The percentage reflects the following:
(a) the fact that if you win we will not be paid our basic charges until the end of the
claim;
(b) our arrangements with you about paying disbursements;
(c) the fact that if you lose, we will not earn anything;
(d) our assessment of the risks of your case. These include the following:
(e) any other appropriate matters.
The matters set out at paragraphs (a) and (b) above together make up [
. . . . . . . . . . . ]% of the increase on basic charges. The matters at paragraphs (c),
(d) [and (e)] make up [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% of the increase on basic charges. So the
total success fee is [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% as stated above.
Schedule 2
The Insurance Policy
In all the circumstances and on the information currently available to us, we believe,
that a contract of insurance with [. . . . . . . . . . . ] is appropriate to cover your
opponent’s charges and disbursements in case you lose.
This is because
We are not, however, insurance brokers and cannot give advice on all products which
may be available.
Law Society Conditions
1. Our responsibilities
We must:
• always act in your best interests, subject to our duty to the court;
• explain to you the risks and benefits of taking legal action;
• give you our best advice about whether to accept any offer of settlement;
• give you the best information possible about the likely costs of your claim
for damages.
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2. Your responsibilities
You must:
• give us instructions that allow us to do our work properly;
• not ask us to work in an improper or unreasonable way;
• not deliberately mislead us;
• co-operate with us;
• go to any medical or expert examination or court hearing.
3. Explanation of words used
(a) Advocacy
Appearing for you at court hearings.
(b) Basic charges
Our charges for the legal work we do on your claim for damages.
(c) Claim
Your demand for damages for personal injury whether or not court
proceedings are issued.
(d) Counterclaim
A claim that your opponent makes against you in response to your claim.
(e) Damages
Money that you win whether by a court decision or settlement.
(f) Our disbursements
Payment we make on your behalf such as:
• court fees;
• experts’ fees;
• accident report fees;
• travelling expenses.
(g) Interim damages
Money that a court says your opponent must pay or your opponent agrees
to pay while waiting for a settlement or the court’s final decision.
(h) Interim hearing
A court hearing that is not final.
(i) Lien
Our right to keep all papers, documents, money or other property held on
your behalf until all money due to us is paid. A lien may be applied after
this agreement ends.
(j) Lose
The court has dismissed your claim or you have stopped it on our advice.
(k) Part 36 offers or payments
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An offer to settle your claim made in accordance with Part 36 of the Civil
Procedure Rules.
(l) Provisional damages
Money that a court says your opponent must pay or your opponent agrees
to pay, on the basis that you will be able to go back to court at a future
date for further damages if:
• you develop a serious disease; or
• your condition deteriorates;
in a way that has been proved or admitted to be linked to your
personal injury claim.
(m) Success fee
The percentage of basic charges that we add to your bill if you win your
claim for damages and that we will seek to recover from your opponent.
(n) Win
Your claim for damages is finally decided in your favour, whether by a
court decision or an agreement to pay you damages. ‘Finally’ means that
your opponent:
• is not allowed to appeal against the court decision; or
• has not appealed in time; or
• has lost any appeal.
4. What happens if you win?
If you win:
• You are then liable to pay all our basic charges, our disbursements and
success fee – please see condition 3(n).
• Normally, you will be entitled to recover part or all of our basic charges,
our disbursements and success fee from your opponent.
• If you and your opponent cannot agree the amount, the court will decide
how much you can recover. If the amount agreed or allowed by the court
does not cover all our basic charges and our disbursements, then you pay
the difference.
• You will not be entitled to recover from your opponent the part of the
success fee that relates to the cost to us of postponing receipt of our
charges and our disbursements. This remains payable by you.
• You agree that after winning, the reasons for setting the success fee at the
amount stated may be disclosed:
(i) to the court and any other person required by the court;
(ii) to your opponent in order to gain his or her agreement to pay the
success fee.
• If the court carries out an assessment and disallows any of the success fee
percentage because it is unreasonable in view of what we knew or should
have known when it was agreed, then that amount ceases to be payable
unless the court is satisfied that it should continue to be payable.
• If we agree with your opponent that the success fee is to be paid at a lower
percentage than is set out in this agreement, then the success fee
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percentage will be reduced accordingly unless the court is satisfied that the
full amount is payable.
• It may happen that your opponent makes an offer that includes payment
of our basic charges and a success fee. If so, unless we consent, you agree
not to tell us to accept the offer if it includes payment of the success fee
at a lower rate than is set out in this agreement.
• If your opponent is receiving Community Legal Service funding, we are
unlikely to get any money from him or her. So if this happens, you have
to pay us our basic charges, disbursements and success fee.
You remain ultimately responsible for paying our success fee.
You agree to pay into a designated account any cheque received by you or by us from
your opponent and made payable to you. Out of the money, you agree to let us take the
balance of the basic charges; success fee; insurance premium; our remaining disburse-
ments; and VAT. You take the rest.
We are allowed to keep any interest your opponent pays on the charges.
Payment for advocacy is explained in condition 6.
If your opponent fails to pay
If your opponent does not pay any damages or charges owed to you, we have the right
to take recovery action in your name to enforce a judgment, order or agreement. The
charges of this action become part of the basic charges.
5. What happens if you lose?
If you lose, you do not have to pay any of our basic charges or success fee. You
do have to pay:
• us for our disbursements;
• your opponent’s legal charges and disbursements.
If you are insured against payment of these amounts by your insurance policy, we will
make a claim on your behalf and receive any resulting payment in your name. We will
give you a statement of account for all money received and paid out.
If your opponent pays the charges of any hearing, they belong to us.
Payment for advocacy is dealt with in condition 6.
6. Payment for advocacy
The cost of advocacy and any other work by us, or by any solicitor agent on our behalf,
forms part of our basic charges. We shall discuss with you the identity of any barrister
instructed, and the arrangements made for payment.
Barristers who have a conditional fee agreement with us
If you win, you are normally entitled to recover their fee and success fee from your
opponent. The barrister’s success fee is shown in the separate conditional fee agreement
we make with the barrister. We will discuss the barrister’s success fee with you before
we instruct him or her. If you lose, you pay the barrister nothing.
Barristers who do not have a conditional fee agreement with us
If you win, then you will normally be entitled to recover all or part of their fee from
your opponent. If you lose, then you must pay their fee.
7. What happens when this agreement ends before your claim for damages ends?
(a) Paying us if you end this agreement
You can end the agreement at any time. We then have the right to decide
whether you must:
• pay our basic charges and our disbursements including barristers’
fees when we ask for them; or
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• pay our basic charges, and our disbursements including barristers’
fees and success fees if you go on to win your claim for damages.
(b) Paying us if we end this agreement
(i) We can end this agreement if you do not keep to your responsi-
bilities in condition 2. We then have the right to decide whether
you must:
• pay our basic charges and our disbursements including
barristers’ fees when we ask for them; or
• pay our basic charges and our disbursements including
barristers’ fees and success fees if you go on to win your
claim for damages.
(ii) We can end this agreement if we believe you are unlikely to win. If
this happens, you will only have to pay our disbursements. These
will include barristers’ fees if the barrister does not have a
conditional fee agreement with us.
(iii) We can end this agreement if you reject our opinion about making
a settlement with your opponent. You must then:
• pay the basic charges and our disbursements, including
barristers’ fees;
• pay the success fee if you go on to win your claim for
damages.
If you ask us to get a second opinion from a specialist solicitor outside our
firm, we will do so. You pay the cost of a second opinion.
(iv) We can end this agreement if you do not pay your insurance
premium when asked to do so.
(c) Death
This agreement automatically ends if you die before your claim for
damages is concluded. We will be entitled to recover our basic charges up
to the date of your death from your estate.
If your personal representatives wish to continue your claim for damages,
we may offer them a new conditional fee agreement, as long as they agree
to pay the success fee on our basic charges from the beginning of the
agreement with you.
8. What happens after this agreement ends
After this agreement ends, we will apply to have our name removed from the
record of any court proceedings in which we are acting unless you have another
form of funding and ask us to work for you.
We have the right to preserve our lien unless another solicitor working for you
undertakes to pay us what we are owed including a success fee if you win.
Notes for Accident Line Protect cases
• For Accident Line Protect cases, you need to annex the following clause to the
agreement
‘Accident Line Protect insurance (ALP)
Accident Line Protect is an insurance policy only made available to you by
solicitors who have joined the Accident Line Protect scheme.
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You agree to pay a premium of £[. . . . . . . . . . . ] for Accident Line Protect
Insurance when you sign this agreement. We undertake to send this to the broker
on your behalf. If you lose after proceedings have been issued, Accident Line
Protect will cover our disbursements and your opponent’s charges and disburse-
ments. It will not cover fees to your barristers or advocates. The maximum cover
is £100,000.
If this agreement ends before your claim for damages ends, Accident Line Protect
ends automatically at the same time.’
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Checklist for use with Law Society Model CFA
[1271]–[1290]
The following is a non-exhaustive list of issues which should be considered before
signing the conditional fee agreement.
HAVE YOU. . . . . . . . . . .
1. TAKEN into account the overriding objective and proportionality in considering
the potential net benefit of the case to your client?
2. CONSIDERED whether the case could be allocated to the Small Claims Track
and the costs implications if that occurred.
3. CHECKED that you have the correct model agreement for this type of case?
4. UNDERTAKEN a thorough risk assessment.
5. APPLIED your risk assessment to your success fee, taking account of:
• the prospects of success/failure;
• payments on account/financial subsidy;
• the risk that losing cases often have higher costs than winning ones and
when setting your success fee;
• considered the element of the success fee relating to financial subsidy
separately;
• recorded your reasons in writing and provided a copy to your client.
6. CONSIDERED the possibility of achieving success on liability but failure on
enforceability?
7. DISCUSSED with your client whether a barrister will be used? If so, have you
discussed:
• whether the barrister will be instructed on a conditional fee agreement?
• whether the conditional fee agreement with the barrister will be on the
same terms as the conditional fee agreement with the client eg success fee
8. EXPLAINED to your client the information required by the Conditional Fee
Regulations:
• the circumstances which will make them liable to pay your costs or
disbursements and discussed how the client will fund these amounts;
• when they can seek assessment of your costs and the procedure for doing
so;
• the circumstances which will make them liable to pay the costs of any
other party;
• whether their risk of becoming liable for costs is insured under an existing
contract of insurance;
• other methods of financing costs;
• whether you believe a particular contract of insurance is appropriate (This
should be confirmed in writing);
• the requirement of their consent to disclose to the court or opponent at
the end of the case the reasons for setting the success fee.
BCS • Issue 96 E-287
0001 [ST: 287] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] (Beg Group) Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:43 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0019] 0
9. CHECKED whether your client’s proposed insurance will meet the other
side’s costs, if a Part 36 offer or payment is not beaten?
10. THOUGHT through the different clauses which can be used regarding Part 36
offers and payments? (There are two possible options if ALP insurance is used.
Other insurers may have different approaches. Check the requirements of your
AEI – they may specify the approach you must take).
11. EXPLAINED to your client the information on costs required by the Solici-
tors’ Costs Information and Client Care Code 1999?
Remember the Code imposes a duty on you to:
• give to your client the best costs information possible – paragraphs 4
(a)and (c);
• keep your client updated about costs as the matter progresses – para-
graph 6.
12. EXPLAINED to your client that the agreement prevents the client from
instructing you to accept an offer to settle which does not provide for your full
success fee.
13. MADE SURE the agreement:
• specifies the proceedings to which it relates;
• will be signed by you and your client;
• specifies the reasons for setting the success fee, and specifies how much of
the success fee, if any, relates to the cost of financial subsidy;
• deals with appropriate funding methods and the insurance position.
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APIL/PIBA 5
Conditional Fee Agreement
INDEX TO PARAGRAPHS
[1290.1]
The nature of the agreement:
(1) The parties
(2) The claim
(3) The issues covered
(4) Enforceability
(5) Papers provided to counsel
(6) client’s consent
(7) Binding counsel
Obligations:
Of counsel
(8) To act diligently
(9) Inappropriate instructions
(10) Obligations of the solicitor
Termination
(11) Termination of the agreement by counsel
(12) Termination of agreement by solicitor
(13) Automatic terminationof the agreement
(14) client becomes under a disability
(15) Counsel taking silk
Counsel’s Fees:
(16) Counsel’s normal fees
(17) Counsel’s success fee
(18) Counsel’s expenses
(19) Success
(20) Part 36 offers and payments
(21) Failure
(22) Errors and Indemnity for fees
Counsel’s entitlement to fees on termination of the agreement:
(23) Fees on termination
(24) Challenge to fees
(25) Return of work
Assessment and payment of fees:
(26) Costs Assessment
(27) Solicitors obligation to pay
(28) Interest
(29) Challenge to Success Fee
Disclosing the reasons for the success fee
(30) Disclosing the reasons for the success fee
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Counsel’s fees in the event of assessment or agreement:
(31) Reduction on assessment
(32) Agreement of fees
NOTES: These paragraphs need to be completed by counsel or counsel’s clerk: 1; 2; 3;
10(10); 16; 17(1), (2) & (3); 25(1).
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
SOLICITORS AND COUNSEL
The Nature of the Agreement
1. In this agreement:
‘Counsel means:
and any other counsel either from Chambers or recommended by counsel in
accordance with clause 25 who signs this agreement at any time at the solicitors
request;
‘the solicitor’ means the firm:
Messrs:
‘the client means:
[acting by his Litigation Friend ]
‘Chambers’ means members of chambers at
2. This agreement forms the basis on which instructions are accepted by counsel from
the solicitor to act on a conditional fee basis for the client in his/her claim against:
(‘the Opponent(s)’) for damages for personal injuries suffered on:
until
(1) the claim is won, lost or otherwise concluded or
(2) this agreement is terminated.
3. This agreement relates to
(1) issues of jurisdiction;
(2) issues of breach of duty;
(3) issues of causation;
(4) issues of limitation
(5) issues of damages;
(6) any appeal by the client’s opponent(s);
(7) any appeal by the client against an interim order;
(8) any appeal by the client advised by counsel;
(9) any proceedings to enforce a judgment or order.
It does not cover:
(10) any other appeal by the client;
(11) any counterclaim or defence by way of set-off;
(12) any part 20 claim
(13) part only of the proceedings unless specifically incorporated in this agreement.
[NOTE: delete those parts of the proceedings to which the agreement does NOT relate]
4. This agreement is not a contract enforceable at law. The relationship of counsel and
solicitor shall be governed by the Terms of Work under which barristers offer their
services to solicitors and the Withdrawal of Credit Scheme as authorised by the
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General Council of the Bar as from time to time amended and set out in the Code
of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, save that where such terms of work are
inconsistent with the terms of this agreement the latter shall prevail.
5. Counsel has been provided with:
(1) A copy of the conditional fee agreement between the solicitor and the client and
the Law Society’s Conditions as they apply to the claim;
(2) written confirmation that ‘after the event’ or other similar insurance is in place,
or a written explanation why it is not; and
(3) where more than one defendant is sued, copies of correspondence between the
solicitor and the ‘after the event’ insurers clarifying whether and when defen-
dants costs are to be covered if the claimant does not succeed or win against all
of the defendants; and
(4) all relevant papers and risk assessment material, including all advice from
experts and other solicitors or barristers to the client or any Litigation Friend in
respect of the claim, which is currently available to the solicitor.
(5) Any offers of settlement already made by the client or the defendant.
6. The solicitor confirms that:
(1) he/she has complied with Regulation 4 of the Conditional Fee Agreements
Regulations 2000 no 692 and the client has confirmed by signing the solicitor/
client agreement that Regulation 4 has been complied with; and
(2) the client or any Litigation Friend has consented to the terms and conditions set
out in this agreement insofar as they relate to the client.
(3) Either:
(a) there are no other methods of financing costs available to the client, or
(b) Notwithstanding there are other methods of financing costs available to
the client, namely. . . . . . . . . . . , the client has reasonably decided
to fund this claim with conditional fees.
7. Counsel is not bound to act on a conditional fee basis until he/she has signed this
agreement.
Obligations of Counsel
8. Counsel agrees to act diligently on all proper instructions from the solicitor subject
to paragraph 9 hereof.
9. Counsel is not bound to accept instructions:
(1) to appear at an interlocutory hearing where it would be reasonable
(a) to assume that counsel’s fees would not be allowed on assessment or
(b) to instruct a barrister of less experience and seniority, provided that
counsel has first used his/her best endeavours to ensure that an appro-
priate barrister will act for the client on the same terms as this agreement;
(2) to draft documents or advise if a barrister of similar seniority would not
ordinarily be instructed so to do if not instructed on a conditional fee basis;
(3) outside the scope of this agreement.
Obligations of the Solicitor
10. The solicitor agrees:
(1) promptly to supply a copy of this agreement to the client or any Litigation
Friend;
(2) to comply with all the requirements of the CPR, the practice direction about
costs supplementing parts 43 to 48 of the CPR (PD Costs), the relevant
CFA between solicitors and counsel [1290.1]
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pre-action protocol and any court order relating to conditional fee agreements
and in particular promptly to notify the Court and the opponent of the existence
and any subsequent variation of the CFA with the client and whether he / she has
taken out an insurance policy or made an arrangement with a membership
organisation and of the fact that additional liabilities are being claimed from the
opponent.
(3) promptly to apply for relief from sanction pursuant to CPR part 3.8 if any
default under part 44.3B(1)(c) or (d) occurs and to notify counsel of any such
default.
(4) to act diligently in all dealings with counsel and the prosecution of the claim;
(5) to consult counsel on the need for advice and action following:
(a) the service of statements of case and if possible before the allocation
decision; and
(b) the exchange of factual and expert evidence;
(6) to deliver within a reasonable time papers reasonably requested by counsel for
consideration;
(7) promptly to bring to counsel’s attention:
(a) any priority or equivalent report to insurers;
(b) any Part 36 or other offer to settle;
(c) any Part 36 payment into Court;
(d) any evidence information or communication which may materially affect
the merits of any issue in the case;
(e) any other factor coming to the solicitor’s attention which may affect
counsel’s entitlement to success fees whether before or after the termina-
tion of this agreement.
(8) promptly to communicate to the client any advice by counsel:
(a) to make, accept or reject any Part 36 or other offer;
(b) to accept or reject any Part 36 payment in;
(c) to incur, or not incur, expenditure in obtaining evidence or preparing the
case;
(d) to instruct Leading counsel or a more senior or specialised barrister;
(e) that the case is likely to be lost;
(f) that damages and costs recoverable on success make it unreasonable or
uneconomic for the action to proceed;
(9) promptly to inform counsel’s clerk of any listing for trial;
(10) to deliver the brief for trial not less than . . . . . . . . . . . weeks/days before
the trial;
(11) if any summary assessment of costs takes place in the absence of counsel, to
submit to the court a copy of counsel’s risk assessment and make representations
on counsel’s behalf in relation to his/her fees;
(12) to inform counsel in writing within 2 days of any reduction of counsel’s fees on
summary assessment in the absence of counsel and of any directions given under
PDCosts 20.3(1) or alternatively to make application for such directions on
counsel’s behalf;
(13) where points of dispute are served pursuant to CPR part 47.9 seeking a
reduction in any percentage increase charged by counsel on his fees, to give the
client the written explanation required by PDCosts 20.5 on counsel’s behalf;
(14) where more than one defendant is sued, the solicitor will write to the ‘after the
event’ insurers clarifying whether and when defendants costs are to be covered
if the claimant does not succeed or win against all of the defendants, and send
that correspondence to counsel.
(15) When drawing up a costs bill at any stage of the case to include in it a claim for
interest on counsel’s fees.
Termination of the Agreement By Counsel
11. Counsel may terminate the agreement if :
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(1) Counsel discovers that the solicitor is in breach of any obligation in para-
graph 10 hereof;
(2) the solicitor client or any Litigation Friend rejects counsel’s advice in any respect
set out in paragraph 10(8) hereof;
(3) Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of any set-off or counter-claim
which materially affects the likelihood of success and/or the amount of financial
recovery in the event of success;
(4) Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of information which has been
falsified or knowingly withheld by the solicitor client or any Litigation Friend,
of which counsel was not aware and which counsel could not reasonably have
anticipated, which materially affects the merits of any substantial issue in the
case;
(5) Counsel is required to cease to act by the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England
and Wales or counsel’s professional conduct is being impugned;
provided that counsel may not terminate the agreement if so to do would be a breach
of that Code, and notice of any termination must be communicated promptly in writing
to the solicitor.
Termination of the Agreement by the Solicitor
12. The solicitor may terminate the agreement at any time on the instructions of the
client or any Litigation Friend.
Automatic Termination of the Agreement
13. This agreement shall automatically terminate if:
(1) Counsel accepts a full-time judicial appointment;
(2) Counsel retires from practice;
(3) the solicitor’s agreement with the client is terminated before the conclusion of
the case;
(4) Legal Services Commission funding is granted to the client;
(5) the client dies;
(6) The court makes a Group Litigation Order covering this claim.
Client Becoming Under a Disability
14. If the client at any time becomes under a disability then the solicitor will:
(1) consent to a novation of his Conditional Fee Agreement with the client to the
Litigation Friend and
(2) where appropriate, apply to the Court to obtain its consent to acting under a
conditional fee agreement with the Litigation Friend.
Thereafter, the Litigation Friend shall, for the purposes of this agreement, be treated as
if he/she was and has always been the client.
Counsel Taking Silk
15. If counsel becomes Queen’s Counsel during the course of the agreement then
either party may terminate it provided he/she does so promptly in writing.
Counsel’s Normal Fees
(1) Counsel’s fees upon which a success fee will be calculated (the normal fees) will
be as follows:-
CFA between solicitors and counsel [1290.1]
BCS • Issue 96 E-293
0005 [ST: 289] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:27:54 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0020] 0
(a) Advisory work and drafting
(a) In accordance with counsel’s hourly rate obtaining for such work in this
field currently £. . . . . . . . . . . per hour.
(b) Court appearances
(i) Brief fee
(a) Trial
(a) For a trial whose estimated duration is up to 2 days
(including — hours of preparation) £. . . . . . . . . . . , 3
to 5 days (including — hours of preparation) £
. . . . . . . . . . . , 5 to 8 days (including — hours of
preparation) £. . . . . . . . . . . 8 to 12 days (including
— hours of preparation), £. . . . . . . . . . . , and 13 to
20 days (including — — hours of preparation) £
. . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Interlocutory hearings
(b) For an interlocutory hearing whose estimated duration is
up to 1 hour (including — hours of preparation), £
. . . . . . . . . . . , 1 hour to 1/2 day (including — hours
of preparation) £. . . . . . . . . . . ,, 1/2 day to 1 day
(including hrs of preparation) £. . . . . . . . . . . ,, over 1
day (including — hours of preparation) will be charged as
if it was a trial.
(ii) Refreshers
(ii) In accordance with counsel’s daily rate obtaining for such work in
this field, currently £. . . . . . . . . . . , per day.
(iii) Renegotiating counsel’s fees
(a) To the extent that the hours of preparation set out above
are reasonably exceeded then counsel’s hourly rate will
apply to each additional hour of preparation.
(b) If the case is settled or goes short counsel will consider the
solicitor’s reasonable requests to reduce his/her brief fees
set out above.
(2) The normal fees will be subject to review with effect from each successive
anniversary of the date of this agreement but counsel will not increase the
normal fees by more than any increase in the rate of inflation measured by the
Retail Prices Index.
Counsel’s Success Fee
(1) The rate of counsel’s success fee will be . . . . . . . . . . . % of coun-
sel’s normal fees;
(2) The reasons, briefly stated, for counsel’s success fee are that at the time of entry
into this agreement:
(i) the prospects of success are estimated by counsel as
. . . . . . . . . . . (X)% as more fully set out in counsel’s risk assess-
ment, and a percentage increase of . . . . . . . . . . . (Y)% reflects
those prospects
(ii) the length of postponement of the payment of counsel’s fees and expenses
is estimated at . . . . . . . . . . . year, and a further increase of
. . . . . . . . . . . (Z)% relates to that postponement
(ii) [Note: the success fee at paragraph 17(1) must be the sum of Y% and
Z%]
(3) The reasons for counsel’s success fee are more fully set out in counsel’s risk
assessment which is* / is not* (*please delete as appropriate) attached to this
agreement.
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Counsel’s Expenses
18. If a hearing, conference or view takes place more than 25 miles from coun-
sel’s chambers the solicitor shall pay counsel’s reasonable travel and accommodation
expenses which shall:
(1) appear separately on counsel’s fee note;
(2) attract no success fee and
(3) subject to paragraph 21 be payable on the conclusion of the claim or earlier
termination of this agreement.
Counsel’s Entitlement to Fees — Winning and Losing
[if the Agreement is not Terminated]
(1) ‘Success’ means the same as ‘win’ in the Conditional Fee Agreement between the
solicitor and the client.
(2) Subject to paragraphs 20, 23 & 26 hereof, in the event of success the solicitor
will pay counsel his/her normal and success fees.
(3) If the client is successful at an interim hearing counsel may apply for summary
assessment of solicitors basics costs and counsels normal fees.
20. If the amount of damages and interest awarded by a court is less than a Part 36
payment into Court or effective Part 36 offer then:
(1) if counsel advised its rejection he/she is entitled to normal and success fees for
work up to receipt of the notice of Part 36 payment into Court or offer but only
normal fees for subsequent work;
(2) if counsel advised its acceptance he/she is entitled to normal and success fees for
all work done.
21. Subject to paragraph 22(1) hereof, if the case is lost or on counsel’s advice ends
without success then counsel is not entitled to any fees or expenses.
Errors and Indemnity for Fees
(1) If, because of a breach by the solicitor but not counsel of his/her duty to the
client, the client’s claim is dismissed or struck out:
(a) for non compliance with an interlocutory order; or
(b) for want of prosecution, or
(c) by rule of court or the Civil Procedure Rules; or becomes unenforceable
against the MIB for breach of the terms of the Uninsured Drivers
Agreement:
(a) the solicitor shall (subject to sub paragraphs (3) — (6) hereof) pay counsel such
normal fees as would have been recoverable under this agreement.
(2) If, because of a breach by counsel but not the solicitor of his/her duty to the
client, the client’s claim is dismissed or struck out:
(a) for non compliance with an interlocutory order; or
(b) for want of prosecution, or
(c) by rule of court or the Civil Procedure Rules
(b) counsel shall (subject to sub paragraphs (3) -(6) hereof) pay the solicitor such
basic costs as would have been recoverable from the client under the solici-
tor’s agreement with the client.
(3) If, because of non-compliance by the solicitor but not by counsel of the
obligations under sub-paragraphs (2), (3), (11), (12) or (13) of paragraph 10
above, counsel’s success fee is not payable by the Opponent or the client then the
solicitor shall (subject to sub-paragraphs (5) to (7) hereof) pay counsel such
success fees as would have been recoverable under this agreement.
(4) No payment shall be made under sub paragraph (1), (2) or (3) hereof in respect
of any breach by the solicitor or counsel which would not give rise to a claim for
damages if an action were brought by the client;
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Adjudication on disagreement
(5) In the event of any disagreement as to whether there has been an actionable
breach by either the solicitor or counsel, or as to the amount payable under sub
paragraph (1), (2) or (3) hereof, that disagreement shall be referred to
adjudication by a panel consisting of a Barrister nominated by PIBA and a
solicitor nominated by APIL who shall be requested to resolve the issue on
written representations and on the basis of a procedure laid down by agreement
between PIBA and APIL. The costs of such adjudication shall, unless otherwise
ordered by the panel, be met by the unsuccessful party.
(6) In the event of a panel being appointed pursuant to sub paragraph (5) hereof:
(a) if that panel considers, after initial consideration of the disagreement,
that there is a real risk that they may not be able to reach a unanimous
decision, then the panel shall request APIL (where it is alleged there has
been an actionable breach by the solicitor) or PIBA (where it is alleged
that the has been an actionable breach by counsel) to nominate a third
member of the panel;
(b) that panel shall be entitled if it considers it reasonably necessary, to
appoint a qualified costs draftsman, to be nominated by the President for
the time being of the Law Society, to assist the panel;
(c) the solicitor or counsel alleged to be in breach of duty shall be entitled to
argue that, on the basis of information reasonably available to both
solicitor and barrister, the claim would not have succeeded in any event.
The panel shall resolve such issue on the balance of probabilities, and if
satisfied that the claim would have been lost in any event shall not make
any order for payment of fees or costs.
Cap
(7) the amount payable in respect of any claim under sub paragraph (1) or (2) or
(3) shall be limited to a maximum of £25,000.
Counsel’s Entitlement to Fees on Termination of the Agreement
(1) Termination by counsel If counsel terminates the agreement under paragraph 11
then, subject to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) hereof, counsel may elect either:
(a) to receive payment of normal fees without a success fee which the
solicitor shall pay not later than three months after termination: (‘Option
A’), or
(b) to await the outcome of the case and receive payment of normal and
success fees if it ends in success: (‘Option B’).
(2) If counsel terminates the agreement because the solicitor, client or Litigation
Friend rejects advice under paragraph 10(8)(e) hereof counsel is not entitled to
any fee.
(3) If counsel terminates the agreement because the solicitor, client or Litigation
Friend rejects advice under paragraph 10(8)( f ) counsel is entitled only to
‘Option B’.
(4) Termination by the solicitor If the solicitor terminates the agreement under
paragraph 12, counsel is entitled to elect between ‘Option A’ and ‘Option B’.
(5) Automatic Termination and counsel taking silk
(a) If the agreement terminates under paragraph 13(1) (judicial
appointment) or 13(2) (retirement) or 15 (counsel taking silk) counsel is
entitled only to ‘Option B’.
(b) If the agreement terminates under paragraph 13(3) (termination of the
solicitor/client agreement) then counsel is entitled to elect between
‘Option A’ and ‘Option B’ save that:
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(i) if the solicitor has ended the solicitor/client agreement because he
considers that the client is likely to lose and at the time of that
termination counsel considers that the client is likely to win, and
the client goes on to win, the solicitor will pay counsel’s normal
and success fees;
(ii) if the solicitor has ended the solicitor/client agreement because the
client has rejected the advice of the solicitor or counsel about
making a settlement the solicitor will pay counsel’s normal fee in
any event and, if the client goes on to win the case, will also pay
counsel’s success fee.
(c) If the agreement terminates under paragraph 13(4) (Legal
Services Commission) or paragraph 13(5) (death of client) or para-
graph 13 (6) (group litigation order) counsel is entitled only to ‘Option
B’.
24. If the client or any Litigation Friend wishes to challenge:
(a) the entitlement to fees of counsel or the level of such fees following termination
of the agreement or
(b) any refusal by counsel after signing this agreement to accept instructions the
solicitor must make such challenge in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Terms of Work upon which barristers offer their
services to solicitors (Annexe D to the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England
and Wales).
Return of Work
25. If counsel in accordance with the Bar’s Code of Conduct is obliged to return any
brief or instructions in this case to another barrister, then:
(1) Counsel will use his/her best endeavours to ensure that an appropriate barrister
agrees to act for the client on the same terms as this agreement; if counsel is
unable to secure an appropriate replacement barrister to act for the client on the
same terms as this agreement counsel will
(a) *be responsible for any additional barristers’ fees reasonably incurred by
the solicitor or client and shall pay the additional fees to the solicitor
promptly upon request and in any event within 3 months of such a
request by the solicitor
(b) *not be responsible for any additional fee incurred by the solicitor or
client.
(2) Subject to paragraph 25(3) hereof, if the case ends in success counsel’s fees for
work done shall be due and paid on the conditional fee basis contained in this
agreement whether or not the replacement barrister acts on a conditional fee
basis; but
(3) if the solicitor or client rejects any advice by the replacement barrister of the type
described in paragraph 10(8) hereof, the solicitor shall immediately notify
counsel whose fees shall be paid as set out in paragraph 23(1) hereof.
[NOTE: delete 25(1)(a) or 25(1)(b)]
Assessment and Payment of Costs / Fees
(1) If:
(a) a costs order is anticipated or made in favour of the client at an
interlocutory hearing and the costs are summarily assessed at the hearing;
or
(b) the costs of an interlocutory hearing are agreed between the parties in
favour of the client; or
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(c) an interlocutory order or agreement for costs to be assessed in detail and
paid forthwith is made in favour of the client:
(c) then
(i) the solicitor will include in the statement of costs a full claim for
counsel’s normal fees; and
(ii) the solicitor will promptly conclude by agreement or assessment
the question of such costs; and
(iii) within one month of receipt of such costs the solicitor will pay to
counsel the amount recovered in respect of his/her fees, such sum
to be set off against counsel’s entitlement to normal fees by virtue
of this agreement.
(1) The amounts of fees and expenses payable to counsel under this agreement
(a) are not limited by reference to the damages which may be recovered on
behalf of the client and
(b) are payable whether or not the solicitor is or will be paid by the client or
opponent.
(2) Upon success the solicitor will promptly conclude by agreement or assessment
the question of costs and within one month after receipt of such costs the
solicitor will pay to counsel the full sum due under this agreement.
28. The solicitor will use his best endeavours to recover interest on costs from any
party ordered to pay costs to the client and shall pay counsel the share of such interest
that has accrued on counsel’s outstanding fees.
(1) The solicitor will inform counsel’s clerk in good time of any challenge made to
his success fee and of the date, place and time of any detailed costs assessment
the client or opponent has taken out pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules and
unless counsel is present or represented at the assessment hearing will place
counsel’s risk assessment, relevant details and any written representations before
the assessing judge and argue counsel’s case for his/her success fee.
(2) If counsel’s fees are reduced on any assessment then:
(a) the solicitor will inform counsel’s clerk within seven days and confer with
counsel whether to apply under Regulation 3(2)(b) of the CFA Regula-
tions 2000 for an order that the client should pay the success fee and
make such application on counsel’s behalf;
(b) subject to any appeal, counsel will accept such fees as are allowed on that
assessment and will repay forthwith to the solicitor any excess previously
paid.
30. Disclosing the reasons for the success fee
(1) If
(a) a success fee becomes payable as a result of the client’s claim and
(b) any fees subject to the increase provided for by paragraph 17 (1) hereof
are assessed and
(c) Counsel, the solicitor or the client is required by the court to disclose to
the court or any other person the reasons for setting such increase as the
level stated in this agreement,
(c) he / she may do so.
31. Counsel’s fees in the event of assessment or agreement If any fees subject to the
said percentage increase are assessed and any amount of that increase is disallowed on
assessment on the ground that the level at which the increase was set was unreasonable
in view of the facts which were or should have been known to counsel at the time it was
set, such amount ceases to be payable under this agreement unless the court is satisfied
that it should continue to be so payable.
32. If the Opponent offers to pay the client’s legal fees at a lower sum than is due
under this agreement then the solicitor:
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(a) will calculate the proposed pro-rata reductions of the normal and success fees of
both solicitor and counsel, and
(b) inform counsel of the offer and the calculations supporting the proposed
pro-rata reductions referred to in paragraph (a) above, and
(c) will not accept the offer without counsel’s express consent.
If such an agreement is reached on fees, then counsel’s fees shall be limited to the agreed
sum unless the court orders otherwise.
Dated:
Signed by counsel
or by his/her clerk [with counsel’s authority]
*[ Additional interlocutory counsel ]
*[ Additional interlocutory counsel ]
*see paragraph 1
Signed by :
Solicitor/employee in Messrs:
The solicitors firm acting for the client:
By signing and today returning to counsel the last page of this agreement by fax the
solicitor agrees to instruct counsel under the terms of this agreement and undertakes to
furnish counsel within 14 days of today with hard copies of the signed agreement
together with any documents under paragraph 5 of this agreement which are not
already in counsel’s possession.
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APIL/PIBA 6
Conditional Fee Agreement
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
SOLICITORS AND COUNSEL
[1291]–[1300]
This agreement forms the basis on which instructions are accepted by counsel from the
solicitor to act under a conditional fee agreement and incorporates the standard terms
agreed between APIL and PIBA on 31.10.05, which is available on both the APIL and
PIBA websites and is incorporated in, but not annexed to this agreement. *Paragraphs
. . . of the standard terms and conditions have been amended as shown and
underlined on the copy annexed hereto.
This agreement is not a contract enforceable at law. The relationship of counsel and
solicitor shall be governed by the Terms of Work under which barristers offer their
services to solicitors and the Withdrawal of Credit Scheme as authorised by the
General Council of the Bar as from time to time amended and set out in the Code
of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, save that where such terms of work are
inconsistent with the terms of this agreement the latter shall prevail.
Csl’s Ref: . . . . . . . . . . . Sol’s Ref . . . . . . . . . . .
In this agreement “Counsel” means: and any other counsel either
from Chambers or recommended by counsel in accordance with clause 20 who signs
this agreement at any time at the solicitor’s request. “The solicitor” means the firm:
.
“The client” means:
[*acting by his/her Litigation Friend. ]
“Chambers” means members of chambers at
The solicitor provided Counsel with instructions, see copy attached, date stamped
/ / and the documents listed there.
What is covered by this agreement
• The client’s claim for damages for personal injuries against suf-
fered on until the claim is won, lost or otherwise concluded, or
this agreement is terminated,* or part only of proceedings as set out below.
• [If either the name of the opponent or the date of the incident are unclear then
set out here as much detail as possible to give sufficient information for the client
and solicitor to understand the basis of the claim pursued.]
• Part only of proceedings, specifically: ;
• Any appeal by the opponent(s);
• Any appeal the client makes against an interim order advised by Counsel;
• Negotiations about and/or a court assessment of the costs of this claim.
What is not covered by this agreement
• Any Part 20 claim against the client;
• Any appeal the client makes against the final judgment order;
• Any application under any award of provisional damages that might be obtained
in these proceedings or to vary any order for periodical payments that might be
obtained in the proceedings.
[NOTE: delete those parts of the proceedings to which the agreement relates or does
not relate as appropriate]
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The case is likely to be allocated to the *multi-track *fast track and damages are likely
to be in excess of *£500,000* £250,000, disregarding any possible reduction for
contributory negligence.
DELIVERY OF BRIEF FOR TRIAL: The solicitor agrees to deliver the brief for trial of
any issue including the assessment of damages not less than . . . . . . . . . . .
weeks*days before the date fixed for hearing.
COUNSEL’S NORMAL FEES are as follows:
Advisory work and drafting: in accordance with
counsel’s hourly rate obtaining for such work in this field
currently: (hourly rate)
£100.00
Court appearances:- [insert hourly rate]
Brief fees for a trial (allowing 5 hours per day in court)
whose duration and hours of preparation are estimated as
follows:
Time estimate for trial Hours of
Preparation
Estimated Fee
Up to 2 days 6 £1,600.00
3 to 5 days 12 £3,200.00
6 to 8 days 18 £5,050.00
9 to 12 days 24 £7,650.00
13 to 20 days 30 £11,400.00
Brief fees for interlocutory hearings whose duration and hours
of preparation are estimated as follows:
Estimated duration Hours of
preparation
Estimated fee
Up to one hour 2 £300.00
One hour to half a day 3 £450.00
Half a day to one day 4 £650.00
Over one day will be charged as if it were
a trial.
Refreshers, estimated at 5 hours in court at counsel’s hourly
rate currently obtaining for such work in this field: £500.00
Renegotiating Counsel’s fees: to the extent that the hours of preparation set out
above are reasonably exceeded then counsel’s hourly rate will apply to each
additional hour of preparation. If the case is settled or goes short, counsel will
consider the solicitor’s reasonable requests to reduce his/her brief fee set out above.
Counsels Success Fees: Case Concludes:
at
trial:
14 or 21
days before
date fixed for
trial
more than
14 or 21
days before
date fixed
for trial
Applicable
row
marked
with a
tick:
CPR Track % % %
Road Traffic Accident Claims (for accident after 6.10.03)
45.17 Multi Track: 100 75 12.5
Fast Tack: 100 50 12.5
[1291] APIL/PIBA 6
E-302 BCS • Issue 96
0002 [ST: 301] [ED: 100000] [REL: 96] Composed: Fri Sep 21 16:29:04 EDT 2012
XPP 8.4C.1 SC_00MDD nllp BCS
VER: [SC_00MDD-Local:14 Feb 12 09:43][MX-SECNDARY: 16 Aug 12 07:51][TT-: 19 Jan 11 08:07 loc=gbr unit=bcs_binder_01_e_0021] 0
45.18(2); 45.
19 (over
£500,000)
100 75 More than
20 or less
than 7.5
Employers Liability Claims (for injury sustained after 1.10.04)
45.21 Multi Track: 100 75 25
Fast Tack: 100 50 25
45.22 (over £
500, 000)
100 75 More than
40 or less
than 15
Employers Liability Disease Claims (when letter of claim sent after 1.10.05)
45.23 (3)(a)
Asbestos
Multi Track: 100 75 27.5
Fast Tack: 100 50 27.5
45.26 Asbestos
Over £ 250,
000
100 75 More than
40/ less
than 15
45.23(3)(d) RSI
&amp; Stress
Multi Track: 100 100 100
Fast Tack: 100 100 100
45.26 RSI
&amp; Stress
Over £ 250,
000
100 100 Less than
75
45.23(e) Other
disease claim
Multi Track 100 75 62.5
Fast Track 100 62.5 62.5
45.26 Other
disease claim
Over £250,000
100 . . . More than
75 or less
than 50
Other Type of PI Claim
Multi Track: 100 . . . . . .
Fast Track: 100 . . . . . .
The reasons, briefly stated, for counsel’s success fee are that at the time of entry into this
agreement:
• ? the percentage increase is fixed by CPR 45. . . . . . . . . . . [specify];
• ? the percentage increase is fixed by CPR 45 . . . .[specify] but CPR 45.18*,
CPR 45.22*, or CPR 45.26* applies to this claim;
• ? the percentage increase sought is consistent with an industry-wide agreement
for this type of case reached by representatives of both Claimants and
Defendants under the supervision of the Civil Justice Council and there is no
special reason to apply a different uplift in this case;
• ? the percentage increase reflects the prospects of success estimated in coun-
sel’s risk assessment which is* not attached to this agreement
• ? the length of postponement of the payment of counsel’s fees and expenses is
estimated at year(s), and a further increase of
. . . . . . . . . . . % relates to that postponement and cannot be recovered
from the opponent.
The success fee inclusive of any additional % relating to postponement cannot be more
than 100% of counsel’s normal fees in total.
Dated:
Signed by counsel
or by his/her clerk [with counsel’s authority]
[Additional counsel*]
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Date signed
Signed by:
Solicitor/employee in Messrs:
The solicitors firm acting for the client
By signing and today returning to counsel the last page of this agreement the solicitor
agrees to instruct counsel under the terms of this agreement and confirms that
the Conditional Fee Agreement between the solicitor and client complies with ss. 58
and 58A of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as amended.
DISCLAIMER: Counsel is not bound to act on a conditional fee basis until both parties
have signed this agreement.
Counsel’s Risk Assessement
[To help counsel make a Risk Assessment and give a Statement of Reasons for Con-
ditional Fees in Personal Injury Cases]
(1) The Solicitor has agreed with the client a *one-stage uplift, namely
. . . . . . . . . . . % or a two-stage uplift, namely . . . . . . . . . . . %
where the claim concludes at trial; or . . . . . . . . . . . % where the claim
concludes before a trial has commenced. The solicitor has*not included an
element relating to the postponement of payment of basic charges.
(2) The following stages of the proceedings have been completed: *pre-action
protocol, statements of case, disclosure, exchange of evidence as to fact,
exchange of expert evidence, case management conference(s), other (please
specify). . . . . . . . . . . . Attempts to settle the claim have failed; the defen-
dant’s latest offer (if any) was . . . . . . . . . . . ; the client’s latest offer (if any)
was . . . . . . . . . . . (see letter(s) dated . . . . . . . . . . . ).
(3) Counsel estimates the overall prospects of success, taking all risk factors into
account, in the region of . . . . . . . . . . . %. This overall assessment is made
irrespective of the date for delivery of the brief.
(4) Csl’s reasons for setting the % increase at the level(s) stated in the agreement are:
(4) [N.B. The ordinary risks of litigation and facts set out elsewhere in this form are
deemed to be incorporated into this statement of reasons and do not need to be
repeated here.]
(5) Further considerations:
.
(6) Csl’s decision: *Accepted; Rejected &/or advised alternative funding / ADR
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(7) Csl’s note of the next step due to be taken (if instructed on conditional fees) &
any comment: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Screened by . . . . . . . . . . . on . . . . . . . . . . . Signed by screener
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Signed by Csl. . . . . . . . . . . Dated . . . . . . . . . . .
The ready reckoner is included for use only as a familiar aide-memoire when assessing
a one stage uplift from the overall prospects of success:
READY RECKONER
Prospects of “Success” % Increase
100% 0%
95% 5%
90% 11%
80% 25%
75% 33%
70% 43%
67% 50%
60% 67%
55% 82%
50% 100%
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS
POSTED ON THE APIL AND PIBA WEBSITES AND TREATED AS ANNEXED
TO THE CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOLICITOR AND
COUNSEL
For Use After 1 November 2005
Index Part One
Conditions Precedent
1. Papers Provided To Counsel
2. Solicitor’s Compliance With The Regulations
Part Two
Obligations of Counsel
3. To Act Diligently
4. Inappropriate Instructions
Part Three
Obligations of Solicitor
5. Obligations of Solicitor
Part Four
Termination
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6. Termination by Counsel
7. Termination by The Solicitor
8. Automatic Termination
9. Client Becoming under a Disability
10. Counsel Taking Silk
Part Five
Counsel’s Fees and Expenses
11. Counsel’s Normal Fees
12. Counsel’s Success Fee
13. Counsel’s Expenses
Part Six
Counsel’s Entitlement to Fees
(A) If The Agreement is not Terminated
14. Definition of Success
15. Part 36 Offers and Payments
16. Failure
17. Errors and Indemnity for Fees
18 (B) On Termination of the Agreement
19. Challenge to the Success Fee
20. Return of Work
Part Seven
Assessment and Payment of Costs/Fees
21. Costs Assessment
22. Solicitor’s Obligation to Pay
23. Interest
24. Challenge to Success Fee
25. Disclosing the Reasons for the Success Fee
26. Reduction on Assessment
27. Agreement on Fees
Part One
Conditions Precedent
Papers provided to Counsel
1. The solicitor should have provided counsel with the following documents:
(1) a copy of the conditional fee agreement between the solicitor and the client and
the Law Society’s Conditions as they apply to the claim;
(2) written confirmation that “after the event” or other similar insurance is in place,
or a written explanation why it is not;
(3) all relevant papers and risk assessment material, including all advice from
experts and other solicitors or barristers to the client or any Litigation Friend in
respect of the claim, which is currently available to the solicitor; and
(4) any offers of settlement already made by the client or the defendant.
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Solicitor’s Compliance with Statute
2. The solicitor confirms that the conditional fee agreement between the solicitor and
the client complies with sections 58 and 58A of the Courts and legal Services Act 1990
and the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000.
Part Two
Obligations of Counsel
To act diligently
3. Counsel agrees to act diligently on all proper instructions from the solicitor subject
to paragraph 4 hereof.
Inappropriate Instructions
4. Counsel is not bound to accept instructions:
(1) to appear at any hearing where it would be reasonable
(a) to assume that counsel’s fees would not be allowed on assessment or
(b) to instruct a barrister of less experience and seniority,(albeit that counsel
shall use his/her best endeavours to ensure that an appropriate barrister
will act for the client on the same terms as this agreement);
(2) to draft documents or advise if a barrister of similar seniority would not
ordinarily be instructed so to do if not instructed on a conditional fee basis;
(3) outside the scope of this agreement.
Part Three
Obligations of the Solicitor
5. The solicitor agrees:
(1) to comply with all the requirements of the CPR, the practice direction about
costs supplementing parts 43 to 48 of the CPR (PD Costs), the relevant
pre-action protocol, and any court order relating to conditional fee agreements,
and in particular promptly to notify the Court and the opponent of the existence
and any subsequent variation of the CFA with the client and of this agreement
and whether he / she has taken out an insurance policy or made an arrangement
with a membership organisation and of the fact that additional liabilities are
being claimed from the opponent;
(2) promptly to apply for relief from sanction pursuant to CPR part 3.8 if any
default under part 44.3B(1)(c) or (d) occurs and to notify counsel of any such
default;
(3) to act diligently in all dealings with counsel and the prosecution of the claim;
(4) to liaise with or consult counsel about the likely amount of counsel’s fees before
filing any estimate of costs in the proceedings, and to provide a copy of any such
estimate to counsel;
(5) to consult counsel on the need for advice and action following:
(a) the service of statements of case and if possible before the allocation
decision; and
(b) the exchange of factual and expert evidence;
(6) to deliver within a reasonable time papers reasonably requested by counsel for
consideration;
(7) promptly to bring to counsel’s attention:
(a) any priority or equivalent report to insurers;
(b) any Part 36 or other offer to settle;
(c) any Part 36 payment into Court;
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(d) any evidence information or communication which may materially affect
the merits of any issue in the case;
(e) any application by any party to have the client’s costs capped;
(f) any costs capping order;
(g) any other factor coming to the solicitor’s attention which may affect
counsel’s entitlement to success fees whether before or after the termina-
tion of this agreement;
(8) promptly to communicate to the client any advice by counsel:
(a) to make, accept or reject any Part 36 or other offer;
(b) to accept or reject any Part 36 payment in;
(c) to incur, or not incur, expenditure in obtaining evidence or preparing the
case;
(d) to instruct Leading counsel or a more senior or specialised barrister;
(e) that the case is likely to be lost;
(f) that damages and costs recoverable on success make it unreasonable or
uneconomic for the action to proceed;
(9) promptly to inform counsel’s clerk of any listing for trial;
(10) to deliver the brief to counsel in accordance with the agreement between the
solicitor and counsel;
(11) to inform Counsel promptly if the case concludes 14 days before the date fixed
for trial if the claim is allocated to the fast-track or 21 days if allocated to the
multi-track;
(12) if any summary assessment of costs takes place in the absence of counsel, to
submit to the court a copy of counsel’s risk assessment and make representations
on counsel’s behalf in relation to his/her fees;
(13) to inform counsel in writing within 2 days of any reduction of counsel’s fees on
summary assessment in the absence of counsel and of any directions given under
PDCosts 20.3(1) or alternatively to make application for such directions on
counsel’s behalf;
(14) where points of dispute are served pursuant to CPR part 47.9 seeking a
reduction in any percentage increase charged by counsel on his fees, to give the
client the written explanation required by PDCosts 20.5 on counsel’s behalf;
(15) where more than one defendant is sued, the solicitor will write to the “after the
event” insurers clarifying whether and when defendants’ costs are to be covered
if the claimant does not succeed or win against all of the defendants, and send
that correspondence to counsel; and
(16) when drawing up a costs bill at any stage of the case to include in it a claim for
interest on counsel’s fees.
Part Four
Termination
Termination by Counsel
6. Counsel may terminate the agreement if:
(1) Counsel discovers the existence of any document which should have been
disclosed to him under clause 1 above and which materially affects Coun-
sel’s view of the likelihood of success and/or the amount of financial recovery in
the event of success;
(2) Counsel discovers that the solicitor is in breach of any obligation in paragraph 5
hereof;
(3) the solicitor, client or any Litigation Friend rejects counsel’s advice in any respect
set out in paragraph 5(8) hereof;
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(4) Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of any set-off or counter-claim
which materially affects the likelihood of success and/or the amount of financial
recovery in the event of success;
(5) Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of information which has been
falsified or should have been but has not been provided by the solicitor, client or
any Litigation Friend, of which counsel was not aware and which counsel could
not reasonably have anticipated, which materially affects the merits of any
substantial issue in the case;
(6) Counsel is required to cease to act by the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England
and Wales or counsel’s professional conduct is being impugned; provided that
counsel may not terminate the agreement if so to do would be a breach of
that Code, and notice of any termination must be communicated promptly in
writing to the solicitor;
(7) A costs capping order is made which counsel reasonably believes may adversely
affect the recoverability of his or her normal fees and/or his or her percentage
increase.
(8) If the opponent receives Community Legal Service funding.
Termination by the Solicitor
7. The solicitor may terminate the agreement at any time on the instructions of the
client or any Litigation Friend.
Automatic Termination
8. This agreement shall automatically terminate if:
(1) Counsel accepts a full-time judicial appointment;
(2) Counsel retires from practice;
(3) the solicitor’s agreement with the client is terminated before the conclusion of
the case;
(4) Legal Services Commission funding is granted to the client;
(5) the client dies;
(6) the court makes a Group Litigation Order covering this claim.
Client becoming under a Disability
9. If the client at any time becomes under a disability then the solicitor will:
(1) consent to a novation of his Conditional Fee Agreement with the client to the
Litigation Friend and
(2) where appropriate, apply to the Court to obtain its consent to acting under a
conditional fee agreement with the Litigation Friend.
Thereafter, the Litigation Friend shall, for the purposes of this agreement, be treated as
if he/she was and has always been the client.
Counsel taking Silk
10. If counsel becomes Queen’s Counsel during the course of the agreement then
either party may terminate it provided he/she does so promptly in writing.
Part Five
Counsel’s Fees and Expenses
Counsel’s Normal Fees
11.
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(1) Counsel’s fees upon which a success fee will be calculated (the normal fees) will
be calculated on the basis of the figures contained in the agreement between the
Solicitor and Counsel.
(2) To the extent that the hours of preparation set out in that agreement are
reasonably exceeded then counsel’s hourly rate will apply to each additional
hour of preparation.
(3) If the case is settled or goes short counsel will consider the solicitor’s reasonable
requests to reduce his/her brief fees as set out in the agreement.
(4) Counsel’s normal fees will be subject to review with effect from each successive
*anniversary of / * first day of February from the date of this agreement
but Counsel will not increase the normal fees by more than any increase in the
rate of inflation measured by the Retail Prices Index.
Counsel’s Success Fee
12. The rate of counsel’s success fee and reasons will be as set out in the agreement
between the Solicitor and Counsel.
Counsel’s Expenses
13. If a hearing, conference or view takes place more than 25 miles from coun-
sel’s chambers the solicitor shall pay counsel’s reasonable travel and accommodation
expenses which shall:
(1) appear separately on counsel’s fee note;
(2) attract no success fee and
(3) subject to paragraph 16 be payable on the conclusion of the claim or earlier
termination of this agreement.
Part Six
Ounsel’s Entitlement to Fees
(A) If the Agreement is not Terminated
Definition of “success”
14.
(1) “Success” means the same as “win” in the Conditional Fee Agreement between
the solicitor and the client.
(2) Subject to paragraphs 15, 18 & 21 hereof, in the event of success the solicitor
will pay counsel his/her normal and success fees.
(3) If the client is successful at an interim hearing counsel may apply for summary
assessment of solicitor’s basics costs and counsel’s normal fees.
Part 36 Offers and Payments
15. If the amount of damages and interest awarded by a court is less than a Part 36
payment into Court or effective Part 36 offer then:
(1) if counsel advised its rejection he/she is entitled to normal and success fees for
work up to receipt of the notice of Part 36 payment into Court or offer but only
normal fees for subsequent work;
(2) if counsel advised its acceptance he/she is entitled to normal and success fees for
all work done.
Failure
16. Subject to paragraph 17 (1) hereof, if the case is lost or on counsel’s advice ends
without success then counsel is not entitled to any fees or expenses.
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Errors and Indemnity for Fees
17.
(1) If, because of a breach by the solicitor of his/her duty to the client, the
client’s claim is dismissed or struck out:
(a) for non compliance with an interlocutory order; or
(b) for want of prosecution, or
(c) by rule of court or the Civil Procedure Rules; or
(a) becomes unenforceable against the MIB for breach of the terms of the Uninsured
Drivers Agreement:
(1) the solicitor shall (subject to sub paragraphs (3)-(6) hereof) pay counsel such
normal fees as would have been recoverable under this agreement.
(2) If, because of a breach by counsel of his/her duty to the client, the client’s claim
is dismissed or struck out:
(a) for non compliance with an interlocutory order; or
(b) for want of prosecution, or
(c) by rule of court or the Civil Procedure Rules
(b) counsel shall (subject to sub paragraphs (3)-(6) hereof) pay the solicitor such
basic costs as would have been recoverable from the client under the solici-
tor’s agreement with the client.
(3) If, because of non-compliance by the solicitor of the obligations under sub-
paragraphs (1), (2), (11), (12) or (13) of paragraph 5 above, counsel’s success fee
is not payable by the Opponent or the client then the solicitor shall (subject to
sub-paragraphs (5) to (7) hereof) pay counsel such success fees as would have
been recoverable under this agreement.
(4) No payment shall be made under sub paragraph (1), (2) or (3) hereof in respect
of any non-negligent breach by the solicitor or counsel.
Adjudication on disagreement
(5) In the event of any disagreement as to whether there has been an actionable
breach by either the solicitor or counsel, or as to the amount payable under sub
paragraph (1), (2) or (3) hereof, that disagreement shall be referred to
adjudication by a panel consisting of a Barrister nominated by PIBA and a
solicitor nominated by APIL who shall be requested to resolve the issue on
written representations and on the basis of a procedure laid down by agreement
between PIBA and APIL. The costs of such adjudication shall, unless otherwise
ordered by the panel, be met by the unsuccessful party.
(6) In the event of a panel being appointed pursuant to sub paragraph (5) hereof:
(a) if that panel considers, after initial consideration of the disagreement,
that there is a real risk that they may not be able to reach a unanimous
decision, then the panel shall request APIL (where it is alleged there has
been an actionable breach by the solicitor) or PIBA (where it is alleged
that the has been an actionable breach by counsel) to nominate a third
member of the panel;
(b) that panel shall be entitled if it considers it reasonably necessary, to
appoint a qualified costs draftsman, to be nominated by the President for
the time being of the Law Society, to assist the panel;
(c) the solicitor or counsel alleged to be in breach of duty shall be entitled to
argue that, on the basis of information reasonably available to both
solicitor and barrister, the claim would not have succeeded in any event.
The panel shall resolve such issue on the balance of probabilities, and if
satisfied that the claim would have been lost in any event shall not make
any order for payment of fees or costs.
Cap
(7) the amount payable in respect of any claim under sub paragraph (1) or (2) or (3)
shall be limited to a maximum of £25,000.
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(B) On Termination of the Agreement
Termnation by Counsel
18.
(1) If counsel terminates the agreement under paragraph 6 then, subject to
sub-paragraph 2 hereof, counsel may elect either:
(a) to receive payment of normal fees without a success fee which the
solicitor shall pay not later than three months after termination: (“Op-
tion A”), or
(b) to await the outcome of the case and receive payment of normal and
success fees if it ends in success: (“Option B”).
(2) If counsel terminates the agreement because the solicitor, client or Litigation
Friend rejects advice under paragraph 5(8) (e) or 5(8)(f) counsel is entitled only
to “Option B”.
Termination by the Solicitor
(4) If the solicitor terminates the agreement under paragraph 7, counsel is entitled to
elect between “Option A” and “Option B”.
Automatic Termination and Counsel taking silk
(5) If the agreement terminates under paragraphs 8 or 10 counsel is entitled only to
“Option B”.
Challenge to fees
19. If the client or any Litigation Friend wishes to challenge:
(a) the entitlement to fees of counsel or the level of such fees following termination
of the agreement ;or
(b) any refusal by counsel after signing this agreement to accept instructions the
solicitor must make such challenge in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Terms of Work upon which barristers offer their
services to solicitors (Annexe D to the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England
and Wales).
Return of Work
20. If counsel in accordance with the Bar’s Code of Conduct is obliged to return any
brief or instructions in this case to another barrister, then:
(1) Counsel will use his/her best endeavours to ensure that an appropriate barrister
agrees to act for the client on the same terms as this agreement;
(1) If counsel is unable to secure an appropriate replacement barrister to act for the
client on the same terms as this agreement counsel will not be responsible for any
additional fee incurred by the solicitor or client.
(2) Subject to paragraph 20(3) hereof, if the case ends in success counsel’s fees for
work done shall be due and paid on the conditional fee basis contained in this
agreement whether or not the replacement barrister acts on a conditional fee
basis; but
(3) If the solicitor or client rejects any advice by the replacement barrister of the type
described in paragraph 5(8) hereof, the solicitor shall immediately notify counsel
who shall be entitled to terminate this agreement under paragraph 6(3).
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Part Seven
Assessment and Payment of Costs / Fees
Costs Assessment
21.
(1) If:
(a) a costs order is anticipated or made in favour of the client at an
interlocutory hearing and the costs are summarily assessed at the
hearing; or
(b) the costs of an interlocutory hearing are agreed between the parties in
favour of the client; or
(c) an interlocutory order or agreement for costs to be assessed in detail and
paid forthwith is made in favour of the client:
(c) then
(i) the solicitor will include in the statement of costs a full claim for
counsel’s normal fees; and
(ii) the solicitor will promptly conclude by agreement or assessment
the question of such costs; and
(iii) within one month of receipt of such costs the solicitor will pay to
counsel the amount recovered in respect of his/her fees, such sum
to be set off against counsel’s entitlement to normal fees by virtue
of this agreement.
Solicitor’s Obligation to pay
22.
(1) The amounts of fees and expenses payable to counsel under this agreement
(a) are not limited by reference to the damages which may be recovered on
behalf of the client and
(b) are payable whether or not the solicitor is or will be paid by the client or
opponent.
(2) Upon success the solicitor will promptly conclude by agreement or assessment
the question of costs and will pay Counsel promptly and in any event not later
than one month after receipt of such costs the full sum due under this
agreement.
Interest
23. The solicitor will use his best endeavours to recover interest on costs from any
party ordered to pay costs to the client and shall pay counsel the share of such interest
that has accrued on counsel’s outstanding fees.
Challenge to Success Fee
24.
(1) The solicitor will inform counsel’s clerk in good time of any challenge made to
his success fee and of the date, place and time of any detailed costs assessment
the client or opponent has taken out pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules and
unless counsel is present or represented at the assessment hearing will place
counsel’s risk assessment, relevant details and any written representations
before the assessing judge and argue counsel’s case for his/her success fee.
(2) If counsel’s fees are reduced on any assessment then:
(a) the solicitor will inform counsel’s clerk within seven days and confer
with counsel whether to apply for an order that the client should pay the
success fee and make such application on counsel’s behalf;
(b) subject to any appeal or order, counsel will accept such fees as are
allowed on that assessment and will repay forthwith to the solicitor any
excess previously paid.
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Disclosing the reasons for the success fee
25.
(1) If
(a) a success fee becomes payable as a result of the client’s claim and
(b) any fees subject to the increase provided for by paragraph 12 hereof are
assessed and
(c) Counsel, the solicitor or the client is required by the court to disclose to
the court or any other person the reasons for setting such increase as the
level stated in this agreement,
(c) he / she may do so.
Reduction on Assessment
26. If any fees subject to the said percentage increase are assessed and any amount of
that increase is disallowed on assessment on the ground that the level at which the
increase was set was unreasonable in view of the facts which were or should have been
known to counsel at the time it was set, such amount ceases to be payable under this
agreement unless the court is satisfied that it should continue to be so payable.
Agreement on Fees
27. If the Opponent offers to pay the client’s legal fees or makes an offer of one
amount that includes payment of Counsel’s normal fees at a lower sum than is due
under this agreement then the solicitor:
(a) will calculate the proposed pro-rata reductions of the normal and success fees of
both solicitor and counsel, and
(b) inform counsel of the offer and the calculations supporting the proposed
pro-rata reductions referred to in paragraph (a) above, and
(c) will not accept the offer without counsel’s express consent.
(c) If such an agreement is reached on fees, then counsel’s fees shall be limited to the
agreed sum unless the court orders otherwise.
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SI 2005/2305
CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS (REVOCATION)
REGULATIONS 2005
[1301]–[1309]
1 Citation and commencement
These Regulations may be cited as the Conditional Fee Agreements (Revocation)
Regulations 2005 and shall come into force on 1st November 2005.
2 Revocation
Subject to regulation 3, the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (the “CFA
Regulations”), the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (the
“CCFA Regulations”), the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Regulations 2003, and the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments)
(No 2) Regulations 2003 are revoked.
3 Savings and transitional provisions
(1) The CFA Regulations shall continue to have effect for the purposes of a
conditional fee agreement entered into before 1st November 2005.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply in relation to a collective conditional fee agreement as
if there were substituted for a reference to the CFA Regulations a reference to the
CCFA Regulations.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
(This note is not part of the Regulations)
These Regulations revoke the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (SI
2000/692), the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (SI
2000/2988), the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1240) and the Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous
Amendments) (No 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3344) in respect of conditional fee
agreements and collective conditional fee agreements entered into on or after 1st
November 2005.
Parties may enter into Conditional Fee Agreements and Collective Conditional Fee
Agreements on or after that date based on the primary legislation.
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SI 2005/2306
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (MEMBERSHIP ORGANISATION)
REGULATIONS 2005
[1310]–[1319]
1 Citation, commencement and interpretation
(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Access to Justice (Membership
Organisation) Regulations 2005 and shall come into force on 1st November 2005.
(2) In these Regulations a reference to a section by number alone is a reference to the
section so numbered in the Access to Justice Act 1999.
2 Revocation and transitional
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Access to Justice (Membership Organisation)
Regulations 2000 (the “2000 Regulations”) are revoked.
(2) The 2000 Regulations shall continue to have effect for the purposes of
arrangements entered into before 1st November 2005 as if these Regulations had not
come into force.
3 Bodies of a prescribed description
The bodies which are prescribed for the purpose of section 30 (recovery where body
undertakes to meet costs liabilities) are those bodies which are for the time being
approved by the Secretary of State for that purpose.
4 Requirements for arrangements to meet costs liabilities
(1) Section 30(1) applies to arrangements which satisfy the following conditions.
(2) The arrangements must be in writing.
(3) The arrangements must contain a statement specifying the circumstances in
which the member may be liable to pay costs of the proceedings.
5 Recovery of additional amount for insurance costs
(1) Where an additional amount is included in costs by virtue of section 30(2) (costs
payable to a member of a body or other person party to the proceedings to include an
additional amount in respect of provision made by the body against the risk of having
to meet the member’s or other person’s liabilities to pay other parties’ costs), that
additional amount must not exceed the following sum.
(2) That sum is the likely cost to the member of the body or, as the case may be, the
other person who is a party to the proceedings in which the costs order is made of the
premium of an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability to pay the costs
of other parties to the proceedings.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
(This note is not part of the Regulations)
These Regulations revoke the Access to Justice (Membership Organisation)
Regulations 2000 in respect of arrangements entered into after 1st November 2005,
and make new, simplified client-care provisions for the purposes of arrangements
entered into on or after that date.
Section 30 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applies where a body of a description to
be specified in regulations undertakes (in accordance with arrangements satisfying
conditions to be so specified) to meet liabilities which members of the body or other
persons who are parties to proceedings may incur to pay the costs of other parties.
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Regulation 3 of these Regulations specifies bodies which are for the time being
approved by the Secretary of State for this purpose. Regulation 4 specifies the
conditions which the arrangements must satisfy.
Under section 30(2) of that Act an additional amount may be included in costs payable
to a member of such a body or other person to cover insurance or other provision
made by the body against the risk of having to meet those liabilities of the member or
other person. Under section 30(3) of that Act that additional amount must not exceed
a sum determined in a way specified by regulations. Regulation 5 of these Regulations
specifies that sum as the likely cost to the member or other person of the premium of
an insurance policy against the risk in question.
[1310] Access to Justice (MO) Regulations 2005, reg 5
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[1320]–[1399]
LS New Model CFA for PI Cases from 1 Nov 2005
For use in personal injury and clinical negligence cases only.
This agreement is a binding legal contract between you and your solicitor/s. Before you
sign, please read everything carefully. This agreement must be read in conjunction with
the Law Society document “What you need to know about a CFA”.
Agreement date
[. . . . . . . . . . . ]
I/We, the solicitor/
s
[. . . . . . . . . . . ]
You, the client [. . . . . . . . . . . ]
What is covered by this agreement
• Your claim against [. . . . . . . . . . . ] for damages for personal injury
suffered on [. . . . . . . . . . . ].(if either the name of the opponent or the date
of the incident are unclear then set out here in as much detail as possible to give
sufficient information for the client and solicitor to understand the basis of the
claim being pursued)
• Any appeal by your opponent.
• Any appeal you make against an interim order.
• Any proceedings you take to enforce a judgment, order or agreement.
• Negotiations about and/or a court assessment of the costs of this claim.
What is not covered by this agreement
• Any counterclaim against you.
• Any appeal you make against the final judgment order.
Paying us
If you win your claim, you pay our basic charges, our disbursements and a success fee.
You are entitled to seek recovery from your opponent of part or all of our basic charges,
our disbursements, a success fee and insurance premium as set out in the document
“What you need to know about a CFA.”
It may be that your opponent makes a Part 36 offer or payment which you reject on our
advice, and your claim for damages goes ahead to trial where you recover damages that
are less than that offer or payment. If this happens, we will [not add our success fee to
the basic charges] [not claim any costs] for the work done after we received notice of
the offer or payment.
If you receive interim damages, we may require you to pay our disbursements at that
point and a reasonable amount for our future disbursements.
If you receive provisional damages, we are entitled to payment of our basic charges our
disbursements and success fee at that point.
If you lose you remain liable for the other sides costs.
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The Success Fee
The success fee is set at [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% of basic charges, where the claim
concludes at trial; or [. . . . . . . . . . . ] % where the claim concludes before a trial
has commenced. In addition [. . . . . . . . . . . ]% relates to the postponement of
payment of our fees and expenses and can not be recovered from your opponent. The
Success fee inclusive of any additional percentage relating to postponement cannot be
more than 100% of the basic charges in total.
Other points
The parties acknowledge and agree that this agreement is not a Contentious Business
Agreement within the terms of the Solicitors Act 1974.
Signatures
Signed by the solicitor(s): . . . . . . . . . . .
Signed by the client: . . . . . . . . . . .
[1320] LS New Model CFA for PI Cases from 1 Nov 2005
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